The nuclear summit in Seoul last month gave world leaders a chance to discuss key nuclear security issues and to draw up a strategy for reducing nuclear threats to the global community. Yet whenever there’s talk of global nuclear security, Pakistan is inevitably a focus of discussion.

The fear within much of the international community, of course, is that the country’s nuclear assets will fall into the wrong hands. But this fear is actually largely misplaced, and the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is generally underestimated. Instead, international attention should be focused on a quite different problem, one that could indeed make Pakistan a threat – it’s possible economic demise.

Pakistan’s nuclear policy is geared towards combating the perceived threat posed by India. Indeed, this was the rationale for launching Pakistan’s nuclear program in the 1970s – Pakistan’s military and general public collectively remember losing East Pakistan, while Kashmir continues to be a major point of discontent. Having been engaged in four wars with India, Pakistan is wary about abandoning its nuclear options, meaning that it will require New Delhi, not just Islamabad, to move on this issue if South Asia is to have any hope of seeing reduced nuclear arsenals. This in turn will require both nations to resolve the differences that underpin tensions, including Kashmir – an issue that has no hope of being resolved without international assistance.

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On April 1, two Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) escort destroyers,Kurama and Yamagiri, anchored at a South Korean navybase in Pyeongtaek as part of a training voyage. The move sent a strongsignal to North Korea that Japan and South Korea are stepping up their security cooperation. However, the fact that the naval exchange barely got a mention in the South Korean mediareflects just how carefully Seoul and Tokyo treat the question of “security cooperation.”

In some ways, it’shard to be optimistic about ties between Japan and South Korea. Last January, Seoul denied reports over talks with Tokyo on strengthening military cooperation. Moreover, talks between South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and Noda Yoshihiko in Kyotoat the end of last year ended with very little progress on regional security, with discussion instead getting snarled in historical issues.

For decades, the volley of politicized disputes overhistorical and sovereignty issueshasundermined progress in Japan-South Korea relations.Talks between Seoul and Tokyooften end with a vague agreement to make relations more “forward-looking,” which in diplomatic speak is simply another way of saying “let’s talk about it later.”

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Japanese companies, increasingly shifting overseas to offset a shrinking domestic market, are taking the first steps to hire foreigners after long resisting even modest changes to their uniform workplace culture.

But they are now confronting the question about just how drastic that change should be. Many Japanese companies say they want foreign workers, but few so far have been willing to overhaul the system – with unequal pay and few opportunities for promotions – that once dissuaded foreigners from joining in the first place.

Greater diversity will likely help corporations overseas, boosting their attractiveness to foreign investors and easing transitions after mergers and acquisitions. Such moves, though, would also upend a corporate culture steeped in diligence and dutiful pride that many Japanese companies still see as a key part of their traditional success.

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After much political posturing in the lead up to the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, the two-day conference this week – attended by more than 50 countries and international organizations – ended with a joint communiqué that reaffirmed the need to ensure “a safer world for all.” Not surprisingly, critics have pointed out that such a communique – long on commitments but short on specifics – amounted to little substantive progress. Coupled with the announcement by the United States this week that it was suspending the food aid deal to North Korea, it’s clear we are back to the drawing board.  

To be fair, this nuclear stalemate isn’t unexpected. Indeed, only the most optimistic – or naïve – would have expected anything of consequence to materialize from this meet. Short of North Korea doing an about-face, the status quo was always likely to persist as the key players continue to disagree on some fundamental issues.

Here’s where the main countries now stand:

The United States: Notwithstanding his strongly worded statements against nuclear terrorism, President Barack Obama’s visit to Seoul can be best described as symbolic. The U.S. president’s visit broke little new ground in terms of real policy debate. His trip to the demilitarized zone – listed as the most dangerous place in the world – provided plenty of photo opportunities and quotes aplenty, but otherwise, little substantive in terms of moving the nuclear issue forward.

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Iran undoubtedly represents one of the key foreign policy issues for U.S. President Barack Obama. And as the world begins to realize the implications of growing Iran-U.S. tensions (and as Obama watches gas prices climb uncomfortably in an election year) his administration is coming under increasing pressure to find a creative policy solution.

Some see Obama as one of the most successful “foreign policy” presidents in recent times – he handled the Arab uprisings calmly, and has countered China’s purported expansion by executing a skillful U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific.  But it’s one of his predecessors’ handling of China that might offer him the most useful guide to tackling the looming issue of Iran.

There are a number of parallels between the state of Sino-American relations in the 1960s and 1970s and U.S.-Iran relations today. During the Cold War, the U.S. managed to avoid direct conflict with an emerging Chinese nuclear power, with the Americans choosing the path of caution and the logic of containment and mutually-assured destruction.

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The instinctive reaction to the announcement by North Korea that it plans to launch a satellite next month was to denounce it as a violation of the “Leap Day deal.” That arrangement involved “simultaneous unilateral announcements” offering nutritional assistance from the United States while North Korea promised to place a moratorium on its nuclear program, including long-range missile launches.

