Some are urging India to play a more active role in the South China Sea. There’s no need – China has too much to lose by escalating territorial disputes.
The South China Sea issue – and China’s position on it – have been the subject of much deliberation, especially since the ASEAN Regional Forum Meeting in Hanoi last July. Indeed, it’s widely believed that the South China Sea will likely emerge as a conflict hotspot in the coming years.
Evidence of this can be found in the heated rhetoric exchanged between parties to the dispute – most notably, China, Vietnam and the Philippines. A declaration by the United States that it has a ‘national interest’ in the region, meanwhile, was seen as a commitment to take an active part, much to Chinese chagrin. In recent weeks, statements by Chinese officials reasserting China’s ‘indisputable sovereignty’ over the South China Sea, and warnings for India against investing in the region, are seen as signs of Chinese aggressiveness that could precipitate conflict.
Suggestions for greater Indian involvement in the South China Sea disputes are made on the grounds that India must be forceful in its dealings with China. The continuation of ONGC Videsh Limited’s (OVL) investments in Vietnamese energy fields is certainly advisable. In fact, there’s nothing to indicate that the Indian government is thinking otherwise. OVL’s presence in Vietnam isn’t a recent phenomenon. Its first joint venture for offshore oil and natural gas exploration in Vietnam’s Lan Tay field, along with Petro Vietnam and BP, became functional in 2003. Deals for the investments now in the headlines were signed in May 2006; this is a project that won’t be halted because of oblique Chinese statements.
But what’s worrying is the suggestion that Indian involvement should extend to taking an active part in the territorial disputes themselves, and that India should actively extend its naval presence – either to protect OVL’s investments or to protect the sea lines of communication. A closer bilateral relationship with Vietnam, Vietnamese rhetoric on the South China Sea disputes and its history of standing up to big powers are offered as the rationale for India to engage and arm Vietnam to win a war in the South China Sea.
These suggestions to recalibrate Indian policy towards the South China Sea and its relationship with Vietnam are premature at best. Despite the rhetoric, conflict in the South China Sea may well not be inevitable. If the history of dialogue between the parties is any indication, then current tensions are likely to result in forward movement. In the aftermath of statements by the United States, and skirmishes over fishing vessels, ASEAN and China agreed upon the Guidelines on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea at the Bali Summit in July 2010. And recent tensions may well prod the parties towards a more binding code of conduct. This isn’t to suggest that territorial claims and sovereignty issues will be resolved, but certainly they can become more manageable to prevent military conflict.
There’s a common interest in making the disputes more manageable, essentially because, nationalistic rhetoric notwithstanding, the parties to the dispute recognize that there are real material benefits at stake. A disruption of maritime trade through the South China Sea would entail economic losses – and not only for the littoral states. No party to the dispute, including China, has thus far challenged the principle of freedom of navigation for global trade through the South China Sea. The states of the region are signatories to the UNCLOS, which provides that ‘Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities, and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection’ but that ‘All other States have freedom of navigation and over flight in the EEZ, as well as freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines.’ The prospect of threats to SLOCS thus seems somewhat exaggerated.
It will also be pertinent to remember that the states involved deem the dispute as only one element of larger bilateral relationships. The South China Sea is by no means the only calculus through which smaller countries view their relationship with China. Philippine President Benigno Aquino, for example, has stated that the dispute in the South China Sea is but one aspect of the relationship with China.
Vietnam, too, hasn’t let its relationship with China be stymied by the disputes over the South China Sea. The General Secretary of Vietnam’s ruling Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong, visited Beijing this month, with the joint statement issued there stating that the two sides would ‘actively boost co-operation’ in offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation. It was also agreed that negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea would be speeded up, military cooperation between China and Vietnam would be strengthened, a hotline between defence ministers established and contacts between high-level officials would be increased. As of July 2011, China, ranking 14th among Vietnam’s foreign investors, had 805 operational projects in Vietnam with a capitalized value of $4.2 billion. Furthermore, China has been Vietnam’s largest trading partner since 2004. Bilateral trade between the two was valued at $27 billion in 2010. In the event of military hostilities, the first casualty would be the economic relationship, an outcome both countries are keen to avoid.
