Every Friday, The Diplomat looks out across the net to find the best articles and analysis involving defense, strategic affairs, and foreign policy. From America’s pivot to Asia, China’s growing military power, important defense trends, to the various territorial spats across the region, The Diplomat has you covered with what you need to know going into the weekend.

Here is our top ones this Friday. Have we missed something you think should be included? Want to share an important article with other readers? Please submit your links in the comment box below! Happy Friday!

Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin announced on Friday that Russia is trying to develop “terrorist-killer robots.”

A South Korean government think tank has confirmed the Pentagon’s estimate that North Korea may now have up to 200 mobile missile launchers. Previously, Seoul had assessed that Pyongyang had at most 94 such units.

Ahead of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s trip to India next week, Afghan’s envoy to Delhi called on India to increase its defense cooperation with the government in Kabul. “We would like to have both lethal and non-lethal assistance to our defense forces” from the Indian government, Afghanistan’s Ambassador to India, Shaida M Abdali, told reporters on Thursday.

The U.S. Navy’s chief of naval operations and the chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force have a jointly written op-ed on Foreign Policy today on how the U.S. can overcome anti-access challenges.

Breaking Defense (formally AOL Defense) reports that after failing its first test in 2008, America’s Raytheon-built SM-3 Block IB missile completed its third successful test in a row this week when it shot down a missile over the Pacific Ocean. “The SM-3 IB is the latest iteration of the venerable Standard Missile, the main weapon fired by the fleet’s Lockheed Martin-built Aegis defense system, which makes it central to the Navy’s role in missile defense,” the report explained.

A new report by AMI International estimates that China and India’s Navies will each purchase 100 new ships and submarines by 2032.

The U.S. Navy's “newest and most advanced nuclear-powered attack submarine” successfully completed its Alpha and Bravo Sea Trials. Its nuclear missile submarine replacement program is not going as smoothly, however.

Despite growing questions concerning cost overruns and survivability in conflict, the U.S. Navy plans to send 11 littoral combat ships (LCS) to the Pacific region by 2022, the U.S. Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations, Jonathan Greenert, said this week, Xinhua and Jane’s reported.

Speaking at the International Maritime Defence Exhibition and Conference (IMDEX) in Singapore on Tuesday, Greenert told reporters that the Navy ultimately hopes to deploy four LCS to Singapore by 2022, with the remaining seven heading to Sasebo, Japan, where they will replace the mine countermeasures ships currently stationed there.

The LCS is a fast, maneuverable, and multi-mission surface ship that is designed most immediately to enable the U.S. Navy to operate a shallow vessel in coastal waters to deal with a number of different emerging asymmetric threats, including anti-access challenges.

The Navy first ordered LCS in 2004 and under the most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan will ultimately procure 52 vessels, down from the 82 it planned to purchase in early 2005. They come in the Freedom variant and Independence variant, which are being built by Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics, respectively.

The first LCS, the USS Freedom (LCS 1), left its home port in San Diego in March of this year and reached Singapore in the middle of last month to begin an eight-month deployment, its maiden overseas voyage. It was expected to participate in the IMDEX conference this week.

At the conference Greenert said that nations in the region had been impressed with the USS Freedom’s capabilities. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin used IMDEX to pitch a multi-mission ship similar to the LCS to Southeast Asian nations, including Singapore.

Inside the U.S., however, the LCS program has lately come under increasing scrutiny. An internal U.S. Navy report written last year but leaked to the press this month questioned whether it was too lightly armed and manned to fulfill its declared missions. A report by Bloomberg News, which obtained a copy of the report, said:

“This review highlights the gap between ship capabilities and the missions the Navy will need LCS to execute. Failure to adequately address LCS requirements and capabilities will result in a large number of ships that are ill-suited to execute” the warfighting needs of regional commanders.

The report went on to note that the ship’s width may prevent it from utilizing certain ports and judged the decision to procure two LCS variants as creating unnecessary logistical and maintenance burdens.

