AirSea Battle shouldn’t only be about the United States. Working closely with Taiwan could pay dividends and help ensure a stable military balance in the Asia-Pacific.
U.S. Representative Randy Forbes’s (R-Va) article in The Diplomat last month entitled “America’s Pacific Air-Sea Battle Vision” called upon Congress to support the Pentagon’s vision for Air-Sea Battle – a concept designed to improve the joint and combined ability of air and naval forces to project power in the face of anti-access and area denial challenges. More specifically, Rep. Forbes pointed out that the United States should “work to bring our allies into this effort.” Indeed, in order for the United States to effectively project power in an anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) environment, networked alliances and ad hoc coalition partnerships would be essential in making U.S. power projection in the Asia-Pacific more resilient and responsive to both the internal and external dynamics of the emerging regional security challenges.
To be sure, the United States faces a number of challenges in meeting its security commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. Beyond uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change, challenges include growing resource constraints and an increasingly assertive and capable China. At least one driver for rethinking U.S. defense strategy is the growing ability of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to complicate U.S. ability to project joint power and operate in the Asia-Pacific region. These emerging PLA A2/AD capabilities not only could complicate U.S. ability to operate, but also imperil regional powers’ ability to deny the PLA air superiority and command of the seas. Anti-access threats, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area, include long-range precision strike systems that could be employed against bases and moving targets at sea, such as aircraft carrier battle groups. Area denial involves shorter-range actions and capabilities designed to complicate an opposing force’s freedom of action in all domains (i.e., land, air, space, sea and cyber).
The Pentagon’s Air-Sea Battle and the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) transcends pure operational and roles of services issues to include cooperation with allies and ad hoc coalition partners in the region, which is critical for ensuring the success of Air Sea Battle and assured operational access. As former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen said, Air-Sea Battle is “a prime example of how we need to keep breaking down stovepipes between services, between federal agencies and even between nations.” He further noted that the Services should “integrate our efforts with each other and with our civilian counterparts” and “work seamlessly with old allies and new friends.” Air Sea Battle and the broader JOAC shore up deterrence and demonstrate to U.S. allies and partners that Washington is committed and able to resist Chinese military coercion.
Addressing these challenges requires greater collaboration not only within the U.S. defense establishment, but effective leveraging of talents of allies and ad hoc coalition partners in the region. The U.S. reportedly has begun examining how to diversify defense relations with traditional allies in the region, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Yet, little consideration appears to have been given to the significant role that Taiwan could play in an evolving U.S. defense strategy, including the JOAC and Air-Sea Battle. Taiwan’s future and U.S. interests in regional security are intimately related. Indeed, Taiwan is a core interest of the United States and has a pivotal role to play as an ad hoc coalition partner in Air-Sea Battle, JOAC, and the strategic rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific.
First, Taiwan should be the central guiding focus of defense planning in the Asia-Pacific region. In assessing JOAC and Air-Sea Battle-related requirements, the greatest emphasis should be placed on contingency planning for a PLA amphibious invasion of Taiwan with minimal warning. Based on a premature and faulty assumption that cross-Strait trade and investment will inevitably lead toward Taiwan’s democratic submission to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authoritarian rule, prominent analysts have asserted that the focus of U.S. defense planning should shift toward the South China Sea and defense of the global commons.
While freedom of navigation is important, shifting our focus entirely over to uninhabited specks of land and access to preferred waterways for shipping therein are not as salient as defending a fellow democracy and critical node in the global economic supply chain. To be sure, Taiwan’s precarious situation shouldn’t be viewed in isolation from the South China Sea. Beyond the relative saliency of Taiwan, U.S. law under the Taiwan Relations Act stipulates that it is in the U.S. interest “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” The myth that Taiwan is inevitably moving into Beijing’s orbit certainly serves CCP interests. This ostensibly self-fulfilling prophesy bears watching. Due to the inherent complications associated with an amphibious invasion, Taiwan is and will remain defendable.
