Every Friday, The Diplomat’s Harry Kazianis looks out across the net to find the best articles and analysis involving defense, strategic affairs, and foreign policy. From America’s pivot to Asia, China’s growing military power, important defense trends, to the various territorial spats across the region, The Diplomat has you covered with what you need to know going into the weekend.

Here is our top five this Friday. Have we missed something you think should be included? Want to share an important article with other readers? Please submit your links in the comment box below! Happy Friday!

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Simply A Phenomenal Flying Machine - (Telegraph) - " Last week Con Coughlin became the first British journalist to see a British pilot conduct a perfect test landing of Britain's new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Here he describes an aircraft that is set to become one of Britain’s leading strike fighters for the next generation."

The Technology China Wants in Order to Catch Up With Western Militaries- (Foreign Policy) - "The Pentagon's latest report on the capabilities of the Chinese military mentions an important aspect to its buildup: China's efforts to develop advanced technologies that have both civil and military use. This means that China is trying to acquire tech that can be used to drive modern aerospace, computing, and transportation industries -- as well as 21st-century military equipment.

How does it get this information? Everything from outright cyber theft to old-fashioned espionage to legitimate business partnerships."

U.S. Carrier Group To Take Part in S. Korea Drills - (DefenseNews) - "A U.S. naval strike group led by the aircraft carrier Nimitz will arrive in South Korea this weekend for sea drills, officials said Friday, following joint exercises that infuriated North Korea.

In addition to the nuclear-powered Nimitz, the group includes three guided-missile cruisers and destroyers, the US military said in a statement, without specifying the total size of the group."

Navy: Ohio Replacement Negotiations 'Have Not Progressed' (USNI News) - "The Navy’s top acquisition official told the Senate Armed Services Committee Seapower Subcommittee that talks with the Defense Department “have not progressed” in putting the Ohio-class ballistic-missile replacement program into a special National Capital Ships Account."

Cyber Attacks a Growing Irritant in U.S.- China Ties - (Sydney Morning Herald) - "Signs are growing that the sustained surge in cyber attacks emanating from China is straining its relations with the US, lending urgency to fledgling efforts by both governments to engage on the issue."

While tensions between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands continue to simmer, a new dimension has seemingly been added to the mix.

In an article written for the People's Daily on Wednesday-- widely considered the "mouthpiece " of China's government -- two academics, Zhang Haipeng and Li Guoqiang, from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, appear to call into question Japan's sovereignty over the Ryukyu islands (Okinawa is part of this island chain).

The authors note that “Unresolved problems relating to the Ryukyu Islands have reached the time for reconsideration.”

There could be a small problem with the authors idea, regardless of any sort of historical debate on who owns the islands -- Okinawa is home to a large American military presence and Japan has held the islands for sometime.

On Wednesday, Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga called the piece in the People's Daily "injudicious." On Thursday, Tokyo filed a diplomatic protest.

So far, the Chinese government has not exactly endorsed the idea, thankfully.

The New York Times, quoting a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman, answered several questions concerning the issue but as the Times noted, did not "take a clear position on sovereignty."

“The history of the Ryukyu Islands and Okinawa has long been an academic problem,” Chinese spokeswoman Hua Chunying explained. “I’m willing to reiterate here that the Diaoyu Islands are China’s inherent territory, and have never been part of the Ryukyu or Okinawa.”

Shewwwww.

While China did not back the article, the trend lines here are certainly not good. Such an inflammatory piece at a time of heightened tensions between the world's number two and three economies makes little sense. The article, considering the content, would have presumably been green lighted by the censors who control China's press. Surely, it stands to reason, they would have surmised that the piece would only make matters worse, and not opened some sort of high minded academic debate over the historical nature of who owns the Ryukyus.

In fact, quite the opposite needs to happen at this point. If both parties wish to ease tensions and return to something approaching the prior arrangement of not allowing conflicting territorial claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands to damage bilateral ties, simple steps must be taken -- by both sides.

