We should be clear that this would not require development of a ‘new’ nuclear weapon because it would be based on an existing weapon and a long-standing military requirement. Such an approach would be consistent with the policy of the Obama administration that stockpile modernization will ‘use only nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities.’
Even so, our recommended effort might still evoke comparisons with the Bush administration’s controversial ‘Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator’ study. To allay these concerns, however, the United States should make clear that, should an underground nuclear explosive test be necessary to confirm the reliability of a modified B83, it would look for other options to meet this military requirement.
Our proposal wouldn’t threaten strategic stability with Moscow or Beijing because of both the number and the nature of the weapons. First, the number of converted penetrators would be kept small, consistent with a niche capability against North Korea, which means they couldn’t threaten the redundant and variegated forces of Russia or China. In any event, we doubt Russia or China would be genuinely threatened by such an effort. Russian officials didn’t object to the development of the B61-11, even though that penetrator was clearly intended to defeat Russian targets in frozen tundra. Indeed, it’s also likely that many important Russian facilities are much too hard for even nuclear weapons.
Nor would our proposal make the B83 ‘more usable’ or lower the threshold for nuclear use. Such a penetrator could only be used, as the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review states, in extreme circumstances. Consistent with that reality, the United States should make clear that it would also invest heavily in conventional penetrators and functional defeat approaches that would provide the president with credible, indeed more desirable, non-nuclear options for holding at risk targets in hard rock. Kim will only be more cautious if he knows that the president has a full suite of options, including non-nuclear ones, to get at him wherever he may hide. Until then, however, his realization that he isn’t immune may help him reconsider some of his more reckless behaviour.
Our first priority at this moment is to ensure the security of allies, particularly Japan and South Korea. It is our security umbrella that allows each state to remain non-nuclear even in the face of North Korea’s provocative behaviour, including its testing and development of nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the United States has deemphasized its tactical nuclear weapons, affirming that ‘it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula’ in the 2005 Six Party Agreement and announcing plans to retire the nuclear-armed Tomahawk missile by 2013. In response to North Korea's provocative behaviour, calls have arisen in Japan for an independent nuclear capability and in South Korea for the emplacement of US tactical nuclear weapons. Neither of these would be positive developments, but they reflect genuine and reasonable security concerns. Compared to these outcomes, a new casing for the B83 seems a reasonable response to North Korea’s dangerous behaviour.
Kim Jong-il’s aggressive behaviour demonstrates the continuing importance of deterrence. The best US response is to maintain capabilities that clearly demonstrate to him that the United States has a credible and effective option to hold at risk what he values most, while preserving stability and respecting our international non-proliferation commitments. Such a capability would help encourage Kim to err on the side of caution when contemplating provocations that might escalate, such as the attacks on the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong. A modified B83 is just such a capability.
Jeffrey Lewis is Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Programme at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He also founded and maintains the leading blog on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, ArmsControlWonk.com. Before joining CNS, he was Executive Director of the Nuclear Strategy Initiative at the New American Foundation. Elbridge Colby is a research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, where he focuses on strategic, deterrence, proliferation, and related issues. From 2009 to 2010, he served as policy advisor to the Secretary of Defence’s Representative for the follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
Jonathan Oldfather
It is an absurd use of our nations resources to build weapons that are not needed. To imply that North Korea would blackmail our nation with a nuclear strike on the west coast, when the response would result in a North Korea that does not exist using the weapons we already possess is conceivable but crazy. To say that Kim would not be deterred because he is down in his bunker safe and sound while his country is a radioactive wasteland implies insanity that cannot be deterred by anything. We would be better off buying food with the money spent and giving it to Kim so his people aren’t starving. Money for US agriculture, healthier Koreans, fewer nukes because they will never be used. Leave it to the S. Koreans to deal with this nut job. Leave him in his hideyhole as long as he wants.
Patricia
Kim Jong-il’s aggressive behaviour demonstrates the continuing ineffectiveness of so-called nuclear deterrence.
Anon
As to Dear Leader Kim, and his top military and ideological commanders, I seriously doubt they would be be particularly frightened by the proposed addition to the US nuclear arsenal, since they know their country can be easily obliterated by existing US capabilities, and not necessarily even nuclear, without them being able to hurt the US in any significant way.
On the contrary, what Mr. Lewis proposes would probably be doing Dear Leader a big favor, as it would be a signal of recognition of his might to the extent that the US is being forced to enter into a nuclear arms race with him.
This would act as an incentive for him to keep his toys.
Ideas about combating proliferation with new and better nuclear weapons were en vogue when Mr. Lewis was in his diapers — these ideas are tantamount to attempting to impose unilateral nuclear disarmament on other countries by strengthening one’s own nuclear forces.
A note to Mr. Lewis: It never worked in the past.
James the Australian
Well said…..these peoples are dinosaurs from the prehistoric ages!
nick
anon, you are mistaken when you claim north korea is not “able to hurt the US in any significant way.” they are building missiles that can reach the western US, possibly with nuclear and chemical/biological weapons. north korea will be able to blackmail the US into concessions and aid once they achieve this capability.
whereas once they bullied south korea into aid with mutually assured destruction, now they will be able to bully the US. act now, or forever hold our peace.
sir mixxalot
I think the disease that Mr. Lewis suffers from is one many arms control people have: they actually are fascinated by these bombs and relish in their wonky details, without thinking thru what their pontification on the glorious details of said bombs actually means for security. In other words, they often just want to show off their knowledge of these bombs as it cements them as some kind of expert in the field.
Mark Spencer
Mad man proposal deserves a Mad response.
North Korea is well justify to build more missiles and more nukes, especially those that can travel all the way to the other side of the globe.
Can’t really blame them from arming themselves, can we?
John Chan
The only place on the other side of the globe from North Korea is called British Isles.
James the Australian
What a big yawnnnnnnn…
Can we expect otherwise from a bunch of old war dogs, worried about losing their jobs?
Viva American Spring….make full use of Youtube,Twitter, Facebook, Yahooo…
Spread the message for the coming Spring…..the jobless, homeless, the hungry need to take to the streets and make their point.