AirSea Battle shouldn’t only be about the United States. Working closely with Taiwan could pay dividends and help ensure a stable military balance in the Asia-Pacific.
U.S. Representative Randy Forbes’s (R-Va) article in The Diplomat last month entitled “America’s Pacific Air-Sea Battle Vision” called upon Congress to support the Pentagon’s vision for Air-Sea Battle – a concept designed to improve the joint and combined ability of air and naval forces to project power in the face of anti-access and area denial challenges. More specifically, Rep. Forbes pointed out that the United States should “work to bring our allies into this effort.” Indeed, in order for the United States to effectively project power in an anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) environment, networked alliances and ad hoc coalition partnerships would be essential in making U.S. power projection in the Asia-Pacific more resilient and responsive to both the internal and external dynamics of the emerging regional security challenges.
To be sure, the United States faces a number of challenges in meeting its security commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. Beyond uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change, challenges include growing resource constraints and an increasingly assertive and capable China. At least one driver for rethinking U.S. defense strategy is the growing ability of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to complicate U.S. ability to project joint power and operate in the Asia-Pacific region. These emerging PLA A2/AD capabilities not only could complicate U.S. ability to operate, but also imperil regional powers’ ability to deny the PLA air superiority and command of the seas. Anti-access threats, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area, include long-range precision strike systems that could be employed against bases and moving targets at sea, such as aircraft carrier battle groups. Area denial involves shorter-range actions and capabilities designed to complicate an opposing force’s freedom of action in all domains (i.e., land, air, space, sea and cyber).
The Pentagon’s Air-Sea Battle and the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) transcends pure operational and roles of services issues to include cooperation with allies and ad hoc coalition partners in the region, which is critical for ensuring the success of Air Sea Battle and assured operational access. As former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen said, Air-Sea Battle is “a prime example of how we need to keep breaking down stovepipes between services, between federal agencies and even between nations.” He further noted that the Services should “integrate our efforts with each other and with our civilian counterparts” and “work seamlessly with old allies and new friends.” Air Sea Battle and the broader JOAC shore up deterrence and demonstrate to U.S. allies and partners that Washington is committed and able to resist Chinese military coercion.
Addressing these challenges requires greater collaboration not only within the U.S. defense establishment, but effective leveraging of talents of allies and ad hoc coalition partners in the region. The U.S. reportedly has begun examining how to diversify defense relations with traditional allies in the region, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Yet, little consideration appears to have been given to the significant role that Taiwan could play in an evolving U.S. defense strategy, including the JOAC and Air-Sea Battle. Taiwan’s future and U.S. interests in regional security are intimately related. Indeed, Taiwan is a core interest of the United States and has a pivotal role to play as an ad hoc coalition partner in Air-Sea Battle, JOAC, and the strategic rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific.
First, Taiwan should be the central guiding focus of defense planning in the Asia-Pacific region. In assessing JOAC and Air-Sea Battle-related requirements, the greatest emphasis should be placed on contingency planning for a PLA amphibious invasion of Taiwan with minimal warning. Based on a premature and faulty assumption that cross-Strait trade and investment will inevitably lead toward Taiwan’s democratic submission to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authoritarian rule, prominent analysts have asserted that the focus of U.S. defense planning should shift toward the South China Sea and defense of the global commons.
Photo Credit: U.S. Navy
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Chinaman
Taiwan was the last piece in the Chinese civil war.Because of the Korea war,the US by force of arms has prevented the mainland from reuniting with Taiwan.In the long run the US will have to make a face saving exit.All empires come and go.The question is can the US defend Taiwan for posterity?
There is absolutely no doubt the US can destroy China many times .The PLA are getting weapons systems to wreak more destruction on US assets. They have not approached the assured destruction capability the US has over China but they are making improvements in the abilityto maximixe damage to US to reach 70%.
When thet figure is reached,the US will have to live with it even with damage limiting.