For starters, it would make sense to keep any military or non-naval maritime vessels or aircraft out of the area surrounding the islands. So both sides can save face, this could be done discretely.  Not every move needs to be completed with a press release. This would greatly limit the possibilities of an accidental collision on the high seas or in the air. Such an incident would make matters infinitely worse.

Next, both sides need to limit unhelpful statements -- official or close to it -- that only inflame tensions. Nationalistic talk on either side, whether about island claims or revisionist historical concepts do no one any good. While many would argue such talk is meant for domestic consumption, it nonetheless carries global ramifications. In an era where social media and a 24 hour news cycle repeats such talk over and over, both parties must be very careful in choosing their words. In this case, both sides simply keeping quiet on the issue could prove a powerful way to ease tensions.

Lastly, a path forward needs to be sketched out where both sides can enter into a sustained dialogue. Hopefully, this is already happening through back channels. Such talks need to be done in private -- away from domestic audiences and the media. Track 1.5 and 2.0 conferences could be a good place to start.

Dialogue is the only way both sides can come to an agreement, or at least attempt to return to the prior gentlemen's agreement to leave the issue to future generations. Neither side has any logical reason to keep escalating tensions, let's hope Tokyo and Beijing see it that way as well.

Like Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream, Park Geun-hye’s "trustpolitik" is intended for multiple audiences. Specifically, Park has put forward Korean, regional, and global visions of trustpolitik, with their common thread being a greater focus on ordinary people and civil society.

Already, the Park administration is rolling out efforts at all three levels.

In addressing North Korea, she has said she will remain resolute in the face of the regime’s threats and provocations, even as she continues to seek to establish a renewed dialogue with the Kim regime, and even offered to include Pyongyang in her regional level initiative.

Moreover, she has pledged that South Korea will not let the actions of North Korea’s leaders impact Seoul’s humanitarian policies towards ordinary citizens. Alongside this effort, she has pledged to continue pressing for greater people-to-people ties between Koreans on both sides of the DMZ. Most notably, Park has announced her intention to create an international park in the DMZ where Koreans from both countries could interact. As she explained the purpose of the international park to the U.S. Congress:

“It will be a park that sends a message of peace to all of humanity… There, I believe we can start to grow peace—to grow trust. It would be a zone of peace bringing together not just Koreans separated by a military line, but also the citizens of the world.”

Additionally, the Ministry of Unification just announced it has approved plans by 14 South Korean companies to invest in the Mount Kumgang resort in North Korea, which was shuttered after a South Korean tourist was shot by a North Korean guard in 2008. Although the approval is dated February 15, right before Park’s inauguration, her administration is likely to have had a hand in this.

In tangent with this policy towards Pyongyang, the Park administration has announced it is launching a Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative. Besides increasing institutionalism among Korea, Japan, and China, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry has said the initiative will “aim to turn mistrust and confrontation in Northeast Asia into trust and cooperation.”

In the beginning, Park noted in her address to Congress yesterday, this might require the parties focus on “softer” issues like the environment, disaster assistance, terrorism, and nuclear safety. By starting with these issues, however, “Trust will be built through this process. And that trust will propel us to expand the horizons of our cooperation.”

Like her North Korea policy, this effort has thus far been inhibited by the actions of other powers—in this case, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s historical revisionism. Whereas Park’s administration intended to send its foreign minister to Tokyo and had worked tirelessly to hold the annual trilateral finance meeting between Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul on the sidelines of an ASEAN+3 meeting, the Park administration cancelled both of these in the wake of Abe’s offense rhetoric and his advisers’decisions to visit theYasukuni war shrine.

With the three nations unwilling to boost cooperation on political and financial matters, they nonetheless still held a Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting in Japan on Sunday and Monday this week. Out of this meeting came a joint communiqué pledging more cooperation in addressing air pollution throughout Asia, and working together to"enhance the full effective and sustained implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change." Park will no doubt seek to leverage this small agreement to achieve breakthroughs in other areas.

