Its been an eventful 12 months in cyberspace, with some international headline grabbing events including the Stuxnet worm and hacking by the group Anonymous. In a number of cases, events have upended the conventional wisdom on cyberspace and have set in motion responses that will have a long term impact on cyberspace.

The Stuxnet worm had been discussed for some time, but its label as the first military grade cyber weapon was only really earned this year, when it was revealed that Iranian nuclear facilities had been targeted by the worm. The revelation put paid to the notion that “air-gapped” systems – those not connected to the Internet – were impervious to attack.

While previously it had generally been assumed that critical infrastructure would only be targeted in the course of full-on hostilities, Stuxnet proved that targeted attacks were possible, although they require enormous resources. Indeed, some put the cost of developing Stuxnet at anywhere up to $10 million. However, given the level of resources available for hire around the world, such costs could tumble.

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Religious, cultural, and historical links notwithstanding, the Republic of Azerbaijan has had a difficult relationship with neighboring Iran ever since its independence in 1991. But tensions have reached new heights in the last couple of year years. 

This was no clearer than it was on August 9 this year, when Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi, chief of Iran’s armed forces’ Joint Staff Command, warned Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev that he would face “a dark fate” should he continue to expand ties with Israel.

The statement prompted the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry to deliver an official protest to the Iranian Embassy in Baku, as well as to arrest three members of the banned Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, which Baku claims is funded by Tehran. Last month, meanwhile, Baku accused Iran of being behind the stabbing of Azeri writer and journalist Rafiq Tagi. And last week, the director of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting office in the Azeri capital, Ahmad Kazemi, was denied entry into Baku, and was forced to leave Azerbaijan the same day.

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This month, the Philippine Navy deployed its latest warship, the BRP Gregorio del Pilar. The vessel is a 46-year-old former U.S. Coast Guard cutter and, amidst the fanfare since Manila first acquired the vessel, the Benigno Aquino administration has also announced its intention to bolster the country’s maritime security capabilities.

The move seems aimed squarely at responding to ongoing tensions in the South China Sea, where increased Chinese assertiveness in disputed waters has prompted the Philippine government to vow to modernize its armed forces, particularly its navy. These tensions have spiked this year as Chinese vessels have harassed other ships in the region, including in March the Philippine government oil exploration vessel MV Venture off Reed Bank in the Spratlys.

The Reed Bank incident was closely followed by alleged Chinese aerial intrusions over Philippine-held territory in the Spratlys in May and June; during one such incident, a Chinese military plane was claimed to have buzzed and intimidated a Philippine fishing vessel operating in the area.

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The “strategic partnership” between India and Russia received another symbolic boost with the visit of India’s prime minister to Moscow from December 15 to 17. While the bilateral relationship between the two countries has always been important considering India’s defense equipment has largely been of Soviet/Russian vintage, the connection has also been of special significance for India’s nuclear ambitions. Indeed, a prominent showcasing of this was to be the commissioning of the first unit of the Russian built nuclear power plant at Kudankulam. Two units of the power plant have been under construction for the good part of the last decade, and the first unit was due to become critical before the end of this year.

But work on the plant, which was nearly 90 percent complete, came to a halt several months ago as a result of public protests expressing fears about nuclear safety. The nuclear establishment and the central government have since engaged in efforts to assuage the fears of the local population through proactive engagement. Yet no breakthrough has been possible that will allow for resumption of work.

Despite the persisting agitation, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reassured his Russian counterpart that work on the timely commissioning of the plant would be resumed soon. However, it’s now obvious that the plant will miss its original commissioning date. And it’s also clear that this episode should hold a special lesson not just for India’s nuclear program, but for all countries that looking to build nuclear power plants.

Writing at Via Meadia, one of my favorite public intellectuals, Walter Russell Mead, observes that the hoopla over Kim Jong-Il’s death obscured something far more consequential: this week’s trilateral security consultations among India, Japan, and the United States.

A formal compact has bound Washington and Tokyo together for decades. Yet no tripartite alliance is in the making, despite years of hopeful talk among Indian and U.S. elites about a “natural strategic partnership” uniting the world’s two democracies. Spooked by China’s increasingly visible presence in South and Southeast Asia, New Delhi is increasingly making common cause with the allies, not to mention with other prospective partners like Australia and Vietnam. As yet, though, Indians show little sign of spurning their history of “nonalignment” in power politics.

Nonalignment has been a mainstay of Indian foreign policy since the days of founding Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. On the other hand, Indians are largely eager for informal collaboration. Mead terms the arrangement now coalescing an “entente,” or informal coalition, rather than an alliance. The phrase evokes the “Triple Entente” that took shape in the years antedating World War I, when the mercurial Kaiser Wilhelm II drove great powers that historically found themselves at one another’s throats – France, Russia, Great Britain – into alignment against the “Central Powers,” an axis among Imperial Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and, sort of, Italy.