As for access denial,this is a defensive.China has no destoyers or carriers prowling off the US.A Chinese official has said the US islike aguy with a criminal record lurkingin your neighbourhood.If you live in that area,you will have to take counter measures.
Btw please don’t give the bs aboutdefenceless US crew on carriers.These guys have the power to blow up China and the world.The problem is after launching attacks on China,they won’t be able to fire the next missile which is troubling to Americans used to KOsovo and Iraq war.
ACT
part of the reason that the United States is reluctant to deal with Taiwan is not only penetration of the island nation’s military and R&D by spies, but also the fact that any overt cooperation between the US and Taiwan on the level that the authors suggest could easily be used as grounds for invasion by the PRC. granted, they are looking to take most of Taiwan’s infrastructure intact (thus, political overtures) but i don’t think they’ll look a gift horse in the mouth either. Then there’s the what Leonard R. alluded to, the fact that Taiwanese politics have increasingly moved to a sort of middle ground of partial reconciliation with the PRC.
kcheng
That is also a result of USA’s lack of resolve in standing up for Taiwan while criticizing moves by Taiwan even under democratic mechanisms that move toward solidifying its freedom and independence. It is blamed as having a carte blanche in “abusing” the TRA for any deepening of its democracy and possibly drawing US forces to Taiwan’s defense. These Taiwan moves are seen as being provocative to China and the USA is so overly sensitive to that. So it is a disappointment by Taiwan for this lack of resolve by the USA (which this article is describing) that has also led Taiwan to this perceived path of closer ties to China! USA has a responsibility to Taiwan.
justrecently
USA has a responsibility to Taiwan.
The U.S. administration, first and foremost, should be accountable to the American people, Mr. Cheng. If American service people are supposed to risk life or health for Taiwan, it’s not so much out of responsibility, but out of solidarity – free people who want to remain free sticking by each other. Yes, the U.S. should work closely with Taiwan, but ways need to be found to handle the leaks.
America should try to shift its role from a hegemon to an ally. That would also mean that all allies take substantial shares in shouldering the defense burden. There is no way that the U.S. pay for the military (as long as the economic base allows for it), and everyone else prospers from trade. Only a hegemon can be told that he has a (unilateral, if need be) “responsibility” in an alliance. That’s the role of a useful idiot, only put more nicely.
The same is true for my country (Germany) and for Europe. We also like to complain about our American friends when they turn nasty (GWB, Iraq War, etc.) but call for them when there’s trouble on our side of the Atlantic (Yugoslavia 1998, Libya 2011, etc.). Here too, it’s either American hegemony or partnership – and only partnership will prove to be sustainable.
Oro Invictus
@ Leonard R. & aaron
Given the length of time the people of Taiwan and the mainland have been separated, as well as in the face of a much greater degree of cultural assimilation and synthesis by virtue of being a more open society than the PRC, I’d argue that the Taiwanese culture has developed into a fully independent and unique socio-cultural pathos completely divergent from modern PRC society; considering how more and more people in Taiwan identify themselves as “Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese”, it seems a flawed assumption to assume that Taiwan will gravitate towards the PRC by virtue of cultural similarities. Likewise, assuming economic ties will foster greater support for the PRC by the Taiwan citizenry is a similarly flawed argument due to such increasing self-identification as a separate nationality and culture in spite of increasing economic ties (not to mention increasing disdain for attempted PRC policies).
As a useful case-study one might consider Hong Kong: Even though Hong Kong is now under PRC administration and has greater levels of economic ties to the PRC than ever before, the people of Hong Kong have grown increasingly antipathetic to the mainland and have also began (though to a lesser extent than Taiwan) to draw a distinction not just between Hong Kong natives and the mainland, but between those from Hong Kong and the contemporary Chinese. If an entity that has effectively been annexed by the PRC has gone from muted criticism to increasing displays of animosity against the PRC by the citizenry, to assume a functionally independent nation which is already characterized by increasing antagonism vis-a-vis the PRC will effectively shift in the opposite direction and move closer to being assimilated by the PRC is a questionable notion.