China’s main strategic direction remains unchanged, however. It is Taiwan that the CCP obsesses over. Disputes with neighbors around the South China Sea can be modulated at will. On the other hand, Taiwan and its democracy present an existential threat to the CCP, and the PLA has done nothing to reduce its military posture opposite the island. In fact, its missile infrastructure has grown as new units have been put into place and more advanced ballistic missiles introduced. If strategic planners must choose between freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and defense of Taiwan as the basis of U.S. force planning, one would hope that President Obama doesn’t abandon Taiwan.
Taiwan as JOAC Partner
What are Taiwan’s potential contributions? For starters, Taiwan is the principle security partner in the region that is willing and able to develop the kind of force needed for networked, integrated deep interdiction operations in an A2/AD environment. Taiwan’s knowledge of single points of failure in the PLA’s air and missile defense system could someday save many lives. Maintaining Taiwan’s capacity to interdict single points of failure in the PLA’s A2/AD system could relieve the United States of part of its heavy operational burden and reduce risks of escalation. For Taiwan, sufficient self defense requires an ability to interdict and neutralize critical nodes in the PLA Second Artillery and other increasingly integrated operational systems opposite Taiwan.
Taiwan is uniquely positioned to contribute to regional situational awareness of the air, space, sea and cyber domains. Peacetime air surveillance data can be fused with other sources of information to better understand PLA Air Force tactics and doctrine. Long range UHF early warning radar data could fill a gap in regional space surveillance. The Taiwanese Navy has a firm grasp of the unique undersea geography and hydrological environment of the Western Pacific Ocean. In the cyber domain, the U.S. Defense Department may tap the expertise on Taiwan, the earliest and most intense target of Chinese computer network operations. Taiwan’s geographic position and willingness to contribute to a regional common operational picture, including maritime domain awareness, air surveillance, and space surveillance and tracking, could be of significant value for both disaster response and military purposes.
More care must be taken to build in firewalls to ensure potential adversaries are unable to penetrate U.S. networks through those of its allies and partners. Furthermore, releasing space-based systems to Taiwan, including broadband communications and remote sensing satellites, could contribute to broader regional situational awareness architecture not only for military purposes but also for civil disaster preparedness and response. Taiwan’s participation in regional maritime domain awareness architecture may also be worthy of consideration.
And then there’s defense industrial cooperation. The Defense Department could also consider expanding cooperative R&D with Taiwan’s Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST), and/or private industry. Taiwan is a world leader in technology innovation, particularly in applied information and communications technology, which should be leveraged for mutual benefit. Isolation of CSIST, which houses a significant reserve of defense research and engineering talent, can be counterproductive.
The Executive Branch should also honor commitments made under the Bush administration to assist Taiwan in its acquisition of diesel electric submarines. Taiwan’s requirement for diesel electric submarines has been validated for island defense, and could play a critical role in interdicting amphibious ships transiting from mainland China in waters northwest and southwest of Taiwan, counter-blockade operations, and surveillance. Submarines are a credible, survivable deterrent.
In addition,the Defense Department and its Taiwanese counterparts should consider the formation of an innovative capabilities working group that could also incorporate representatives from think tanks and both countries’ defense industries. Possible focus areas might include cruise missile defense, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), multi-domain awareness, and Taiwan’s central role in the U.S. rebalancing toward Asia.
The fact is that no free and open society understands China as well as Taiwan. Unfortunately, few U.S. military officers conduct in-country training in Taiwan, and there are no known students attending Taiwan’s National Defense University (NDU) or other intermediate/senior service schools. More educational exchanges between the two defense establishments are warranted, particularly for junior and non-commissioned officers. Even as the Pentagon has actively pursued deeper and broader military-to-military relations with the PLA, the number of U.S.-Taiwanese conferences held on the PLA has dwindled.
