The United States should be relieved, not distraught, if the dollar’s use as the sole global reserve currency were to come to an end — as some believe may soon happen. The 2007/8 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has not been resolved, and China is yet to face the worst of its effects. German domestic policies post-unification were as much responsible for the Eurozone debt crisis as any domestic factors in the affected countries. The Eurozone debt crisis will continue to affect Spanish and European politics and will probably lead to Spain and other countries leaving the Euro absent a strong fiscal union or a transformation of Germany’s economic model. China’s rebalancing, when it properly begins, will see GDP growth rates fall to below 5% and will average around 3% for a decade, but this will not be a disaster for China. Trade tensions are set to rise until global imbalances are resolved.
If any of the above predictions seem to contradict what readers have seen in the financial or mainstream press recently, they would be recommended to get a copy of Peking University Professor Michael Pettis’ new book The Great Rebalancing: Trade, Conflict, and the Perilous Road Ahead for the World Economy. Professor Pettis is very well known amongst China finance watchers, and his blog is a must read for many who have interests in China’s economy or financial system.
Pettis bases much of The Great Rebalancing’s content on fairly simple economic accounting identities (necessary truths) concerning the relationship between any country’s domestic savings and investment rates, production and consumption rates, and external current and capital accounts. Building off these, he creates a book full of easy-to-understand, yet often misunderstood theories, explanations and predictions for what went wrong internationally before the 2008 Financial Crisis, what has been going on since, and where things are likely to head in the future. A key area of his argument is that any domestic policy which affects the relationship between savings and investment or production and consumption has a trade effect, whether or not it is intended as such.
For example, he argues that the U.S. dollar’s role as the global reserve currency does not give Washington the “Exorbitant Privilege” argued by many, but rather places on the United States an “Exorbitant Burden.” Foreign nations, as they export capital to the United States, force onto it a trade deficit, which lowers U.S.growth, worsening the fiscal deficit (as opposed to the commonly held view that foreign capital allows the U.S. to borrow cheaply by lowering interest rates), facilitating the disruptive real estate bubble and the decline in U.S. savings through higher unemployment and more debt.
Pettishas also argued for years on his blog, and comprehensively in this book, that China’s unbalanced economy must undergo a disruptive and probably painful rebalancing. This once contrarian view has become more and more accepted by both commentators and experts watching China’s economy (and its leaders), and the recently announced policy that aims to close the income gap can also be seen in this light. The argument that Chinese GDP growth rates will probably fall to just 3% on average during China’s rebalancing period is still controversial, yet Pettis believes that as long as household incomes are growing at much faster rates, there is little risk that the social unrest that many fear will accompany a decline in GDP growth will come to pass. After all, people are usually content when they can consume more, better support their families and obtain higher-quality services, not when GDP increases.
Although much less technical than Professor Pettis’ earlier book The Volatility Machine, which focuses on balance sheet stability,The Great Rebalancing still requires quite a bit of concentration, as any book tackling the complex interactions between various nations and their domestic and external economic situations invariably must. Having said that, The Great Rebalancing is probably one of the clearest, most elegant and logically written explanations of world trade, including both how policies affect trade and how trade affects economies. As described above, this is not just a China book, but a book encompassing some of the biggest economic and financial questions of our time. The persuasive, clear and well-reasoned arguments behind many of the seemingly unorthodox ideas in the book will make it both pleasing and nicely unsettling for many readers. Hopefully its message will be heard amongst policymakers before some of the more disturbing predictions become realities.

emerich
Pettis's book indeed does a terrific job of clarifying key economic relationships: trade balances are one side of the coin, financial balances the other side. Pinch one side, the other side adjusts. His book will do a great service if the link between financial and trade flows becomes more widely understood. It's ironic though that the book's arguments line up with politicians who know only one thing about trade and it’s that China must revalue the Yuan. I think Pettis takes his own arguments too far and oversimplifies. The US deficit and China's surplus aren't due to US profligacy, he argues, but to Chinese financial repression and other forms of subsidy for the trade sector; Greece's crisis is due to similar policies in Germany. But: why Greece and not any of the other 25 countries in the Eurozone? Don’t Greece’s policies have anything to do with Greece’s problems? And if the U.S. government ran a budget surplus, thus increasing aggregate saving, and/or Americans started saving more, wouldn't causation run the other way, forcing a lower trade surplus in China, Germany and other surplus countries, and/or higher deficits in other deficit countries? In Pettis’s model, instead of thrifty Germans and Chinese and profligate Greeks and Americans, a picture he deplores as moralistic, we get powerful, malign Chinese and Germans and victimized Greeks and Americans. Does that get us there?
