The Japanese government’s failure to provide tuition-wavers for students attending pro-North Korean schools inside Japan “constitutes discrimination,” a UN committee has said in a new report.

“The Committee is concerned at the exclusion of Korean schools from the State party’s tuition-waiver programme for high school education, which constitutes discrimination,” the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights wrote in a regular report published on the domestic situations in all signatory countries.

“Recalling that the prohibition against discrimination applies fully and immediately to all aspects of education and encompasses all internationally prohibited grounds of discrimination, the Committee calls on the State party to ensure that the tuition-waiver programme for high school education is extended to children attending Korean schools.”

Since April 2010 the Japanese government has provided subsidies to offset the cost of high school education in Japan. However, it has not been providing funding to ethnic-Korean schools run by the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, or Chosen Soren (Chongryon), and funded in part by the North Korean government. Chongryon acts as North Korea’s unofficial embassy in Japan because the two countries do not maintain diplomatic ties.

Although Tokyo doesn’t officially recognize the schools, they have been around since the 1950s and have been heavily funded by Pyongyang throughout that time, albeit this funding has decreased in recent years as North Korea’s economic situation has deteriorated. There are reportedly around 70 such schools inside Japan which educate around 8,000 ethnic-Koreans from elementary school through high school. At their peak the schools educated 40,000 Koreans in Japan.

The schools usually feature portraits of North Korean leaders Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il on their walls and in many cases students enjoy a fully compensated trip to North Korea during their senior year.

Although they have historically taught a pro-Pyongyang curriculum to their students, teachers and administrators at the Chosen schools say this has changed in recent years and now the students even learn some South Korean history. Still, many Japanese still view the schools with extreme suspicion and claim they are used to develop spies for Pyongyang, a charge that the students themselves deny.

Much of the animosity towards the schools emanates from the continued anger in Japan over North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, an issue Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has taken an avid interest in resolving. Japan’s suspicion of North Korea is also fueled by Pyongyang’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs.

Chongryon is itself a controversial organization in some quarters in Japan. It was established in 1955 for Korean supporters of North Korea in Japan (most of whose ancestors originated from what is now South Korea) and considers Juche its official ideology. As detailed in the memoir Aquariums of Pyongyang, in the past Chongryon was active in persuading many ethnic-Koreans in Japan to move to North Korea, which Pyongyang supported owing to these migrants’ wealth and the remittances they often received from relatives that stayed behind in Japan. At the same time, many of those who moved quickly became disillusioned with North Korean and tried to return to Japan. They were subsequently thrown into hard labor camps in North Korea.

Although Japan’s central government and many of its local ones have not been providing funding for the pro-North Korean schools since 2010, Prime Minister Abe came into office much more vocal in his opposition to ever funding the school. In February his government officially banned funding, a decision that was criticized by the United Nations and the International Olympic Committee at the time.

In its report, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also criticized Japan for how it has handled the issue of “comfort women.”

The South West Pacific is dotted with small and micro states, with many only recently winning independence and still facing varying degrees of internal instability. These countries range from tiny islands to artificial amalgamations of diverse cultures. The largest, Papua New Guinea, has over 800 different languages, a tough proposition for any national government, quite apart from its other challenges. The region is marked by weak governance and poor, fast-growing populations.

These islands have only recently integrated into the global economic system. Many were under European colonial control until as late as the 1970s or 1980s. While a number of tribal groupings and islands form nation states, virtually none are viable as continuing independent entities. And given the region’s history as a strategically significant staging ground for geopolitical contests, the collapse of one country could lead to greater regional instability and an external presence, including military.

As a result of these features (and geographical proximity), Australia and New Zealand have become the region’s de-facto underwriters. Despite nominal independence in 1975, Papua New Guinea now receives around AUD$500 million per annum from its large neighbor. Australia has also assisted in stabilizing and capacity-building activities in the region, but its ability to militarily intervene in future crises is limited by logistics.

The most vulnerable types of countries (from an Australian strategic perspective) can be categorized according to two main cultural groups: Polynesian nations and the larger Melanesian nations (the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and East Timor). As a side note, Micronesia is somewhat further away and does not factor greatly into Australia’s grand strategy.