Likewise, from a more militaristic and/or geopolitical perspective, defense of Taiwan makes exceedingly great sense; defense of Taiwan in the face of PRC aggression would rally regional and global nation-states behind the US while also maintaining regional equilibrium and long-term stability. Indeed, Taiwan’s very existence as an independent nation effectively curtails much of the PRC’s ability to aggressively assert itself in the area; without Taiwan, logistical costs for both military and economic lanes and such in the region would grow increasingly costly for the US and any allied nation, while also weakening regional trade due to fears of instability caused by PRC encroachment. Ensuring the continued independence of Taiwan not only serves as a public opinion victory for the US, but also an economic one by ensuring stability in regional affairs. As long as the people of Taiwan do not desire to be joined with the PRC (which, by current trends in public opinion, there is no reason to expect they will in the foreseeable future), defense of Taiwan makes perfect sense for the US economically, militarily, and politically.
Granted, the US wouldn’t be doing this out of the goodness of their heart nor necessarily because of any ideological impetus, rather it would primarily be a case of simple pragmatism; however, it is difficult to denigrate the US for this given every nation on Earth functions in the exact same way. What’s more, while I dislike the disproportionate power the US wields and will almost certainly continue to wield for the foreseeable future in both the SCS and globally (as, in a globalized world, theoretically each nation should have effectively equal say in geopolitical affairs), the US has, at least, been relatively (and I do stress relatively) benign as leading power; there is every reason to expect, given past history and the very nature of autocratic and non-pluralist nations, that the PRC would hardly be anywhere as benign an influence in the SCS in the same position. At least, with the current status quo, the region experiences a relative minimum of imposition on local affairs by the US, ensuring largely unhindered autonomy.
aaron
@Oro – What do you see as the defining features of Taiwanese culture and what makes it important enough for ROC citizens to choose “Taiwanese” culture over Chinese culture?
In fact, the majority of Taiwanese do not see themselves as fundamentally “Taiwanese.” Rather, they see themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese; Chinese culture is the root culture, “Taiwanese” gives them a small degree of uniqueness. Here in Taiwan, the language (even Taiwanese language is a variant of Minnan language), intellectual traditions, religious traditions, racial identification and culinary traditions are dominated by Chinese tradition. As China continues to emerge and develop its soft power, more and more Taiwanese will come to respect the achievements of the Mainland.
ROC military leaders do not want to be drawn into an American hedging system against the PRC. They’d prefer to keep things quiet and foster stability by strengthening economic and social ties to the Mainland. Ever notice how retired ROC generals are flocking to the Mainland to drink and socialize with retired PLA generals (not to mention their business ventures)? What does that tell you about the character of Taiwan’s military leaders and the direction of their politics???
I like Taiwan and Taiwanese people, but they don’t have the will or the interest to be solid American allies. It’s their choice; they’ll be fine in the future.
Oro Invictus
@aaron
I never actually said the majority of Taiwanese see themselves as a completely separate group, rather that the number of them who do so has been increasing dramatically. Currently, the breakdown is such that the majority see themselves as somewhere between “Chinese” and the entirely separate “Taiwanese” identity; notably, the next largest group identify themselves as “Taiwanese” and the remainder as effectively “Chinese”. The current trends, while it remains to be seen if and when the proportion seeing themselves as “Taiwanese” exceeds that of those seeing themselves as somewhere in the middle, show the amount considering themselves “Chinese” to be dropping precipitously while those considering themselves “Taiwanese” to be growing proportionately.