The Diplomat speaks with Gareth Jennings, IHS Jane's Aviation desk editor and managing editor of Jane's Missiles & Rockets, to discuss Japan’s choice of the F-35 fighter in its recent F-X competition.

With the passing of Kim Jong-il, many questions are being asked about North Korea, its people, and its dealings with the outside world. There is, however, one issue that trumps all others: what does this change of leadership mean for the North Korean nuclear program?

So far, there are no clear indications of a change in North Korea’s posture towards the outside world. There’s the possibility that his son, Kim Jong-un, will lean on his “nuclear card” in some show of strength to enhance his domestic position. However, there’s also the possibility he might refrain from any sort of tactical or crisis driven display to strengthen his position. Kim belongs to the young generation – he’s a man in his 20s with a long life ahead of him – and so may be inclined to leave the nuclear card unplayed in order to gain economic and political benefits for his country.

The path that he chooses will depend on two major factors. First is his personal nature, combined with his grooming by his father and the system – very little is known or can be done about this by the rest of the world. Second, his choice will be guided by the advice or signals provided to him by the outside world. This is there the international community can make a difference.

Japan, like a number of other U.S. allies and the U.S. military itself, has just signed up to procure the F-35 Lightning II fighter aircraft, built primarily by Lockheed Martin. Experts are already questioning whether the F-35 was the right choice for Japan, and this debate is sure to inform the decisions of other countries in the Asia-Pacific that are seriously considering buying F-35s of their own. Australia has already signed onto the F-35 program, but is having second thoughts. Singapore is due to announce its decision on whether to procure the aircraft in 2012, while South Korea is set to deliver its verdict by October of that year. India, too, is being targeted by Washington as a future customer for the aircraft.

The make-or-break questions that these countries will now be asking are:

How much does an F-35 really cost? The answer is that it depends who you ask. A Lockheed Martin spokesman said the day before the Japanese procurement was announced that: “The average recurring flyaway cost of an F-35A, in 2010 economics, is approximately $65 million.” But hours later, the Japanese Ministry of Defense confirmed that it was paying JPY8.9 billion ($114 million), or JPY9.9 billion ($127 million) including spares, for each F-35. It’s unclear why the two figures are so far apart, but it’s easy to understand why potential partners like Australia have lost trust in the numbers.

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The new phase of Chinese naval development could include even more new weapons and sensors than the previous phase, if the recent launch of another specialized testing ship is any indication.

Last month, the PLA Navy launched “Ship 893,” its third new weapons trials vessel since 2005. Trials ships are equipped with systems to track and analyze new missiles and sensors during testing.

The People’s Liberation Army develops and builds weapons in five-year cycles, the most recent of which began in late 2010. The 2006-2010 cycle heavily emphasized new ships, including new frigates and destroyers and a refurbished Soviet-made aircraft carrier.

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The Diplomat speaks with Christopher Hughes, professor of International Politics and Japanese Studies at the University of Warwick, about Japan's recent decision to purchase the U.S. F-35 fighter aircraft.

Japan has selected the F-35 as its next generation fighter aircraft. What do you think led to this decision over other possible choices like the Eurofighter or F-18?

The first reason that the Japanese government may claim, but which I think is one of the least convincing, would be the capabilities of the F-35 over the F-18 and Eurofighter. The F-35 is supposed to replace the F-4, which is essentially an interceptor/air superiority fighter, and this is the kind of role that the F-X (project) is necessary for, especially if the aim is to ensure Japanese air defense against Chinese fighters like the J-20. The F-18 and especially the Eurofighter could easily fulfill this kind of role, whereas the F-35 is perhaps not ideally suited to this role.

For sure, the F-35 is a very capable aircraft (or should be whenever it goes into service), but it isn't the F-22, and the Eurofighter could certainly match anything that Russia and China has and perform an F-22 type of role. Moreover, the F-35 is really designed because of its stealth capabilities for air defense penetration and for delivering precision guided munitions. So it isn't really an air superiority fighter. Its stealth capabilities might be attractive to Japan, but again these are less important for air defense. The Eurofighter, although lacking stealth, is designed to counter an adversary's stealth capabilities. So if the mission and defense requirement as declared by the Japanese Ministry of Defense is for an F-4 replacement with F-4 roles, then the F-35 is probably not the ideal aircraft.

The F-35 is also not ideal in terms of providing Japan with domestic industrial fighter production to help preserve its defense industry. Japan probably would have been allowed to build and develop indigenously nearly the entire set of technologies for the F-18 and Eurofighter. It looks like Japan may get some domestic build on the F-35, and this will provide some useful technological learning, but it will be quite minimal compared to the Eurofighter or F-18.

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