None of the Melanesian states has had a long history as a cohesive, viable political unit.  The Solomon Islands has around 500,000 citizens and compared to Papua New Guinea, home to over seven million, it is a relatively small country. By 2003, the Solomon Island’s government had become virtually unworkable and it was only the invitation and deployment of a regional force, led by Australia and New Zealand, which helped stabilize the nation and avoid collapse.  According to the stabilization force’s official website: “[the] Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) is a partnership between the people and Government of Solomon Islands and fifteen countries of the Pacific. RAMSI arrived in Solomon Islands in July 2003 at the request of the Solomon Islands Government. Since then, much has been achieved and Solomon Islands is continuing on its path to recovery.”

RAMSI was initially military-led, but it relatively quickly introduced a policing capability, capacity-building and development projects. While successful in stabilizing the country, the operation was difficult, expensive and resulted in a long-term engagement. This effectively made Australia a quasi-colonizer, although at the time it was framed in different language.

Despite the challenges, an Australia faced with another impending implosion of a near neighbor would likely mobilize and intervene. Still, questions remain over the ability to undertake and sustain such a deployment, which would be framed in term of humanitarian or invited “assistance”, but would undoubtedly be for security purposes.

It is worth noting that Australia had significant difficulty deploying to East Timor in 1999 and relied heavily on US logistical support. Should Papua New Guinea falter or fail, the prospect of the immediate evacuation of foreign nationals and a long-term power vacuum would certainly draw in external actors, both state and non-state.

Considerations for intervention in Australia’s near neighborhood continue to play out in defense strategy debates. Within Australian White Papers and asset procurement decisions, a key tension remains: whether there should be an emphasis on regional/neighborhood scenarios or on participating in global conflicts as a junior coalition partner (i.e. Iraq, Afghanistan and, in an historical context, Western Europe during the World Wars).

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seeks to project the image of a steadfast friend and ally of America, in contrast to his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) predecessors.  

Though it is unfair to claim that the DPJ was anti-American, Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are indeed focused on a firmer political and military partnership with Washington. The Japanese cabinet has pushed forward the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), seeks to solve the Okinawa basing issues, and emphasizes the vital importance of Japan-US Security Treaty.

But ironically, at the same the time, the Abe team’s inclinations threaten the Japan-US alliance.

Abe wants to take Japan away from the “postwar regime.”  But what is the postwar order? Fundamentally, it is the constitution and a set of liberal reforms enacted under the US occupation. American officials under General Douglas MacArthur worked closely with Japanese reformers. They built on the achievements of the Meiji Restoration to transform the dysfunctional imperial state into a more effective and stable parliamentary democracy that has been Japan’s most successful regime ever. Abe’s dislike of this regime is a clear rejection of American ideas.

The United States has many partners whose norms are incompatible with current American values. For example, Saudi Arabia, an intolerant theocracy whose practices are antithetical to nearly all Americans, works closely with the U.S. Nevertheless, the closest American allies have generally been with states that share the same liberal democratic orientation of the U.S.

Abe is not about to bring despotism to Japan. But his virulent hatred of the American-drafted basic law reflects a heartfelt desire to move back to some of the prewar principles that most Americans, rightly or wrongly, find unappealing.

Abe also has a very different understanding of Japan’s 1931-45 history from most foreigners (and many Japanese). One aspect is a devotion to the Yasukuni Shrine, whose deities include Japanese leaders executed for war crimes by the United States, and doubts about whether Japan invaded neighboring countries during that period. Though Abe himself has not – so far – set foot at Yasukuni as prime minister, he sent an offering to the shrine. Abe has not formally repudiated the “Kono statement,” whereby Japan admitted that its wartime military had enslaved foreign women, or former premier Murayama’s declaration expressing remorse for past Japanese actions. But though every Abe utterance is followed by some damage-control declaration by his spokespersons, he and his supporters have made it explicitly clear that they dislike this “masochistic” perception of Japanese history.  

