The relationship between the United States and China, one country an established power, the other a rising power, will decisively shape the 21st century world. Of the many aspects of this relationship, one of the most important is the strategic relationship, with “strategic” meaning the many ways that the two countries’ plans, doctrines, capabilities, postures, and actions interact across the nuclear offensive and defensive, outer space, and cyber realms.

Building a stable and cooperative “win-win” strategic relationship serves the interests of both the United States and China. It would contribute to both countries’ security interests, not least by avoiding dangerous military competition, confrontation, or even conflict between our two countries in the years ahead. A cooperative strategic relationship would also provide a foundation for action to address global political, security, and economic challenges. It would allow scarce leadership attention, political capital, and economic resources in both countries to be used to address pressing domestic, economic, social, and other priorities.

The tough challenges that our countries’ leaders need to address in pursuing greater strategic cooperation are well known. They range from the long-standing political disagreements over Taiwan to mutual uncertainties about each other’s military intentions, plans, programs, and activities – both at the strategic level and in Asia. But there are also important foundations for building greater cooperation, including the economic interdependence between the two countries and the recognition by both countries’ leaderships of the importance of this relationship. 

Regarding more specific next steps, five areas stand out for possible future dialogue and action:

In what it called a major step in the “systematic upgrade of its equipment and defense,” the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) on February 25th received the first of an expected 20 Type 056 Jiangdao-class stealth corvettes, a new type of ship that experts say will play a major role in defending China’s territorial waters. 

The Bengbu (hull 582) was delivered to the PLAN during a commissioning ceremony in Shanghai attended by China’s top brass, including PLAN commander Wu Shengli, who is also a member of the powerful Central Military Commission; Liu Yi, deputy commander of the PLAN, Li Andong; deputy director of the General Armaments Department; and Su Zhiqian, commander of the East China Sea Fleet.

The Type 056 program was first unveiled in 2010. Nine other Type 056 corvettes have been launched since the launch of the Bengbu lead ship in May 2012 and are now being outfitted with weapons and electronics systems. Although Chinese media reported that the new corvette would be put into service “in large quantities,” the PLAN appears to have plans to acquire a total of 20 for the time being. 

The Type 056 comes armed with a pair of two-cell YJ-83 anti-ship missile launchers, an eight-cell FL-3000N (HQ-10) surface-to-air missile system, a PJ-26 76 mm main gun and two 30 mm close-in weapons systems (CIWS), and two (presumably Yu-7 torpedo) tubes. Its flight deck can accommodate a Z-9 helicopter. 

The primary role of the new corvette, which the PLA Daily said “features good stealth performance and electromagnetic compatibility,” will include patrols in territorial waters, anti-submarine warfare, and escort, amid an ongoing shift away from “active-service base-defense systems featuring aging military strength, single function and low combat power,” to a “new-generation base-defense military strength.” The vessel is configured so that it can conduct missions independently or in coordination with other forces.

Cui Yiliang, editor of the China-based Modern Ships Magazine, said the Type 056 was best suited as a patrol vessel to deal with territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea, as well as over Taiwan. Other roles could include denial of offshore waters to U.S. submarines and surveillance vessels.

Lan Yu, another editor at the magazine, told the state-run Global Times that while the weapons systems on the Type 056 are “modest compared to larger warships,” it can nevertheless “outgun most rivals it might encounter in the South China Sea,” a situation that would likely be different in a confrontation between China and Japan over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea or with the Taiwanese Navy in the Taiwan Strait. 

Cui said the corvette’s somewhat limited defense systems mean it is unlikely to be part of a future carrier battle group.

Meanwhile, the Military Training Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters announced on February 26th that the PLA would conduct as many as 40 military exercises in 2013 to increase combat readiness. Among the various exercises, Navy and Air Force units will conduct joint sea-control confrontation drills.

Last week, cyber-security concerns burst onto the stage with a series of articles linking the People’s Liberation Army to hacking of various U.S. institutions.  The source of these articles was a report from Mandiant, which detailed a selection of Chinese cyber-espionage efforts.  These efforts included attacks on nearly 150 firms and institutions, most often with the object of gaining access to valuable intellectual property.