Political Paradox in the Taiwan Strait
A paradox currently characterizes cross-Strait relations. On the one hand, economic interdependence between the two sides reduces the likelihood of conflict. Yet because Taiwan’s democratic system of government – an alternative to mainland China’s authoritarian model – presents an existential challenge to the CCP, China continues to rely on military coercion to compel concessions on sovereignty. The objective reality of the matter is that Taiwan, under its existing Taiwanese constitutional framework, exists as an independent sovereign state. Until the CCP renounces the use of force to resolve political differences in the Taiwan Strait, as well as substantially reduces its military posture against Taiwan, America should deepen and broaden defense relations with Taiwan. Acknowledging Taiwan’s pivotal role in the U.S. rebalancing strategy in the Asia-Pacific region would be a proper starting point.
Taiwan, for its part – with foreign assistance as needed – could implement cost effective solutions to meet the world’s most stressing military challenge, and could be viewed as a transformational test bed for others to emulate. Taiwan’s defense could play a role in fostering innovation and developing new operational concepts. Taiwan faces the most stressing military challenge in the world – if selected operational problems could be solved for Taiwan (e.g., integrated air/missile defense and ASW), they could be resolved everywhere.
At the same time, Taiwan and the U.S. may find mutually beneficial ways to integrate their efforts including in defense-related R&D and low cost, high quality electronic components that could reduce costs for U.S. weapon systems. Taiwan is one of the largest U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customers in the world, and industrial and technological cooperation has been limited to date. Arms sales contribute to the Air-Sea Battle through the promotion of combined interoperability and cost savings to U.S. Air Force and Navy via larger production runs and economies of scale. Also, at least in theory, the more Taiwan does the less that will be required of U.S. armed forces. However, the relative weight granted to arms sales through FMS channels implies a patron-client relationship. Rebalancing U.S.-Taiwan defense relations into a true partnership would likely be more sustainable.
As Taiwan attempts to become more self-reliant in its defense, and as the U.S. considers Air-Sea Battle concepts, development of cutting-edge technology is critical, as is a sound economy from which resources can be drawn for force modernization, manpower, and readiness. One underlying goal of Air-Sea Battle is doing more with less in an era of budgetary constraints. Along these lines, an initiative also could include options for enhancing U.S.-Taiwan defense industrial cooperative in a way that could provide cost effective and advanced defense articles as well as benefiting Taiwan’s industrial base and U.S. requirements. Among other concepts, a preliminary assessment could focus on how to better leverage Taiwan’s innovativeness in cost effective information and communications technology (ICT) design, research and development, and production. Also warranted could be potential cooperative weapon systems development programs, such as small diesel electric submarines and cost effective short take off and landing aircraft.
Among the states in the Asia-Pacific region, Taiwan has the greatest interest in the success of Air-Sea Battle. U.S. defense policy is designed to counter China’s strategy of raising the cost of U.S. power-projection operations in the Western Pacific to prohibitive levels, thereby deterring any American effort to meet its defense obligations to allies and friends in the region, including Taiwan. As one key report by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis assessment notes, Air-Sea Battle must account for geostrategic factors, such as U.S. treaty and legal obligations to defend formal allies and friends in the region. Even more importantly, the report stresses: “AirSea Battle is not a U.S.-only concept. Allies such as Japan and Australia, and possibly others, must play important enabling roles in sustaining a stable military balance.” Among all potential coalition partners, none is potentially as important as Taiwan.
Mark Stokes is the Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute. Russell Hsiao is a senior research fellow at the institute.
Photo Credit: U.S. Navy
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Kiang
You think Taiwan does not resent America?
Alex
I think I know why Formosa/Taiwan is called The Heart of Asia…..
Wint Park
Restrictions in place for South Korea to develop advanced weapons don’t help the cause.
Major Lowen Gil Marquez, Phil Army
The Country of Taiwan served as main base of the Allied United Nation Forces if ever the Chinese Communist will invade the Philippines, Vietnam,Brunei, Cambodia, South Korea,and Malaysia. On strategic perspective the Taiwanese will be a decisive point in wining the war on Chinese communist initiated invasion on Asian Nation and Taiwan will served as Chock point of Allied Forces to stop the Chinese in Hegemony of Ocean that all connecting to WESTERN PHILIPPINE SEA…
flora
Major Lowen Gil Marquez, Phil Army
From your words I can guees that you are just jealous of China!