Abe’s contempt for the legacy of General MacArthur and his “revisionist” views on history are perhaps not, at least in his own mind, incompatible with a pro-American stance. They follow in the footsteps of the object of his worship, his grandfather Nobusuke Kishi. Kishi served in General Tojo’s cabinet, was arrested as a suspected war criminal, but was later released and ended his career as prime minister and a stalwart defender of the American alliance. But the inescapable fact is that Abe’s behavior undermine U.S. goals, and for that matter Japanese ones as well, for several reasons.

First, Japan and the United States seek to build as large a coalition as possible to contain China. It may be that the Chinese menace will prove ephemeral, but understandably Tokyo and Washington must prepare for the worst. Abe’s pronouncements on history make it harder to bring South Korea, the most valuable partner in dealing with China in Northeast Asia, into this coalition, given the sensitivity in Korea of Japanese attitudes towards the past. Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso’s pilgrimage to Yasukuni, after having attended to inauguration of President Park Geun-hye in Seoul, was a slap in the face of Korea.

Second, although it is hard to believe that the Communist autocrats in Beijing are morally outraged about these questions given their own party's history, there will still be over a billion Chinese after the Communist Party is gone. The United States and Japan have a stake in good relations with post-communist China. It is thus critical that the Chinese people perceive Japan as a friendly nation, rather than as a country ruled by men who feel pride rather than shame about Japanese deeds in China during the 1931-45 war.

Third, and most important, Abe is laying the groundwork for diminishing American support for Japan. Experts know that, despite his rhetoric, he is no warmonger. Japanese hawks like Abe are in fact more reluctant to resort to force than American doves. The world would surely be a better place if every country on the planet were as peaceful as Japan. But their words make them seem particularly nefarious. Already, his efforts have earned him a nasty editorial about his “inability to face history” in the Washington Post on April 26. A well-orchestrated media campaign by China, or by various activists in the U.S., would find it easy to use Abe to link today’s Japan with the Bataan Death March, the Rape of Nanjing, and by association with Auschwitz and the Holocaust. This could have dreadful consequences for Japan’s image in the United States and ultimately sabotage the alliance with the United States.

Robert Dujarric runs the Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies, Temple University Japan, in Tokyo (robertdujarric@gmail.com)

U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping will hold their first official meetings since Xi assumed China's presidency on June 7-8 in California, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) said on Monday.

“President Obama will meet with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China on June 7-8 in California. The early June meeting will be President Obama’s first meeting with Xi Jinping since he became China’s President,” the NSC announced via its Twitter account (@NSCPress) late Monday afternoon.

“The two leaders will review progress & challenges in U.S.-China relations & discuss ways to enhance cooperation in the years ahead,” the NSC went on to say.

The two leaders previously met when then-Vice President Xi Jinping traveled to Washington, DC in February 2012 at the invitation of U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden.  During that trip Xi also met with then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey, and members of the U.S. Congress.

During his U.S. trip Xi also visited Los Angeles where he was met by California Governor Jerry Brown and Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa. In California, Xi and Governor Brown began working on a Memorandum of Understanding that was finalized during Brown’s trip to China back in April of this year.

Since Obama won reelection and Xi formally inherited power, the Obama administration has dispatched Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey, among other officials, to Beijing.

Obama and Xi have also talked by phone and Obama hosted China's incoming Ambassador to the U.S., Cui Tiankai at the White House in April.

The new sides have pledged to develop a new type of great power relationship, although the exact meaning of the phrase has been a source of speculation. 

Also on its Twitter feed on Monday, the NSC said that “National Security Advisor Tom Donilon will travel to Beijing on May 26-28 to prepare for this meeting between POTUS [President of the United States] and President Xi.” Donilon has long served as President Obama’s point man on relations with China.

Interestingly, earlier this month California media outlets announced that Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa would travel to China from May 26 to May 29 to promote tourism, trade and investment. It was not clear if he would meet with President Xi on the trip.

Every Monday The Diplomat's Zachary Keck takes a look at the latest happenings in the Asia-Pacific region. From important meetings of heads of state, to critical trade and business gatherings to matters of culture and art, The Diplomat keeps you up to date on the latest events.

Here is this week's primer. See an event we missed or something for next week? Please post a comment below!

May 19-20: Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rakhmon is on a state visit to China at the invitation of President Xi Jinping.