While international espionage is nothing new, this manifestation of espionage is the result of several trends, including the information revolution, the growing importance of intellectual property to the international economy, and the increasing capacity of NGOs and substate organizations to conduct major, independent intelligence gathering operations.  Indeed, some doubt remains as to the extent to which the activities of the “Unit 61938” can be directly attributed to the Chinese government, as opposed to parochial business interests within the PLA. In any case, the Mandiant Report has sparked a vigorous debate about the appropriate U.S. response to cyber-criminal activity, whether Chinese or not.

Coincidentally, my institution (the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce) ran a simulation last week on a cyber attack against U.S. defense contractors.  Although the simulation abstracted a great deal from reality, it nevertheless provided some policy lessons.  The attackers in our simulation (representing a Russian criminal organization rather than the PLA) shied away from directly assaulting U.S. government institutions, instead focusing their efforts on a law firm associated with several contractors.  The attackers hoped to gain access to intellectual property, including patent applications and trade secret information, as well as patterns of communication between the firm, the government, and the contractors.

In our simulation, the attackers substantially succeeded in most of their goals, although they did run into some difficulty selling the information. The most important lesson we learned is that poor communication between government and private organizations can doom cyber-defense efforts.  In our case, the law firm only reluctantly relayed its concerns about a breach to the government and to its clients, leaving the attackers with ample time to conduct their theft. This reluctance was hardly irrational; the perception that secrets could be at risk would prove devastating to the firm’s business prospects. Although our simulation did not subdivide the U.S. government (by creating different teams for different departments), similar dynamics surely complicate interagency responses to cyber-attacks.

As noted, the Patterson School simulation abstracted from reality in several critical ways, and in any case concentrated on accomplishing goals other than realistically portraying a major cyber attack.  Nevertheless, the simulation described a series of events more likely to characterize the experience of soldiers, sailors, policymakers, entrepreneurs, and the leaders of non-governmental organizations than the various “hot war” scenarios that often occupy organizational time and effort. Not all future conflict will occur in digital space, but many will, and developing the proper human and organizational capital for managing such conflicts is a critical task for government and academia.

The West’s position in nuclear negotiations with Iran undervalues the importance of the nuclear program to the Islamic Republic. Reports last week of the kind of sanctions relief the P5+1 would be prepared to offer Iran in exchange for curbing its nuclear program indicate that the West views the issue as one of peripheral importance for Iran.

On Tuesday, the P5+1 met with Iran in Almaty to start yet another round of talks. Media reports suggested the West may propose to Iran a deal in which the West would suspend sanctions on gold and precious metals in exchange for Iran suspending enrichment activities at its underground Fordow facility.

If this is true (and this kind of valuation of Iran’s nuclear interests is consistent with the P5+1’s approach so far), it isn’t a great offer. Fordow houses Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium to 20%, and as a matter of conventional wisdom it is the only known nuclear facility buried deep enough to likely be immune to Israeli bombardment. It is also worth remembering that it was developed by Iran while under sanctions, and has become a symbol of national resistance and pride.

The closure of Fordow would mean that any further development which could lead to a weapon would either have a longer lead time (while Fordow was reactivated, or other facilities were configured for a higher level enrichment), and be vulnerable to air attack by Israel or others. But perhaps more importantly than that, it would be Iran giving up its much-vaunted policy of freely pursuing its nuclear ambitions.

The combination of practical and symbolic implications means that this is a big deal for Iran. As such, the global powers are in essence proposing that in exchange for Iran making a large concession on its nuclear program, they will suspend a comparatively unimportant part of the broader sanctions regime. That sort of price – because let’s be clear, this is a transaction and not straightforward coercion – looks more appropriate for a peripheral interest, not a core one.

Iran itself has a habit of making unrealistic opening offers in negotiations, more to calibrate the subsequent discussion than out of any genuine expectation that the offer will be accepted. Although it would do no harm for the West to pay more attention to this element of Iran’s negotiating style, there is no evidence to indicate that the P5+1 have themselves adopted this posture. The more likely scenario is that this offer, if the leak is genuine, is simply confirmation that the P5+1 under appreciates how important these issues are to Iran.

There are two things going on here. One is a misunderstanding of whether the P5+1 is the client (the party with something the vendor wants, i.e. capital) or the vendor (the party who wants something the client has), and the other is a failure to gauge the value Iran places on the Fordow enrichment plant.

