By Yogesh Joshi

Four years after a historic nuclear deal was signed, many in American policy circles deride the agreement as a failure. They're wrong.

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The 2008 Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Agreement was supposed to mark a watershed moment for India – U.S. relations, ending the two democracies long-standing estrangement and ushering in a new era where New Delhi and Washington would be “indispensable partners.” But four years after the deal came into effect, much of the initial enthusiasm that it engendered has dissipated. Especially in American foreign policy circles, many feel that the nuclear agreement has failed to meet expectations.

From India's perspective, nuclear cooperation was a sine qua non for any meaningful growth in India-U.S. ties in other areas. That being said, there was also a genuine expectation in the U.S. that assimilating India into the nuclear mainstream would reap enormous economic, political and strategic dividends for the country. However, many of the deal’s strongest proponents at the time of its signing now claim that these gains failed to materialize.

Economically, the U.S. was attracted to the vast potential India’s large and growing nuclear energy market had for domestic nuclear firms. This viewpoint failed to take into account India’s domestic nuclear liability law, which obliges nuclear suppliers to be liable for damages their equipment results in. Many U.S. companies have balked at this requirement, and the economic gains of the deal have failed to materialize accordingly.

For many in Washington, the nuclear deal similarly failed to tie India closer to the U.S.-led global non-proliferation and arms control architecture. India has defied American expectations by making no concerted effort to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and has shown no interest in voluntarily halting its production of fissile materials (enriched uranium or plutonium). More troubling for many in Washington is India’s continued refusal to parrot the American line regarding Iran’s nuclear program.

Lastly, the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal had an explicit strategic dimension. By the turn of the 21st century, balancing China’s growing power had become a strategic imperative for the U.S., which saw India as a viable alternative to China because of its sheer size, geography, military capabilities, and democratic political values. The nuclear deal was supposed to provide the edifice of a robust security relationship between the two states centered on balancing Chinese power.

Rather than actively balancing China, India has mostly pursued a hedging strategy, as most prominently demonstrated by the unofficial but influential Nonalignment 2.0 report from earlier this year.  As Ashley Tellis presciently remarks, “for the U.S., which has just recovered from India’s Nonalignment 1.0, Nonalignment 2.0 is a strategic nightmare.” Whether India is explicitly pursuing a nonalignment redux policy or not, there’s little doubt that it has tried to avoid creating an overwhelming dependence on American military hardware.

Based on the above evidence, many in Washington speak of the false promise of the nuclear deal in transforming India-U.S. relations. This general impression is compounded by the policy paralysis with which the Manmohan Singh government has suffered for most of its present term.

There are a number of problems with the above picture, however. First, it portrays the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal as a strategic fix to India-U.S. relations rather than a strategic bet. To be sure, the Bush administration fully understood that a single document would not realign India’s entire worldview to bring it in line with the America’s own outlook. That being said, it was a calculated gamble which, once it was decided that India mattered for the U.S. at the highest levels, was the most optimal strategy to transform the bilateral relationship.

Second, the critical view also discounts the complexities that domestic politics interject into the foreign policy decision-making of democracies like India. Third, four years is a very short time period for passing any judgment on the consequences of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and, in any case, strategic choices always take some time to produce their desired results.

But most importantly, the pessimist picture suffers from a selective marshaling of evidence. For example, the issue of liability notwithstanding, the interests of American nuclear firms are being advanced by the Indian government over other foreign suppliers. In fact, just before President Bush signed the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear agreement into law, India promised to exclusively reserve approximately 10,000 MW of the nuclear reactor market for U.S. vendors. No such promises were made to other advanced nuclear technology powers. Similarly, by early 2009, two prominent locations in the industry friendly states of Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh had been reserved for the American companies Westinghouse and General Electric. As Saurav Jha rightly argues, India has only offered two dedicated locations for reactor development to American firms. Furthermore, earlier this year, U.S.-based Westinghouse and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited signed an “Early Works Agreement” for setting up five nuclear reactors at Mithivadi in the state of Gujarat.