May 19-20: Mexican Foreign Minister José Antonio Meade Kuribreña is in China for working visit.

May 19-21: Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina visits Thailand.

May 19-21: UK's Foreign Office Minister of State Hugo Swire will be Thailand to hold the inaugural Thai-UK Strategic Dialogue that was first announced last November. Vice Foreign Minister Jullapong Nonsrichai will represent Thailand at the Dialogue. 

May 19-27: Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to visit India, Pakistan, Switzerland, and Germany. It will be Premier Li’s first overseas voyage since taking his current position.

May 20: Myanmar President Thein Sein to travel to U.S. for a meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama at the White House.

May 20-22: Afghan President Hamid Karzai to travel to India for meetings with India President Manmohan Singh. According to Defense News, India may station ground forces in Afghanistan after NATO forces withdraw in 2014.

May 20-22: India and the U.S. to hold Homeland Security Dialogue, which will focus on terror groups like LeT and al-Qaeda, illicit financing and transnational crimes. Home Minister Sushilkumar Shinde will lead the talks for India. The U.S. will be represented by Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano.

May 20-28: 66th Session of the World Health Assembly. The World Health Assembly is the supreme decision-making body of World Heath Organization.

May 20-29: Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Joseph Yun, will travel to Indonesia, Brunei, and Vietnam May for bilateral and multilateral meetings with senior officials.

May 21: U.S. Air Force test launches a Minuteman III ICBM at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA.

May 21: ASEAN’s Council of Permanent Representatives Plus Three will hold a meeting.

May 21: Iran’s Guardian Council’s deadline to announce the official list of candidates for next month’s election.

May 21-24: ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Senior Official Meeting and ARF Defense Officials' Dialogue held in Brunei. There will also be a ASEAN Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM), a ASEAN Plus Three SOM (APT SOM), and an East Asia Summit (EAS SOM).

May 21-25:  Vice Premier Wang Yang will pay an official visit to Zimbabwe and then will travel to Ethiopia to attend the African Union’s special summit for the 50th anniversary of the Organization of African Unity.

May 21-26: Japan’s Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Kenta Wakabayashi travels to Columbia and Ecuador. In Columbia he will attend the Summit and the Ministerial Meetings of the Pacific Alliance. In Ecuador he will attend the inauguration ceremony of President Rafael Correa Delgado on May 24. China will also send an envoy to Ecuador for the occasion.

May 21-28: Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman will travel to Indonesia, India, and Bangladesh. From May 21-23 she will be in Indonesia to participate in the U.S.-Indonesia Global Policy Dialogue. On May 24-25 Sherman will be in India to prepare for the U.S.-Indian Strategic Dialogue next month. She will end the trip with a stop in Bangladesh from May 26-28 where she will lead the U.S. delegation to the second U.S.-Bangladesh Partnership Dialogue (see below) and meet with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasin.

May 22-23: APEC to hold a Senior Finance Officials' Meeting in Manado, Indonesia.

May 22-24: Lao Foreign Minister Thongloun Sisoulith will visit Japan.

May 23: U.S. President Obama to discuss legality of drone mission in a speech at the National Defense University.

May 23-24: NATO and Russian officials meet in Moscow on Missile Defense.

May 24:  Iran’s Defense Ministry says it will unveil new military technology during parades for Khordad 3, which marks the anniversary of the liberation of Khorramshahr city from Iraqi occupation during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War.

May 24-26: Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to visit Myanmar to hold talks with President Thein Sein.

May 24-29:  Uruguayan President José Mujica will visit China.

May 26-27: The U.S. and Bangladesh will hold their second annual Partnership Dialogue in Dhaka. The first one was held in Washington, DC last year. The proposed Trade and Investment Cooperation Framework Agreement (Ticfa) between the two countries is expected to be discussed, as is a petition in the U.S. to revoke Bangladesh’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) designation, which allows for certain products to be imported into the U.S. duty-free. Earlier this month, Bangladesh’s Commerce Minister GM Quader said, ““From the top level on both sides, we’ve agreed to sign the Ticfa with America soon.”

May 27-30: Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to visit Japan.

Unspecified: Fiji leader Voreqe Bainimarama said he would travel to China before the end of the month.

