Instead of maintaining a dangerous status-quo, Washington should attempt a new approach to avoid a possible deadly strategic rivalry.
My new book, The China Choice, explores the decision America faces about its relations with China and its role in Asia as China’s power grows. But the title may be a little misleading, because of course there is more than one choice to be made. America faces at least two decisions, and one of the keys to making them well and getting them right is to consider them in the right order.
The first is on the question of principle: should America even contemplate changing the role it plays in Asia, in order to accommodate China’s rising power, or should it insist on preserving the status quo? The second is on the question of degree: how far should America be willing to go to accommodate China, and where should it draw the line beyond which it is not willing to make further concessions?
Rory Medcalf’s valuable critique of the book here on The Diplomat last week focuses primarily on the second question, and makes some important points about it which I will explore a little later. But I’ll start by saying something about the first question, because we cannot decide how far Washington should go to accommodate Beijing before we are quite clear that it should even try to do so, and why.
In The China Choice I argue that America should try to accommodate China’s growing power. I propose that it should be willing negotiate a new regional order in which it continues to play a major strategic role, but not the kind of primacy that it has exercised until now. The main reason is simply that China no longer accepts U.S. primacy as the basis for the Asian order, and that as its power grows to equal and overtake America’s, the chances of successfully imposing primacy on China are too low, and the risks and costs of trying are too high, to be justified.
Even if China may not become strong enough to dominate Asia itself, it is already strong enough to prevent the U.S. maintaining primacy. If America tries to perpetuate the status quo, there is a very real risk of an escalating contest which neither side could win, and which could very easily flare into a major, and perhaps catastrophic, war. The main reason for America to seek an accommodation with China is to reduce the risk of such a catastrophe.
Many people will disagree. Some of them think that the relationship with China is working fine, and that accommodation – or further accommodation – is unnecessary. They think that Washington is committed to a good relationship with Beijing, and that China will be satisfied with the kind of relationship America is offering now.
I think this is too optimistic. The relationship today can manage day-to-day stresses, but is not robust enough to withstand real problems. Some people cite the Chen case earlier this year as proof that the relationship is strong, but the fact that such a minor issue can cause such anxieties about the future of the world’s most important bilateral relationship surely points the other way. The U.S.-China relationship is probably going to have to face much greater stresses in future, and it is not at all clear that it is strong enough to withstand them. Furthermore, the relationship seems to be getting weaker rather than stronger over time, so the risk of a rupture grows.
The present fabric of the relationship is weak and getting weaker because China’s and America’s ambitions in Asia over coming decades are inherently incompatible. It is important to my argument to explain why this should be so. Those who think that America is already accommodating China have perhaps not really registered what is at stake here. For the past 40 years the Asian strategic order, and the U.S.-China relationship, have been based on a conception of American leadership which places all other countries in Asia in a clearly subordinate position. American policy today precludes any substantial change in this status quo over the coming decades. This was made clear by Barack Obama in his speech in Canberra in November of last year.
American optimism about the future of the relationship therefore depends on the hope that China will find this acceptable. It is often said that America’s policy towards China today is not containment. But Washington clearly does resist any substantial expansion of China’s influence at the expense of U.S. primacy. So if it’s not containment, that can only be because China is not seeking such an expansion.
Photo Credit: U.S. State Department (Flickr)
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Dailisan
I do not know where Mr White gets his inspiration, but it certainly is not from the rest of the Asian countries. He argues in favor of the superpower status of China and the dwindling power of the United States in Asia, as if these are manifest destiny. They are not. Mr White should also consider that each of the Asian countries also have a vote on the table. Most of these countries have a far better record on human development, economic growth and international reputation than China. Growth is relative and China's is being achieved at horrendous cost to its people and environment. There is also that no small matter of the rising threat of economic recession in China. The recent intensifying conflicts in the East Sea and the South China Sea are all instigated by China's inordinate claim to these maritime territories. China is not a growing power, Mr White. It is a growing problem.
