In the past, the Chinese response to exploration activities conducted by the other claimants in the South China Sea has been calibrated. It rhetorically denounced them for infringing on China’s territorial rights, but its actions were more restrained and differeniated. In fact, many claimants have ongoing oil and natural gas exploration and production activities close to their coastal waters in the Spratlys, but China hasn’t dispatched naval vessels to disrupt them so far. (The June 9, 2010 incident in which a Chinese fishing boat damaged the survey cable of a Vietnamese research ship occurred in an area in the Spratlys far from Vietnamese shores.) By comparison, Chinese reaction to similar activities in the Paracels is much tougher. A few years ago, a Chinese patrol boat reportedly snipped the seismic survey cable of a research vessel owned by a Western firm, which had entered an agreement with Vietnam to conduct oil and gas exploration.
Everything else being equal, the probability of another naval clash between China and Vietnam in the waters around the Paracels is much higher.
But Vietnam is no pushover. It may not have much of a navy, but it has repeatedly demonstrated that it isn’t afraid of China. To show Beijing that it is prepared for a fight, Hanoi has ordered six Kilo-class Russian submarines (which will enter service in a few years). Diplomatically, Vietnam has also played its card skilfully. Its ties with the United States have improved dramatically, with the two former foes holding their first joint naval exercise in the South China Sea in August last year.Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.
Whether Washington’s new posture on the South China Sea and improved US-Vietnamese relations have emboldened Hanoi to confront Beijing is anybody’s guess. What matters for Beijing now is how to avoid another possible clash with Vietnam in the Paracels. With Hanoi announcing a live-fire exercise in this area for June 13, the risks of an accidental conflict are real.
Of the two protagonists, China needs to seize the moral high ground first, since international opinion tends to favour the weaker party in such disputes. For a start, China should temporarily suspend its patrol activities in the disputed areas to avoid any possible accidental conflict. Beijing should also offer specific proposals to Hanoi on how to avoid similar confrontations in the future. For instance, imposing a temporary moratorium on exploration activities by both sides in the disputed waters should calm the nerves.
These ad hoc measures must be followed up by more intense diplomatic initiatives that will help forge a multilateral solution to the South China Sea disputes. The Sino-Vietnamese row may have created a crisis, but it also provides a unique opportunity for China and ASEAN to accelerate the negotiation for a stronger code of conduct. Some in China may view signing such a code of conduct as needlessly constraining Beijing’s options. But for a country whose intentions and growing military capabilities have unnerved its neighbours, this may be one of the few realistic gestures to make its declaration of ‘peaceful development, credible.
Minxin Pei is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and adjunct senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace