At that point, cool heads in New Delhi probably will see that India’s rapid move into Afghanistan was based on the wrong but understandable conclusion that Washington meant to defeat its 9/11 attackers. Undone by US-NATO fecklessness, they will also see that what once was a glittering economic and diplomatic opportunity has been transformed into a potentially war-causing question of national honor, willpower and prestige.
If India leaves Afghanistan, there’s no way to avoid having the Taliban, Pakistan and all the Muslim world perceive the common-sense Indian departure as anything but a victory for Islam over Allah’s polytheist enemies. Unavoidably, India’s Afghan withdrawal will be seen as a triumph for Pakistan that restores its strategic depth; as an act that puts a huge dent in New Delhi’s oft-stated ambition to be a regional superpower; as a signal to India’s growing Islamist militant movement and its foreign backers that Hindu power is not invincible; and, by Beijing, as a sign of India’s lack of resolve at a time of rising Indo-Chinese tensions.
It’s nice to think that when this no-win situation becomes clear, New Delhi and its generals will have the thick-skin and toughness to decide the Afghan game is not worth the candle. (And that their counterparts in Islamabad are adult enough to forego public gloating.) For New Delhi, realism dictates that a major military effort in Afghanistan is not sustainable, and that it isn’t worth introducing the massive Indian force needed to try to protect India’s Afghan investment only to fail and perhaps set in motion events that could potentially lead to a nuclear confrontation with Pakistan.
Sadly, few governments in history have ever had the courage to get out of quagmires while the going was good. The US surged in Iraq and Afghanistan and still lost both wars, for example, and Russia is now losing its second war in the North Caucasus. At day’s end, the need of both New Delhi and Islamabad to save face and protect their strategic interests may well lead to the brink of a nuclear disaster over Afghanistan, which, to paraphrase Bismarck, probably isn’t worth the bones of one Indian grenadier.
Michael Scheuer is the author of ‘Imperial Hubris’ and former chief of the CIA’s Bin Laden Issue Station. He writes regularly for Non-intervention.com
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roxtggub
I’m not sure where you are getting your info, but good topic. I needs to spend some time learning more or understanding more. Thanks for wonderful info I was looking for this info for my mission.
John Smith
Here is a different approach India can take to win them all. Since Muslim nations are never at ease with each other when the external threat is absent. India can leave Afghan with NATO at the same time. After a while the quarrel about who is a good Muslim will break out between different branches of Islam, India can return to Afghan as a good mediator. This strategy will avoid the danger of nuclear flash point between India and Pakistan, as well as establish India as a good partner to all Muslim nations.
Fuzair
So the Pakistanis are paranoid, are we? How come there is no mention of Ayni Farkhor Air Base in this article? The only IAF base outside India? And the recent military training exercises carried out by the IA and IAF there?
And I’ve heard reports of a second IAF base being planned outside India as well.
Singh
Read the following link at pakistan defence forums of all places, for an answer on the Ayni airbase. Your information seems to be slightly outdated.
http://www.defence.pk/forums/india-defence/65021-why-indian-air-force-tajikistans-ayni-air-base-idle.html
As for India planning a second airbase outside India, without any concrete proof, you may as well say India is planning a thousand airbases. I sense a hint of paranoia here, what do you think?
Linda
It?s rlelay helpful for me which I have ever seen.Its presented well and nicely written which easy to understand.Thank you very much for the information
Anon
Michael Scheuer: “A good deal of the Indian media portrays India’s activities in Afghanistan as successfully winning Afghan hearts and minds and building a long-term welcome for India. This is unlikely.”
India is interested in preventing Pakistan, its longtime enemy, from gaining too much influence here.
Fortunately for India, that interest actually appeals to nearly three-quarters of the population, which has a somewhat unfavorable or worse view of Pakistan and tend to blame it for their country’s problems.
These Afghans tend to view India’s aid work here as motivated primarily to curb the interests of Pakistan, something they strongly support, further bolstering India’ s reputation as a benevolent neighbor.
India has managed to become one of the most-liked foreign countries in Afghanistan — with almost three-quarters of the population finding India somewhat favorable or better — after committing just $1.2 billion to the country.
Though some of India’s success in winning over Afghans has to do with historical ties between the two countries, when it comes to administering aid, India is often simply better than the U.S. at developing projects that locals find more tangible and effective.
Nine years into the war, the U.S. has now begun shifting toward an Indian aid model, focusing on projects that produce brick-and-mortar results.
India outdoes U.S. aid efforts in Afghanistan
Tom A. Peter GLOBALPOST 9 September 2010
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/afghanistan/100908/india-outdoes-us-aid-efforts-afghanistan