With the Indo-Pacific concept now in diplomatic and strategic vogue, as annunciated by Rory Medcalf amongst others, there is room to more concisely refine what it means for the region. Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa has helped do just that at the recent Indonesia Conference hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C. He took the opportunity to propose an Indo-Pacific “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” in his keynote address. Listening to Natalegawa’s speech was reminiscent of a somewhat similar concept proposed under Australia’s former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.

At the zenith of his premiership in 2009, Rudd called for a pan Asia-Pacific Community to incorporate the disparate regional architecture under one organizational roof, to be "able to engage in the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation, and action on political matters and future challenges related to security." The idea earned a frosty reception throughout the region, and quickly died. In particular, China never warmed to it. WikiLeaks cables released in late 2010 (after Rudd was deposed as prime minister) revealed that his true intentions were to use the community to “contain” China’s growing regional influence.

So how is Natalegawa’s idea different? It calls for a new paradigm entirely, parallel to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.  Natalegawa outlined three key areas that could be addressed in the Indo-Pacific under his notion of a regional friendship treaty: the trust deficit; unresolved territory disputes; and managing change in the region. The foreign minister noted that a lack of trust could lead to open conflict and emphasized the need for clear, open communications between state actors. He also implicitly sought to link building the modalities of that trust to his idea of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

The “management” (note that this is not necessarily “resolution”) of territorial disputes and dealing with rival claims (notably in the South China Sea) is also a key area. Again, Natalegawa linked this back to trust and communication, warning that every effort must be made to avoid strategic miscalculation that could spark conflict. Finally, he made a levelheaded observation about change in the Indo-Pacific: it will not cease. He emphasized that the region will continue to change inherently and naturally with no single end point of arrival through an economic, security, or political lens. He underlined that this is the core reason for a new paradigm for management in bilateral and multilateral scenarios in the Indo-Pacific. His treaty would add to the patchwork or regional architecture, not attempt to replace it all as Rudd envisioned with his Asia-Pacific community.

In essence Natalegawa’s diplomatic clarion call for this treaty can be seen in a similar vein as Rudd’s Asia-Pacific community, but has a greater chance of success because of its terminology and underlying values. The three-legged formula Natalegawa outlined in his speech is one that most, if not all states in the region could support. Signing onto a treaty that promotes trust, communication, and management of differences in a changing environment has more appeal than Rudd’s more concrete architectural intent. The Asia-Pacific Community had an underlying motive of containing one actor or set of actors; in contrast, Natalegawa has made clear that the key primer for this treaty would be to strive for sustained peaceful cooperation, with some episodes of competition more than likely to occur.

Still, the elephant in the room is China. Hardly the poster child for extensive multilateral engagement, convincing China to come on board will be the fundamental make or break for any such Indo-Pacific treaty. Here, both Australia and the U.S. have key diplomatic roles to play. Given the increased bilateral engagement that both countries have had with China in recent years, a diplomatic offensive in selling the merits of any such treaty should be undertaken by Canberra and Washington. Australia in particular should put this to the top of the priority list in the newly minted bilateral ministerial strategic talks.

It would be intellectually lazy to consign the Indo-Pacific idea to a monolithic set of ideals or architectural design. The concept will remain fluid within a fluid context. But the notion of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation is one that could ultimately prove to be a lynchpin of stability in an ever dynamic and changing region.

This concept is still in its infancy. Natalegawa may succeed where Rudd failed. Watch this space.

Jack Georgieff is a visiting Thawley Scholar from the Lowy Institute with the office of the Japan Chair at CSIS.

One of the more important public debates in Japan in recent months has surrounded the Abe government’s aim to make significant changes to the Japanese Constitution. Abe plans to start with Article 96, which stipulates the process for making Constitutional changes, and loosen the amendment process to make other changes easier. One of the targets of further change is Article 9, the renunciation of war imposed upon Japan by the Constitution’s American authors during the Occupation following WWII.

Changing Article 9 is a difficult task in part because it has similarities with the Second Amendment of the American Constitution, not in content, but in the sense that it has become a deeply embedded part of Japanese perspectives of their own national identity. It is more than a legal statement; it is also a statement of Japanese values and culture as they have developed since the end of the war.