Despite what opinion pieces in the Global Times may say, there’s reason to suspect that China doesn’t want to escalate conflict in the region. Although commentary from the United States has suggested that China considers the South China Sea a ‘core interest,’ no official Chinese writing can be found to corroborate this. In addition, China’s caution can also be seen as a reflection on Chinese military capabilities, which aren’t seen as strong enough to win a war over the South China Sea. In fact, the China National Defence News, published by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s General Political Department, has likened the use of force by China in the South China Sea to shooting one’s own foot. Not only would the use of force bring ASEAN together on the issue, it could conceivably involve the United States and Japan, derail China’s plans for continued economic growth and undo China’s diplomacy. Chinese declarations on the South China Sea can therefore be seen as attempts to exaggerate claims so as to secure a better negotiating stance.
For India to revise its policy on the South China Sea against such a backdrop would be foolhardy, especially as it’s unclear how willing partner a partner Vietnam would be in an escalation of any conflict with China. Given that escalation isn’t in China’s interests either, it remains unlikely that China will use military force to disrupt OVL’s operations.
All this means that there’s no need for India to take positions on territorial disputes in which it is not involved. Perhaps India could take a page out of the US book on this matter. Despite claiming a ‘national interest’ on the issue, the United States has categorically stated that it won’t take sides on the territorial disputes. A revision of Indian policy on the issue should be based on a clear understanding of what India stands to gain, and how Indian national interest is best strengthened. India’s relationships with Southeast Asian countries aren’t uni-dimensional, and aren’t geared only towards checking the Chinese imprint in the region.
As regards to military support for OVL’s operations, the issue should be reflected upon seriously. It’s one thing to build capabilities in order to deter misadventure, quite another to back investment with military might. This is a matter that will affect Indian ventures globally. Is India prepared – both in terms of military and policy implications – to send military backing for all such ventures? This is a point that’s bigger than India’s relationship with Vietnam or China – it’s a question of Indian values and vision.
Rukmani Gupta is an Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) in New Delhi. This is an edited and abridged version of an article that was originally published by the organization here.
Photo Credit: Vranitzky
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chandrakant
china bigotry thinks vietnam is inferior therefore it cant never be true friends. look at china and russia they dont get along because they look down on each other
Linh My
@NguyenPTrung
What you describe is a reasonably accurate description of the Viet Nam I saw in 1995 on my first post war trip back. Still, even then, it was obvious that things were changing. Looking back, the implementation of “Doi Moi” in 1986 was enormously important and transformational. While NVA Col Bui Tin was very outspoken, he was far from the only one to realize the potential danger that China posed to Viet Nam and the rest of East Asia.
In 2011 Viet Nam is a far different country than it was in 1976. I spent all or part of the years from 1969-1972 fighting to defend the Republic of Viet Nam. We lost. I wish that we had won. What I wish doesn’t matter. What matters is the future of East Asia. China should be encouraged to take it’s rightful place in the world as a Great Power in a peaceful manner that respects China’s East Asian neighbors as equals.
It is true that China suffered greatly from Imperialism. That does not give China the right to subject the rest of East Asia to Chinese Imperialism. The time for Imperial Empires is over.
Kung Pao
@Linh My : “… that respects China’s East Asian neighbors as equals”
It’s like flogging a dead horse !
Leonard R.
@cravola cao
Your analysis is detailed and impressive.
Compared to you, I feel like a peacenik and an optimist.
Linh My
@Cravola Cao
It is nice to hear good sound professional military reasoning. What do they say, amateurs study tactics and professionals study logistics?
My experience in Viet Nam was as a Sailor, mostly down in the Mekong Delta in what is now called Dong Tap. After I returned to America I joined the US Army National Guard and eventually worked for the academy as an instructor for the old M-60A3 tanks. I am also familiar with the early XM-70/M-1 Abrams series of tanks. So I did retire as a Soldier, though all of my Active Duty was as a Sailor.