Compounding the ship’s troubles, many of the planned ships are now running between eight and thirteen months behind schedule. This revelation has prompted criticism from some members of Congress, including Senator John McCain (R-AZ). At a Congressional hearing earlier this month, Sen. McCain noted: “The Navy plans for the Littoral Combat Ship to comprise over one-third of the nation’s total surface combatant fleet by 2028, and yet the LCS has not demonstrated to date any adequate performance of assigned missions…. We need to fix it, or find something else quickly.”

Navy officials have continued to defend the LCS, however. Speaking on board the USS Freedom on Saturday, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus said the program had started out as a mess but has since become one of the Navy’s best performing programs.

Calling LCS “an incredibly capable ship,” Mabus said that the ships are “going to be one of the most important crucial platforms in the United States Navy in the future.”

Fresh off a three-week standoff over their disputed border, the Line of Actual Control (LAC), China and India are taking steps to repair their relationship and possibly set it on a more stable long-term trajectory.

Although the standoff ended with the withdrawal of troops from the border on May 6, and Indian External Minister Salman Khurshid’s subsequent visit to China last week, recent overtures from both sides, but especially from Beijing, suggest a desire to quickly repair the damage done to the bilateral relationship.

Ahead of his trip to India next week, China’s Premier Li Keqiang told a visiting Indian youth delegation on Wednesday that India and China "must shake hands" to make Asia an "engine of the world economy.”

“Many people in the world believe that in the 21st century, the Asia-Pacific, Asia in particular will play a more important role in global economy and politics and that Asia will become an important engine for the world economy,” Li said, adding: “For this vision to truly come true, our two countries must shake hands and conduct exchanges so that together we can raise the standing of Asia in the world and truly make Asian economy an important engine for the world economy.”

Li’s remarks followed similar ones made by Qin Gang, the Director-General of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Information Department. In a trip to India on Monday, Qin assured his Indian hosts that Beijing viewed the recent border incident as an “isolated” incident that should not be allowed to affect broader bilateral relations. Qin also praised the two sides’ use of the joint border dispute resolution mechanism to ensure the standoff remained a “local” issue that didn’t spill over into other issues.

Most notably, Qin stressed that one lesson China was taking away from the recent standoff is the urgent need to agree to a final settlement on the border.

“We need to redouble our efforts to push forward the framework for negotiations so that we can reach a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution at an early date,” Qin said, Indian media outlets reported.

Following closely on the heels of Qin’s visit, which was mainly to prepare for Premier Li’s trip to India from May 19-21, Chinese and Indian military officials held their own talks on Wednesday at the Multipurpose Complex of Chinese Army (PLA) on the Chinese side of the border.

Although these are all positive signs for the short-term, it’s not at all certain that any actual progress on resolving the border issue will follow. Talking about the need to solve the border issue has never been the problem—agreeing on issues has been. After all, the two sides have held 15 rounds of talks on the border question over the years, and are still stuck on the second of a three-phase approach for reaching a final agreement. Notably, each step in the process gets progressively more detailed and so more difficult to come to terms on.

Still, there are strong and growing economic incentives to reach an agreement. The two sides have seen their bilateral trade metastasize in recent years, rising from US$3 billion in 2000 to US$80 billion today. With China already India’s largest trading partner, the two sides aim to increase annual trade volumes to US$100 billion by 2015. Leaders in Beijing are also putting increasing importance on China's trade with India, as evident by Li’s decision to make India the destination for his first visit abroad in his new position.

Yet, the bilateral exchange still heavily favors China, with India running a US$20 billion trade deficit with Beijing in 2011. Like the border standoff, this is cause for concern among certain quarters in New Delhi.

On Sunday evening, Dr. Kenneth Waltz passed away at the age of 88. Waltz is best known for his books Man, the State, and War and Theory of International Politics. The first book set the terms on which researchers would approach the study of international relations, dividing theories between first image (individuals and human nature), second image (regime type, such as communist or democratic), and third image (systemic effects). Waltz himself preferred the third; Theory of International Politics formed the basis of Waltz’ answer to what he believed was the most important question of international relations: “Why do balances recur?” His answer: states in anarchy, whether communist, capitalist, or monarchist, sought security, and most readily found that security through balancing behavior. 