Nonetheless, Article 9 presents a problem because of the very strong language used. The article states, “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”  Part of the difficulty with Article 9 rests in the second sentence, which clearly prohibits Japan from maintaining a military. Since the Korean War, Japan has, not surprisingly with encouragement from the ever-hypocritical US government, maintained a “defense” force. This was initially formed as a National Police Reserve that was basically a light infantry, but over time evolved into a more complete air, sea, and land force designed to defend Japan from external attack. The Japanese government has interpreted its way around the fact that this doesn’t look much like this is within the spirit of Article 9 by claiming that it maintains self-defense forces, and thus not a military per se. Of course, this is simply splitting hairs—the Japanese today have a sophisticated military and are among the top ten military spenders in the world.

Abe’s goal is to rewrite Article 9 by limiting the renunciation of war and stating only that Japan refrains from the use of force to settle international disputes, rather than prohibiting the maintenance of a military force. The justification for this, according to Abe, is that Japan cannot fulfill its obligations under collective security agreements and within the UN without a normal military force. In some respects, this makes a great deal of sense. Japan has already interpreted itself so far away from the meaning of Article 9 that it is in pretty clear violation of its own constitution. It has participated in multinational (led by the US) military engagements such as the war in Afghanistan and UN Peace Keeping Operations for some time, although this only occurred after a heated public debate on whether or not the Constitution allowed for such activities. It is difficult to see how the maintenance of the SDF squares with never maintaining air, land, and sea forces. So to keep the Article 9 unchanged is essentially hypocritical and it makes sense to bring the Constitution in line with the reality of contemporary Japan and the rather liberal interpretation they have developed for Article 9.

However, one of the interesting outcomes of the postwar Constitution is that the public bought Article 9 and it has often been presented as a source of pride for Japanese—theirs is the one country to renounce war. In conversations with many Japanese over the years I have occasionally used the term “guntai” in reference to the SDF. I am always corrected that the SDF is “jietai” (or rikujô jietai for ground forces), meaning a self-defense force as opposed to the meaning of guntai, which refers to an army and implies offensive capabilities. I have been told that the U.S. has a guntai, while Japan does not. While from an American perspective, it is difficult to see the difference beyond the fact that the Japanese do not maintain offensive weapons like aircraft carriers—oh, right, they have helicopter carriers now—don't have ICBMs, and don’t participate in offensive actions alone or with their allies, from a Japanese perspective the difference is real and allows for the conceptualization of Japan as a country that does not maintain a military or at least not in a way that other countries do. In other words, Article 9 is a basis for a kind of Japanese exceptionalism built on the idea that Japan is the only country to renounce war.

Of course, the Japanese have the right to amend their Constitution in any way they desire. But in the process the Abe government should give some thought to the cultural consequences of such a change. While there is no reason to believe that Japan will somehow return to its militaristic past, as some in other parts of Asia claim, it is important to recognize that Article 9, like the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, is more than a rule—it is culturally embedded and, as such, it is an important part of Japanese constructions of national identity. The consequences of rewriting Article 9 are difficult to predict, but if Abe is able to move ahead with his plan, it will contribute to a change not only in the Japanese Constitution, but over time to a restructuring of how Japanese perceive of themselves both as a nation and as a player on the international stage.

Outgoing Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has once again infuriated the clerical establishment by accompanying his close aide, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, to register as a candidate in the presidential election next month. Not only is it illegal for a sitting president to endorse a candidate, but Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his allies have made it abundantly clear they opposed Mashaei candidacy. 

Unsurprisingly, Mashaei’s registration has prompted immediate and fierce criticism from many members of the Iranian regime, particularly those close to Supreme Leader Khamenei. It has also sparked media reports that he could face “74 lashes” if found guilty of having violated Iran’s election laws. However, one point of criticism made by Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, the head of Iran’s national police force, is particularly noteworthy.

Earlier this week, Moghaddam took Ahmadinejad and Mashaei to task for their constant worship of Shi’a Islam’s Messiah figure, Muhammad al-Mahdi, the 12^th or Hidden Imam. Specifically the police chief said: “The new deviant sect [a euphemism used to refer to Ahmadinejad and his allies] claim that they receive their orders from Imam of the Age [12^th Shia Imam]. It has been eight years that they are speaking about this matter but it is not clear who is their deputy [of the 12 Shia Imam].”