The thought of having a few thousand tank firing positions built on the Northern Border, shuffling a few hundred tanks in and out of the positions, setting up dummy tanks(they even make cheap inflatable ones), setting up heat sources to mimic a tanks thermo signature and all kinds of other stuff just makes me tingle all over. I’m absolutely sure that the Vietnamese High Command has already spent decades setting this sort of thing up. They were good at that during the war. The Serbs also did a pretty god job of that as well more recently. I just love the idea of tying up, wearing out and expending lots of very valuable Chinese resources on junk targets built for a few hundred $$$.
Another book that I think significant in the present situation is “Gathering Storm” by Winston Churchill. It describes the lead up to WWII and how it could have been bloodlessly prevented. No one listened to him, so Churchill had to lead England through the war that he had tried so hard to prevent. The book is out of copyright and can be downloaded for free. Hopefully, Viet Nam, ASEAN and the rest of the world will remain firm and this discussion will remain academic. I mostly live in Viet Nam these days. My wife and I have retired well. Between the Army, Social Security and investments, we can afford to maintain homes here in Viet Nam and America as well. My wife’s family is here in Viet Nam and Viet Nam has become a very friendly place for Americans, especially for those of us who shared a war.
I really have little to add to your last post. It covered things quite well. Are you familiar with Col Bui Tin? He had some very interesting things to say about China not long after the fall of Sai Gon.
Cravola Cao
@Linh My
I am glad that Vietnam now is sounded like your country, no longer a war. Here, a friend of mine, a retired US Army Colonel, he served in Mekong Delta during 1969 as a young Lieutenant Army Advisor for a South Vietnamese Unit, he too wishes to have a home in Vietnam. And, another was a key advisor for a 3-star South Vietnamese General who died from the helicopter accident in South Vietnam. You may racall that incident, at when South Vietnamese Army carried out a short-lived campaign in Cambodia. When he got back to the US, he suffered a stroke only a week after being promoted to Grenadier General by President Nixon. All have fond memories about Vietnam and their Vietnamese friends. Dear, Linh My, you are the luckiest one that I know.
I am delighted that you remind me about Sir Winston Churchill who started his carreer as a young war-correspondent in North Africa during World War I (My Dad gave me his bio-book when I was only 7 or 8 year old.) … Unfortunately, no one listened to Sir Winston Churchill, and so World War II did happen, and history witnessed the well- recorded “face-off” between Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery of the British Army and Field Marshall Irwin Rommel of the German Army. In my personal opinion, I still favor Field Marshall Rommel, even he lost his entire Africa Corp,… because all the German supplies cargoes sunk by the Allies before (if any) a few lucky reaching to him. Back to France, he later guessed correctly that the allies would attack Normandy not Pas De Calais as firmly believed by his superior, Field Marshall Von Rundstedt. The allies proved they were masters of Sun-Tzu by telling the Germans where they would attack, only the Germans did not believe until too late! It was a version of Sun-Tzu like a poker game.
You are right! Logistics played a key role. Another German Field Marshall surrenderd at Stalingrad, mostly because he did not get 600 tons/a day of ammunition among so many other grave mistakes. The Japanese too lost all its outer defense rings, a chain of islands, because no re-inforcements could reach them. All of these lead to the defeats of either advancing army or entrenchement army. The Chinese too, during 1979 Sino-Vietnam war, faced the same problem, they quickly run out of steam only after 17 days … No matter how “experienced” Chinese Generals (many were Korean War Veterans), they had to retreat immediately to avoid being bottled up and chopped off by Vietnamese militia and artillery bombardement. We have to give the Chinese credit for their timely decision. Because it could be a lot worse. Retreating operation is very tough and it requires a very professional staff to execute the retreat successfully. For example, very few did well like German General Kurt Student who re-organized the retreating Germans and defeated the allies’s Operation Market Garden. On the contrary, South Vienamese Army was at worst when it did the so-called “tactical retreat”. It did so poorly and that lead to the collapse of the entire army (1 million strong army plus 1 million Police + 1 million South Vietnamese civillian self-defense force) in a matter of weeks.
