From May to September 1939, the USSR and Japan fought an undeclared war involving over 100,000 troops. It may have altered world history.
In the summer of 1939, Soviet and Japanese armies clashed on the Manchurian-Mongolian frontier in a little-known conflict with far-reaching consequences. No mere border clash, this undeclared war raged from May to September 1939 embroiling over 100,000 troops and 1,000 tanks and aircraft. Some 30,000-50,000 men were killed and wounded. In the climactic battle, August 20-31, 1939, the Japanese were crushed. This coincided precisely with the conclusion of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (August 23, 1939) – the green light for Hitler's invasion of Poland and the outbreak of World War II one week later. These events are connected. This conflict also influenced key decisions in Tokyo and Moscow in 1941 that shaped the conduct and ultimately the outcome of the war.
This conflict (called the Nomonhan Incident by Japanese, the Battle of Khalkhin Gol by Russians) was provoked by a notorious Japanese officer named TSUJI Masanobu, ring-leader of a clique in Japan’s Kwantung Army, which occupied Manchuria. On the other side, Georgy Zhukov, who would later lead the Red Army to victory over Nazi Germany, commanded the Soviet forces. In the first large clash in May 1939, a Japanese punitive attack failed and Soviet/Mongolian forces wiped out a 200-man Japanese unit. Infuriated, Kwantung Army escalated the fighting through June and July, launching a large bombing attack deep inside Mongolian territory and attacking across the border in division strength. As successive Japanese assaults were repulsed by the Red Army, the Japanese continually upped the ante, believing they could force Moscow to back down. Stalin, however, outmaneuvered the Japanese and stunned them with a simultaneous military and diplomatic counter strike.
In August, as Stalin secretly angled for an alliance with Hitler, Zhukov amassed powerful forces near the front. When German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop flew to Moscow to sign the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Stalin unleashed Zhukov. The future Red Army Marshal unveiled the tactics he would later employ with such devastating effect at Stalingrad, Kursk, and elsewhere: a combined arms assault with massed infantry and artillery that fixed the enemy on the central front while powerful armored formations enveloped the enemy’s flanks, encircled, and ultimately crushed him in a battle of annihilation. Over 75 percent of Japan’s ground forces at the front were killed in combat. At the same time, Stalin concluded the pact with Hitler, Japan’s nominal ally, leaving Tokyo diplomatically isolated and militarily humiliated.
The fact that the fighting at Nomonhan coincided with the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was no coincidence. While Stalin was openly negotiating with Britain and France for a purported anti-fascist alliance, and secretly negotiating with Hitler for their eventual alliance, he was being attacked by German’s ally and anti-Comintern partner, Japan. By the summer of 1939, it was clear that Europe was sliding toward war. Hitler was determined to move east, against Poland. Stalin’s nightmare, to be avoided at all costs, was a two-front war against Germany and Japan. His ideal outcome would be for the fascist/militarist capitalists (Germany, Italy, and Japan) to fight the bourgeois/democratic capitalists (Britain, France, and perhaps the United States), leaving the Soviet Union on the sidelines, the arbiter of Europe after the capitalists had exhausted themselves. The Nazi-Soviet Pact was Stalin’s attempt to achieve his optimal outcome. Not only did it pit Germany against Britain and France and leave the Soviet Union out of the fight – it gave Stalin the freedom to deal decisively with an isolated Japan, which he did at Nomonhan. This is not merely a hypothesis. The linkage between Nomonhan and the Nazi-Soviet Pact is clear even in the German diplomatic documents published in Washington and London in 1948. Recently revealed Soviet-era documents add confirming details.
Zhukov won his spurs at Nomonhan/Khalkhin Gol – and thereby won Stalin’s confidence to entrust him with the high command in late 1941, just in time to avert disaster. Zhukov was able to halt the German onslaught and turn the tide at the gates of Moscow in early December 1941 (arguably the most decisive week of the Second World War) in part by deploying forces from the Soviet Far East. Many of these were the battle-tested troops he used to crush the Japanese at Nomonhan. The Soviet Far Eastern reserves – 15 infantry divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 1,700 tanks, and 1.500 aircraft – were deployed westward in the autumn of 1941 when Moscow learned that Japan would not attack the Soviet Far East, because it had made an irrevocable decision for southward expansion that would lead to war with the United States.
Photo Credit: Wikicommons
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Franklin
Don't forget that Zhukov was severely mauled by Germans in Rhzev, propably the most bloodiest battle even in standart of eastern front. He was far from genius military commander. If he had commanded those Red Army troops which try to cut Finland in Suomussalmi-Raate (Dec39-40Jan) his troops would have been mauled by Finns as Germans did 3 years later in Rhzev (Operation Mars).
Brett
The 'Rzhev meat grinder' was important, with heavy losses for the Soviets, because it meant that German forces were tied up there instead of being able to reinforce Stalingrad.