Ahmadinejad’s reverence of the Hidden Imam is well known and goes at least as far back as his time as Mayor of Tehran. Many in the West have used Ahmadinejad’s proclaimed belief that the Messiah’s return is imminent as evidence that Iran would precipitate a nuclear armed conflict if it acquires nuclear weapons.

But the fact that the clerical elite in the Islamic Republic fear Ahmadinejad’s “Mahdism” underscores what these commentators overlook; namely, Ahmadinejad’s reverence of the Messiah figure is primarily (though not entirely) used for domestic political purposes. He does this in two ways.

The first is in bolstering his populist credentials and image as an ordinary man struggling against powerful and corrupt regime stalwarts like former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Although most Shi’ites don’t actually believe al-Mahdi’s return is imminent, many view the Mahdi’s reappearance in an allegorical sense of meaning an end to all the injustices that plagued Shi’ites and Iranians from Husayn’s martyrdom in the 7^th century to present times.

Ahmadinejad has seized on this narrative to portray his struggle against corrupt and powerful rivals in terms of a defining moment in Shi’a Islam. This gives it instant appeal among his most important constituencies—primarily lower class and rural Iranians—and makes it more difficult for members of the Iranian regime to challenge. After all, a self-proclaimed Islamic Republic shouldn’t oppose someone deferring to one of Shi’a Islam’s most revered figures. Indeed, when some regime members, including clerics, have challenged Ahmadinejad’s worship of al-Mahdi in the past, his allies have countered by labeling them "opponents of the Imam of the Era," referring to al-Mahdi.

Of more concern to Supreme Leader Khamenei, however, is the ways in which Ahmadinejad conjures up the image of al-Mahdi’s return to directly challenge the Islamic Republic and the Supreme Leader’s rule.

In accordance with the speeches and writings of Revolutionary leader Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic is based on the principle of Velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist), which holds that a senior Shi’a jurisprudent (faqih), as a man learned in the teachings of Islam, is best able to interpret the al-Mahdi’s will in his absence. As such, this faqih— which in the Islamic Republic is the Supreme Leader—should act as al-Mahdi’s deputy in governing the Shi’a faithful.

Implicit in Velayat-e faqih, however, is the notion that once al-Mahdi returns there will no longer be a need for the Supreme Leader to interpret his will, as the Imam can directly govern his followers. Therefore, Velayat-e faqih will cease to exist upon the Hidden Imam’s reemergence on earth.

Ahmadinejad has a vested interest in seeing the end to the Velayat-e faqih system. After all, unlike nearly all his predecessors in the Islamic Republic, with the exception of its first president following the revolution, Ahmadinejad isn’t a cleric himself. Thus, the only way the highly ambitious Ahmadinejad is ever going to reign supreme in Iran is if he can discredit the Velayat-e faqih system.

Openly calling for the end to the Velayat-e faqih is obviously not possible, however, as he would quickly be imprisoned and possibly executed. Ahmadinejad must therefore mount a more subtle challenge to the system. Through the Hidden Imam’s return, Ahmadinejad is again couching his challenge to the Islamic Republic in the language of Shi’a Islam itself. This makes it difficult for Supreme Leader Khamenei and his clerical and layman allies to root out.

Moreover, given the continued importance of Shi’a Islam to most Iranians, and the important role clerics and Islam have played in all major political and social movements in modern Iran, Ahmadinejad’s “Mahdism” is an effective tool in trying to bring the masses to his side. For that reason, it remains a potent danger to Khamenei and the Iranian regime.

The irony of course is that Ahmadinejad is seeking to use Shi’a Islam’s Messiah figure to usher in an “Iran minus the clergy.”

An outspoken nationalist mayor in Japan has sparked a fury over his suggestion that the Japanese imperial military’s keeping of sex slaves during WWII was a military necessity.

"To maintain discipline in the military, it must have been necessary at that time," Toru Hashimoto, a conservative mayor of Osaka, said on Monday. "For soldiers who risked their lives in circumstances where bullets are flying around like rain and wind, if you want them to get some rest, a comfort women system was necessary. That's clear to anyone."