A. G. de Ágreda
Mr. White;
I value the ideas you bring to the fore but I believe that there are a few considerations missing.
First, Asia does not have to be THE arena in which both nations contend. What about influence in South America or Africa? What about non geographic spheres of influence such as financial markets, World media and the like? It might look as though China will stay within the limits of Asia in a globalised World. I don't think so.
Second. The World today is about influence and alliances. Is China going to be happy with an agreement in which other actors -which might be US allies- are not taken into account? Moreover, is it going to be happy with a 50% share in her own continent and regional sphere of influence? I think it unlikely either.
Third. You may be focusing too much on the chance of war and political influence. What about global dominance of financial and currency markets? Is the US in a position to accept a peer to the USD(ollar) any more than a peer to the USN(avy)?
There are probably many more considerations to make. I just wanted to emphasize the fact that the regional context is no longer valid when dealing with global actors.
Thank you for your excellent arguments and your patience reading this. Have a fantastic 2013.
Gwinter
The proper perspective to take on China is the "Iron Fist." The US dictates terms and China obeys submissively. We do not accept the Chinese government or culture as our equal. We have nuclear weapons and will use them to prevent China from expanding one centimeter into the oceans around it. We are masters of the sea and China will resist this to it's own detriment. The defense particularly with nukes is much stronger than the offense. Given the fact the status quo empowers the US our position is impregnable. Perhaps we should have a Pearl Harbor on Chinese sea and air forces before they become big enough to be more than a nuisance. We should regularly sail aircraft carriers through the Taiwan straits and defy China to do something. We need to increase the provocation level not decrease. China must come to grips with eternal American control of the Pacific all the way up to their territorial waters. China must kowtow before us as a FIRST step.
neutral
Soon the US will go the way of the Roman and British empires. It's inevitable. The only way to stop it is to destroy both China and Russia. Off course these two countries aint waiting to be destroyed. Before being blown off the world map,they will inflict enormous and unacceptable destruction on US assets.Btw no amount of missile shileds will limit the destruction.
The Chinese are being demonised.They aint going to be the big brother. They want to be treated with respect. If the US thinks its nuclear weapons can coerce the Chinese,there is no reason why the PLA can't build more missiles.There is no need for the PLAto match the US missile for misslle 50 to 100 nm will suffice to maim the us if the Pentagon were really to initiate the first strike.
Soon the US with its economy in dire straits will have to choose between butter and guns. If it chooses the former,the world be a much safer place for all countries,including the US.Excessive military build up won't buy the US more security. It will make the Chinese and Russians more insecure and lead to them adding more capable weapons. The sooner the Pentagon knows it cannot have 100% security ,the better.
Adelo Vant
Sounds like paid advertising to me, "America to seek an accommodation with China is to reduce the risk of such a catastrophe" or "China to seek an accommodation with America is to reduce the risk of such a catastrophe." If this is the starting point for either, then catastrophe will fall on everyone. China emergence and America position in global standing is assured with peace; So, such talk is foolish and very dangerous blustering, not diplomacy.
dorrany
Thing is Hugh White believes China to be able to start a war, primarily out of nationalist pride. But in my opinion at worst it will only be a few thousand naval deaths before China and the U.S reach an accomdation. In other words a world war or nuclear war is not going to happen. China and the U.S are too reasonable and likeminded to wage a war with each other.
Anti neo-cons
You sound naive. If Mitt Romney comes to power, my money is on a nuclear war.
Beijing will use its nuclear heft if Washington with its superior navy push too hard and crosses the red line. And the red line is Chinese territories jumped claim by greedy Manila, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. Beijing cannot bargain this away nor act timid over it. It has to do a "Falkland Islands" stand on it. Bet on it.
The same applies to the Diaoyus. No surrendered and indicted war criminal nation shall or be allowed to enjoy spoils of war at Chinese expense, Washington notwithstanding.