Waltz hardly believed that states and individuals didn’t matter, as he regularly engaged in policy recommendation. Rather, he believed that systemic factors, largely beyond the reach of states and statesmen, explained the most important international phenomena. In part because of his belief in the robustness of balancing tendencies, Waltz had little patience with what he regarded as unnecessary military interventions. The United States would not lose the Cold War because it lost Vietnam; rather, we would expect that other states in the neighborhood would balance against Soviet, Chinese and Vietnamese power, and even that the three communist states would balance against one another. The developing relationship between Washington and Hanoi, based on concerns about China, vindicates this belief. Similarly, Waltz warned against America’s pointless war in Iraq.

Later in his career, Dr. Waltz’ work focused on the promise of nuclear proliferation to bring “peace in the post-war world.” Waltz argued that the costs of nuclear war were too great for a pair of nuclear-capable antagonists to fight one another to the bitter end. Consequently, limited proliferation could help ensure peace between historic antagonists. Unsurprisingly, these arguments were welcomed in states with nuclear potential, such as India. Waltz wasn’t afraid of applying this argument to Iran, arguing that nuclear capability would make Iran both more secure and more careful about its international behavior.

The relevance of Waltz’ work to contemporary East Asian politics is obvious, and can in some ways be seen through U.S. regional policy. The growth of Chinese power will threaten China’s neighbors; these neighbors will seek to balance against China, either through internal (increased defense spending) or external (alliance building) means. The specifics of conflicts like the Senkaku and Spratly island disputes aren’t irrelevant, but they must be understood in context of this broader framework. The long-term ability of states like Japan and South Korea to remain non-nuclear also stands in some question.

But we need not accept the implications of Waltz’ arguments as gospel truth.  Any framework of analysis necessarily excludes some variables, or else it is of no utility. Study of the “gaps” between Waltz’ images, such as transnational contacts, non-governmental organizations, and international norms, has been enormously profitable from a research standpoint. Changes in states, and in the way people interact within and between them, may indeed transform the nature of structural anarchy such that the future will differ from the past.

Kenneth Waltz’ influence lives on directly through his students, the roster of whom reads like an A-list of international relations theory. In many ways the study of IR has grown beyond the bounds that Waltz set, but he remains the critical starting point for virtually everyone who dedicates themselves to the academic pursuit of international relations. Dr. Waltz’ contribution was immeasurable, and his presence will surely be missed.

Last week, lost in the buzz that was the U.S. Department of Defense's latest assessment of China (see Andrew Erickson's Take here), DoD released another very important report with some crucial information all its own.

Entitled Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2012, the report, in its unclassified format, attempts to provide information concerning "the current and future military power of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)."

There are quite a few important nuggets of information in the report. I would encourage Flashpoints readers to read the document in its entirety, but here are some of the highlights:

From the Executive Summary:

"North Korea fields a large, forward-deployed military that retains the capability to inflict serious damage on the ROK, despite significant resource shortfalls and aging hardware. The DPRK continues to be deterred from conducting attacks on the ROK largely because of the strength of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. On a smaller scale, however, the DPRK has demonstrated its willingness to use military provocation to achieve national goals, such as in 2010 when it sank the ROK naval vessel CHEONAN, killing 46 ROK Navy sailors, and shelled Yeonpyeong Island, killing two ROK Marines and two civilians."

North Korean Security Perceptions:

"North Korean threat perceptions are shaped by a legacy of guerilla warfare dating back to its anti–colonial struggle against the Japanese, political and economic isolation, experience during wartime, and a political culture that is defined by an unending existential struggle with outside forces. North Korea has portrayed the ROK and the United States as constant threats to North Korea’s sovereignty, in a probable attempt to legitimize and justify the Kim family rule, its draconian internal control mechanisms, and its existing strategies as the best defense against encroachments on the North’s sovereignty."

