Since its inception in 1988, the Fengyun (FY) program has become an international symbol of China’s burgeoning ambitions in space. China’s weather satellite program began with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s 1970 approval of a Central Military Commission proposal to initiate research and development on weather satellites. With the launch of the first FY-1A in 1988, China became only the third nation to launch its own meteorological satellites. Since then, China has launched four FY-1 weather satellites into polar orbit, five FY-2 geosynchronous weather satellites, and two FY-3 satellites that were boosted into polar orbits on Long March-4 launch vehicles.

The FY series appear to be roughly analogous to those associated with the U.S. Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. The FY-3, equipped with almost a dozen all weather sensors, is China’s most advanced space asset providing meteorological support to the People’s Liberation Army. The system also could provide measurement and signature intelligence data to China’s emerging anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) targeting architecture. In addition to five additional FY-3 satellites to be launched between now and 2020, the next generation geosynchronous weather satellite, the FY-4, is expected to enter service in 2014.As a dual use asset, FY-3 requirements appear to have been developed by both the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) and China Meteorological Bureau. Specific PLA users with significant interests in the program include the GSD Second Department and GSD Third Department. Presumably, the GSD Operations Department and Service-level weather bureaus are key PLA users.

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David Axe is reporting from Afghanistan.

On January 10, insurgents assaulted and captured a telecommunications building in the city of Sharana, in the southeastern province of Paktika. The assault, which claimed the lives of 10 people, demonstrated both the growing capabilities of the Afghan military and the insurgents’ continued ability to strike hard where least expected.

At 8:45 in the morning, five insurgents – at least three of them dressed in Afghan National Army uniforms – opened fire on policemen guarding the Paktika Communications Directorate building, across the street from the Kabul Bank and just a block from a government command post and the local offices of the National Directorate of Security. Two policemen died instantly. The insurgents seized the building and 10 people working inside.

The attack was unexpected. Not only did it strike at the heart of government power in Paktika, it came at the height of winter, traditionally a period of relative calm in Afghanistan, as conditions prevent insurgents from easily moving around.

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No offense to Rosa Brooks, who laments in Foreign Policy over Barack Obama’s supposed failure to provide a “grand strategy,” but it seems to me that the administration is doing just fine.

It’s true that U.S. foreign policy can’t be summed up succinctly or in flashy headlines, but the broad thrust of working to counter future threats is a step in the right direction. No, we don’t have talk like that of Reagan’s Cold War “Evil Empire” challenge or even George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil.” But the United States has been placed on a clear course of shifting U.S. attention toward the Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific as it winds down the two conflicts that have dominated the past decade.

America exists in a complex, multi-threat world, and there simply isn’t a “grand strategy” that neatly encapsulates all the challenges it faces. Grand strategies can undoubtedly sometimes be a good thing, and I sometimes personally wish the United States could craft a buzz-worthy foreign policy mission statement that it could confidently plug around the world. However, such a singular idea needs a singular global challenge, one that can rally not just Americans, but other nations to a universal threat.  

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Reading the comments on The Diplomat and other high-profile international relations websites, you could be forgiven for thinking that we’re already at war – China and the United States would seem to have locked horns, while India and Pakistan, and Israel and Iran, are already exchanging rounds.

This got me thinking: Are the bilious remarks, bitter acrimony and xenophobic hatred that litter the bottom of articles the relatively harmless rants of a motley crew of ultra-nationalists, a handful of off-duty soldiers, government information warfare experts and nerds taking a break from Call of Duty? If that were all there is to it, there’d be no reason to worry.

Sadly, the commenting wars raise a profound and troubling question about the evolution of world affairs: Could the hatred sown by geopolitical e-warriors today adversely influence tomorrow?

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With the Conference on Disarmament (CD) scheduled to start its first session of 2012 in Geneva from January 24, the Islamabad-based Institute of Policy Studies held a seminar on “Challenges to Pakistan’s Nuclear Program and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.” The participants, as has been highlighted by reports in the Pakistan Observer and the Nation, supported the position that the country has taken on blocking any progress on the FMCT negotiations.

It may be recalled that Pakistan has held this position over the last few years, demanding that the treaty must include existing stockpiles of fissile material within its scope. The rest of the states armed with nuclear weapons, in contrast to the Pakistani position, conceive the FMCT as a prospective treaty that’s meant to prohibit the future production of fissile material from the time it enters into force. Therefore, in their formulation, it isn’t meant to have a retrospective effect.

Why is Pakistan maintaining such a position on the FMCT? Judging comments by the Pakistani ambassador to CD, Zamir Akram, it’s because Pakistan feels threatened by the asymmetry that exists in the fissile material stockpiles of India and Pakistan. This, he fears, provides an undue advantage to India and would allow it to build a larger number of nuclear warheads. Second, he believes the problem has been compounded for his country by the grant of the waiver to India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group that has opened the opportunity for India to acquire uranium from abroad, thereby enabling the country to use its own uranium reserves for the strategic build up. A visibly disadvantaged Pakistan, therefore, is left with no option but to obstruct the FMCT.

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As a college professor, I know that assigning a student a grade of “F” for Failed is very likely to bring down a hail of argument, pleading and rancor. States that are labeled “failed” or “failing,” on the other hand, are usually silent about the epithet – and may even welcome it if aid arrives in its wake.