India’s nuclear liability law does indeed create an obstacle for U.S. firms. But it is more a result of India’s democratic processes and also, to a large extent, the changed perceptions of nuclear energy after the Fukushima crisis. In fact, when the law was initially proposed, the Indian government categorically rejected any liability claims against nuclear technology suppliers. However, the memories of the Bhopal Gas tragedy and the legitimacy crisis which unfolded after Fukushima would bind the hands of the Indian government. In any case, under Indian law the supplier’s liability is limited in both the dollar amount that can be incurred — U.S.$91 million — and the time frame companies can be held liable for. Moreover, given the sheer size of India’s nuclear energy market, any amount incurred from one plant is almost certainly to be made up for by the profits made on other plants. This is especially true given the stricter safety standards of modern generations of nuclear reactors. Indeed, it’s telling that as American companies balk at the nuclear liability law, other advanced nuclear exporters like France are eagerly entering India’s nuclear market.  

Additionally, whatever economic benefits the U.S. hasn’t obtained from India’s nuclear industry pale in comparison to the enormous profits U.S. defense companies have reaped from sales to India.  Despite India’s reservations about becoming too dependent on American military hardware, over the last seven years U.S. defense corporations have received more than U.S. $8 billion worth of contracts from India, increasingly displacing Russia as India’s preferred military supplier. This is occurring despite the enormous stipulations Washington places on arms contracts and the difficulty recipient nations often have in securing spare parts for their purchases over the entire course of the contract. 

Strategically India and the U.S. have become extremely close. More than fifty joint defense exercises have taken place in the last seven years. Since 2005, India has supported all IAEA sanctions against Iran including those which reported it to the UN Security Council. India’s dependence on Iranian oil has also been reduced drastically, a fact that Hillary Clinton herself attested to recently.

With regards to China, India has offered strong support for the Obama administration’s rebalance strategy, including Washington’s increased focus on the Indian Ocean, a geographical area which New Delhi has historically guarded as its exclusive sphere of influence. New Delhi has also expanded its relationship with other U.S. allies like Japan, and has pledged to play a stronger role in protecting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Strategic convergence has also been greatly facilitated by the annual Indo-U.S. strategic dialogues that were initiated in 2010. Today the U.S. and India cooperate on a broader range of foreign policy issues than at any other time in the history of their bilateral relationship.

With President Obama’s reelection and Prime Minister Singh’s renewed focus on pursuing reforms and important policy decisions, a claim can be made that outstanding issues in the nuclear deal have a good chance to be resolved. But, while not denying the need for more engagement between the two nations in realizing the objectives of the nuclear deal, there is a strong case to be made that critics of the deal simply lack the patience that a historic strategic reorientation requires.

Yogesh Joshi is a doctoral student in international politics at the Center for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and a CSIS-Pacific Forum Young Leader. He recently joined the steering committee of the International Network of Emerging Nuclear Specialists and represented India at Global Zero World Summits in Paris (2010) and London (2011).

Photo Credit: White House Photo by Pete Souza

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    1. luvs

      obama came to india to make a business deal which would create 50,000 jobs in america while giving free aids to pakistan ….now i have two questions
      1 who needs whom?
      2 trust america?

      Reply
      • Anjaan

        @ luvs,
        I love you …. that is all I can say ………. !!!

        Reply
        • luvs

          i can understand …..