So who said pre-election budgets were for handouts? Very shortly after her treasurer released a remarkably austere budget, with bad news on the surplus front to boot, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard awoke to a robust 8-point bounce in her standing as preferred prime minister, to put her level with Opposition Leader Tony Abbott just over three months out from the election.

Both leaders sit on 46 percent, according to the Age/Nielson poll, which for Gillard is just 4 points shy of her peak.

Unfortunately for Gillard’s Labor Party, its election prospects remain dire, with just 32 percent of the primary vote, up 3 percent from its embarrassing low in the April result, which came after the party once again aired its dirty laundry with an aborted Rudd challenge. Once preferences are distributed, the poll shows 54-46, in favor of Abbott’s Coalition.

That is still not good news for Labor, and there is a strong argument to make that the poll bump isn’t meaningful, but simply a return to trend (or, in more technical terms, a “dead cat bounce”).

Still, it does give Gillard a slight window of opportunity. After again missing its surplus, Labor has been hammered in recent days as the party of profligacy. This is a little unfair. Government spending did, after all, help Australia navigate the global financial crisis with relative aplomb. But in the leadup to the election (an unusually long one by Australian standards), Labor can now tout at least a modicum of budget responsibility, and a willingness to take political risky decisions, such as ending the baby bonus introduced under John Howard.

In terms of actually governing, though, whoever is in power is likely to face a conundrum. While it is expedient to blame excessive spending for the budget deficit, a slide in tax revenues weighs heavily, with projected tax revenues now down AUD60 billion. (For the headaches posed by lower tax revenues, see exhibit A, Japan.) Now that the commodities supercycle seems to be running out of steam, the next Australian government may have to do with less.

To some extent, moderating Chinese demand may be offset by a weaker Australian dollar, which has notably fallen below parity with the U.S. dollar in recent days. That helps make Australian manufacturers more competitive. But any expectations that this will keep the good times rolling is tempered by movements within the region, which is increasingly looking like it’s in a game of currency musical chairs.  In short, any gain from an Australian dollar slide may well be short lived.

Still, for now Gillard may feel she’s put the party squabbling behind her. Labor is still very likely to face defeat in September, but the legacy of Australia’s first woman prime minister will look a lot healthier if she can turn a rout into a competitive election.

James Pach is editor of The Diplomat. 

With the Indo-Pacific concept now in diplomatic and strategic vogue, as annunciated by Rory Medcalf amongst others, there is room to more concisely refine what it means for the region. Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa has helped do just that at the recent Indonesia Conference hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C. He took the opportunity to propose an Indo-Pacific “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” in his keynote address. Listening to Natalegawa’s speech was reminiscent of a somewhat similar concept proposed under Australia’s former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.

At the zenith of his premiership in 2009, Rudd called for a pan Asia-Pacific Community to incorporate the disparate regional architecture under one organizational roof, to be "able to engage in the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation, and action on political matters and future challenges related to security." The idea earned a frosty reception throughout the region, and quickly died. In particular, China never warmed to it. WikiLeaks cables released in late 2010 (after Rudd was deposed as prime minister) revealed that his true intentions were to use the community to “contain” China’s growing regional influence.

So how is Natalegawa’s idea different? It calls for a new paradigm entirely, parallel to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.  Natalegawa outlined three key areas that could be addressed in the Indo-Pacific under his notion of a regional friendship treaty: the trust deficit; unresolved territory disputes; and managing change in the region. The foreign minister noted that a lack of trust could lead to open conflict and emphasized the need for clear, open communications between state actors. He also implicitly sought to link building the modalities of that trust to his idea of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

The “management” (note that this is not necessarily “resolution”) of territorial disputes and dealing with rival claims (notably in the South China Sea) is also a key area. Again, Natalegawa linked this back to trust and communication, warning that every effort must be made to avoid strategic miscalculation that could spark conflict. Finally, he made a levelheaded observation about change in the Indo-Pacific: it will not cease. He emphasized that the region will continue to change inherently and naturally with no single end point of arrival through an economic, security, or political lens. He underlined that this is the core reason for a new paradigm for management in bilateral and multilateral scenarios in the Indo-Pacific. His treaty would add to the patchwork or regional architecture, not attempt to replace it all as Rudd envisioned with his Asia-Pacific community.