Failed states have been held responsible for almost all of the world’s security problems: from the diffusion of nuclear weapons technology to the flows of undocumented immigrants. The term became popular after the familiar Cold War binaries were rendered useless. Failed states entered the mainstream vocabulary in the United States after the 9/11 attacks. The problem with Afghanistan, many said, was not so much that it was an enemy state, and more that it wasn’t much of a state at all.

Governments, think tanks and NGOs began deploying the term “failed state” to justify their invasions, counsels and budget requests, until it lost its meaning. We do have some systematic attempts at measurement: the State Fragility Index (constructed by the Center for Systemic Peace), the Peace and Instability Conflict Ledger (out of the University of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management) and the Failed States Index (put together by the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy). This last is probably the most widely-read, and denizens of some troubled spots – like Kenya, which moved out of the top (sic) 15 failed states in 2011 – might be paying attention to the rankings. It’s fair to assume, though, that citizens or policymakers in Somalia (1st for four years running) or Haiti (six places higher in 2011) aren’t much moved.

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The last few weeks’ conversation about the makeup and disposition of fleets in North America and Asia has taken on a stream-of-consciousness feel. Most recently, Commander Bryan McGrath took the time to agree in print with my Flashpoints post from last week, which depicted the U.S. Navy’s decision to forward-deploy Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) to Singapore and perhaps the Philippine Islands as a throwback to the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, the standard-bearer for U.S. interests in China and the Western Pacific in the decades preceding World War II. Bryan (a classmate from way back, hence the first-name terms) accentuates the need for adequate numbers of ships, both to telegraph resolve to Asian allies and partners, and to deter a China that has a habit of overstepping its diplomatic and legal bounds in the near seas.

The quality of a fleet’s ships, aircraft, and weaponry counts for a lot, of course. But as Adm. Sergei Gorshkov, the father of the Soviet Navy, liked to say, quantity has a quality all its own. Small, simple craft can be mass-produced at less expense and in greater numbers than complex men-of-war. They can also be sent into harm’s way with less fear of political blowback should the fleet suffer heavy losses in battle. An aircraft carrier or Aegis cruiser is “lumpy capital,” meaning that the American taxpayer invested lavishly in building, equipping, and manning it. Commanders and political leaders think twice before hazarding such resource-intensive assets in combat, where they could be crippled or sunk – vitiating that investment of lives and treasure. Lesser craft like the LCS are less prone to activate decisionmakers’ reflex for risk aversion.

The latest $ 1.1 billion contract for three Type-209/1400 diesel-electric submarines looks set to breathe new life into the Indonesian Navy (Tentera Nasional Indonesia – Angkatan Laut or TNI-AL). It represents the third major TNI-AL purchase after the acquisition of new corvettes and landing ships since 2000 and has also been described as a move to “maintain power balance in the region,” prompting various analysts to attribute the purchase to Jakarta’s attempt to play regional submarine “catch-up.”

On Monday, Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro, flanked by the country’s military leadership, announced that after 10 years of frugality on the part of the military designed to give precedence to political reform, the country was now entering an intensive period of military procurement. Coming from many countries, such talk would sound reckless, if not dangerous. But coming from Indonesia, it should be welcomed.

Purnomo also spelled out his 2012 wish list, which includes tanks, multiple launch rocket systems, a guided missile destroyer, and retrofits for ex-U.S. F-16s and ex-Australian C-130 transport planes. And much more new equipment is to follow before the end of President Yudhoyono’s term in 2015, not least three new South Korean submarines.

For the first time in recent memory, the Indonesian defense ministry has money in its pocket. Announcing the acquisition of an additional six Su-30 Sukhoi fighter aircraft over the weekend, Purnomo could be heard to boast: “Our economy is very strong and we have a defense budget of Rp 150 trillion [$16.3 billion].” While that figure represents a multi-year procurement budget, Purnomo is right to feel flush. In December, the government decided to revise the defense allocation upwards, giving defense a 53 percent year-on-year increase. That presents Jakarta with a 2012 defense budget of $7.9 billion – a total that should finally bring the defense budget above the 1 percent of GDP mark (just).

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Western analysts have scrambled to learn as much as possible about North Korea’s Jang Song-thaek. His skill in not only surviving political purges, but rising to the top of North Korean power circles stands out among the current North Korean leadership.  He’s the current Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission and uncle of the “Great Successor,” Kim Jong-un.  Many have argued that he could serve as a key advisor or even as caretaker of North Korea while Kim gains experience and builds loyalty within the regime. Anyone looking to understand North Korea after the passing of Kim Jong-il would, then, be well advised to keep an eye on Jang.

As with all things North Korea, though, hard facts are difficult to come by. What is known about Jang is that he came from a humble background and attended Kim Il-sung University in Pyongyang. While there, he dated Kim Il-sung's daughter, Kim Kyong-hui. Kim Il-sung strongly disagreed with the relationship and ordered Jang should be expelled from the university and transferred to the Economy University of Wonsan. Despite her father's opposition, Kim Il-sung was persuaded to give his blessing for them to marry.

From 1978 until the early 1980s, it was believed Jang underwent re-education as a steel worker because of his inability to curb his alcoholism and neglect towards his governmental duties.But Jang was welcomed back to the inner elite after he completed the construction of the 13^th Festival of Youth and Students in 1989. In 1992, he was elected to the Central Committee's Central Delegate and then to Vice Director of the Guidance Division. It seemed Jang was once again on the rise.