Strategic Goals:

"Since the loss of the Soviet Union as a principal benefactor, devastating famine of the 1990s, and the economic rise and political maturation of the ROK, North Korea has largely abandoned unilaterally enforced reunification as a practical goal. North Korean goals and strategies reflect the reality of political isolation, significant economic deprivation, a deteriorating conventional military, and the increasing political and military power of nearby states. Nevertheless, the North has pursued a military posture that allows it to influence coercively South Korea through provocation and intimidation, and to attempt to have as equal a voice as possible in the future of the Peninsula."

One area the report touches on that is of major importance to security watchers is North Korea's other weapons of Mass Destruction that are non nuclear; mainly Biological:

"Open sources have often reported defector allegations of a North Korean biological warfare program. North Korea continues to research bacterial and viral biological agents that could support an offensive Biological Weapons program. Infrastructure, combined with its weapons industry, gives North Korea a potentially robust biological warfare capability."

And Chemical:

"North Korea probably has had a longstanding Chemical Weapons (CW) program with the capability to produce nerve, blister, blood, and choking agents and likely possesses a CW stockpile. North Korea probably could employ CW agents by modifying a variety of conventional munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles. In addition, North Korean forces are prepared to operate in a contaminated environment; they train regularly in chemical defense operations. North Korea is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention."

Such reports, as can be seen in the recent China DoD report, give scholars without security clearance a window into modern U.S. national security thinking. They can serve as a guide to the capabilities and assets potential adversaries may pose, potential military strategies and doctrines, and even sometimes areas of cooperation and hopes for compromise.

The danger in such reports is that certain lines or phrases can be cherry picked by various parties for agenda setting or even domestic propaganda. Just a quick survey over China's reaction to  the recent DoD report as well as various pundits' reactions to Australia's recent white paper demonstrate this point. Nonetheless, such defense assessments are important for researchers, scholars, and interested parties to move beyond the headlines and take a more analytical view.

So North Korea watchers and media, read the report in full. It's worth your time.

As many Flashpoints readers are fully aware by this point, I have a true passion for the military doctrine and strategy that has come to be known as Anti-Access/Area Denial, or A2/AD for short.

Called by one party "counter intervention operations," various nations around the world are building up asymmetrical strategies to deny access to contested areas of geographic importance or potential areas of conflict. Weapons like cruise missiles, mines, and quiet conventional submarines would all be used to deny a potential opponent access to various domains such as air, sea, land, or even space or cyber realms. The goal is to level the playing field militarily, so a smaller nation with fewer resources can combat the advantages held by larger, more modern powers.

Indeed, one area scholars interested in A2/AD seem to miss – or maybe just don't emphasize to my liking – is the multi-domain nature of such a strategy. Military planners who wish to utilize such tactics would need to plan across all domains in order to create a viable strategy and defeat an opponent with most likely a more modern military on paper. Indeed, creating a multi-domain A2/AD strategy that is robust in multiple areas would have major advantages. One could attempt to signal to a potential opponent that the costs of conflict or intervention would be so high that risking conflict would not be worth it – deterrence at its very finest.

Cyber is one area that many A2/AD enthusiasts seem to deemphasize. It would be easiest to operate and stop a potential enemy from accessing contested territory or a conflict zone if you are able to halt the ability of forces to gain access to something as simple as GPS. You can't fight if you don't know where you are – simple as that. In last year's Joint Operational Access Concept document, where the report sites key antiaccess capabilities, cyber is mentioned: "Cyber attack capabilities designed to disrupt U.S. command and control systems and critical infrastructure, both civilian and military." While this mention is clearly important, it is listed fifth on a list of six key concepts.

Yet, Cyber could be and should be considered the likely instrument of choice when attempting to deny an adversary access. A combatant could launch a cyber attack utilizing a third party or proxy to damage a potential foe’s command and control (C2) or C4ISR to inhibit communications and effectiveness of combat operations. Utilizing a proxy could give the attacking party deniability and create a level of doubt not only on the other side, but also in the media as well.