We all know what will happen next. The U.S. demands additional sanctions, North Korea withdraws from its part of the bargain, and tensions increase. Let me suggest a way to avoid another rerun: rather than insisting that the launch violates the long-range missile launch moratorium, Washington should test the North Korean claim that it’s launching a satellite and not a missile by accepting Pyongyang’s offer to allow experts and journalists to observe the launch.

While most analyses of the North’s rationale for making this announcement involve Pyongyang palace intrigue, this approach is mistaken. The planned launch has been a long time in the making. The use of a new test facility suggests that it’s part of a long-term strategy and isn’t being driven by an internal power struggle as much as it is by the desire to establish the legitimacy of the satellite program. That doesn’t mean the announcement isn’t provocative – it’s clearly meant to create discord and provoke responses from multiple parties.

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A week of discussions last month with the United States’ Northeast Asian allies sent one very important message: there are no doubts about the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent in that region of the world. Neither North Korea’s provocations and fire-breathing rhetoric, nor China’s recent flexing of its foreign policy muscles has shaken our allies’ faith in the US commitment to their defense.

At least, not yet.

While our Japanese and Korean interlocutors signaled confidence in Washington for the near term, they made it clear – echoing comments we’ve heard throughout the region over the last year – that they worry about the long-term ability of the United States to meet its commitments. Intentions aren’t the problem: there are few doubts about the sincerity of commitment across the U.S. political spectrum to a strong presence in Asia. No, these concerns are deeper, and go to the very will and even ability of the United States to address profound problems in its political and economic system. Capability isn’t the problem – it’s will. And it’s in large part the will to tackle problems at home that worries our friends.

Asian leaders and experts worry that failure to confront and at least to start solving the titanic economic and structural challenges facing the United States will mean that Washington – whatever its intentions – will find it much harder to maintain its position as the guarantor of stability and liberal order in the Pacific basin. In particular, Asian audiences focus on Americans’ inability or refusal to address our budgetary woes, to revitalize an economy that has had its worst decade in generations, and to overcome the seemingly intractable political gridlock that prevents meaningful governmental action even on issues for which broad agreement exists.

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U.S. arms sales remain a constant source of tension in Washington’s relationship with Beijing. In September, the Obama administration announced the latest round of sales, with a total value of $5.9 billion. In response to the upgrades for Taiwan’s existing F-16A/B fighters, the Chinese Foreign Ministry summoned U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke and warned that “the wrongdoing by the U.S. side will inevitably undermine bilateral relations as well as exchanges and cooperation in military and security areas.”

It has become a familiar ritual and, compared to past announcements, the Chinese reaction could be even considered relatively restrained. This time, there was no talk of sanctions against U.S. arms companies or the disruption of vital ties between the two sides’ militaries.

One reason for Beijing’s muted response was the fact that the latest U.S. arms package included neither a submarine design program, nor the delivery of new F-16C/D fighters for Taiwan’s air force. This seems to have placated the Chinese leadership, as the military balance in the Taiwan Strait continues to shift strongly (and probably irreversibly) in Beijing’s favor. 

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As the Belgian-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, or SWIFT, pushes ahead with its plans to expel blacklisted Iranian banks from major state-owned institutions to the Iranian Central Bank, Tehran is on the verge of becoming completely frozen out of the global financial system. Already under a barrage of sanctions, the Iranian economy is reeling from double-digit inflation, marked depreciation in currency, and huge disruptions in foreign trade.

In response, the Iranian regime has moved on two fronts: first, revisiting its nuclear posture by considering substantive dialogue and greater flexibility in terms of transparency and openness to inspection, verification and confidence-building measures; and second, stepping-up its economic engagement with Asian giants to ameliorate its growing isolation. This is precisely where India is central to Iran’s counter-strategy for withstanding international isolation.

India’s “Persian adventure” indicates an increasingly pragmatic and independent character of the country’s foreign policy posturing. India has been able to deepen its ties – almost simultaneously – with both Iran and the United States as it adeptly walks a diplomatic tightrope, with rising tensions over Iran’s nuclear program hitting fever pitch.

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The Vietnam “story” has changed over time. First, it was a war story; then Vietnam “became a country” in the run-up to the normalization of U.S.-Vietnam relations in 1995. Now the country is moving forward with a new narrative, a strategy of active and proactive international integration.

Now, the country’s top foreign policy makers have decided it’s time for Vietnam to fully launch itself into the international arena. In a conversation with the Council on Foreign Relations last year, Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh said: “This was a turning point in our foreign policy, because before we focused on economic integration, but now we also integrate in all areas such as not only economic but politics, diplomacy, security, defense, culture and social effects.”

This “active and proactive integration” will include the market’s “invisible hand” with all the resultant spillover effects. Vietnam’s trade volume now exceeds 160 percent of GDP. Being a member of the World Trade Organization and APEC, having concluded many free trade agreements and being part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Vietnam sees the world as a myriad of markets and business opportunities. Trade with China, for example, has increased 900 times since 1992. Vietnam has also become an attractive market for many other countries. In July, the U.S. 2011 National Export Strategy added Vietnam to its list of “next tier” markets, identifying the five important markets as Colombia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Vietnam. Singapore alone has invested more than $23 billion in Vietnam. Vietnamese businesses have begun their own projects abroad, and they are now worth $11 billion.

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