A better indicator, though, may be the various polls regarding whether or not Taiwan should unify with the mainland; most prefer the status quo indefinitely, the next largest group desire the status quo with the eventual aim of complete independence, the third largest desires immediate independence, the fourth seeks the status quo with the eventual goal of unification, and the smallest seek immediate unification. Shifts in the polls have, likewise, seen the amount seeking independence (either in the short or long run) increasing radically with those geared towards unification dropping in kind (though the percentage of those supporting the indefinite status quo has remained largely unaltered). More intriguingly, polls which do not present the option of maintaining the status quo (though these tend to be smaller in scale, as larger polling groups appear uncomfortable with the political ramifications of suggesting the status quo cannot be maintained) show the vast majority of individuals desire independence.
Similarly, the whole bit about the retired ROC generals going to the mainland should come as no surprise; honestly, wouldn’t you expect that the PRC would try to lure such individuals to garner information on the ROC? However, the fact that the citizenry and even the politicians seem unimpressed in quite telling. Indeed, the fact that the PRC’s propaganda overtures towards the ROC only having the slightest effect in the military (a much more monolithic organization removed of the pluralist elements defining much of the rest of ROC society), suggests that, despite vastly increasing the amount of funding geared towards shifting public opinion in tandem with increasing economic links, the failure of the PRC’s soft diplomacy campaign is the message rather than how it is being marketed. Soft diplomacy can only get you so far, as it cannot fundamentally change the beliefs of a people, particularly those in pluralistic societies; the checks and balances provided by differing belief systems inherently dilutes such things, removing much of the presentation of a message and instead breaking it down to its core message. That the aforementioned polling shifts have occurred and even accelerated despite the vast increase of time, materials, and effort the PRC has place into its PR efforts with Taiwan is testament to how flawed the people of Taiwan view this message to be.
A useful analogy, perhaps, would be that of the social dynamics of the post-independence American Colonies; these were individuals who were, effectively, much more culturally similar to England than the Taiwanese are to the mainland (as relative geographic isolation and a more closed society prevented the same degree of socio-cultural shifts and adaptations), as well as one mired in complete uncertainty towards their future. These were people who had succeeded less out of martial strength or establishing and fortifying themselves against outsiders (the latter being as the Chinese who fled to Taiwan did) than the simple fact that England had deemed wars in continental Europe more deserving of attention and resources than those affecting the colonies. Like Taiwan, there were individuals who suggested reuniting with England as well as those who the colonies for England’s shores (that both of these occurred to even greater extents [primarily the former] than with Taiwan vis-a-vis the PRC is significant given the much greater degree of geographic separation between the Colonies and England). Despite all of this, the course of history showed the US able to solidify itself as a completely separate identity, despite various incursions (not just militarily) from England and associated entities (though, to be fair, the US did many times serve as the primary instigator for the aforementioned events).
While it is true that there are some key differences between Taiwan and the US’ early years (primarily related to the colonial nature of the latter and pre-independence societal development, though certain aspects of pre-revolution China did allow for internal divergent development and establishment prior to the exodus to Taiwan), the sheer dynamism of modern Taiwanese culture when compared to the early US is such that such geographic matters are of little concern in terms of socio-cultural development (though, of course, of major concern economically and militarily). As long as the Taiwanese people do not desire unification then the civilian political establishment will (be it due to popular empathy or political modality) follow suit; likewise, while less susceptible to the influence of popular opinion by the citizenry, the military will similarly gravitate in a similar direction due to the aforementioned political support. As such, for the foreseeable future (barring the military reversing its current systematic trends and becoming more independent from oversight by civilian authorities and influences and/or the citizenry “doing a 180″ from current positions and seeking unification with the mainland) Taiwan is no less trustworthy an ally of the US than the majority of its various allies and associates.
aaron
You misrepresent the significance of retired ROC officers visiting the Mainland: it’s not just that China is luring them; it’s that retired generals are actively seeking to visit, and strengthen contacts with the PRC. Retired ROC generals have established organizations to facilitate this contact and they also invite PRC counterparts to Taiwan. The fact that most of the citizenry/politicians don’t care about these visits is a reflection of Taiwan’s apathy in the face of deepening PRC influence. The U.S. government has voiced its concern over these visits.