In essence Natalegawa’s diplomatic clarion call for this treaty can be seen in a similar vein as Rudd’s Asia-Pacific community, but has a greater chance of success because of its terminology and underlying values. The three-legged formula Natalegawa outlined in his speech is one that most, if not all states in the region could support. Signing onto a treaty that promotes trust, communication, and management of differences in a changing environment has more appeal than Rudd’s more concrete architectural intent. The Asia-Pacific Community had an underlying motive of containing one actor or set of actors; in contrast, Natalegawa has made clear that the key primer for this treaty would be to strive for sustained peaceful cooperation, with some episodes of competition more than likely to occur.

Still, the elephant in the room is China. Hardly the poster child for extensive multilateral engagement, convincing China to come on board will be the fundamental make or break for any such Indo-Pacific treaty. Here, both Australia and the U.S. have key diplomatic roles to play. Given the increased bilateral engagement that both countries have had with China in recent years, a diplomatic offensive in selling the merits of any such treaty should be undertaken by Canberra and Washington. Australia in particular should put this to the top of the priority list in the newly minted bilateral ministerial strategic talks.

It would be intellectually lazy to consign the Indo-Pacific idea to a monolithic set of ideals or architectural design. The concept will remain fluid within a fluid context. But the notion of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation is one that could ultimately prove to be a lynchpin of stability in an ever dynamic and changing region.

This concept is still in its infancy. Natalegawa may succeed where Rudd failed. Watch this space.

Jack Georgieff is a visiting Thawley Scholar from the Lowy Institute with the office of the Japan Chair at CSIS.

One of the more important public debates in Japan in recent months has surrounded the Abe government’s aim to make significant changes to the Japanese Constitution. Abe plans to start with Article 96, which stipulates the process for making Constitutional changes, and loosen the amendment process to make other changes easier. One of the targets of further change is Article 9, the renunciation of war imposed upon Japan by the Constitution’s American authors during the Occupation following WWII.

Changing Article 9 is a difficult task in part because it has similarities with the Second Amendment of the American Constitution, not in content, but in the sense that it has become a deeply embedded part of Japanese perspectives of their own national identity. It is more than a legal statement; it is also a statement of Japanese values and culture as they have developed since the end of the war.

Nonetheless, Article 9 presents a problem because of the very strong language used. The article states, “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”  Part of the difficulty with Article 9 rests in the second sentence, which clearly prohibits Japan from maintaining a military. Since the Korean War, Japan has, not surprisingly with encouragement from the ever-hypocritical US government, maintained a “defense” force. This was initially formed as a National Police Reserve that was basically a light infantry, but over time evolved into a more complete air, sea, and land force designed to defend Japan from external attack. The Japanese government has interpreted its way around the fact that this doesn’t look much like this is within the spirit of Article 9 by claiming that it maintains self-defense forces, and thus not a military per se. Of course, this is simply splitting hairs—the Japanese today have a sophisticated military and are among the top ten military spenders in the world.

Abe’s goal is to rewrite Article 9 by limiting the renunciation of war and stating only that Japan refrains from the use of force to settle international disputes, rather than prohibiting the maintenance of a military force. The justification for this, according to Abe, is that Japan cannot fulfill its obligations under collective security agreements and within the UN without a normal military force. In some respects, this makes a great deal of sense. Japan has already interpreted itself so far away from the meaning of Article 9 that it is in pretty clear violation of its own constitution. It has participated in multinational (led by the US) military engagements such as the war in Afghanistan and UN Peace Keeping Operations for some time, although this only occurred after a heated public debate on whether or not the Constitution allowed for such activities. It is difficult to see how the maintenance of the SDF squares with never maintaining air, land, and sea forces. So to keep the Article 9 unchanged is essentially hypocritical and it makes sense to bring the Constitution in line with the reality of contemporary Japan and the rather liberal interpretation they have developed for Article 9.