The Falklands War is a good example of what happens when you undervalue your adversary’s interests. Against a background of colonial withdrawal globally, and British naval withdrawal from the South Atlantic, Argentina calculated that the British did not value maintaining control of the islands enough to pay the costs of retaining them. They also underestimated the capacity of Britain to defend its control.

After seizing the islands, however, Argentina found itself facing a Britain resolved and capable of using force to return the islands to British control. It was a failure to accurately gauge the value of the Falklands in the minds of Britain’s leaders.

The negotiating position of the P5+1 in relation to Iran’s nuclear program underestimates the value of the program to Tehran in a similar way; in the minds of the rulers of the Islamic Republic, the nuclear program is a core interest. The West is underestimating the pain that Tehran is prepared to undergo in order to keep all its options on the table.

Britain’s combination of military superiority and a willingness to accept the costs of military action casted it in the role of client, not vendor, in the case of the Falklands. That is, Britain had the power to assert or relinquish sovereignty over the islands, and the Argentines wanted them to give it up. By underestimating the UK’s resolve and capacity, Argentina mistakenly cast itself in the role of client.

Something similar is going on in the nuclear negotiations. The West’s calculation is that, structurally, the power lies with them – that is, Iran is the vendor because it wants relief from sanctions and is willing to sell others things it values in order to obtain this relief. ButTehran is the client; it is developing a nuclear program, and the West would like it to stop.

Sanctions are of course an effort to reverse this dynamic. And if the West were appropriately gauging the value of the nuclear program to Iran, perhaps they would have more luck bringing those efforts to bear. But as things stand, if a negotiated solution is not found, then (with or without air strikes on Iran’s facilities) Iran will eventually be in a position to build a nuclear weapon. It seems to be prepared to weather the effect of sanctions to keep that option open. The P5+1 must realize it’s the vender if it hopes to change Iran’s nuclear calculus.

Dina Esfandiary is a Research Associate in the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

Harry White is strategic analyst based in Canberra, Australia.

Already hit by soaring costs, delays and second thoughts by potential customers, Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) ran into more problems last week when a crack was discovered during a routine inspection, prompting the grounding of all aircraft.

The more than half-inch crack on the low-pressure turbine blade of a conventional takeoff and landing F-35A was discovered on February 19th during a routine inspection at Edwards Air Force Base in California. Under strict protocol, ground inspections are held after every 50 hours of engine service. After these findings were corroborated by a different test, all 51 F-35s currently in service in the U.S. fleet were grounded as a precautionary measure, and all further tests and training flights were halted for the three variants of the radar-evasive aircraft. Soon afterwards, the British Ministry of Defense also announced its own suspension of all test flights.

The entire F135 engine, meanwhile, has been shipped to manufacturer Pratt & Whitney in Middletown, Connecticut, for examinations

Matthew Bates, a spokesman for Pratt & Whitney, told Defense News that the engine had 700 total engine operating hours, of which 409 accrued in flight.

Unfazed by this latest crisis in the multiyear, $396 billion program, Lieutenant General Christopher Bogdan, the director of the F-35 program at the U.S. Department of Defense, said on February 25th the aircraft could be back in the air “in the next week or two."

Although the verdict won’t be known until the end of this week at the earliest, possible causes include a foreign object hitting the turbine or basic manufacturing defects. A more devastating, albeit less likely, scenario would involve high-duty cycle fatigue cracking, which can lead to complete engine failure within as little as 90 minutes.

Pratt & Whitney also remains optimistic despite the setback — the second engine-related grounding in 2013 — saying that such discoveries during the testing phase of a program were “part of the process.” The first engine-related grounding involved the F-35B jump-jet variant after a test flight at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida on January 16th was aborted because of a fueldraulic system failure. After identifying the source of the problem — an improperly crimped fueldraulic line — the Pentagon decided to resume F-35B operations, a decision that was made nine days before last week’s discovery.

With the program only 35-40 percent complete, it wouldn’t be surprising if the most expensive defense program in U.S. history experienced other setbacks in future. Once completed, the Pentagon intends to purchase a total of 2,443 of the three F-35 variants for the U.S. Navy, Air Force and Marines, though it may be forced to lower orders if “sequestration” goes through.