The least noted aspect of Park’s Trustpolitik policy has been its international component. This is essentially a continuation of her predecessors, Lee Myung-bak’s, “Global Korea” policy, except Park will consider Northeast Asia separately from the rest of the globe. Thus, Park is likely to continue her predecessors’ effort to gain a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and to focus on South Korea’s development cooperation with developing nations instead of pure aid.

Thus far Africa has surprisingly been the focus of the Park administration’s efforts. As Park was en route to the U.S. over the weekend, Yonhap News Agency reported that Blue House was in talks with Parliament over the possibility of creating a Korea-Africa Center to coordinate South Korea’s policy towards the African continent. The proposed center would be modeled off the ASEAN-Korea center, with its central headquarters located in Seoul and up to four African based branches in Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt.

But Park is not waiting for parliament’s approval to begin engaging the continent. On Monday Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kyou-hyun will travel to New York to participate in a high-level UN Security Council debateon security and terrorism issues in Africa; particularly the Sahel. Following that meeting, Kim will be in Brussels for a donor conference for Mali. The Foreign Ministry has already said Kim will arrive in Brussels with “detailed plans for development cooperation” in Mali, and a pledge of US$1 million of aid for the war torn country.

Surprise!

States (not to mention pundits) spend an inordinate amount of time trying to figure out what other states thinks.  Discerning the intentions of a foreign government is no easy task; even understanding the basic structure of government can be a challenge, and states have a strong incentive to deceive others as to their intentions, beliefs, and capabilities. Even if the United States privately decided not to defend Taiwan from PRC attack, it would behoove American leaders to make Beijing believe the U.S. would rush to Taipei’s defense, in the hopes that the threat of intervention would deter an attack.  At the same time, state leaders regularly speak to different audiences; the President of the United States surely wishes to convey a different message of credibility and deterrence to Taiwan than to the PRC, as a “blank check” might encourage the former to become overly adventurous.

Accordingly, it’s hard to know what another state is thinking, even when that state sends costly signals of intent. But what if even the leaders of states don’t know how they’ll react to certain events? A recent International Organization article by Jonathan Mercer investigated the role of emotion in decision-making. Although the theory is somewhat complicated, the argument boils down to the idea that we use our own emotional reactions to events as evidence of our interests and preferences. A classic experiment along these lines involves a coin flip, with heads deciding one course of action and tails the other. By flipping a coin, you determine whether you’re happy or sad about the outcome; accordingly, you know which path you really prefer.

Mercer argues that the leadership of the United States sent costly signals of disinterest in the fate of South Korea, withdrawing all forces and de-emphasizing the possibility of intervention in case of a North Korean attack in 1950. When the attack came, however, U.S. leaders had an unexpected emotional reaction of alarm, which led to concern about how the rest of the world would interpret inaction.  As Mercer points out, U.S. policymakers used their own sense of shock and alarm as evidence that the world would see the United States as weak.  Consequently, the United States intervened in contravention of its own expectations. Later in the war, an emotional attachment to the idea of “reputation” prevented American policymakers from understanding the consequences of advancing beyond the 38^th parallel.

The bottom line is that an approach to decision-making that concentrates on interests and raw calculation will come up short.  As Mercer suggests, “Strategy depends on imagining not only how another feels, but how another will feel as a result of one’s policy.” This adds another layer of calculation to how, for example, China and Japan try to predict each others’ responses to moves in the Senkaku/Diayou islands. It is deeply difficult for policymakers to empathize with (or put themselves in the position of) the leaders of another state, and perhaps even more difficult to try to understand the emotional complexity associated with the intrigue and infighting associated with the internal deliberations of the other government. Similarly, there are stark limits on the practice of “Kreminology”, or the effort to discern intent from the governmental infighting, when emotional reactions may yield unpredictable behavior. Brinksmanship, whether over islands or high altitude deserts, may be even more dangerous than the players appreciate.