          Reply
    2. luvs

       

      @ MEGAKIDS - KNOW ABOUT YOUR COUNTRY THEN COMMENT ON OTHERS
      Every 45 seconds someone in the United States is sexually assaulted (1).
      1 out of every 6 women currently in college has been raped (2), however, 9 out of 10 women raped on campus never tell anyone about the rape (3).
      1 in 10 men is raped in his lifetime (4), 1 in 7 of those victims will have been assaulted before the age of 18.
      More than 61.5% of rapes are never reported to law enforcement (5).
      Approximately 35% of rape is committed by an acquaintance, and 17% by a relative other than spouse (6).
      74% of sexual assaults are perpetrated by assailants well known to the victim (7).
      A female child victim is 7 times more likely to be re-victimized as an adult (8).
      Nearly 6 out of 10 sexual assaults occur at the victim’s home or the home of a friend, relative, or neighbor (9).
      1 in 15 rape victims contract a sexually transmitted disease (STD) as a result of being raped (10).
       
      The United States has the world’s highest rape rate of all countries that publish such data- 13 times higher than England and more than 20 times higher than Japan (12).
      An American woman is 10 times more likely to be raped than to die in a car crash (13).
      61% of rape victims are females under the age of 18 (14).
      Contrary to common belief that violent crime rates are notably lower in rural areas, a recent analysis of location data collected for the 1999 National Women’s Study found that 10.1% of women living in rural areas had experienced a completed rape as compared to 13.6% of women living in urban and suburban communities—hardly a notably lower rate.

      Lewis, S. 2003. Unspoken Crimes: Sexual Assault in Rural America, Enola, PA: National Sexual Violence Resource Center
      References:
      U.S. Department of Justice, 1994 
      Statistics on Sexual Violence Against Women, 1990; Woodruff & Koss 
      Rape Treatment Center of Santa Monica Longitudinal Study, 1995 
      Indiana Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2002 & The American Medical Association, 2000 
      Indiana Coalition Against Sexual Assault, 2002 
      U.S. Department of Justice, 1994 
      U.S. Department of Justice, 1994 
      Indiana Coalition Against Sexual Assault, 2002 
      National Crime Victimization Survey, 1996 
      Statistics on Sexual Violence Against Women: A Criminological Study, 1990 
      Ibid. #10 Senate Judiciary Committee, 1990 
      Ibid. #12 American Medical Association, 2000

      Reply
      • Davos

        Luvs, How do you presume that Megakids is from the US???? Your presumptions and attitude is yet another example of why India is where it is. When ever any criticism is directed at India, most Indians jump up and down defending India with irrelevant facts and not accepting any constructive criticism, instead of focusing on how to making real change.
        Although I don't agree with all Megakids comments (he seems to have a lack of understanding of India's history for starters), he is correct in stating that India's historical stature, will not be enough to be a truly relevant power in the coming years.

        Reply
      • a.p.

        Nationalism is a very bad thing. Crimes are the consequence of all the advanced countries and liberty, obviously if you are in a totalitarian state or in Iran you have not that data or you don't even know about them…. A person not from US

        Reply
    3. Christian

      The US and India are meant for each other. Both Americans and Indians have a penchant for killing.
      Americans kill defenseless children and teachers with guns. Indians rape and kill defenseless women.
      These are the two greatest nations of the twenty-first century!

      Reply
      • Bankotsu

        I rather India join China and Russia to create multipolar world rather than gang up with U.S to contain China.
        If India fights China, there won't be a multipolar world and the U.S will win.

        Reply
      • started-me-thinking

        Abu Ghraib seems pretty much forgotten today being no longer in the daily news. But AB was a microcosm of what's wrong (or right) with these two countries. As for one of them, rapes and murders though horrible pale in comparison to the numerous acid attacks against defenceless people. Such acts are totally and revulsively inhuman.

        Reply
        • Anjaan

          @ started-me-thinking,
          Have you noted the difference ……. ?
          1. One is horrific criminal act …… by individuals, where there is no public or state support …. as in case of US school shooting, or the cases of Indian rape and murder.
          2.  The other is equally horrific criminal act ….. this time committed by the State, with full public support, against another state and its people ….. there are numerous examples ………the US in Vietnam, Combodia, Iraq …. and  Pakistan in Afghanistan, Mumbai and Kashmir are the prime examples …….

          Reply

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