Also, using cyber is certainly more cost effective than designing, building and testing expensive advanced military equipment. All in all, cyber certainly needs to gain a higher level of appreciation when we consider future A2/AD tactics and strategy. Why send missiles or submarines when you can use weapons that have deniability and cost little to employ?

With controversy swirling last week surrounding a possible Russian sale of an advanced air-defense system, the S-300, to Syria, there are even more sophisticated air-defense platforms designed by Moscow that military planners around the world may soon have to anticipate dealing with.

The S-400, the next generation of air-defense systems, has the potential to create serious problems for fighter aces around the world.

"The 400 is an evolution of the 300.  It has many features specifically designed to overcome countermeasures and stealth, such as a larger, more powerful radar that is more resistant to jamming.  It also actually has a set of three missiles of varying range that provide overlapping layers of defense," Ivan Oelrich, an independent defense analyst and adjunct professor at the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University, told The Diplomat. 

"The S-400, or Triumph, consists of a radar and several missiles. The main radar tracks targets, calculates an intercept course, and sends guidance signals to the missiles, directing them toward the target.  When the missiles get close enough, they switch over to an independent, on-board guidance system for the final attack."

Oelrich explained the system is not combat tested nor has it been sold outside of Russia, so information on the system is limited.

While such an advanced air-defense platform could certainly create problems for strategic planners, even the most advanced technologies like the S-400 require proper training.

"Even very capable weapons, especially sophisticated and complex systems, are of limited use when in the hands of poorly trained users and the missile would have to be part of a comprehensive air-defense system," explains Orelich.

"It turns out that Syria has a fairly thick air defense system but, as recent Israeli attacks demonstrate, it can be penetrated.  If the weaknesses of the system are due to poor training, discipline, and doctrine, then adding a high performance system will not help much." 

So could we see the S-400 being sold to other militaries besides Russia?

"The Russian government says that [foreign] sales are sometime off while the manufacturer has suggested that foreign sales are possible. These things are very hard to predict but I would be extremely surprised if Russia sold the missiles to Syria while the current crisis continues; it would be seen as an extremely provocative escalation."

The 15-tonne Kuang Ta Hsing No. 28 was docked at the Ta Fu fishing port on Siaoliouciou, off Pingtung County in Taiwan’s south. Forensic technicians were busy photographing the 55 bullet holes, some in thick parts on the port side, that had been discovered on the fishing vessel — evidence, preliminary analyses said, that a heavy-caliber machine gun was used.

Two days earlier, on May 9, the fishing boat had been fired upon by a Philippine government vessel while operating some 164 nautical miles southeast of Taiwan’s southernmost tip. The unarmed crew took cover in the cabin, but for Hung Shih-cheng, a 65-year-old Taiwanese fisherman, it was too late. He was killed when a bullet penetrated the right side of his neck.

The accounts differ. Philippine authorities claim that the fishing boat was intercepted approximately 43 nautical miles east of Balintang Island in the Balintang channel, and was therefore operating illegally in their country’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). They also contend that the Kuang Ta Hsing provoked the shooting by trying to ram the Filipino Maritime Control Surveillance 3001, an “aggressive act” that forced its crew to take defensive action.

Philippine coastguard spokesman, Commander Armand Balilo, said the coast guard fired at the machinery to disable the Kuang Ta Hsing and was unaware that a crewmember had been hit.

For its part, Taiwan countered that the incident occurred in the countries’ overlapping exclusive economic zones. Hung Yu-chih, skipper of the Kuang Ta Hsing No. 28 and son of the deceased, denies any attempt was made to ram the much larger coast guard vessel.

Taiwan and the Philippines, which have no official diplomatic ties and have overlapping claims over a series of islands in the South China Sea, have yet to ink a fisheries agreement such as the one that was signed last month between Taipei and Tokyo to regulate areas near the disputed Diaoyutai/Senkaku islets in the East China Sea.