Northrop Grumman in cooperation with the U.S. Navy recently conducted the "first fly-in arrested landing" of the highly coveted X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS).

According to Northrop Grumman, the test "represents the first arrested landing by a Navy unmanned aircraft. It marks the beginning of the final phase of testing prior to carrier-based trials planned for later this month."

The X-47B is a tailless, strike fighter-sized unmanned aircraft now under development and testing. It is part of the U.S. Navy’s highly touted Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration (UCAS-D) program.

The aircraft sports a 62-foot wingspan.  It is also shaped like a "flying wing." For comparison to other popular aircraft, it is 17 feet wider than the F/A-18 Super Hornet.  Reports place the X-47B's top speed in the "high subsonic" range with a maximum capable distance of about 2,100 nautical miles.

The X-47B is a prototype designed to fly autonomously. This is different than drones or UAVs that are currently being used by America's military. Such systems are usually flown remotely by ground-station-based military personnel. The aircraft, while not intended for "operational use," is part of a an effort geared toward the development of other unmanned carrier-based aircraft intitatives.

Such aircraft with long range that will have the ability to operate from carriers are important. With many nations developing anti-access capabilities with long range missiles that could in theory attack multi-billion dollar carriers, remotely operated aircraft could be a prized asset that could place a carrier out of range of enemy shore based weapons.

"India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but if it is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary. The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian perspective,” Shyam Saran, former Foreign Secretary and the current chairman of India’s National Security Advisory Board, said in a recent speech, the Times of India reported.

The key in Saran’s comments is the reference to tactical nuclear weapons. Pakistan is believed to be developing such weapons to counter India’s “Cold Start” military doctrine. In recent years, terrorist attacks on India originating from Pakistan—most notably the 2008 Mumbai attacks—have led many Indian policymakers to conclude that Islamabad, emboldened by its nuclear deterrent, is supporting certain terrorist groups based out of Pakistan who carry out attacks on the Indian homeland.

After the Mumbai attack Indian’s military leaders reportedly developed a new doctrine called Cold Start, which called for Indian troops to rapidly mobilize for limited conventional strikes on the Pakistani side of the border immediately following a terrorist attack. The rationale was that this would give Delhi the ability to retaliate against Islamabad without sparking a full-fledged nuclear exchange.

Lacking the conventional military power to confront India’s military, Pakistani military officials are believed to be building tactical nuclear weapons to deploy in the field for possible use against the invading Indian military forces.

Saran’s speech appears to be India’s response to Pakistan’s theatre nuclear weapons. As he explained it:

“Pakistani motivation is to dissuade India from contemplating conventional punitive retaliation to sub-conventional but highly destructive and disruptive cross-border terrorist strikes such as the horrific 26/11 attack on Mumbai. What Pakistan is signaling to India and to the world is that India should not contemplate retaliation even if there is another Mumbai because Pakistan has lowered the threshold of nuclear use to the theatre level. This is nothing short of nuclear blackmail, no different from the irresponsible behavior one witnesses in North Korea.”

Saran then shot down the notion that India would distinguish between theatre and strategic nuclear weapons usage.

"A limited nuclear war is a contradiction in terms,” He said. “Any nuclear exchange, once initiated, would swiftly and inexorably escalate to the strategic level. Pakistan would be prudent not to assume otherwise as it sometimes appears to do, most recently by developing and perhaps deploying theatre nuclear weapons."

Saran is a veteran diplomat with extensive experience dealing with nuclear issues. Before his current position, for instance, he served as the prime minister’s special envoy to the negotiations over the U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal—where he was the counterpart to R. Nicholas Burns—and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. He stepped down from that post in 2010.

A proponent of India’s Look East Policy, Saran also has extensive experience dealing with China including over the border issue. Last year, he called on India’s foreign policy establishment to develop a deeper understanding of China’s strategic culture.

During his recent speech Saran took aim at China directly stating, “Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s strategic program continues apace,” according to Michael Krepon at Arms Control Wonk.

