The TPP, Abenomics and America’s Asia Pivot
Image Credit: REUTERS/Toru Hanai

The TPP, Abenomics and America’s Asia Pivot

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Japan’s entrance into the Trans-Pacific Partnership free-trade treaty negotiations is arguably the most important event in U.S. relations with the Asia-Pacific in the last decade. This is because the sustainability of long-term American strategic power in Asia and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s attempts to resuscitate the Japanese economy are entirely co-dependent. Without an economically resurgent Japan, Asia will be increasingly sucked away from the U.S. and into the Chinese economic and strategic orbit. Washington’s Asia pivot is not complete without a Japan-powered TPP, which both supports its growing Asia-Pacific political and security alliance and acts as an economic containment treaty against China.

Just as the Soviet Union relied on a massive military arsenal for its power, Chinese influence derives overwhelmingly from its economy. Until now, the U.S. has had relatively few economic levers in its Asia pivot, with the exception of free trade agreements (FTAs) with its firmest friends: Australia, Singapore and Korea. Instead, Washington has focused mainly on political and military efforts, whether improving frosty relations with former foes such as Vietnam or deploying additional regional ballistic missile defense resources.

If implemented, the TPP including Japan fixes this economic gap in America’s Asia policy by increasing trade flows among its members, making them less dependent on trade with China and thereby strengthening their economic position relative to their giant neighbor. Importantly, Japan’s participation as the largest Asian economy in the TPP multiplies the treaty’s economic network effects. It also gets the U.S. back in the free-trade game, given that China has already signed, or is pursuing, FTAs with a number of TPP member-countries including Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Chile.

The TPP also complements Washington’s security relationships. TPP countries are predominantly close U.S. military allies that share concerns about – and often bear the brunt of – China’s aggressive regional military swagger. Tokyo’s reliance on shipping lanes for hydrocarbon imports provides a fulcrum for coordinated efforts on regional energy and security policies, including blunting ongoing Chinese attempts to intimidate TPP members on maritime boundary claims and the valuable oil and gas that lies beneath the seabed.

U.S. strategy in Asia relies on the economic rejuvenation of Japan, which in turn relies on Abe’s three-pronged economic program. The first two elements of Abenomics, fiscal and monetary, are already in place and are set to continue for the foreseeable future. This is the easy stuff of economic policy which sweetens the patient for the bitter medicine to follow. The Bank of Japan’s massive monetary easing (which is bigger than that of the U.S. Federal Reserve’s efforts), record deficit spending and rising inflation expectations are the first caffeine boosts to the Japanese economy. Like double espressos on an empty stomach, the java fix is powerful at first, but eventually fades. This is why Abe intends to implement domestic structural reform to permanently waken Japan from its two-decade economic slumber.

Politically, Abe is relying on the TPP negotiations as a vehicle to drive this structural reform agenda. The central plank of these reforms is improving Japan’s competitiveness and regaining its export edge. The TPP will lead to lower costs for imported goods, increased regional access for Japanese exporters and reduced Japanese reliance on trade with China. However this export boost requires the successful execution of contentious domestic initiatives, including raising the consumption tax rate, lifting workforce participation, lowering electricity prices through deregulation, and encouraging foreign direct investment. The biggest challenge for the Prime Minister is cutting Japanese tariff and non-tariff barriers on key staples such as rice, given the LDP’s rural voting base and resulting opposition within his own party. Not surprisingly, Abe has already indicated that he will partially protect key agricultural sectors in order to persuade his MPs to support the rest of his agenda.

Comments
2
Ross Sterling
August 8, 2013 at 18:22

..'a run on Japanese bonds-as they lose their safe haven for foreign investors, with declining numbers of Japanese to pick up the slack'…this is an all too familiar argument to support the impending doom of the Japanese economy but in reality foreign holding of Japanese debt only accounts for 8.4%. Compare this to the Greek situation (an extreme example I know) where foregin holding of debt was ~70% and the fact that Japan has levers over its owen currency and you can quicly realise that the situation is vastly different.

paul kim
August 7, 2013 at 10:53

With debt burden at 230% of GDP, assuming of all of it expires and has to be replaced at 2% interests, that's 4.6% of GDP. You are suggesting Japanese government's tax receipt is around 4.6% GDP. How can it be, besides, the majority of Japan's debt are beyond five-years maturity and the cost of debt servicing were fixed at the time of debt issurance. 

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