On Tuesday July 4, North Korean television announced that the country had successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) earlier in the day. As per the Wall Street Journal:
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The missile, identified as the Hwasong-14, was launched at a steep trajectory and flew 933 kilometers (580 miles), reaching an altitude of 2,802 kilometers, according to North Korean state television. The numbers are in line with analyses from U.S., South Korean and Japanese military authorities.
Here in Seoul, things seemed to continue on as usual, which tends to be the case in this city more than used to similar news. The biggest strategic consequence, of course, is for the United States. A successful intercontinental ballistic missile of this sort could potentially strike anywhere in Alaska.
With the latest launch, North Korea took one step further along the nuclear side of the byungjin line of parallel development of nuclear weapons and the national economy, and arguably, one step back on the economic side of the dual-track policy. In the formulation of the byungjin line, of course, both are interrelated. Missile launches are often described as evidence of progress in industry and science, ultimately benefiting economic progress. This launch was no exception, as seen in KCNA’s statement on July 4 (emphasis added):
The success in the test-fire of inter-continental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14, final gate to rounding off the state nuclear force, at just one go is a powerful manifestation of the invincible state might and the tremendous capability of the self-reliant national defense industry of Juche Korea that has advanced at a remarkably rapid pace under the great Workers’ Party of Korea’s new line on the simultaneous development of the two fronts, and a great auspicious event to be specially recorded in the history of the DPRK which has long craved for powerful defense capabilities.
To put this launch in context, it happened as North Korea is already under sanctions designed to strike at its coal exports, one of its most important sources of income, and the United States has just signaled its resolve to go after North Korea’s financial channels through secondary sanctions of Chinese entities. At the same time, Kim Jong-un’s tenure has very much come to be associated with some economic progress (albeit starting from low level, and primarily benefiting the relatively privileged classes), symbolized by projects such as the recently opened Ryomyong Street.
It is not yet clear what the consequences for the test launch will be. The United States will likely try to add more sanctions targeted against specific entities and persons that help North Korea evade sanctions and acquire equipment for its nuclear and missile programs.
The United States will probably also call for international sanctions, but as Chad O’Carroll points out, Washington may have a hard time getting such measures through in a quick manner given its currently tense relationships with both Moscow and Beijing. The United States may also further push Beijing to implement the already existing sanctions against North Korea, but nothing appears to have changed with the claimed ICBM test that would fundamentally alter China’s strategic calculations in the region. In other words, Beijing continues to regard North Korea as a buffer between itself and U.S. forces in the region, and as a geopolitical asset.
Whatever happens, it is safe to assume that it will not be good news for North Korea’s international ties in diplomacy, trade, and finance. It would be easy to assume that economic progress and nuclear weapons development are mutually exclusive, since the second leads to further international isolation and economic sanctions, and therefore hampers the first.
In reality, that may be true. The North Korean byungjin narrative, that weapons development helps economic progress, is difficult to swallow, especially when one considers the opportunity cost that the weapons programs carry, both in terms of domestic resource dedication and the cost in international isolation.
But there is another way to look at it. Whatever the actual consequences will turn out to be, North Korea is making a strategic calculation that the gains from the test, and from overall nuclear weapons and missiles development, will be greater than the potential costs and downsides. Consider the following two factors.
First, North Korea has made economic progress in the past few years, and particularly since Kim Jong-un came to power, even under years of severe sanctions. North Korea has been under various forms of UN Security Council sanctions since its first nuclear test in 2006. During these years, its economic development has been impacted far more by domestic policy decisions than by international developments.
Again, we are absolutely not talking about any growth miracle, and some probably exaggerate the degree of the wealth increase in North Korea over the past few years. But without a doubt, North Korea is far better off now than it was 11 years ago, and worlds apart from the famine of the 1990s. Food insecurity prevails in North Korea but the country has not seen widespread starvation since the late 1990s. Largely thanks to better (or rather less predatory) economic frameworks and increased space for private production and trade within the economic system, things are looking much better today than in many years.
Just look at this video recently published by the Daily NK of markets in Chongjin, one of North Korea’s largest cities in its northeast. Is this long-term, sustainable growth that will eventually lead North Koreans to enjoy the same prosperity as their counterparts in South Korea or even China? Probably not. But at least it’s something.
Second, and relatedly, North Korea likely has numerous channels for trade and various transactions that are not commonly known, but that play highly significant roles for the economy. For example, consider the information that Ri Jong-ho, a former official in North Korea’s Office 39, supplied in a recent interview with Kyodo News. Ri claims that North Korea procures up to 300,000 tons of fuel and various oil products from Russia each year, through dealers based in Singapore. As a point of comparison, a commonly cited figure for crude oil supplies from China is 520,ooo tons per year. Proportionately, then, 300,000 tons is not close to a majority, but still represents a significant amount for North Korea. While intelligence services or others with access to classified information may have known this already, Ri’s claims, if true (they have not and in all likelihood cannot be fully corroborated), show the extent to which North Korea is using work-arounds to bypass sanctions.
The point here is that North Korea has gotten used to going through back channels and unconventional means to acquire highly significant amounts of supplies required for its society to function. It is an economic system where unconventional (and often illicit) channels of trade are not exceptions, but core parts of the economic management toolbox. This is not to argue that sanctions do not or cannot work. Rather, it shows the extent to which unconventional methods are institutionalized within economic management in North Korea.
The North Korean government is no monolith, and there are almost certainly some parts of the governing apparatus that are more and less pleased with the ICBM test. But in the higher echelons of the leadership, the strategic calculation is probably that even with the added sanctions that are very likely to come, North Korea will be able to continue along roughly the same economic strategies as it has thus far. Perhaps we can call it North Korea’s own “strategic patience”: continuing with patchwork strategies for international economic relations, with little concern for the impact of lack of sustainable growth on people’s livelihoods, while banking on eventual recognition as a nuclear power. Only time will tell whether targeted secondary sanctions will change that calculation.
Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein is the co-editor of North Korean Economy Watch and an associate scholar with the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
This post was originally published by North Korean Economy Watch and appears with kind permission.