Krepon also reported that Saran had some harsh words for Pakistan’s military:

“Pakistan is the only country where nuclear assets are under the command and control of the military and it is the military’s perceptions and ambitions which govern the development, deployment and use of these weapons. This is a dangerous situation precisely because the military’s perceptions are not fully anchored in a larger national political and economic narrative…. There is an air of unreality about the often adulatory remarks about the Pakistani military’s stewardship of the country’s military assets.”

While sequestration may have many wondering about the future of America’s military, amazing technological innovations continue nonetheless.

Case in point: Boeing’s X-51A WaveRider.

The unmanned hypersonic vehicle “achieved the longest air-breathing, scramjet-powered hypersonic flight in history May 1, flying for three and a half minutes on scramjet power at a top speed of Mach 5.1. The vehicle flew for a total time of more than six minutes.”

According to a Boeing press statement:          

“A U.S. Air Force B-52H Stratofortress from Edwards Air Force Base released the X-51A from 50,000 feet above the Point Mugu Naval Air Warfare Center Sea Range at 10:55 a.m. Pacific time. After the B-52 released the X-51A, a solid rocket booster accelerated the vehicle to about Mach 4.8 before the booster and a connecting interstage were jettisoned. The vehicle reached Mach 5.1 powered by its supersonic combustion scramjet engine, which burned all its JP-7 jet fuel. The X-51A made a controlled dive into the Pacific Ocean at the conclusion of its mission. The test fulfilled all mission objectives.

The flight was the fourth X-51A test flight completed for the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory. It exceeded the previous record set by the program in 2010.

The X-51A program is a collaborative effort of the Air Force Research Laboratory and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, with industry partners Boeing and Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne. Boeing performed program management, design and integration in Huntington Beach, Calif.”

Such technology could have amazing civilian as well as military uses.

Boeing Phantom Works President Darryl Davis noted that: “This demonstration of a practical hypersonic scramjet engine is a historic achievement that has been years in the making. This test proves the technology has matured to the point that it opens the door to practical applications, such as advanced defense systems and more cost-effective access to space.”

Take a look at the videos below:

The Diplomat’s Zachary Keck spoke with United States Congressman J. Randy Forbes R-VA, chairman of the House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee and Co-Chairman of the Navy-Marine Corps Caucus.

You recently wrote a piece for Real Clear Defense that some have characterized as sort of a “foundational piece” for a “broader thesis” you are working on explaining why the nation should prioritize a robust navy.  I was hoping you could give us a brief outline of what this thesis is?

Thanks for inviting me to again offer my thoughts with The Diplomat. My staff and I often refer to the website for fresh commentary on everything Asia. 

For the past decade we have asked our Army and Marine Corps to play a disproportionate role fighting two land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These men and women have done everything their Nation asked of them to help keep us safe here at home. As I look out over the next decade and consider the re-rise of China and its activity in the Near-Seas, Iran's nuclear ambitions, the global economy’s dependency on commercial and energy shipping, and other flash-points for instability like the Horn of Africa, I am struck by the maritime character of these issues. That is why I believe that in the decade ahead we will ask our sea services (Navy and Marine amphibious forces) and projection forces to make their own disproportionate contribution to upholding American interests and providing for our common defense. To achieve this, it will require not just a bigger Navy but also the right force structure, including more amphibious ships, attack submarines and new payloads and capabilities that will help us conduct sea control missions and project power into A2/AD environments. 

I look forward to beginning a national discussion about this subject. I also look forward to challenging the Department of Defense and the services about some of the assumptions that have driven our defense investments over the last two decades - has our Navy grown too small for the missions we ask of it? Have we allowed our sea control capabilities to atrophy? Have we over-invested in short-range tactical fighters at the expense of long-range power projection? 

