Needless to say, these are expensive capabilities. Many are disproportionately costly (and vulnerable) relative to the platforms against which they’re being fielded. And in some cases, particularly anti-submarine warfare and ballistic missile defence, their prospective cost greatly exceeds the operational effect they can be expected to produce. All of this would be exacting for the United States in peak economic condition. In a new era of fiscal stringency, with US debt expanding and the Pentagon looking to save hundreds of billions over the next decade, expecting the US military to do more with less is at best unlikely, and at worst wholly untenable.
It also risks failing to learn from history. Strategic competition in the Western Pacific is beginning to echo the Cold War, only this time the United States is at risk of reprising the role of the Soviet Union. Washington has already repeated Moscow’s mistakes in Afghanistan. With AirSea Battle, Washington is trying to do too much with too little. It’s facing off against an opponent in better economic shape whose smarter, more asymmetric strategy will impose a disproportionate military burden. For Washington, adopting such a maximalist doctrine risks playing into China’s hands and, like the Soviet Union, spending itself into penury.
But cost factors are only part of the danger. An arms race is already underway in Asia. AirSea Battle will accelerate this process, with serious implications for regional stability and crisis management. First, by creating the need for a continued visible presence and more intrusive forms of surveillance in the Western Pacific, AirSea Battle will greatly increase the range of circumstances for maritime brinkmanship and dangerous naval incidents.
Second, AirSea Battle’s emphasis on pre-empting China by striking early against the PLA will continue to compress the time available to decision-makers in a crisis. As military plans become increasingly dependent on speed and escalation, and diplomacy fails to keep up, a dangerous ‘use it or lose it’ mentality is likely to take hold in the minds of military commanders. This risks building an automatic escalator to war into each crisis before diplomatic efforts at defusing the situation can get underway.
And finally, AirSea Battle calls for deep strikes on the Chinese mainland to blind and suppress PLA surveillance systems and degrade its long-range strike capabilities. Such an attack, even if it relied solely on conventional systems, could easily be misconstrued in Beijing as an attempt at pre-emptively destroying China’s retaliatory nuclear options. Under intense pressure, it would be hard to limit a dramatic escalation of such a conflict – including, in the worst case, up to and beyond the nuclear threshold.
Taken together, the costs and risks associated with AirSea Battle spell trouble for US primacy in Asia, and for the sea control and power projection capabilities on which it relies. Yet while Washington’s comfortable hegemonic habits will be hard to kick – especially after so many peaceful, prosperous decades – it’s not all doom and gloom. Primacy, after all, is only a means to an end, a way of preventing China from attaining regional dominance. There are other, more cost effective ways of doing that, including by playing China at its own game. That would involve developing a maritime denial strategy, focused mainly on the use of submarines, designed to inhibit China’s use of the sea for its own power projection. Indeed, the same capabilities that imperil US power projection in the Western Pacific would have an equally profound effect on China’s own fledgling efforts.
This strategy is no panacea for the region’s problems, of course. It wouldn’t be cheap or easy and it would involve Washington making some hard capability trade-offs as well as accepting greater limits on its capacity for intervention in the Western Pacific. But there are benefits as well. In particular, maritime denial would allow the US to continue to play a strong role in the region. It would enable Washington to fulfil its defensive commitments to regional allies, prevent Chinese dominance and, at the same time, by reducing its visible military footprint, give Beijing more political breathing room. To that end, a US maritime denial strategy would also help avoid the worst aspects of crisis instability that AirSea Battle would provoke. And all without breaking the bank.
Raoul Heinrichs is Sir Arthur Tange Scholar at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, and Deputy Editor of Pnyx.
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Aaron Bouma
As the situation continues, we should expect that China will deploy more DF-21D anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles. (ASBM)s. This is certainly one way the Chinese are countering the US Navy Carrier groups.
Major Lowen Gil Marquez, Philippine Army
All battle plan has a dangers. if such plans will be process and converted or becomes now an OPERATION ORDER its output will rtesult to the risk and danger, but it will make more favorable to those who has a better plan and implementation order, air sea battle is costly but it go to the process, the US has the most and advance doctrine in the world, so how even dangerous it is as long it will benefit the rest of the world and then go…
Brendan
I feel like in the event of a minor break out of war.china will not be able to stand its ground along the coast due to the fact that china has just really started in building its navy , the us has been building its navy after the spanish american war see the difference
Yamato Kira
The real loser in this quest is neither China nor US, it is the smaller countries that will be use as pawns. But this can also be an opportunity to smaller countries in expanding its military capability :-)
Brigadier Arun Sahgal (Retd)
In any scenario of confrontation, either side has to make the first move. If Chinese have to execute AA/AD strategy the they will have to launch preemptive attacks to deter US forces build up. Similar action would be required by the Americans in their Air – Sea Battle concept. Moot question is who will blink first in the period leading up to deployment of forces.
Given the inherent deterrence potential of the standoff, it will be a difficult decision to cross threshold and launch the first strike. Two aspects are important taking all political factors into account. First, period leading up to the crisis and the way regional and international dynamics play out will provide nature and level of escalation. second and more important will be the function of perception of relative power and political resolve of leadership. shooting war will be a function of deterrence breakdown with huge implications for regional stability. Either side will find it difficult to back down fearing geopolitical los of face fearing international standing.
C. L. Staten
Brigadier: Sir, your points are most salient, which is why it is so important the U.S. administration is seen by the world (and especially China), to be true to their word and not reluctant to engage…should that prove necessary. The world's intelligence analysts hang on to every word that comes from the American White House in order to assess the actual resolve and level of truthfulness of U.S. official statements.
Dave Chan
There is really no point for US and China to enter into any form of military conflict. China is minding her own business in this part of the Pacific. US is coming to China's doorstep to pick a fight. Having been subject to foreign invasion for a century from 1840 to 1945, China will certainly make sure this will not happen again. At all costs. It is deplorable that US and many western countries fail to perceive the resolute of the Chinese people in the backdrop. Another thing about China is that she is very good at asymmetric strategy. People conversant with Chinese history know.
Imran Abubakar
seriously? your comments are all fake just like China
slim
This "There is really no point for US and China to enter into any form of military conflict" is fine. The rest, except the asymetric bit, is way, way off. China is harassing the peace east and south.
nil dagoy
the PHILIPPINES' 7000++ islands is a willing ENORMOUS AIRCRAFT CARRIER that can cover the whole West Phil Seas in that conflict. That is a concept.
Memo
Frank, I would like to ask, rptfecseully, that you participate in serious discussion instead of deliberately trying to ruin the discussion with comments that you fully know are inane and illogical.