Several hundred JSFs are also expected to be sold to international clients. Canada, Turkey and Italy have delayed their decision or are reviewing plans to purchase the aircraft. However, Bogdan maintains there is no indication that any foreign partner is considering pulling out of the program.

Given that the JSF program has already proved so costly, killing the program is probably not a viable option. As such, it is better that all the problems be identified now, while the aircraft is still under development, than after mass production or deployment have begun. A positive offshoot of the bad publicity that has surrounded the project over the years is that it is now under tremendous scrutiny by the public, media and governments, something that cannot be said of eventual competitors such as China’s J-20.

The Diplomat's editor Harry Kazianis spoke with Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment Senior Fellow Mark Gunzinger concerning Sequestration and its possible effects on America's pivot to Asia.  

1. As Sequestration looms, America has made a commitment to "pivot" or "rebalance" to the Asia-Pacific. One part of this is shifting military assets into the Pacific. In an era of greatly reduced resources, what impact will this have on the defense component of the pivot in terms of readiness and available manpower if forces are needed in a crisis (defense or non-defense related aka tsunami or earthquake etc.)?

Major cuts to the defense budget will impact the U.S. military’s readiness to respond to crises in all geographic regions. The impact will be more significant if the Defense Department is forced to make uniform percentage reductions across its programs without regard to its strategic priorities, which is what the sequester will do unless Congress acts to modify the Budget Control Act of 2011. It is highly likely that sequestration could delay Asia-Pacific rebalancing initiatives that DoD might pursue. For example, funding may not be available to harden overseas military facilities to ballistic missile attacks, or establish new locations that U.S. forces could disperse to in the event of a crisis. It could also reduce exercises and training activities the U.S. military undertakes with our Pacific allies as part of an overall strategy to maintain regional stability. As for shifting more assets to the Asia-Pacific, a sequester will likely cause DoD to revisit its timing for doing so, especially if it results in significant cuts to the overall size of our nation’s air and naval forces.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is scheduled to arrive in the U.S. today ahead of his meeting with President Barak Obama at the White House on Friday. The summit will be the first between the two leaders since Abe returned to power in December.

Abe had initially sought to make the U.S. the destination of his first overseas trip as Prime Minister but was reportedly rebuffed by the White House who said a trip would not be possible until after President Obama’s inauguration last month. As a result, the Japanese leader traveled to Southeast Asia instead as Tokyo looks to use common concern over China to strengthen ties with ASEAN member nations.

Abe’s trip comes at a time when Tokyo is facing a tougher regional security environment. Japan remains locked in a tense standoff with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, with few signs of a resolution in sight. The summit also takes place just a week after North Korea conducted its third nuclear tests, withmany speculating that it plans to undertake at least one more test in the near future.

The nationalistic Japanese leader has long been a strong proponent of strengthening the U.S.-Japan military relationship. Even so, the Chinese and North Korean challenges have made closer military ties with the U.S. a far more urgent matter for Tokyo.

Indeed, at Japan’s request the two sides announced they would consider revising their military treaty last November while Abe’s predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, was still in office. At the time, Japan had said that revisions were necessary because of “qualitative changes in the security environment” since the last time the allies revisited the treaty in 1997. Working-level talks began the following month.

The U.S. has long pushed Japan to increase its security role in the region by upgrading its military forces and loosening restrictions on what types of operations they can participate in. These views are shared by Abe and, as a result of Chinese and North Korean actions, a growing number of Japanese. However, Abe’s eagerness to expand Japan’s defense role has reportedly unnerved some U.S. officials, who— while insisting they still would like the Self-Defense Forces to embrace “collective self-defense”— worry Abe’s defense policies will further worsen tensions with China and other regional powers like South Korea.

In revisiting the defense treaty, Washington will undoubtedly seek to resist Japan pressure to make a more explicit commitment to the defense of islands that Japan disputes with its neighbors. So far, the U.S. has adopted a characteristically ambiguous policy towards the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, affirming that the Islands do fall under its defense treaty with Japan, while insisting it does not take sides on territorial disputes.

Abe’s visit will also have a strong economic component to it, as the Japanese leader seeks to revise a sluggish economy that also faces long-term structural issues. Abe will want reassurances from Obama that the U.S. will continue to support his aggressive monetary policies that have come under fire from some of Tokyo’s trade partners. Abe will also seek to convince Obama to support exports of America’s natural gas to Japan, which remains highly dependent foreign energy imports.