Under the Pentagon’s proposed FY 2014 base budget, the Navy would get the largest share out of any services at about 29.5 percent, followed by the Air Force at 27.4 percent and the Army at just under 24.6 percent. In your opinion, is this a good ratio or should certain services be getting a greater share of the budget?

Much talk about budget percentages has percolated in recent years as the defense budget has begun to decline. From my perspective, I would never argue that one service or another should receive a specific ratio of the defense budget. This approach would be antithetical to good strategic planning.  Just the same, I think that allocating equal 1/3 shares of the defense budget to the Army, Navy, and Air Force also makes little strategic sense. If America is going to posture its conventional and strategic forces to maintain a competitive advantage in the decade ahead we are going to have to do a heck of a lot more than striving to achieve budget fairness.

In terms of your question, first, I would add briefly that I hesitate to talk strategy in terms of percentages. If the Air Force had 50% of the budget it would matter little if the defense budget had fallen so low we couldn't afford Air Force priorities, let alone those of the other services, And second, I think we really should be starting to answer this budgeting question by asking what we anticipate the national security environment will look like over the next 5, 10, 20 years. From there we must ask what America's defense priorities and objectives will be and decide what combination of military capabilities are best suited to support these ends. While strategy is about ways, means, and ends, too often we dictate an arbitrary mean, or a budget figure, as the starting point and then let that drive the ends we desire. If we believe, as I do, that the future will demand more from our Sea Services and projection forces, then we will have to strongly consider resourcing these efforts at a level commensurate with the contribution they will play. I look forward to this discussion and debate as the Department concludes its Strategic Choices and Management Review and moves ahead with the 2014 QDR.  

In March it was announced that the Defense Department had invited China to participate in the RIMAC exercises in 2014. Then, last month, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey visited China in an effort to restore military-to-military ties. I’m curious to know your views on mil-to-mil ties with China. Do you see them as valuable and important as many others have claimed?

Military-to-military engagement with the PRC is important. Bottom line - building longstanding relationships between senior DoD officials or military officers and their Chinese counterparts will help keep the back lines of communication open and avoid potential miscalculation in the future.  

But we should also be asking the extent to which these ties are valuable and pay dividends for the United States. Are the Chinese interested in doing joint counter-piracy missions because they share our interest in building relationships, or because they just see the training value in working with the U.S. Navy up close? I think we need to be wary of engagement with China (especially military exercises) when it is done solely for its own sake. 

While I do not have a problem with China's participate in RIMPAC 2014 as long as our allies and other regular participants have been briefed and are OK with it, I will be watching very closely to ensure their participation is consistent with the statutes of the 2000 NDAA.  

In your view what is Congress’s role in the Asia Pivot or Rebalance, and is it fulfilling this role? 

The rebalance, to me, is nothing more than a renewed emphasis on a now seven-decade old strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Putting a bumper sticker on it may serve a valid interagency purpose of drawing more bureaucratic attention to the issue, but I don't find anything particularly new about the Administration's approach.  That said, I do think refocusing our time, energy, and resources back to this critical region was necessary, and came not a moment too soon as China's growing assertiveness was beginning to dominate the discourse.  

What is Congress' role in continuing to support our long-standing policy of engagement, presence, and maintaining a favor balance of military power in the region? Very simply, continuing to do exactly that. The pillars of the regional liberal order we have sustained over the last seven decades- economic growth, stability, and the expansion and consolidation of democratic governments - should be the same ends we strive for over the next seven decades. Congress has an important role across the spectrum, including trade policy, diplomatic outreach, alliance management, and sustaining our defense posture and engagement. Given my position on the Armed Services Committee, I am focused on the balance of military power and the continuation of regional stability. In this area I have concerns, many of which have been exacerbated in the last decade by the combination of the PRC's rapid military modernization and our own focus of resources elsewhere. While I don't think our Asia-Pacific strategy is necessarily about China or its military growth, it is China's military and perceived intentions that concern me the most in the security realm. Therefore, our strategy in the region could be adjusted to focus more on China if Beijing's decision-making demands it.