The incident has sparked outrage in Taiwan, which argues that the excessive force used by the Philippine coast guard against unarmed fishermen was unacceptable. A handful of legislators from the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) have called the shooting an “act of war” rather than an accident, though such views are in the minority. Compounding the anger are memories of a similar incident on January 15, 2006, in which another Taiwanese fisherman was killed when a Philippine government vessel opened fire. Nobody was ever held accountable for the death.

Although there have been few public displays of anger in Taiwan over the matter, a small group of Taipei City councilors from the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), accompanied by pro-independence organizations, protested outside the Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO), the Philippines’s de-facto embassy in Taiwan, and threw shoes at the building, on Monday. Hundreds of members from an estimated 30 fishermen’s associations also held a peaceful protest in front of MECO later in the day, throwing eggs and burning the Philippine flag. A few passers-by shouted that Philippine workers should be expelled.

Taipei’ response has been firm, with the Ma Ying-jeou administration demanding a full investigation, an official apology from Manila, compensation for the family of the victim, and the start of negotiations over a fishery agreement as soon as possible. On May 11, Taipei issued a 72-hour ultimatum and said that if these demands were not met by midnight on May 14, Taiwan would retaliate by suspending the processing of applications by Philippine workers (there are about 87,000 of them in Taiwan), recall its representative to Manila, and expel the Philippines’ envoy. The U.S. government, which has refused to take sides in the matter, was apprised of the ultimatum before it was issued.

Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration also announced that it would hold off on an amendment to an aviation pact between Taiwan and the Philippines.

At the time of this writing, Manila’s official response has not satisfied Taipei, which has called it “unacceptable” and “frivolous.” Antonio Basilio, the Philippines’ representative in Taiwan, departed for the Philippines early on May 13 for emergency consultations in Manila. According to Taiwan’s foreign ministry, Manila was evaluating how to respond and was expected to issue an official response by Tuesday’s deadline. Taiwanese investigators, meanwhile, will depart for the Philippines later this week to initiate a joint investigation.

As the war of words intensifies, both sides have launched cyber-attacks, though it’s unlikely they were orchestrated by government agencies. Taiwan’s Presidential Office confirmed that its web site had been hacked on Sunday, and that the attacks had been traced back to the Philippines. Other government web sites, including the Ministry of National Defense, the Coast Guard Administration, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, were also targeted, it said.

Meanwhile, several Philippine government web sites reported they had been the targets of denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks from computers in Taiwan.

In a sign of escalation, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) has reinforced patrols in the area where the incident occurred with two ships, in addition to the two already there, and is considering extending its operations in the South China Sea by 100 nautical miles. Legislators have also requested that the CGA’s recently commissioned Hsinbei, a 2,000-tonne patrol ship equipped with a 40mm antiaircraft cannon, be dispatched to the South China Sea to hold exercises should Manila fail to meet Taipei’s demands.

Meanwhile, the Navy dispatched one Lafayette-class frigate to the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines on Sunday to ensure the safety of Taiwanese fishermen. Furthermore, the Ministry of National Defense announced on Monday that one Chengkung-class frigate and one Kidd-class destroyer would also head for the area this week to participate in a joint exercise with the CGA near the location of last week’s shooting.

There is no indication that the Philippine coast guard and Navy intend to respond in kind.

The Legislative Yuan also adopted a resolution on Monday calling on the CGA to intercept and board any Philippine fishing vessel entering Taiwan’s 200 nautical mile EEZ if Manila fails to meet the 72-hour deadline.

China, which claims the entire South China Sea and has its own sovereignty disputes with the Philippines, also weighed in on the incident, calling it “barbaric” and requesting an investigation.

Ironically, the risk of Chinese involvement in the dispute — Beijing never misses a chance to “side” with Taiwan, which it regards as one of its provinces, in regional disputes — will force Taipei to strike a careful balance between showing firmness with Manila and avoiding escalatory action that could compel China to take action. Already, Taiwan’s foreign ministry has stated that it will not cooperate with China in the dispute, a decision that Beijing will again wrongly attribute to the government’s fear of angering the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), although opposition to such cooperation spans Taiwan’s political spectrum.