President Obama, on the other hand, will be most concerned with getting Abe to commit Japan to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the cornerstone of Washington’s economic agenda in region. The high free trade standards the TPP requires have made it the target of certain powerful interests groups inside Japan, especially the heavily subsidized Agricultural sector. Given the leverage the U.S. has over Japan as a result of Tokyo’s standoff with China, it should not be difficult for Washington to overcome this resistance to the TPP.

Zachary Keck is assistant editor of The Diplomat. He is on Twitter: @ZacharyKeck.

A new poll released by Gallup has found that Americans view Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programs as the greatest security threat their country faces.

99% of respondents characterized the development of nuclear weapons by Iran as a threat to the United States, with 83% saying it was a “critical threat” and 16% saying it was “important but not critical.” Only one percent of respondents said it was not an important threat.

The U.S. and its allies accuse Iran of pursuing nuclear weapons under the guise of a civilian program, a charge Tehran vehemently denies.

83% of respondents also said that the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea’s nuclear program was a critical threat to the United States, with 14% saying it was important but not critical and three percent saying it was unimportant.

The survey was conducted from February 7-10 and thus before North Korea’s third nuclear test occurred.

Notably, Americans were much more sanguine about the countries that possesses nuclear weapons capable of reaching the United States, with 51% saying that China’s military power as a whole was a “critical threat” to the U.S., and a mere 29% saying the same about Russia. “The conflict between India and Pakistan” was said to be a “critical threat” by one-quarter of respondents, down from 32% in 2004.

This was the first time Gallup asked respondents specifically about Iran and North Korea’s development of a nuclear weapon.

The numbers were compiled through phone interviews of a random sample of 1,015 adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia.

Zachary Keck is assistant editor for The Diplomat.

Hamid Karzai’s order banning Afghan forces from calling in Coalition air support has raised many concerns about the ability of the Afghan Army to defeat its Taliban opponents. The intent of the mandate is not completely clear, as it may be possible for coalition forces to continue pre-planned strike operations in coordination with Afghan forces. The Coalition could also use airpower in an interdiction role, striking at Taliban concentrations in transit to the front, although whether this practice would reduce civilian casualties is far from certain.

Traditionally, airpower theorists and practitioners have resisted close air support, which (in their view) fails to leverage the potentially transformative effect of air attacks on enemy organizations.  However, the “Afghan Model” and its cousin the “Libya Model” conceives of the use of airpower in close collaboration with ground forces. Given that Afghan Army ground forces have yet to demonstrate a clear advantage over their Taliban counterparts, airpower really is the Afghan government’s“asymmetric advantage.” Whatever the Taliban may have, it lacks the tools that airpower provides, including reconnaissance, strike, and mobility.

The languorous U.S. efforts to develop Afghan airpower further complicate the problem. Embroiled in an internal contracting dispute, the USAF has yet to acquire the kind of light, counterinsurgency-oriented aircraft that would be ideal for the Afghan Air Force, such as the Brazilian Super Tucano. A different contracting dispute has slowed the delivery of Russian transport and attack helicopters.

The Afghan Air Force is hardly doomed to ineptitude and ineffectiveness; the Soviets rated the Air Force as the most capable Afghan armed forces branch during the occupation, and parts of the organization survived through the Taliban period. Nevertheless, prospects of the Afghan Air Force operating advanced jet aircraft in the near future aren’t particularly good, and in any case shouldn’t be the priority. Simple, low maintenance platforms that perform a variety of roles could help the Afghan armed forces maintain its edge.

Integration of air and ground power is the most important and complex test of a military organization. Even mature organizations have problems; witness the experience of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force(PLAAF) during the 1980 war against Vietnam, where problems of logistics, doctrine, and equipment dramatically limited the ability of airpower to assist deployed ground forces. Still, airpower normally helps more than it hurts. My best guess is that President Karzai and his senior military officials understand the importanceof airpower to the war effort, and that the integration of airpower with Afghan Army operations will continue in less visible ways. At the same time, it behooves the Afghan government (and its international supporters) to make equipping the Afghan armed forces with intrinsic air capability a key priority.