“Comfort women” is a term often used to describe the nearly 200,000 women the Japanese Imperial Army coerced into sex slavery during the war. The bulk of the women came from Korea, China, and the Philippines.

In 1993, the Japanese government issued an apology to its neighbors for its past policy of maintaining sex slaves. Before taking office, however, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said that he was considering revising the statement in light of the supposed lack of historical evidence that the women were forced into servitude.

Since taking office the Abe administration has walked back these initial statements, however. Abe’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga has told reporters that: “The stance of the Japanese government on the comfort women issue is well known. They have suffered unspeakably painful experiences. The Abe Cabinet has the same sentiments as past Cabinets.”

The Minister of Education has quickly condemned Hashimoto’s remarks. Nonetheless, South Korea quickly decried the remarks with other condemnations likely to follow.

Many people in the region, particularly in China and South Korea, believe that nationalism has been growing in Japan. Last month, an unusually large number of parliamentarians, 168, visited the controversial Yasukuni war shrine as did three members of Abe’s cabinet. This was roundly criticized by China and South Korea who promptly withdrew from various diplomatic engagements, including an ASEAN+3 (China, South Korea, and Japan) meeting.

Nevertheless, earlier this week the policy chief of Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party, Sanae Takaichi, vowed to continue visiting the shrine in the future, referring to it as an “internal affair.” The terminology was important as Japan and China pledged to not interfere in each other’s internal affairs in agreeing to re-establish bilateral relations in the 1970s.

Although Abe did not visit the shrine this time, the Japanese press has speculated he may go later in the year. Moreover, in a speech last month Abe appeared to question whether Imperial Japan’s actions constituted aggression.

Every Monday The Diplomat's Zachary Keck takes a look at the latest happenings in the Asia-Pacific region. From important meetings of heads of state, to critical trade and business gatherings to matters of culture and art, The Diplomat keeps you up to date on the latest events.

Here is this week's primer. See an event we missed or something for next week? Please post a comment below!

May 12-18: U.S. delegation led by Special Representative for North Korea Policy Glyn Davies will travel to the Republic of Korea (ROK), China, and Japan to discuss North Korean policy. In Seoul through the 15th, the delegation will meet with Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Lim Sung-nam and Vice Minister of Unification Kim Nam Sik. On the 15th-16th the delegation will be in Beijing to meet with Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs Wu Dawei. The delegation will end the trip in Tokyo where they will meet with Director General for Asian and Oceanic Affairs Shinsuke Sugiyama and Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobukatsu Kanehara.

May 12-15: Vietnam Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung is in Moscow at the invitation of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev.

May 13: Philippines holds legislative elections. Presidential elections are not until 2016.

May 13: British PM David Cameron will travel to the U.S. to meet with President Barack Obama at the White House.

May 13: Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi will travel to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to attend a ministerial meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Contact Group on Mali.

May 13-15: The U.S. and South Korea will conduct naval exercises involving the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Nimitz and AEGIS-guided destroyers that will focus on missile detection and anti-submarine maneuvers.

May 13-16: Pyongyang’s Spring International Trade Fair with be held with companies Germany, Malaysia, Mongolia, Switzerland, Singapore, Australia, Italy, Indonesia, China, Poland and Taiwan attending, North Korea Tech reported, citing state media.

May 13-17: Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Dipu Moni will be visiting the U.S. She will meet with Secretary of State John Kerry in Washington on Friday. 

May 13-June 14: The UN Human Rights Council meeting is held.

May 13-June 28: The UN Council on Disarmament its second annual session.

May 13-June 14: The UN Human Rights Council meeting is held.

May 14: India to release trade data.

May 14-15: 169th NATO Chiefs of Defense meeting will be held in Brussels. Afghanistan is expected to be main focus of the meeting.

May 15: The Arctic Council will hold its Ministerial Meeting where the chairmanship will be passed on from Sweden to Canada who will hold it through 2015. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry will be in attendance.

May 15: Malaysian to release GDP numbers.

May 15: Secretary of Iran Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Saeed Jalili and EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton will hold a meeting in Istanbul. The EU has billed the meeting as a “follow-up to the last round of [P5+1] negotiations held in Almaty.” Over the weekend Jalili signed up to run in Iran’s Presidential election next month. Separately Iranian officials will meet with their counterparts from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN nuclear watchdog.