However, one of the interesting outcomes of the postwar Constitution is that the public bought Article 9 and it has often been presented as a source of pride for Japanese—theirs is the one country to renounce war. In conversations with many Japanese over the years I have occasionally used the term “guntai” in reference to the SDF. I am always corrected that the SDF is “jietai” (or rikujô jietai for ground forces), meaning a self-defense force as opposed to the meaning of guntai, which refers to an army and implies offensive capabilities. I have been told that the U.S. has a guntai, while Japan does not. While from an American perspective, it is difficult to see the difference beyond the fact that the Japanese do not maintain offensive weapons like aircraft carriers—oh, right, they have helicopter carriers now—don't have ICBMs, and don’t participate in offensive actions alone or with their allies, from a Japanese perspective the difference is real and allows for the conceptualization of Japan as a country that does not maintain a military or at least not in a way that other countries do. In other words, Article 9 is a basis for a kind of Japanese exceptionalism built on the idea that Japan is the only country to renounce war.

Of course, the Japanese have the right to amend their Constitution in any way they desire. But in the process the Abe government should give some thought to the cultural consequences of such a change. While there is no reason to believe that Japan will somehow return to its militaristic past, as some in other parts of Asia claim, it is important to recognize that Article 9, like the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, is more than a rule—it is culturally embedded and, as such, it is an important part of Japanese constructions of national identity. The consequences of rewriting Article 9 are difficult to predict, but if Abe is able to move ahead with his plan, it will contribute to a change not only in the Japanese Constitution, but over time to a restructuring of how Japanese perceive of themselves both as a nation and as a player on the international stage.

Outgoing Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has once again infuriated the clerical establishment by accompanying his close aide, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, to register as a candidate in the presidential election next month. Not only is it illegal for a sitting president to endorse a candidate, but Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his allies have made it abundantly clear they opposed Mashaei candidacy. 

Unsurprisingly, Mashaei’s registration has prompted immediate and fierce criticism from many members of the Iranian regime, particularly those close to Supreme Leader Khamenei. It has also sparked media reports that he could face “74 lashes” if found guilty of having violated Iran’s election laws. However, one point of criticism made by Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, the head of Iran’s national police force, is particularly noteworthy.

Earlier this week, Moghaddam took Ahmadinejad and Mashaei to task for their constant worship of Shi’a Islam’s Messiah figure, Muhammad al-Mahdi, the 12^th or Hidden Imam. Specifically the police chief said: “The new deviant sect [a euphemism used to refer to Ahmadinejad and his allies] claim that they receive their orders from Imam of the Age [12^th Shia Imam]. It has been eight years that they are speaking about this matter but it is not clear who is their deputy [of the 12 Shia Imam].”

Ahmadinejad’s reverence of the Hidden Imam is well known and goes at least as far back as his time as Mayor of Tehran. Many in the West have used Ahmadinejad’s proclaimed belief that the Messiah’s return is imminent as evidence that Iran would precipitate a nuclear armed conflict if it acquires nuclear weapons.

But the fact that the clerical elite in the Islamic Republic fear Ahmadinejad’s “Mahdism” underscores what these commentators overlook; namely, Ahmadinejad’s reverence of the Messiah figure is primarily (though not entirely) used for domestic political purposes. He does this in two ways.

The first is in bolstering his populist credentials and image as an ordinary man struggling against powerful and corrupt regime stalwarts like former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Although most Shi’ites don’t actually believe al-Mahdi’s return is imminent, many view the Mahdi’s reappearance in an allegorical sense of meaning an end to all the injustices that plagued Shi’ites and Iranians from Husayn’s martyrdom in the 7^th century to present times.

Ahmadinejad has seized on this narrative to portray his struggle against corrupt and powerful rivals in terms of a defining moment in Shi’a Islam. This gives it instant appeal among his most important constituencies—primarily lower class and rural Iranians—and makes it more difficult for members of the Iranian regime to challenge. After all, a self-proclaimed Islamic Republic shouldn’t oppose someone deferring to one of Shi’a Islam’s most revered figures. Indeed, when some regime members, including clerics, have challenged Ahmadinejad’s worship of al-Mahdi in the past, his allies have countered by labeling them "opponents of the Imam of the Era," referring to al-Mahdi.