And, yes, for those lives had gone through wars, we all hope a shooting war will never happen. If one said, “war is an extension of the policy.” If it is true, then it seems like China’s policy now is pushing to make war happen. Or, if you think, the Chinese see the danger and they try to avoid? That is why they are the most vocal, the loudest, the most aggressive … because they are in fear now? And whom they fear? Remember, a barking dog rarely bites! But again.. its nature is unpreditable like a dying scorpion still stings! Rather waiting to get the surprise “sting” ASEAN now has to act to establish a central command center (similar the Pentagon) like “ASEAN-COM” built and headquatered in Indonesia ASAP (This way helps to “Save more money, build force fast”). Other local headquaters will need to work on “speacialized tasks” in case of war. For instance, Laos should concentrate on building “Speacial Force”, Thailand upgrades its airforce (its airport suitable strategic bombers), Vietnam works on “access denial” weapons (long range land-based missiles) and develop a swarm of “Piranha” naval force (high-speed missiles boats, submarines) against Chinese “Sharks” (frigates, air-craft carriers, etc.), Cambodia is a hub of longistics, land transport fleet, army engineers corps; other maritime countries get more advanced warships and more submarines. Philippines’ marines presumply the best (because of routine excercise and trained by US Special Forces.) More importantly, ASEAN will need more streamline weapons (could be produced by ASEAN in the future)… If some action taken (at least on the blue print) then China will no longer call Philippines as a “mosquito” anymore. China forgot ASEAN is more populous than the US… Calling a country in such a language shows that China lacks vision, and this short-sighted can lead to war, if not “tricked” into war.
Right?
So, you read about Col. Bui Tin? I don’t. What are interestings about his accounts? Can you explain China’s behavior as it is now? Why it suddendly departs from the wisdom of Deng Xiao Ping (a man named by Chairman Mao as “the steel needle hidden in a cotton pulp”)? China lost patience becase it took the American bait when attacking the South Vietnamese controlled Paracel islands in 1974? So, that attack happend to cause Vietnam and China will never again be as close as “lips and teeths” anymore? If so, it was very clever to sow distrust among the communists and win back Vietnam later. If it is true then US is the ultimate winner of the Vietnam war in 2011 (or 2010). And so, thousands of Americans did not die in vain despite the fact that North Vietnam won the war to unite the country in 1975. Would it be compared to Irag’s Saddam Hussein’s sudden attack against Kuwait (a apart of Basan Province when occuppied by the British around 1930 or so (if I am not mistaken!) Saddam Husein’s attack trigged the 1st Gulf War. Could it be Prime Minister Pham Van Dong’s trick as regard to the Paracel islands to lay a foundation for a new war? (It can’t be!) Anyway, either way, it looks like US is winning big by adopting “smart power” against Chinese “hard power” now. If so, it is a brilliant US strategy to roll back Chinese influence everywhere to its corner. Cheers.
Linh My
@Cravola Cao
Your well thought out response don’t leave much for me to add. China does have intelligent leaders and Generals. Still things can get out of control. Every time the German tried to put a leash on Hitler, the Allies gave him everything that he wanted. Eventually the German General Staff surrendered to the inevitable and WWII in Europe started. Though there were some similarities in Japan prior to WWII, I think that the pre WWII Japanese political situation may more useful in looking at China than pre WWII Germany. Mao is dead. Unfortunately, the workings of the Chinese Government are not very transparent. All we can do is guess. Guessing wrong can cause the very thing that we don’t want, War with China.
Opaque governance is something that today’s China does share with both pre WWII Germany and Japan.
So I’ll mostly comment on Bui Tin.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bui_Tin gives a pretty good biography
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bui_Tin
and
http://www.amazon.com/dp/155750881X
are a couple of his books
Mostly, I’m familiar with quotes from his books. Next time that I’m back in America, I’ll likely order one unless one of them is released on kindle first.
Cravola Cao
@Linh My
Being an “American warrior” living in Vietnam now, I bet you know your Vietnamese friends more than I do. Vietnam has a military tradition, so I think they respect “warriors” like you. Thank you for the “links”, I will search for those books.
Vietnam is a beautiful country.
Enjoy the peace, the sun, the beach and good Vietnamese cuisine.
Ur Septim
Why not claim the whole Philippines, eh China? It is laughable to read the argument of most of the people here defending China’s claim over Spratlys.
Havoc
@Ur Septim
Well, Spanish and American claimed it first.
RP Defender
why is the Philippines open why are we still in the 19th century what’s wrong with uou people?