As for the effects of PRC propaganda on the ROC military being slight, what evidence do you have to support this claim??? I’ve had discussions with ROC military officers and former soldiers which suggest that PRC propaganda and psychological warfare efforts have likely been effective in lowering military morale.
Simply because some people identify themselves as Taiwanese and prefer the status quo does not mean that they want to take a stronger role in militarily opposing China. Most Taiwanese think it’s hopeless to stand up to the PLA and they prefer to seek stability by engaging with the Mainland and foregoing dreams of independence. A lot of ROC elites in the KMT and the military still desire future unification with the Mainland and they do not support the idea of strengthening military cooperation with the U.S. This ideological problem may be part of the reason why so many officials in Taiwan’s military and security organizations are willing to spy for the PRC.
The social and political situation here in Taiwan stands in sharp contrast to what one finds in Japan. The Japanese government, and many in the public, see China’s military rise as a cause for concern and they have been steadily increasing military cooperation with the United States. I like Taiwan, and I wish I could share your optimism. Unfortunately Taiwan cannot, and does not want to be a military ally of the U.S. in the same way that countries like Japan and Australia seek to be.
vec
Taiwanese love the Chinese motherland.
Pax americana is dead and over.
All dreams and fantasies of America to divide and rule must end.
Let Cuba be Taiwan in the 21st century.
Andao
It’s obvious you’ve never seen a single opinion poll conducted in Taiwan about feelings towards the motherland. Far more want independence than reunification, and most want the status quo. Sorry pal.
AL
My family is originally from Taiwan, we don't like Chinese like that. We are ok with them to a certain extend as long as they don't claim Taiwan is a part of China and that they are human and they are as equal as anyone else . A lot of Chinese escaped to Taiwan and they don't want to think about China.
victor
South Korea,Japan,and Taiwan will be pivoting towards China in the next ten years.
They know where the butter is coming from in the 21st century.
American economic and military dominance is at the declining curve.
Goodbye to declining pax Americana and its Air -Sea battle dreams of Asians fighting Asians.
Even India is not falling for the american trap now.
Woulf America like the same medicine of Cuba replacing Taiwan.
Liberty
Just a gentle reminder that ALL the Pacific Asian countries’ Exports to China today have been processed/assembled in the latter’s sweat shops, then sent to the final destinations:the US & EU markets. That means these countries indirectly export their products ( made in China: assembled in China) to the US& EU via the middleman, China. The US should sell all sophisticated weaponry to Taiwan to defend itself in the face of a more & more rising aggressive China eager to conquer the whole region for its expansionist hegemonic ambitions.
vec
The technology of China has even surpass America in certain weapon systems and the general gap will close in next 10 years.
China will soon be therefore selling weapons to latin America and and have a base in Cuba.
Remember America is a huge debtor and depends on borrowed monies for its subsistance.
So dont be ungrateful to your creditor.Dont bite the hands that feed you
Duke
Don’t you know that the CCP bought the US T-bonds just for the sake of its safe investment & holding down the RMB for its own export advantages over other competitors? There’s nothing called ‘grateful or ungrateful’ here!China better stop buying the US-Tbonds because this practice just causes more harm than good to the US economy.Just look at Hawaii(already a state of the Union) & Puerto Rico (still waiting for its statehood). These territories have lobbied the US Congress really really hard to become a state of the USA unlike Taiwan, Tibet,or Xinjiang never want to be part of a commie China. Just think about this!
Andao
If China stops buying T bonds, the RMB rises, the USD drops (and exports more). You think China is doing the US a favor?