Of more concern to Supreme Leader Khamenei, however, is the ways in which Ahmadinejad conjures up the image of al-Mahdi’s return to directly challenge the Islamic Republic and the Supreme Leader’s rule.

In accordance with the speeches and writings of Revolutionary leader Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic is based on the principle of Velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist), which holds that a senior Shi’a jurisprudent (faqih), as a man learned in the teachings of Islam, is best able to interpret the al-Mahdi’s will in his absence. As such, this faqih— which in the Islamic Republic is the Supreme Leader—should act as al-Mahdi’s deputy in governing the Shi’a faithful.

Implicit in Velayat-e faqih, however, is the notion that once al-Mahdi returns there will no longer be a need for the Supreme Leader to interpret his will, as the Imam can directly govern his followers. Therefore, Velayat-e faqih will cease to exist upon the Hidden Imam’s reemergence on earth.

Ahmadinejad has a vested interest in seeing the end to the Velayat-e faqih system. After all, unlike nearly all his predecessors in the Islamic Republic, with the exception of its first president following the revolution, Ahmadinejad isn’t a cleric himself. Thus, the only way the highly ambitious Ahmadinejad is ever going to reign supreme in Iran is if he can discredit the Velayat-e faqih system.

Openly calling for the end to the Velayat-e faqih is obviously not possible, however, as he would quickly be imprisoned and possibly executed. Ahmadinejad must therefore mount a more subtle challenge to the system. Through the Hidden Imam’s return, Ahmadinejad is again couching his challenge to the Islamic Republic in the language of Shi’a Islam itself. This makes it difficult for Supreme Leader Khamenei and his clerical and layman allies to root out.

Moreover, given the continued importance of Shi’a Islam to most Iranians, and the important role clerics and Islam have played in all major political and social movements in modern Iran, Ahmadinejad’s “Mahdism” is an effective tool in trying to bring the masses to his side. For that reason, it remains a potent danger to Khamenei and the Iranian regime.

The irony of course is that Ahmadinejad is seeking to use Shi’a Islam’s Messiah figure to usher in an “Iran minus the clergy.”

An outspoken nationalist mayor in Japan has sparked a fury over his suggestion that the Japanese imperial military’s keeping of sex slaves during WWII was a military necessity.

"To maintain discipline in the military, it must have been necessary at that time," Toru Hashimoto, a conservative mayor of Osaka, said on Monday. "For soldiers who risked their lives in circumstances where bullets are flying around like rain and wind, if you want them to get some rest, a comfort women system was necessary. That's clear to anyone."

“Comfort women” is a term often used to describe the nearly 200,000 women the Japanese Imperial Army coerced into sex slavery during the war. The bulk of the women came from Korea, China, and the Philippines.

In 1993, the Japanese government issued an apology to its neighbors for its past policy of maintaining sex slaves. Before taking office, however, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said that he was considering revising the statement in light of the supposed lack of historical evidence that the women were forced into servitude.

Since taking office the Abe administration has walked back these initial statements, however. Abe’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga has told reporters that: “The stance of the Japanese government on the comfort women issue is well known. They have suffered unspeakably painful experiences. The Abe Cabinet has the same sentiments as past Cabinets.”

The Minister of Education has quickly condemned Hashimoto’s remarks. Nonetheless, South Korea quickly decried the remarks with other condemnations likely to follow.

Many people in the region, particularly in China and South Korea, believe that nationalism has been growing in Japan. Last month, an unusually large number of parliamentarians, 168, visited the controversial Yasukuni war shrine as did three members of Abe’s cabinet. This was roundly criticized by China and South Korea who promptly withdrew from various diplomatic engagements, including an ASEAN+3 (China, South Korea, and Japan) meeting.

Nevertheless, earlier this week the policy chief of Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party, Sanae Takaichi, vowed to continue visiting the shrine in the future, referring to it as an “internal affair.” The terminology was important as Japan and China pledged to not interfere in each other’s internal affairs in agreeing to re-establish bilateral relations in the 1970s.

Although Abe did not visit the shrine this time, the Japanese press has speculated he may go later in the year. Moreover, in a speech last month Abe appeared to question whether Imperial Japan’s actions constituted aggression.