Correcting this military shortfall begins with admitting it exists. We have started to do that with the development of new concepts like the Joint Operational Access Concept and setting up the AirSea Battle Office to manage that limited operational concept’s implementation. Now we must take a hard look at the platforms, payloads, training, posture, and alliance questions related to supporting these concepts and our alliance commitments. As I mentioned earlier, there may be areas where we need more capabilities, better capabilities, or different capabilities that we haven't consider before. We are going to do the analysis and look at all of these questions over the coming year. 

We should also consider the broader security question in the context of our alliances and other relationships in the region. What new can these alliances offer that contribute to regional security? How can they be updated to meet the demands of the times? What can the United States provide its partners that will help deepen our relationship for the future? 

At first glance, the two series of Israeli air strikes inside Syria on Friday and Sunday may suggest that Israel is no longer reluctant to take sides in Syria’s two-year-old civil war. But the likelihood that Jerusalem would seek to precipitate the by-now almost inevitable toppling of the Bashar al-Assad regime by cooperating with the rebels is low. Based on what is known, the target of the air strikes, which reportedly killed as many as 42 Syrian soldiers, were Iranian arms bound for Lebanese Hezbollah.

The reason is simple. For all its other faults the Assad regime has ensured a relatively stable border with Israel, and whatever comes after its downfall —likely, a mixture of Islamist rebels, some of whom have pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda — would likely be more threatening to the Jewish state.

Reports indicate that the heavy air strikes targeted stores of short-range Fateh-110 missiles that were awaiting transfer to Hezbollah. Syria, which has developed a domestic version of the Iranian-made missile under the designation M-600, was accused by Israel of transferring “hundreds” of missiles to Hezbollah in 2010. Israel has said that the transfer of such technology to the Lebanese organization was a “red line.” Some analysts also posited that the shipment could have included Scud D missiles, which have a range of 600km.

Of particular concern to Israel is the fact that the solid-fuel Fateh-110 can deliver a 500kg warhead at a distance of 250-300km with a “circular error probable” (CEP), of 330 feet, which would provide Hezbollah with the ability to strikes targets deep inside Israel with greater precision.

Four months earlier, Israeli air strikes inside Syria targeted a convoy of Russian-made SA-17 anti-aircraft missiles, also reportedly bound for Hezbollah.

A close aide of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said during a radio interview that Israel aims to avoid “an increase in tension with Syria by making clear that if there is activity, it is only against Hezbollah, not against the Syrian regime,” and Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel’s top-selling newspaper, reported that the Netanyahu government had used diplomatic channels to assure Assad that it had no intention of taking sides in the civil war. But Jerusalem is aware that it can probably act with impunity against the Assad regime, which is reluctant to open a new front given its domestic struggles.

Netanyahu wouldn’t have headed for China on Sunday to discuss trade issues if his government expected that its actions over the weekend risked leading to war with its neighbor.

Hezbollah and its patron in Iran appear to be trying to exploit the chaotic situation in Syria to transfer arms to southern Lebanon. Whether Assad has played any role in such attempted transfers remains to be seen. Nonetheless, the weapons might be the Assad regime’s repayment to the Shi’a organization for its support in the Syrian civil war.

With the possible topping of the Assad regime and the likelihood of growing foreign involvement following claims that the regime has used chemical weapons against its opponents, Tehran and Hezbollah could also fear their overland shipping route through Syria might be closing fast, and could therefore be attempting to send as much materiel to south Lebanon as they can before a post-Assad Syria emerges.

Hezbollah’s ability to remain a credible threat to Israeli security, and to act as a deterrent against military intervention targeting the Iranian regime, depends to a large extent on Syria remaining open as an arms conduit. Hence the group’s support for the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war, and the sense of urgency it might now feel in procuring whatever it can before the opportunity closes with the fall of the Assad regime.

Turkey’s recent upgrade to ‘dialogue partner’ (not full membership) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has once again brought to the fore two questions:  How important is the SCO? Would the SCO benefit from expanded membership?