May 15: The U.S. House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees hold hearing with Executive Branch officials on policy towards Iran.

May 15-16: The 9th Annual China Nuclear Energy Congress will be held in Beijing. The Congress is an annual event which assembles leaders from all stakeholder groups across the region to discuss matters relating to nuclear energy. The event is organized by the China Decision Makers Consultancy (CDMC).

May 15-19: Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras will lead a delegation of around 50 business leaders and privatization officials on a trip to China. He will meet with both President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang on the trip.

May 15-24: The 17th round of TPP negotiations will be held in Peru

May 15-26: The Cannes International Film Festival is held. Chinese director Jia Zhangke’s new film, “A Touch of Sin” will compete as will films by two Hong Kong directors.

May 16: The U.S. House Foreign Relation Committee’s Subcommittee on the Asia-Pacific holds a hearing on U.S. Foreign Assistance Priorities in East Asia and the Pacific.

May 16: Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will be given a state visit at the White House where he will meet with President Barack Obama. The two leaders will discuss issues relating to Syria, trade and economic cooperation, and countering terrorism.

May 16: The UN Security Council will hold talks on the sanctions regime against North Korea.

May 16-17: ASEAN-EU Senior Officials Meeting (AEU SOM) will be held in Vietnam.

May 18-19: China’s State Councilor Yang Jiechi, who ranks above China’s foreign ministry in Chinese foreign policy making, will visit Nepal.

May 19-20: The second Asia-Pacific Water Summit will be held in Chiang Mai, Thailand. The summit, which is organized by the Asia-Pacific Water Forum (APWF), has made “Water Security and Water-related Disaster Challenges: Leadership and Commitment” its theme. The first summit was held in Japan in 2007. The Thai Prime Minister has invited heads of state from over 49 countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Among those attending will be Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Vanuatu Carcasses Kalosil.

Unspecified: Israeli PM Netanyahu is expected to travel to Russia to discuss arm sales to Syria with President Vladimir Putin.

Unspecified: Qatar’s Foreign and Prime Minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani, will travel to Iran this week at the invitation of Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi.

Over the past several years, it has been common practice for Chinese academics and pundits to describe the U.S. "pivot" or "rebalancing" to Asia as part of a greater strategy of containment. Popular Chinese news media like Xinhua, the People’s Daily and the Global Times regularly run articles assuming that the U.S. is enacting a containment strategy as it once did against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In the contemporary debate among various Chinese scholars and in the media, the pivot is seen as  a strategy based on American financial monopoly, or at least one based on the military industrial complex’s need for an opponent. Occasionally some in the U.S. like Bonnie Glaser and Joseph Nye warn the U.S. against a policy of containment, apparently giving credibility to such charges.

On the other hand, U.S. policymakers reject the notion of containment. There simply has not been the type of policy realization as famously took place when George Kennan sent his ‘Long Telegram’ to Washington in 1946. Indeed, many in Washington insist that the relationship with China is one of engagement and is highly successful in a number of spheres, including trade, counter-proliferation, and global governance. Voting patterns in fora like the UN Security Council show closer U.S.-Chinese positioning than would be expected.  

So the question remains concerning how to understand the disconnect between the two perspectives. Such opposing viewpoints can be explained if one assumes that the U.S. has been enacting a much more nuanced policy than simple containment. Rather, the U.S. is enacting a policy of hedging towards China. In fact, many states in the region (such as Japan, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines) have policies towards China that could be characterized as hedging.

Appropriated from the financial world, the basic assumption is that hedging means a state spreads its risk by pursuing two opposite policies towards another state. In international relations, states carry out two contradictory policy directions simultaneously: balancing and engagement. A state prepares for the worst by balancing – maintaining a strong military, building and strengthening alliances – while also preparing for the best and engaging – building trade networks, increasing diplomatic links, and creating binding multilateral frameworks. U.S. behavior towards China easily fits into both of these extremes.

Why have U.S. policymakers and a number of their Asian peers decided to pursue such a policy towards Beijing? In essence, it comes from uncertainty. It is difficult to develop policy without strong knowledge of what the other state intends. While this uncertainty exists at some level between all states, diplomatic custom, international government organizations, and multilateral rule systems (like the WTO) minimize this uncertainty by imparting predictability to state-to-state relations. This predictability is enhanced by diplomacy, transparency, and on occasion, espionage. So what is different concerning China that provokes the urge to hedge?