NguyenPTrung
Red China should always treat Vietnam as its best friend. Don’t forget Vietnam used to fight and die to protect China from capitalism spreading in the 60′s and 70′s. Also remember both countries have a lot in common, specially the soviet style government led by communist parties.
Cravola Cao
@Linh My
I read your other comment regarding the overall situation in Asia, I found that your analysis is both interesting and logical. As a soldier yourself, you already knew how difficult to fight a jungle warefare. And if war happened at sea too, you would also know it is even tough to blockade all of ASEAN’s sea and river ports. A land war in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (or Indochina) as it is now even more difficult in terms of achieving absolute supremacy to suppress an experieced “militia” (even if at a ratio 15/1 not be enough) backed by a more professional regular forces with more advanced equipment plus a more mobility armor forces to reach every corner of Vietnam’s jungles in a relatively shorter time as compared to the last “Vietnam War”. For instance, during the Vietnam war, US and its allies used massive air bombardement to destroy the North Vietnamese logistics along the Ho Chi Minh trail (most concentrated at those choke points) … For all of efforts, at best US and allies were just to slow down but never to stop the flow of NVA and war materials reaching to the Viet Cong in the South. However, US and its allies had one advantage. US and South Vietnamese army field commanders could have calculated the time required the North Vietnamese units (who survived constant B.52 strikes, tactital air strikes, artillery shells and commandos raids, … poisonous snakes, etc.) to reach to the South Vietnam’s Central highland or further south to Mekong Delta. This “interval time” allowed all field commanders a “breathing space” to plan, adjust, prepare and plan many “killing zones” and co-ordinations among various tactically superior ground and air forces dealing with North Vietnamese attacks in a timely manner. Now, Ho Chi Minh trail is a highway and Vietnam’s overall infrastructure much improved, it means Vietnamese forces now could reach to any battle field quicker and could attack its enemies from all directions (of their choosing) without allowing its enemies any sufficient time to plan for an active defense or counter attacks, etc.(it is already difficult to deal with an elusive enemy, especially when the enemy can mount many “surprise” attacks in a relatively short time at multiple locations). This “new” enhanced mobility of Vietnamese force today coupled with the treacherous mountain ranges and weather condition in North Vietnam will help the Vietnamese bring “hell” to any military convoys or any fixed military bases at any time without much warning, etc. They can re-group attacking forces and bring in re-enforcements faster. Not even to mention that the Vietnamese “militia” who could field anti-aircraft weapons, mines, booby traps, etc., They are not a secondary force! A border war with China in 1979-1984 unfolded the quality and effectiveness of “militia” (whom Chinese commanders disregared them and so paid a high price). Vietnamese militia can execute an “easy” task, all they do is to dig up tons of unexpolded bombs (left behind) to improvise them into deadly anti-tanks or anti-personel on the Chinese attacking units … Imagine! A sole US 500-pound bomb could blow up any Chinese tanks easily. All they need is to blow up only 10 Chinese tanks or trucks a day. Just do the math. How many tanks Chinese need to replace in one year? . It is therefore more expensive, if (let’s say) Chinese turn to adopt air tranport to move around to avoid such casualties … If they do, they will only lower their fighting effectiveness and they are too subjected to become an easy target for shoulder-missiles and anti-aircraft guns. At this tempo, this land war is more expensive and more difficult to operate. Is’nt it a nightmare to any army commander? How the Chinese can stop the Vietnamese counter attacks or even reduce their own war mounting casualties? Can they stop all Vietnamese supply lines originating from Thailand or Cambodia’s ports or from a web of Mekong Delta’s water ways or from the East Sea to slow the war down a bit? Only if the Chinese, “IF” they can control 100% air, sea, land, rivers … from Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia to the whole Pacific ocean. Even if so, the war will still go on, because the Chinese simply can not attack Thailand (a US treaty ally) only they want to bring US and half of the world’s fire power to break China into pieces really fast in Indochina and pursuit them into China. And yet, this is only the best theater that the Chinese can hope dealing with its war on the paper, the real shooting war can be a lot worse and un-predictable. What if the ASEAN is to become a serious fighting force like NATO with sophisticated