Philippine President Benigno Aquino called for calm on Monday, but refused to comment further on the crisis, saying that comments at the presidential level risked escalating tensions.

The release of the Australian Defense White Paper (DWP) has attracted much international attention and commentary. Some analysts have noted the more conciliatory language on China compared with the 2009 DWP. While there is some truth to this claim, there is no basis to argue that the positions taken on China in the new DWP are too “soft” or that they suggest a disconnect between Canberra and Washington. The DWP’s references to the possibility that hostile powers might employ coercion or intimidation in the Indo-Pacific zone or that miscalculation could result in rising tensions in the South China Sea are undoubtedly said with China in mind.  Moreover, the similarity of the DWP’s language on China and that used by the Obama administration is quite striking.

For example, the DWP stated that “Australia welcomes China’s rise,” and that “its policy is aimed at encouraging China’s peaceful rise.” When Hu Jintao visited the White House in January 2011, President Obama stated at a joint press conference that “We welcome China’s rise.” In February 2012 he told visiting Xi Jinpingthat he welcomed China’s peaceful rise and said he believed that “a strong and prosperous China is one that can help to bring stability and prosperity to the region and to the world.” U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that the rebalancing to Asia strategy is not aimed at curtailing China’s rise.

The Australian Government declared in the DWP that it “does not approach China as an adversary.” In one of Hillary Clinton’s first speeches as secretary of state, she rejected the view that China is an adversary. “To the contrary,” she said, “we believe that the United States and China can benefit from and contribution to each other’s successes. President Obama did refer to China once as an adversary—in the final 2012 presidential debate with candidate Mitt Romney—though he also said it was a potential partner. At the time, his statement was seen as a slipup, and contrary to the policies of his administration.

The DWP proclaims that Australia doesn’t have to choose between the United States and China.  Indeed, U.S. officials share this view. Former Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell has underscored that countries don’t need to choose and in fact benefit from having good relations with both the U.S. and China. This explicit rejection of Hugh White’s “choice” thesis by the Australian government in the DWP will help move the discourse forward to a more constructive space conducive to closer relations with both China and the U.S.

Canberra and Washington agree that China’s defense spending and military modernization are to some extent reasonable. The DWP says they are “a natural and legitimate outcome of its economic growth.”  Former Secretary of Defense Panetta similarly said on a visit to China in September 2012 that China’s military modernization is “understandable given its economic growth.” Such language has not gone unnoticed by Beijing, which has welcomed the acceptance of China’s military rise.

Both the U.S. and China seek to develop their military relations with the PLA to promote miscalculation and promote mutual understanding.  The DWP states that “Australia is committed to developing strong and positive defense relations with China through dialogue and appropriate practical activities.” Panetta said in China that the U.S. vision is for a “substantive and sustained” military to military relationship with China that “builds trust through cooperation.” But not all strategists down under are convinced. Robert Ayson asserts that the DWP errs on the optimistic side when it come U.S.-Sino relations. Such analysis goes against the grain of what the U.S. is seeking with a peaceful rise of China in the Indo-Pacific, and what the U.S. foreign policy apparatus is attempting to achieve in this respect.

Moreover, if one examines the DWP language more carefully, just as the U.S. is clear-eyed about the potential threats that are posed by China’s rise, so too is Australia. The DWP states that it is in Canberra’s interests that “no hostile power in the Indo-Pacific is able to coerce or intimidate others through force or the threat of force.” Regarding the South China Sea, Australia supports a resilient regional community to help achieve these objectives and mitigate strategic risks and reduce the chances of misjudgment or miscalculation. Both these references can be seen as having China in mind given its strategic behavior over the last few years. So while Andrew O’Neill asserts that the language of the 2009 DWP should not be seen as inflammatory, such analysis misses the more nuanced assessment of possible strategic flash points in the Indo-Pacific that could involve China.