First, China is clearly a rising power. Beijing's unfinished rise means that no one yet knows – including China itself – its true potential and ability to project power. This uncertainty could be described as structural: it has to do with power and the perception of how much power and influence Beijing will eventually have. Second, no one knows how China will use its growing clout. Indeed, over the duration of the South and East China Sea crises, regional players have been trying to gauge Chinese willingness to use force to pursue its claims. No one knows how far Beijing is willing to go. Thirdly, China’s regime type makes it a particularly difficult state to read; its foreign policy-making system is comparatively opaque. Contrast this with the United States, where foreign diplomats can access U.S. policy intentions by spending time in Congress, visiting think tanks,  reading  free media, and so on.

Clearly the utilization of a hedging strategy demonstrates that U.S. policymakers are undecided on whether China constitutes a threat. Hedging is not simply defined by a state’s actions, but by its intentions. In May 1941, although Germany’s relationship with the USSR looked like hedging, it was not. While Germany was enacting two opposing policies of balancing and engagement with the Soviet Union, it had in fact already decided on war in November 1940. This illustrates a crucial difference between U.S.-China relations and German-Soviet relations: U.S. policymakers are genuinely uncertain which line to pursue.

In a situation when a state is hedging against another state, what is the optimum policy reaction for the latter? One advantage of the hedging discourse over a containment discourse is that Chinese leaders need not take the defensive. They can attempt to persuade the U.S. and regional powers of China’s benign intentions through a re-engagement of China’s 1990s soft diplomacy. Beijing could begin by shelving or de-prioritizing a number of territorial issues. The Chinese leadership might opt for trust-building through new institutions and customs while resurrecting neglected ones, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement. If Chinese leaders were to accede to a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, or utilize conflict resolution mechanisms such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), it might go a long way to dampen the hedging policies of regional states. If the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) were to continue its tradition of issuing White Papers with ever-increasing transparency, it would also go a long way to calming regional fears. In order to mitigate a hedging strategy, one must only address the causes of uncertainty in the relationship. Some of those are structural and difficult to address, but others are well within the reach of policymakers in Beijing.

John Hemmings is a non-resident SPF Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS and a doctoral candidate at the London School of Economics.
 

Whatever the intent of Iran’s nuclear program, it appears regional tensions and fears surrounding Tehran’s possible motivations could be pushing together some interesting partners.

Various outlets are reporting that Israel and nations such as Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) could be forming a defensive pact with Iran in mind. If such reports pan out, the repercussions of such a move would be felt far and wide across the Middle East and indeed globally.    

According to the Sunday Times:

“The proposal, referred to by the diplomats involved as “4+1”, may eventually lead to technicians from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan working alongside Israelis in joint command-and-control centres.

The American-brokered plan is to build a “moderate crescent” of allied states that share a powerful vested interest in countering Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

‘The plan is to start with information-sharing about Iran’s ballistic missiles,’ said an Israeli official.”

Such a plan would face many hurdles. For starters, Israeli relations with Turkey have been strained for several years since the Gaza flotilla raid in 2010. While just recently a breakthrough has seen some improvement in ties, and the Times previously reported that Israel might base strategic assault aircraft in Turkey, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s proposed trip to Gaza is already threatening this rapprochement.

Furthermore, although Israel and Turkey have cooperated closely for decades, Tel Aviv has had far more issues with the three Arab states historically and still lacks formal relations with Saudi Arabia or the UAE.

Thus, it’d be truly historic if, as the Sunday Times report also said, Israel gained access to radar stations in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  Israel would then in exchange share information from its early warning radar and anti-ballistic missile defense systems, though “it’s not clear in what form.” It is also being reported that Jordan would be protected by Israel’s Arrow long-range anti-missile system.

Various outlets are also describing the possible plan as being pushed by the U.S.

Moving to some sort of regional containment strategy would certainly pose risks and rewards to all parties concerned, and would certainly create just as many questions as answers.

For starters, if reports are correct, has the United States and Israel truly given up on stopping Iran’s nuclear program and moved towards containing Tehran? Could negotiations with Iran still lead to a breakthrough? Could this be just a bluff to push Iran towards a deal?