interoperation with one command structure? If so, many Vietnamese fighter squadrons and/or war ships, submerines could base in the Philippines (or vise versa for Philippines and allies’ ground forces to base and fight in Indochina)to discrupt or threat all Chinese naval movements at sea. That happened will spell the end of Chinese shipping lanes. Not just along Philippines’s West Sea, but also the East Sea will be under the attacking ranges of Vietnamese SU-30s or ASEAN’s F-16s or others. Those ASEAN capable fighters equipped with anti-ship missiles do not even need to engage a direct fight with any Chinese fighters who attempt to provide cover or rescue or to chase/intercept the Vietnamese or Philippinos airforce. They will let other Vietnamese fighters, even the lowly Mig-21s (or any of ASEAN’s more advanced fighters) with a simple mission is to adopt an ambush tactics to shoot down Chinese near out-of-fuel fighters. At a distance of 1,500 km, Chinese figters will run out of missiles and/or gasoline in a dog-fight real fast. If lucky, if any, Chinese survival fighters will have to fight all the way back to its bases in Hainan island. A distance of 1,500 km far away from its bases will scare Chinese fighters to a complete nervous shutdown after dodging countless of air intercepts by ASEAN air force, air defense from land bases and from war ships… To survive this kind of war, it is clear that the Chinese have to quit the South China Sea’s lanes, and they will depend on their Burma’s oil pipes to pump gasoline back to China to feed their economy and their war machine (It is too costly to use South China Sea or further the Philippines’ East Sea, because all that vast ocean area controlled by the ASEAN, Japan, Australia, and US forces who possess a whole arrays of nuclear attack submarines, advanced missiles boats, air defense units, advanced fighters, etc. from Japan to India) Also, the war situation on land is not much better for China either, because China can not count on Burma for its oil supply anymore. Today Burma seems to move toward democracy or taking a more independent stance. More importantly, Burma (now Myanmar) is a member of ASEAN. It will likely join the ASEAN or simply take a neutral stand. Either way will prevent Burma to feed China’s oil thristy. As it is now, India is another suitable power at its best to push China’s influence out of Burma, this is done faster with little helps from Japan and US. China will therfore lose that logistic life-line from South Asia. At North East Asia, China also can not be too certain about its “unpreditable” North Korean ally either. If a war broken out between the North and South Korea, US and Japan will intervene for sure … And so, China will have to deal with millions of North Korean refugees at the very first phase of the another war. This new front is closer to Beijing, only 800 km from the Yellow Sea, Beijing is within the range of US bombers. Right from the begining, US and its allies are clearly the winners provided by two real “possibilities”. 1) North Korea will break loose from China (when its main “feeder” is no longer to feed it). 2) North Korea will collapse under social(facing internal revolts), economic and military pressure (similar Lybia’s end result) and it will take Manchuria down with it too. So, Mr. Linh My, you are right on the target! Even if SUN TZU came back to life, he could not help even a “super-power” who has all 14 “hostile or un-friendly states” along its border, a very fragile internal social/economical condition among many ethnics with billion mouths to feed, international isolation, etc. As a result, China is to become weaker due to its costly air, land and sea wars with no ending, China will succumb when facing-off all of its enemies who are to become stronger day by day. So, a single shot from the South China Sea or even a “sound of cannon” reaching Philippines is the first signal of to spell the end of China.
a_canadian_observer
@Linh My and Cravola Cao: My hat off to your analysis.
PapaJohn
@ Cravola Cao,
This is very good pieces of analysis.
Observer
@ Cao – excellent write up. Keep up the good work.
Frank
You forget to mention the nuclear force.
a_canadian_observer
@Frank: Keep going… tell us the rest what you meant…
Huang
@Cravola Cao,
Great efforts was made on your part here in descriding multiple scenarios or “paper war games”. Most of the observations written were either published news accounts and opinion pieces stiched together and became your long story and ended with your wishful thinkings.
A short response to your nothing new story/stories.
P.S. a short story with substance is less time consuming and fun to read.
a_canadian_observer
@Huang: As usual, anything that doesn’t seem to praise china gets offended and talked down by you and the likes of you. Remember what I said about your nice words befor?
Huang
@ a-canadian-observer,
To your post, I would only say-likewisw…likewise!