I look down upon you.
You dont respect people!
How shame
Seacommand
Quoting “A lot of ROC elites in the KMT and the military still desire future unification with the Mainland and they do not support the idea of strengthening military cooperation with the U.S. This ideological problem may be part of the reason why so many officials in Taiwan’s military and security organizations are willing to spy for the PRC.”
This perceives the worng way for the majority Taiwanese elites and military leaders in regards of thinking the security issues of cross-stait unification with mainland. Many factors influence the dynamic process of cross-strait policy making in terms of geostrategic concerns, cross strait military balance and the internal concensus for the future. All have to take into account with a careful calculaton. In balancing the ends, ways and means for what Taiwan’s military can do, status quo will be the favorable one(actually Taiwan is doing) because it’s safer and enduring. But in reality, one cannnot use “status quo” as an executive strategy since this may upset the mainland. To my argument shorter, Taiwan’s coure of action is mainly buying time to foster the possibility for the mainland to be democratic or peace transformation. I don’t know what you see from my argument that US and Taiwan still have rooms to cooperate in areas of diplomatic and military security arrangement. The question is, what US will do to help advancing Taiwan’s defense capability in the expense of annoying PRC, since US’ military commitment is based on national interests.
Chris Lee
Considering interests of Wall Street and big coperations?
Do you think U.S. government can screw up China to cooperate with Taiwan?
The U.S. Government even screw up China to protect American job security for vote.
but screw up China by cooperating with Taiwan?
Good Luck!
TaiwanLink
@ Oro & aaron,
Interesting discussion. If they get past the subject line in this article, “abandon Taiwan” supporters and status quo advocates may sense the smell of flatulence in a crowded church in Foggy Bottom on a hot summer morning. Fear of Beijing incentivizes U.S. policymakers to keep the cross-Strait issue as quiet as possible, regardless of the obvious role that Taiwan could play in Air-Sea Battle. US cross-Strait policy is an issue that deserves ALOT more public debate.
The authors seem to have buried the lead. The central passage is this:
“…because Taiwan’s democratic system of government – an alternative to mainland China’s authoritarian model – presents an existential challenge to the CCP, China continues to rely on military coercion to compel concessions on sovereignty. The objective reality of the matter is that Taiwan, under its existing Taiwanese constitutional framework, exists as an independent sovereign state. Until the CCP renounces the use of force to resolve political differences in the Taiwan Strait, as well as substantially reduces its military posture against Taiwan, America should deepen and broaden defense relations with Taiwan. Acknowledging Taiwan’s pivotal role in the U.S. rebalancing strategy in the Asia-Pacific region would be a proper starting point.”
Reading between the lines and focusing on the “constitutional framework” reference, this seems to be subtle advocacy for normalizing relations with the Republic of China (ROC). There is no “Taiwanese” constitutional framework (at least yet), only ROC. If interpreted correctly, normalizing US relations with Taiwan is a stretch. But the conventional wisdom needs to be rocked. It makes sense to introduce such a concept to a U.S. audience that’s being bombarded with unprincipled views, including those of Henry Kissinger, Zbig Brzezinski, retired profit-oriented four star admiral/generals such as Bill Owens, and so-called “realist” academics such as Charles Glaser among others.
Dual recognition in the Taiwan Strait is unlikely but possible within the context of a “One China” policy since the PRC and ROC constitutions can be interpreted as having overlapping territorial jurisdictional claims. In other words, “One China” is embodied in constitutional overlap. No need for all this “’92 Consensus” or “Taiwan Consensus” stuff. This is one why reason why the “Constitutional One China” concept of the Frank Hsieh faction within the DPP is interesting. As a guiding China policy for the DPP, it could allow for a broader interpretation of the “One China” policy in Washington. This assumes DPP supporters could play the loyal opposition in a DPP/KMT good cop/bad cop effort, and push dual recognition in the name of the ROC. The US side could even negotiate a U.S.-ROC Joint Communique to enshrine a “One China” policy in bilateral relations if needed, and maybe even a fourth US-PRC Communique! When you think about it, the only reasonable and enduring solution for stable, constructive ties with both sides of the Taiwan Strait is dual recognition. CCP success in alienating Taiwan legitimizes its reliance of coercive military power to resolve political differences around its periphery.