First, to the question of the value, if any, of the SCO. According to skeptics, the SCO security cooperation is nothing more than window dressing. Despite this, there is no other organization in Central Asia that has both the potential and willingness to be responsible for the region’s security. NATO is unwilling to do so. Without NATO, Russia must take the lead – it has bases in three of the five Central Asian states – and has consistently expressed a desire to be the security guarantor for the region.

Given that the security issues in Central Asia are generally transnational in nature, a multilateral approach seems natural. Russia has recognized this (as has China) by involving itself in two multilateral security organizations in Central Asia; the SCO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Both organizations have four common members: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The remaining CSTO members are Armenia and Belarus, while China and Uzbekistan are the SCO's remaining members. The security capabilities that China and Uzbekistan offer (as opposed to Armenia and Belarus) could be useful for Russia. Similarly the geographical proximity of all SCO member states intractably links their security interests.

Strategic competition between Russia and China has admittedly been a hindrance to SCO security development. Russia has focused as much if not more on CSTO. For its part, Beijing is willing to play a non-primary security role in the region - it has little choice due to its policy of non-intervention - but China doubts Russia’s ability to take charge. As one former Chinese official noted “we understand (Central Asia is Russia’s ‘backyard’). But you’re (Russia) supposed after all to look after your own yard, water the flowers.”  

Economically, any Central Asian organization that doesn’t include China is not credible. The rise of Kazakhstan, booming cross-border trade and mining booms have been a result in part of China’s economic growth. Under SCO agreements (in Chinese), improved transport links have been built. This has facilitated trade, helping contribute to sustained GDP growth among smaller SCO states.

Legitimate claims have been made that the SCO is merely China’s multilateral cover for its bilateral engagement in Central Asia. Many of China’s energy and transport deals in the region have been made bilaterally, but they are sometimes negotiated on the sidelines of SCO summits. For example, Tajikistan secured road and mining projects bilaterally the day before the 2012 SCO Heads of State Summit in Beijing. Annual heads of state and heads of government meetings provide smaller SCO countries with regular high-level access to both Moscow and Beijing that very few countries enjoy. It is unlikely that Beijing, in particular, would have the time or willingness to individually hold regular dialogues at prime ministerial level with each SCO state. The summits are the backbone for good governmental relations between China and Central Asian states.  

In short, the value of the SCO is that its membership has enough clout to make a difference while also being proximal enough to maintain a commonality of interests.

Finally, to the second question of whether an expanded membership would benefit the SCO:  Any new member would need to add to the organization’s clout without diffusing its interests. It is difficult to imagine any country outside of Central Asia offering this.

The six SCO countries have a very clear set of issues that need addressing: cross-border resource disputes, drug trafficking from Afghanistan, poverty (including Western China and Southern Russia), instability (in China's Xinjiang Autonomous region, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and transnational crime/terrorism.

Commentary that the SCO has not tried to earnestly tackle these concerns probably has some basis. There have been some gains: demarcation of the border between China and its neighbors, establishment of a permanent anti-terrorist structure (however nascent), regular military exercises (however shallow) as well the aforementioned economic successes. The remaining issues are tough and will not be solved quickly. However, the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan (which borders Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and China) may sharpen the focus of the organization. Once the U.S. security veil is lifted in Afghanistan, Russia and China will likely have to more seriously address sources of instability on their doorstep. But at least in the SCO, every Central Asian issue impacts on the national interest of all current members.

In aiming for a more prosperous, secure Central Asia, a ‘mini’ SCO is far from perfect but it may be the best there is. An expanded SCO might look more prestigious. Turkey would be the first NATO member, while Afghanistan (currently an ‘observer state’) would also attract a lot of attention. But new members could further weaken the organization's potential to work constructively. The SCO would benefit from keeping its membership limited and focusing on the issues at hand.

Dirk van der Kley is a research associate for the Lowy Institute for International Policy.