Less than a week after Pyongyang defied the international community with a third nuclear blast South Korean sources allege that one day prior to the blast and despite increased scrutiny, North Korea tested a long-range missile engine.

Quoting unnamed South Korean officials, Yonhap News Agency reported on February 17th that Pyongyang had carried out a combustion testing of the engines for the intermediate-range KN-08 missile at the Dongchang-ri launch site on February 11th, with the aim of extending the range of the missile beyond 5,000 km, as well as be able to deploy them.

Military sources said the engines were intended for a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Despite frequent references to the missile as an ICBM, analysts doubt that at 18 meters long and 2 meters in diameter, the liquid-fuel KN-08 is large enough to carry enough propellant to attain such a range (that is, >5,500 km) — at least based on current North Korean technology. The alleged test may therefore have been intended for a larger-sized variant of the KN-08 IRBM.

Given that North Korea was under intense international scrutiny over its plans to detonate a nuclear device, Pyongyang was fully aware that the test would be detected by U.S. surveillance satellites. Analysts say North Korea may have therefore carried out the test to raise U.S. and its regional allies' concerns over Pyongyang's growing capabilities. Alternatively, some suspect North Korea was signaling to the U.S. and its allies that it would test the missile if additional sanctions were put in place following its nuclear test.

During the centenary celebrations of Kim Il-sung’s birth on April 15, 2012, Pyongyang unveiled a road-mobile launcher — purportedly made in China — outfitted with what were presumably KN-08 mock-ups.

In January 2013, U.S. intelligence agencies claimed they had evidence showing that North Korea was moving mobile launchers around the country. However, the ongoing engine tests, added to the fact that the North has yet to test-fire the missile, would indicate that the KN-08 is not yet ready for operational deployment. The road-mobile launchers, therefore, may simply have been decoys meant to throw off U.S. satellite imagery, a strategy that Pyongyang’s ally China, among others, has embraced.

Still, the time when the KN-08 becomes operational may be approaching. North Korea has carried out numerous tests related to the missile over the past two years. A South Korean source said Pyongyang could now be closer to deploying the KN-08 if it judges that the supposed test earlier this month was successful.

Key to this will be Pyongyang’s ability to couple nuclear-tipped intermediate- or long-range missiles with road-mobile transporter-erector-launchers (TEL).

Earlier this month 38 North reported that work at the Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground (aka Musudan-ri) pointed to the possibility that Pyongyang may be making preparations for an upcoming test of a liquid-fueled rocket, which media have speculated could be the KN-08 or the intermediate-range Musudan (BM-25).

Both missiles can be launched from TELs or fixed platforms. Still, analysts at 38 North— which is run by the U.S.-Korea Institute at John Hopkins University’s SAIS—cautioned that available satellite imagery doesn’t allow them to conclude that the ongoing work is a sign that Pyongyang is readying to test-fire the KN-08 there anytime soon.

The institute also claims that some of the ongoing construction at the site is similar to components of a new launch pad at the Semnan Space and Missile Center in Iran, which could provide further evidence of Iranian assistance in North Korea’s missile program. Japan’s Kyodo news also reported last week that Iran sent North Korea a proposal last fall offering it millions of U.S. dollars (denoted in other currencies) to send observers to North Korea’s third nuclear test.

Photo analysis by 38 North in late 2012 also showed that construction was ongoing at a launch pad at the Sohae Satellite Launch Station on the northwestern coast.

The North is believed to have conducted as many as three tests of large liquid-fueled, first-stage rocket engines at Sohae in 2012 for its Unha-3 rocket— which Pyongyang claims it successfully launched on December 12, 2012 — or the KN-08. Although Pyongyang maintains that the Unha-3 is a satellite launch vehicle, opponents believe it is an ICBM, with an estimated range of 10,000 km.

Analysts believe the North Koreans are currently enhancing the upper gantry platform at Sohae to make it capable of launching rockets or missiles larger than the KN-08 or the Unha-3.

The intelligence on a regime as closed as Pyongyang remains less than optimal, and as such it is always difficult to truly comprehend what North Korea is up to, much less ascertain the rationale behind its actions. What is clear, however, is that Pyongyang’s belligerence under Kim Jong-un does not suggest he will be any different than his father, which bodes ill for future regional security.