The similarity of Australia’s new rhetoric to U.S. policy pronouncements is a pleasing sign from a U.S. perspective. Beijing’s not-so-muted triumph that it is not viewed as the strategic threat that China was explicitly labeled only four years ago will be beneficial—as long as China doesn’t misinterpret the shift as weakness. This new DWP can be viewed as a synchronized framework for Australia and U.S. to further engage with China on issues of strategy and defense, and continues to dispel any notion that China’s rise and military modernization will lead inevitably to outright conflict. Canberra and Washington singing the same strategic tune can only be welcomed, in language and in policy.

Bonnie S. Glaser is a senior adviser with the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies and a senior associate at Pacific Forum CSIS.

Jack Georgieff is a visiting Thawley Scholar from the Lowy Institute with the office of the Japan Chair at CSIS.

India and China are both beefing up their aircraft carrier forces through the induction of new carrier-operated aircraft.

On Saturday India’s Defense Minister AK Antony commissioned the country’s first squadron of Russia-built MiG-29K at the INS Hansa Naval near Goa near the Southern tip of India. The squadron, which will be named INAS 303 Black Panthers, consists of 16 MiG-29K fighters some of which were inducted into the India military three years ago allowing Indian pilots to become comfortable flying the aircraft.

India’s Economic Times reported that, “The MiG-29Ks, with a range of 1,300km and a service ceiling of 58,000-feet, are capable of STOBAR (short takeoff but arrested recovery) operations. They are armed with R-73 and RVV-AE guided air-to-air missiles, Kh-35E anti-ship missiles, KAB 500KR/OD TV guided bombs and S-8KOM rockets.”

The 303 Blank Panthers squadron fighters are the first of what will be a total of 45 fighters India has agreed to purchase from Russia for over US$2 billion, including 29 more MiG-29Ks.

The newly commissioned fighters will continue carrying out training exercises until November or December when the Russian built INS Vikramaditya (formerly Gorshkov) aircraft carrier that is currently being refitted is scheduled to be inducted by India’s Navy. Delhi’s other aircraft carrier, the INS Viraat, is currently undergoing maintenance but will continue operating for at least the next few years and possible through 2018.

India also currently has plans to build two indigenous aircraft carriers (IACs). The first is a 40,000 ton vessel currently being constructed at Cochin Shipyard and is scheduled to be inducted into India’s Navy in the next four or five years. It will be placed in the water on August 12 of this year and will undergo its first sea trials 24 months after that, according to Antony.

While commissioning the new maritime aviation squadron on Saturday, Antony also marked the 60^th anniversary of India’s naval aviation.

The day before the ceremony that Antony attended, on Friday, China announced it had formed its first carrier-borne aviation force. Citing PLA sources, China’s state media reported that the forming of the force— which will consist of “carrier-borne fighter jets, jet trainers and ship-borne helicopters that operate anti-submarine, rescue and vigilance tasks”— demonstrates that “the development of China's aircraft carriers has entered a new phase.”

The reports also said that Admiral Wu Shengli, a Princeling member of the Central Military Commission—China’s highest military decision-making body— and the commander of the PLA Navy, attended the ceremony.

The media stories also focused heavily on the quality of the pilots that were included in the group. One report stated:

“The personnel of the force are more elite than the aviation forces within the PLA. To be able to fly fighter jets, the pilots should have flown at least five types of aircraft and their flight time must exceed 1,000 hours.

Rich experience in joint drills and major drills is also a prerequisite. The pilots also received training in courses like warship theory, nautical basics, and maritime meteorology.”

It also revealed that the Liaoning, China’s first aircraft carrier, is capable of holding around 30 fixed-wing aircraft, expected to initially be the J-15s.

China has plans to build a second, larger aircraft carrier that is capable of carrying more fighters. In its annual report on China’s military modernization last week, the Pentagon suggested that it believed China would complete this indigenous aircraft carrier within a decade.