Matt
HQ-9 that is death ally the Straits of Taiwan. That is what the Persian Gulf will look like the Straits of Hormuz, no air power, no sea power. You would need a larger Harop and missile strikes before the planes could take off to hit, in fact they would have to be in the air prior to armed and with air to air refueling. The problem is they are thinking the same thing.
aaron
I find it admirable that these authors express so much support for Taiwan. Unfortunately, developments in Taiwan’s government and society are quickly turning Taiwan into a liability for the U.S., not an asset. From President Ma Yingjeo, down to the average ROC army private, there is noticeable lack of will to stand up to the PRC. Many Taiwanese, including those who have served in the ROC military, will readily admit that there are serious morale problems in the military. The Ma Administration would rather focus on disaster relief than think about how to fight the PLA. Cooperating with Taiwan’s military research bodies would be just like giving our military technology to China. The Chungshan Institute of science and Technology has had PRC spies at the top levels of its military R&D department. Not to mention that a lot of laid off scientists and engineers from CSIST are targeted and hired by the PRC. Taiwanese elites in academia do not see the PRC as a threat, business leaders generally see the PRC in positive terms and they aren’t going to jeopardize their lucrative business ventures for defense concerns. The Taiwanese public seems completely oblivious to the PRC threat; they’d rather criticize American beef than criticize the PLA for aiming ballistic missiles at the island. The success of the PRC’s strategy of slowly deepening influence, and winning over the Taiwanese public, should not be underestimated.
The U.S. should give some support to Taiwan, but it needs to give much higher priority to Japan, Australia, Korea, The Philippines and India.
Leonard R.
@Stokes & Hsiao: “To be sure, the United States faces a number of challenges in meeting its security commitments in the Asia-Pacific region…”
Not the least of which is that (a)Fujian Province missile batteries are less than 150 kilometers from Taiwan. (b) Taiwanese people are basically Chinese. – not communist Chinese – but ‘speak, read & eat’ Chinese and finally, (c). Taiwan makes more money in the PRC than it does in the US.
So yes, the Air-Sea battle plan faces some problems with Taiwan.
—
@Stokes & Hsiao:
“The Pentagon’s Air-Sea Battle and the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) transcends pure operational and roles of services issues to include cooperation with allies and ad hoc coalition partners in the region…”.
But there is something to be said fr geography and economics. So as a lay person, I favor a ‘Let’s All Look at a Map’ battle plan. There are a lot of places in the world the US can defeat and destroy the PRC – very fast. But Taiwan – and yes – even South Korea – don’t make sense strategically. They’re not worth the blow-back.
ASEAN or India OTOH, make sense. Oil countries? Yeah. But why defend a country that is 100 miles
away from Fujian Province?
A better solution might be to let millions of Taiwanese immigrate to the US.
America does bear some responsibility for this mess.
Thomas
The Us military Industrial Comnplex needs Taiwan to Justify to the American people why 51% of their budget needs to go to military expenditure instead of education and healthcare because of the big bad red according to the Army. LOL Just research America’s unemployment rate and laugh with me!!!
Oro Invictus
While, given the inherent devastation any war in the part of the world would bring, I dislike considering such martial matters, pragmatically such things cannot be ignored. At the same time, many of these articles’ suggestions (increasing cooperation with R&D on Taiwan, information transfer, military-to-military conferences) are relatively peaceful means to increase defensive capabilities in the region and deter PRC aggression, while also yielding benefits beyond military dimensions by strengthening ties with Taiwan and demonstrating a US commitment to regional security beyond the simple threat of the overwhelming brute force the US forces can project. Likewise, the articles’ focus on improving the submarine fleet of Taiwan over that of the aerial forces is quite sensible; whereas much of Taiwan’s aerial assets would be neutralized by PRC bombardment likely before they could be deployed, undersea capabilities both provide a means of constantly harassing and impeding amphibious assaults while taking advantage of the PRC’s relatively poor anti-submarine capabilities.
However, the US must be careful in implementing any of these suggested ties with Taiwan; it must never be forgotten the primary goal should be deterrence and avoidance of conflict in the region.