Also, he barely discusses the impact of China’s undervalued currency on China’s financial system. Hasn’t it caused inflation? And isn’t the inflation offsetting at least some of the advantage from the undervalued currency? Hasn’t all that buying of dollars contributed to the financial boom, which in turn has driven up labor costs relative to those in the U.S.? He says China’s labor pool have kept inflation in check, but according to some recent statistics, Chinese labor costs have risen 70% relative to those in the U.S. since the crisis.
That having been said, one needn’t look far for evidence of inefficient capital allocation in China (ghost towns, etc.), and China’s wouldn’t be the first country to learn that investment doesn’t guarantee growth if it’s unproductive.
Bankotsu
"economically it is locking up the Europe up with a new US-EU free trade pact"
I think the U.S-EU trade pact is mainly for political purposes, they want to reassure europe that U.S is not abandoning them with their so called "pivot" to Asia.
Victor Charlie
You cannot play game with the global community for ever! TPP & US-EU trade pact will 'help Chinese economy get back on the right track' via rebalancing (sometimes painful) & playing by the rules of the game!
John Chan
Professor Pettis’ global rebalancing message has been heard loud and clear by the policymakers of the old imperial powers, they are engineering a forced global economic rebalancing right now. USA’s grant scheme is to restrict China’s growth by deploying a multi-prongs approach; economically it is locking up the Europe up with a new US-EU free trade pact, locking up Asia-Pacific with TPP and enforced the restrictions on China’s growth with forward power presence (pivoting) in Asia-Pacific. Japanese and the Filipino’s provocation seems the vanguard that the USA can cripple China without resort to long enduring trade wars.
Professor Pettis’ global rebalancing message is most likely to whistle of replaying WWII.
smartmoney
Mr Pettis' message would sit in nicely with Mr Obama's recent speech carrying the usual stuff about less spending, less government, less WMDs, less taxes but only more jobs for the people. A bag of hot air in other words.
Jaques666
Haha! John Chan you are right! The old Imperial Powers' leaders have indeed heard the message loud and clear. For example, Wen Jiabao, Premier of China (one of the old Imperial powers) said in 2007: "..There are stuctual problems in China's economy which cause unsteady, unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable development"
Premier Wen in 2009 at the WEF: "China's economic rebound is unstable, UNBALANCED and not yet solid."
Li Keqiang said in 2010 in Qiushi that China has created an "irrational economic structure" which was "unsustainable".
You are indeed right about your first point. Although it is sad that you have not really read the book (or maybe even the post). Also sad that you have not read or listened to what your current Premier or future Premier think about China's "rebalancing".
Pettis's message is not at all about trade pacts as you suggest (again it would be useful if you knew at least a little bit of the theory you were wading into), in fact he suggests that such trade cooperation is going to be severely threatened by the inability (not unwillingness) of China to rebalance. Go and read the book, then come back and see if your comments are any more informed. (btw, you don't have to agree with the book, but at least you might be able to accurately state what Pettis says)
John Chan
@Jaques666,
The idea of USA-EU trade pact to restrict China’s growth was wondered aloud on the BBC America. Anybody with common sense can put TPP and USA’s pivot to Asia together with USA-EU trade pact to figure out what the predatory imperialists are up to when they talk about Great Rebalancing.
Jaques666
Well I wont comment on whether an EU-USA trade pact or a TPP would restrict China's growth, but I can assure you that rebalancing would be very good for China's long term growth, as Pettis, Wen Jiabao and James Parker are arguing. Rebalancing is only minimally to do with trade pacts. So your "common sense" may not be that common or make that much sense…
Rebalancing is about increasing Chinese consumption relative to production, allowing savings rates to fall, and allowing Chinese wage growth to catch up with productivity growth, and to allow China's economy to become more efficient, its terms of trade to improve (ie stop swapping goods for forex and foreign goods below value – as the peg does), and its financial stability to become more sustainable (through halting the situation currently whereby debt is growing faster than GDP growth). Rebalancing is being pushed by the State Council, Premier Wen, a large amount of Chinese university academics and the CASS, as well as incoming Premier Li Keqiang. Still not sure what you are on about when you say Imperialists.
Feel free not to reply if you check what Premier Wen, Li Keqiang, the State Council, etc etc have said about it and decide that you are accidentally "defending China" against them.
David Rocourt
Both you guys have made valid points. However, the core of the issue is being ignored. A major rebalancing will likely have repercussions that we have yet to fathom. Therefore, considering the state of the global economy as a whole, we must make sure that our navigation through the recovery process does not vear towards unchartered terrain.