Would KMT and DPP Central Committees oppose normalization of US-ROC relations? Normalization would be a dream come true for the KMT and Ma administration, but they can not openly push it. It’s possible that they could push ROC sovereignty if Beijing steps up its campaign in Washington for a “thoughtful review” of the Taiwan Relations Act. Short of that, making trouble with both Beijing and Washington at the same time would be disastrous. Many senior KMT members thought Chiang Kai-shek’s refusal to push for such an arrangement in the lead up to the UN vote in 1971 was idiotic (see Jay Taylor’s fascinating bio of Chiang Kai-shek on this issue).
Between the Conlon Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of 1957 and the UN seat issue of 1971, the mainstream U.S. policy and academic community viewed dual recognition as in the best interest of the United States. Former National Security Advisor to President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, operated in isolation from this community, and it’s an uphill battle to recover from the colossal mistake that he still tries to glorify. He sacrificed the dual recognition option in favor of short term political expediency related to Vietnam and Nixon’s flailing public image. Oddly enough, hardline nationalists in the DPP could undermine a move within Congress in favor of normalization if it implied Taiwan is part of “One China,” regardless of how loosely “China” is defined.
It’s helpful to focus on areas of consensus between the KMT and DPP rather than policy differences. There’s a natural tendency of both sides to paint the other in the darkest hue of Blue or Green as possible. Americans should understand democracy and this tendency. But they often buy into pan-Blue rhetoric that casts the DPP as crazed troublemakers intent on sacrificing every drop of American blood for Taiwan independence. And they often buy DPP rhetoric that the KMT is pro-China, which is implied to be synonymous with pro-Communist. The KMT dropped any reference to unification in their 2009 revised party charter. In 2009, Chinese observers slammed Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou as “mianli cangzhen” or “hiding a needle in cotton,” and a “dutai fenzi,” advocating an independent Taiwan. An “independent Taiwan” is defined as advocating shared sovereignty, coexistence of equal entities with each side having its own administrative jurisdiction that is not subordinate to the other, and a status quo calling for “mutual non-denial,” and highlighting unification as an option but not inevitable.
Final comment on the spy issue. Of course communist spies are a problem. It’s not just Taiwan though. If you were Chinese intelligence, and wanted insights on the most sophisticated U.S. equipment, would you invest much effort on Taiwan? Of course not – go to the source and break into DoD or US defense industry computer networks, or recruit guys with direct access. Like Singapore and other friends, Taiwan isn’t a formal NATO treaty ally and doesn’t get the top line stuff. Still, Taiwan is viewed as a security risk given PRC intelligence penetration, with Lo Hsien-che, a one star general cited as the most senior officer accused of espionage since the 1960s. If this is the best the PRC has done, then Taiwan’s counterintelligence community deserves kudos. Whatever Lo may have given would be minor compared to the coups Taiwan has pulled off over the last 20 years. Recent reporting indicates that China may be penetrated much more than Taiwan.
Beyond the cross-Strait context, a South Korea two star general was arrested two years ago for passing the country’s war plan to North Korean intelligence. The East Germans recruited secretaries to Presidents, Premiers, and so forth. At one time, an estimated 15,000 Communist spies were assessed to be operating in West Germany. Taiwan cases that have been publicized pale in comparison with West Germany and South Korea. And the United States maintained its alliance with West Germany and continues to maintain the alliance with South Korea. Let’s face it. If Chinese spies want the best information on US weapon systems, they won’t get it on Taiwan.
Good discussion!