Last month was the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). At the naval parade held to commemorate the event, in front of delegations from 29 countries, PLAN Commander General Wu Shengli declared that Beijing intended to build aircraft carriers, spurring widespread speculation over China's blue-water ambitions.
Last month was the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). At the naval parade held to commemorate the event, in front of delegations from 29 countries, PLAN Commander General Wu Shengli declared that Beijing intended to build aircraft carriers, spurring widespread speculation over China’s blue-water ambitions.
So what should we make of Beijing’s assertiveness and openness about its carrier plans? My advice: ignore it.
Traditional measures of naval power fail to give an accurate picture of China’s maritime ambitions and capabilities. Beijing currently lacks the hardware and skills to keep a carrier at sea, especially under wartime conditions. So even if there is the political will to commit the necessary resources, it will be many years before China joins the exclusive carrier club.
Thus, it is in the murkier arena of unconventional weaponry – the modern-day, real-world equivalent of the sling and stone David used to defeat Goliath – that represent the truest indication of China’s nautical prowess. Indeed, Beijing already boasts a range of non-traditional (or what the Pentagon calls ‘asymmetric’) capabilities that could unsettle Asian maritime stability and pose problems far beyond Chinese shores without it ever building a carrier.
Over the past decade, China has introduced a variety of disruptive technologies designed to make US and Allied naval operations in the Pacific more hazardous. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union possessed an arsenal of powerful, manoeuvrable anti-ship missiles that could skim just metres above the water at supersonic speeds. Today, Chinese engineers and scientists are mastering similar technologies.
Chinese planners have long assumed – correctly and realistically – that the PLA would fight from a position of weakness should it be pitted against the United States, a vastly superior military power. Missiles, however, being relatively cheap and easy to mass produce, offer an excellent chance of evening the odds.
A long-range cruise missile costs as little as $500,000 – a pittance for China – while a single US cruiser is worth around $1 billion. To put it another way, one US aircraft carrier would literally buy 10,000 missiles. Missiles are also tremendously difficult to defend against, as evidenced in the 1982 Falklands War between Argentina and the UK, when a single French-built Exocet missile sank the Royal Navy’s HMS Sheffield.
While the warhead did not detonate upon impact, the speed of the projectile (clocked at over 1100km/h) and the inferno caused by the remaining fuel in the missile’s fuselage were sufficient to doom the Sheffield, which has come to symbolise the vulnerability of modern warships.
Five years later, the US Navy found itself in a comparable situation as it conducted patrols in the Persian Gulf during the Iraq-Iran ‘tanker war’. Two Iraqi anti-ship missiles struck the USS Stark, killing a fifth of its crew in fires that took 18 hours to extinguish.
Chinese analysts are known to have carefully examined the two incidents to draw conclusions about the efficacy anti-ship warfare.
An Asian ‘no-go zone’
Beyond its operational lethality, Beijing also looks to its missile force for its strategic effects. Chinese strategists believe the threat of missile strikes could force US carrier groups to keep their distance, effectively erecting a no-go zone along the Asian littorals.
How large this nautical safe haven might be is anyone’s guess, but US military planners are clearly troubled by recent trends. Successive annual reports published by the Pentagon assert that ‘China is seeking to hold surface ships at risk through a layered capability reaching out to the “second island chain” [which runs from the Kuriles in the north through Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas and the Carolines, and down to Indonesia in the south].’ This implies that the Chinese are seeking the capability to deny US military access to Asian waters by unleashing salvos of accurate missiles that could reach as far as Guam, a major hub for American power projection.
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James Lynch
All the pundits do is talk about what the Peoples Republic armed forces can or may do to allied naval forces opposing China's expansioist policy. Let's turn the subject on its head and ask what are the capibilities of the US and allied naval forces in the western pacific region and what they are capable of doing on a tactical level of operations to any PLAN, PLA, or PLAAF or combination thereof that ventures into combat against the United States and her allies.
James P. Lynch
Historical Consulting & Research Services, LLC.
Matt
Guam is part of the strategic triangle Guam Hawaii, Fiji whomever has control of that controls the Pacific. Now at present the US controls it, by controlling Guam and Hawaii and denying the PLA a base in Fiji. If the PLA goes ahead and establishes a base in Fiji behind Guam. The triangle becomes a dispute area. The US would also find themselves fighting on two flanks. Fiji is Guam but in reverse from the PLA view point I feel. The US doctrine is to contain another power from emerging in the Pacific, the PRC seeks the break that containment. Putting a PLA base behind Guam is a game changer, which can be achieved via soft power. But yes Guam is the key to the PRC opening up the Western Pacific. It is the strategic triangle that prevents and invasion of Australia via the Coral Sea. Once the triangle comes into dispute or the US are forced back to Hawaii that flank is exposed. The string of pearls while considered a defensive line or from the US view containable is actual an offensive line for the PRC to launch its running backs. The art of war is to build up for war without alerting you enemy you are doing it, the PLA could build six carriers now, but would further lead to an arms race and build up in SEA, the PLA seek to avoid that outcome. Also it is expensive to operate a carrier fleet, so the PLA will build them when they are ready, at present they will continue to train for carrier warfare on land based assets and via simulators. Indeed the PLA has built the fleet around carriers that are yet to be built. So while there is concern in relation to the PLA build up it is managed by the PLA in a risk management fashion. They do not want to alarm their quarry. The recent US/Japan war games were deceptive in location, the real objective is in fact Okinawa I believe. Once the reunification occurs between Taiwan and the mainland it is possible during conflict for the PRC to Island hop and seize this strategic asset. While the PLA do not seek to invade the Japanese mainland, they do seek to control the Islands.
Gary
The knight’s armour was discarded when gunpowder and guns came into play.
The large ships and aircraft carriers are also outdated by the new missiles.
We need small very fast composite unmanned surface vessels with remote controlled missiles that can be dropped into areas and triggered when needed.