Can such a coalition of unlikely partners work considering historic differences?

There is also the issue of nuclear proliferation. If Iran’s nuclear program continues on with no international agreement that could place limits on its ability to build nuclear weapons, will other nations in the region consider building their own nuclear arsenal?  

Every Monday The Diplomat's Zachary Keck takes a look at the latest happenings in the Asia-Pacific region. From important meetings of heads of state, to critical trade and business gatherings to matters of culture and art, The Diplomat keeps you up to date on the latest events.

Here is this week's primer from May 6 through May 11.

See an event we missed or something for next week? Please post a comment below!

May 6-7: 7^th ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting

May 6-8: Finland’s Foreign Minister Mr. Erkki Tuomioja travels to India.

May 6-8: 72^nd session of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons’ Executive Council.

May 6-10: Rose Gottemoeller, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, will travel to Japan and South Korea to “discuss a wide ranging agenda including extended deterrence, missile defense cooperation, and arms control and nonproliferation issues.” On May 10, she will deliver “Arms Control, Nonproliferation and the Enduring U.S.-ROK Alliance.”

May 6-11: The seventh meeting of the 11^th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Central Committee continues.

May 7: Russian President Vladimir Putin marks first year anniversary of his third term in office.

May 7: South Korean President Park Geun-hye will meet with President Barack Obama at the White House. She will deliver a speech to a joint session of Congress the following day.

May 7-8: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry will travel to Russia this week to meet with President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Iran, Syria, the upcoming G-8 meeting, and the Boston Marathon bombings are all expected to be on the agenda.

May 8: China releases export, import, and trade balance data.

May 8-9: Taiwan and Japan will hold the first meeting of their new joint commission on fishing near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in Taipei.

May 8-9: Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi will visit Mongolia.

May 8-10: World Economic Forum on Africa will be held in Cape Town, South Africa. The theme will be Delivering on Africa’s Promise.

May 8-18: A delegation of Myanmar’s Opposition Party, National League for Democracy, will visit China. South China Morning Post reports that Aung San Suu Kyi will not be among the lawmakers owing to an alleged age restriction imposed on the trip by the host.

May 9: China releases Consumer and Producer’s Price Index.

May 9-10: India’s External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid will visit China Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The two sides are expected to discuss bilateral relations and prepare for Premier Li Keqiang’s upcoming visit to India. The two sides have been at loggerheads of their disputed borders. Over the weekend Khurshid traveled to Tehran where he co-hosted the 17th India-Iran joint commission meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi.

May 9-13: The first round of negotiations for Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) will be held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam.

May 10-11: G7 finance ministers and central bank governors meeting.

May 10: India releases trade data.

May 11: Parliamentary Elections in Pakistan.

May 11: 15th anniversary of the Indian nuclear test, "Pokhran II."

May 11: Defence Minister A.K. Antony will commission a new squadron MIG-29 K fighter planes into the Indian Navy.

South Korean President Park Geun-hye will leave for Washington, D.C. on Sunday in what her office is billing to be a historic trip.

Park will be in the United States from Sunday to next Friday for her first overseas trip since taking over as president in February. Unlike her predecessor, Lee Myung-bak’s, trip to the U.S. in 2011, Park will not be given a state visit. Instead, her visit is being labeled a formal visit but will still include a summit meeting and dinner at the White House.

Still, there are high expectations for the trip next week.

In one sign of the importance South Korea is placing on the trip, Park’s office announced on Friday that they had created a special English-language slogan for the summit: “Bound by trust, forward together,"

A presidential spokesperson, Yoon Chang-jung, explained the decision in a press conference earlier today.

"This English slogan was created on our own and condenses the meaning this summit carries toward the American people. As far as I know, this is the first time that (South Korea) has put forward an English-language slogan about a summit,” Yoon said, Yonhap News Agency reported.

North Korea is expected to be the main focus of Park’s meetings with Obama. Despite the unified response they showed in the face of North Korea’s latest provocations, the two allies have slightly diverging policies when it comes to dealing with Pyongyang.

Whereas the Obama administration has taken a hardline stance towards the North, Park is taking an approach that is being billed as a “trust building process for the Korean Peninsula.” The policy essentially consists of responding to all of Pyongyang’s provocations but delinking South Korea’s humanitarian aid and offers for dialogue from North Korea’s actions and rhetoric.