Bongskie
If China does a Japan and drive south rather than north, it is but logical knowing that Russia and China today are supporting each other these days. There respective stands in global issues being resolved by the UN is a sign that this is so. If china for example makes a provocative move and starts a war with the US, there is a possibility that Russia will again side with China and this war will be to the bitter end for most of the democratic world. But china and Russia can also suffer extensively even if they joined forces as the capability of the US militarily speaking is also extremely effective not to mention other countries that would be supporting the US from many powerful countries in Europe and also Asia. But Russia might not also be willing to risk a disastrous consequence by joining China and this would be favorable to countries for which the US will be fighting for. Together with the US, a war would china would still remain catastrophic but at least they have a fair chance of inflicting incalculable losses to China too from which China might not be able to recover anymore. Indeed if the Spratlys, Scarborough or Senkakus cause the next big war, China will also get be seriously impaired contrary to her most optimistic views that insuch an event she will come out the shining knight. She won't be. She might not even make it past this war.
Robert Haggerty
The shadow of Nomonhon could have been even greater. Since the battle ended on August 31,939 (the day before the Germans invaded Poland) , it was never widely reported in the west. Had the Germans known how devastatingly effective the Red Army, and a general named Georgi Zhukov, were in this battle they certainly would not have so badly underestimated the fighting capacity of the Red Army. This underestimation would prove fatal to the Germans in their planning and execution of the invasion of the Soviet Union.
kalendjay
The reference in this article to the US oil embargo on Japan, and Japan's subsequent push to the Dutch East Indies needs amplification. As usual the US was clueless about the potential of oil diplomacy and strategy. On the eve of WW II, US submarine strategy was a backwater and US torpedoes were a failure, failing even to explode on contact and to interdict shipping in the early phases of the war. By war's end, about 70% of oil shipments to Japan were interdicted. But imagine if more than 90% were interdicted within 18 months of Pearl Harbor? So much for the Big Picture.
Better yet, mines are vastly more cost effective than submarines. They could have been delivered by air, and remained resident for months in waters long out of reach of American control, such as Manilla Bay or the sea of Japan. Perhaps if the navy tested this theory with the same thoroughness as the aircraft carrier or dirigible based biplanes, Japan may have imitated the concept, but never beat the US at it's own game. Ironically, the US was obsessed with early versions of Jap terrorism, such as balloon bombs, but never had a public policy toward sea based mines. The point being, that in any balance of terror regarding mines, it would have been advantage USA. Indeed, there is a robust history of mine warfare during WW II, including a shutdown of the Port of Charleston. But this was a secret war, in which the public duly adhered to the rule: "A slip of the lip can sink a ship".
As with WW II, there is again a mismatch of military strategy and resource strategy. Armies must consider the stakes and costs of resource control and plan battle conflict accordingly. Consider that Operation Desert Freedom and the occupation of Iraq were not really about oil at all. The US could have doubled Iraqi oil production within 5 years of the invasion. Instead, it declined, giving encouragement to Iran and other oil fanatics, who promptly escalated the price of oil more effectively than the 1973 OPEC could have dreamed.
As with Khalkin Gol, timing and a sense of how to map history have been important in Iraq. Iran was truly shocked that the US made such effortless headway in overthrowing Saddam. But this would have meant much more today than then, now that Iran is close to having the Bomb and Ahmadinejad is in charge. So we have boobs like Condaleeza Rice in charge of war diplomacy, the reason why Cheney and the Bushes were so unwelcome at the GOP convention. Perhaps she should pull up an empty chair and pretend she is talking to Obama.
Jay
Germany and Japan would have lost eventually no matter what. Neither nation has the man power to really control the territory they held let alone if they had ended the USSR. The Nazi still froze their asses off and were having supply difficulties. The Soviets would have fallen back to the Urals and Siberia tightening their supply lines and their front forcing both the Germans and Japanese to overextend to achieve victory. IT would have taken another year maybe two for Japan and Germany to fall, but they still would have.
The_Observer
This has got to be one of the better articles from the Diplomat in along time.
Strange how one decision made then cold have effected how the world turned out. Prior to WWII, Germany was both a power-house in cultural and scientific terms but after the war the Americans and the Soviet Union took in Germany's best scientists and engineers. Till then, chemists anywhere in the world had to be able to read and write German because the Germans were carrying out the best research in that field.
It could be argued that if Germany had maintained continued dominance in Europe that German today would be learnt as a second language in most of the world's schools and not English. At the time, the Russians for obvious geographical, economic and military reasons learnt German, The Italians and Japanese were allies of Germany, the Chinese were heavily influenced by the Germans in their military, legal system and even beer making, the USA had a large German immigrant community as does Brazil, the Egyptians were supported by Germany in their anti-imperialist battles, and the various German colonies were to be found in Africa and the Pacific at the time.
Mladen
Obviously, you haven't look into fact that Moscow was about halfway from Polish border to Ural. And if Japan attacked Soviet Union, first task would have been to control Pacific seaboard and cut communication with USA and then move through Mongolia toward India and then Middle Eastern oil. And in India, many people were fed-up with British dominion. According to US propaganda in 1941, US government was very much concerned about possibility that Axis forces control rest of the world while only Americas stay US allied. So, USA would have been forced to jump into war to avoid such outcome, but beating isolationism would have been much harder without Pearl Harbor.