Nonetheless, Yonhap reports that the two leaders will try to talk with a “single voice” on North Korea during Park’s trip, and will issue a joint declaration on the importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance following their meeting.

As Yoon, Park’s spokesperson explained:

"On the occasion of a summit, the two countries will adopt a joint declaration about ways to move relations between the two counties forward at a time when they mark the 60th anniversary this year of the alliance."

North Korea will not be the only topic of discussion between Obama and Park. The leaders are also expected to discuss the negotiations surrounding the U.S.-ROK 1974 nuclear deal, which was set to expire in 2014. Negotiations over renewing the pact broke down last month over South Korea’s interest in acquiring enrichment and reprocessing facilitates to master the nuclear fuel cycle.  The U.S. has opposed this as it goes against President Obama’s global non-proliferation agenda and would likely complicate its efforts to persuade North Korea and Iran to give up their nuclear programs. With the talks reaching an impasse, the sides announced last week that they would extend the deadline for two years in order to continue negotiations.

Economic issues are also expected to figure prominently into Park’s trip to the United States. The United States is South Korea’s second largest trading partner with bilateral trade exceeding US$58 billion in 2012. This is expected to grow in the future now that the U.S.-ROK free trade agreement has gone into effect.

To capitalize on the increased opportunities, Park is traveling to the U.S. with the largest economic delegation in the country’s history. The 51-member business delegation will include the heads of South Korea’s five largest companies, including Lee Kun-hee, chairman of Samsung.

The meeting with Obama on Tuesday will not be the only symbolic point of Park’s trip, On Wednesday Park is scheduled to give a speech to a joint session of Congress, something only leaders of America’s closest allies are asked to do. Although five of Park’s predecessors have addressed joint sessions of Congress in the past, it is particularly unusual for a leader that is not on a state visit to do so.

As debate rages whether the United States should intervene in the ongoing conflict in Syria, there could be a problem with the evidence to justify such an action.

The most compelling argument made by those urging intervention in Syria is that the now infamous "redline" declared by President Obama -- usage of chemical weapons --  had been crossed. Israel, Great Britain and France had declared recently that evidence had pointed to chemical weapons being used.

Today in a report by the Guardian, it seems that western intelligence agencies are concerned they "can no longer prove for certain whether the Syrian government was responsible for alleged chemical weapon attacks, because initial samples and evidence trails have degraded over time."

It now seems that the United States and its allies may have to wait for further evidence of chemical weapons use before setting on a course of military action against Syria.

British Defense Secretary Philip Hammond noted the problem with relying on soil and blood samples before his talks with U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel.

"The confidence that we are seeking degrades over time, and in order to have a properly measured chain of custody we would need to obtain samples after an[other] incident," noted Hammond.

Hammond also noted that if chemical weapons were used again that "we can detect further use."

"The regime will now be focused on the fact that the west will be looking for evidence."

There could be other issues with the evidence as well.

In a report from VOA, Gregory Koblenz, an expert on weapons of mass destruction and current Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, explains that the West’s chemical warfare allegations against Syria are based on two basic forms of evidence, neither of which alone provides enough information about what really happened on the ground.

“One is video footage of alleged chemical attacks in Syrian hospitals,” he explained to VOA.  “Some of the symptoms we see are consistent with exposure to a nerve agent like sarin, but the problem is that there are other chemicals that can cause similar reactions, and just the videos alone don’t provide enough information and context to really assess what happened to these people.”

Koblenz also has his doubts on human and soil samples.

“The provenance is murky, and that raises questions about whether these samples are really from the location they are said to be taken from, whether they were tampered with along the way, whether they stored properly to preserve the signatures within the samples to provide a useful analysis,” Koblenz explains. 

Such analysis of the evidence posses challenges for the United States and concerned states on what steps to take next.

If Syria did use chemical weapons, and the West feels the case is not strong enough for some sort of military action, the Assad regime could just simply stop their use -- essentially get a free pass on possible past deeds -- in an attempt to avoid military action. Assad could also decide to use such weapons in very low concentrations, hoping he does not get caught because future evidence could also fail to meet the burden of proof.