With the BRICS Fifth Summit drawing to a close, observers are already analyzing the summit’s impact on the future of these important nations. Here’s a recap of what has been going on in Durban, South Africa in a number of key areas.

BRICS-African Relations

This year’s summit was the first head-of-state summit to be held in South Africa. Fittingly, the theme of the conference was “BRICS and Africa-Partnership for integration and industrialization.” To that end, several African organizations as well as non-BRICS leaders like Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi participated in the summit alongside BRICS heads of state South African President Jacob Zuma, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Africa presents both enormous opportunities and challenges for BRICS nations. On the one hand, BRICS members like China and India have been steadily deepening relations on the continent in order to tap into Africa's enormous natural resources as well as to open up markets for consumer goods. That latter goal is likely to prove particularly important as certain parts of Africa emerge as international success stories.

On the other hand, many parts of Africa are steadily deteriorating due to a breakdown of governance; indeed, immediately prior to the summit the Central African Republic's capital city of Bangui was overrun by militants forcing its president to flee the country and resulting in the deaths of some 13 South African peacekeeping troops. Meanwhile, Egyptian leader Morsi is presiding over an increasingly perilous situation at home as political disputes continue to hamper necessary economic reforms. Ominously, with an estimated three months to go before its foreign reserves run out, the global political risk consulting firm, Eurasia Group, said in a research note this week, “the chances of state collapse [in Egypt] will be better than even in the coming three months.” 

As President Xi Jinping has learned in his travels this week, one challenge BRICS countries face in deepening their presence in Africa is the possibility of opening themselves up to charges of imperialism and neocolonialism. One way to hedge against this risk is by acting through multilateral institutions and initiatives. In this regard, it wasn’t surprising to see BRICS come together at the summit in creating a number of new institutions and initiatives.

BRICS-led development bank?

No such initiative was as important and anticipated as the creation of a BRICS development bank, and as well as the related reserve currency fund.

Unfortunately, earlier today BRICS leaders announced they had failed to reach an agreement on funding the development bank. Earlier South African Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan had said, “We have made very good progress” on working out the terms of the bank. With some areas of contention still needing to be worked out, BRICS will likely continue discussing how to bring this idea to fruition in the coming months.

BRICS was more successful in agreeing to pool some of their reserves together to create a currency stabilization fund to hedge against future volatility in international financial markets.  Together, BRICS holds $4.4 trillion in foreign currency reserves and the new stabilization fund will initially consist of $100 billion, $41bn of which will come from China.

Independent of this, China and Brazil signed a $30bn currency swap agreement this week to insulate their own bilateral trade from international financial markets, providing enough capital for Sino-Brazilian trade to continue for eight months during a global financial crisis. 

The potential biggest intra-BRICS challenge in implementing its vision for a more equitable international financial order—particularly as it relates to the foreign reserve fund— will be to ensure that China’s dominance in its liquid reserves holdings does not result in Beijing dominating the multilateral initiative.

Formation of  BRICS business council:

On the eve of the summit, a business forum was launched featuring over 900 business professionals which resulted in the creation of a permanent business council. The business council consists of 5 members, each of which is a BRICS country representative. Yuri Ushakov, Russian presidential aide said, “Its main task will be [the] implementation of multilateral investment projects,” including the formation of the BRICS-led development bank.

Creation of BRICS think-tank:

South Africa’s Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) was given the responsibility of nurturing and growing the South African BRICS Think Tank launched prior to the summit. The think tank is supposed to be a South African equivalent of BRICS think tanks already established in other member states. Its purpose is to “provide a forum for discussion among academics, policy makers and non-governmental organizations on the BRICS developmental strategy” that will allow member states to collaborate on policy research and analysis.

Clearly, the Fifth BRICS Summit has proven ambitious in its aims. Despite its critics, many diplomats are optimistic about the outcomes and long-term implications for these new projects. South Africa is in a unique position to advance fellow-African interests through the BRICS forum to assist in developing the continent, and has recognized its role as such.

If the summit’s projects are successful, they can add legitimacy and credibility to BRICS as an alternative institution to other more Western-dominated ones. As Memory Dube,  Senior Researcher at the South African Institute for International Affairs, noted: "If [BRICS] can establish common norms then they will succeed in entrenching their position on the international arena.”  

Whether they will succeed in this, as well as how exactly it will impact international relations, remains to be seen. It’s more certain, however, particularly after this summit, that it remains one of the most important trends to monitor in the coming years.

Elleka Watts is an editorial assistant for The Diplomat.

Well, if that was Act III in the Kevin Rudd drama, it was a fizzer; the equivalent of the main protagonist walking out onto center stage and forgetting his lines. Exit stage left for the entire cast.

First, let’s recap. Australia – a rich, fortunate country that has been one of the chief beneficiaries of China’s insatiable demand for commodities – dispenses in 2007 with 11 years of conservative Coalition rule and hands a landslide victory to the Labor Party, led by former diplomat (and fluent Chinese speaker) Kevin Rudd. It’s a generational shift and Rudd is wildly popular with the electorate. It looks like Labor will be settling in for the long haul.

Except that Rudd proves to be profoundly flawed. By most accounts an indecisive megalomaniac, he leaves his parliamentary colleagues feeling ignored and abused. When his poll ratings finally begin to dip in mid-2010, following an embarrassing reversal on climate change policy and a controversial mining tax proposal, his colleagues topple him, in a coup as unprecedented as it is brutally efficient. Such is Rudd’s lack of support that he doesn't even contest the leadership spill. In his place, the party installs his deputy Julia Gillard, who becomes Australia’s first female prime minister.

In his book The Party Thieves, ABC journalist Barrie Cassidy recounts scenes of Labor MPs breaking out the wine in their offices the night before the coup, confident they have the numbers and that voters will soon forget. History suggests this may have been hopeful.

Gillard soon calls an election, and must confront not only a Coalition opposition rejuvenated under a disciplined Tony Abbott, but also damaging leaks from within her own party. Fingers point to Rudd as the source. The election leaves neither party with a majority, but Gillard is able to cobble together a government with the support of several independent MPs. Rudd is inexplicably given the post of foreign minister.

The new government is soon in trouble. A popular deputy leader who has a strong base of support within her party, Gillard grates on much of the Australian electorate. She’s helped by the fact that über-conservative Abbott is hardly more popular. Gillard does well holding the government together, but she is dogged by speculation of a challenge from Rudd, who retains widespread voter support.

Finally, in February 2012, the challenge happens. But Gillard is a master tactician, and she forces Rudd to play his hand too soon—indeed, goading him into an astonishing resignation as foreign minister while in Washington D.C., followed by a 36-hour dash back to Australia to contest the leadership spill. Rudd is soundly beaten, 71-31, and moves to the back benches.

South Korean broadcasters and banks were hit with a cyber attack at 2 PM local time on Wednesday, temporarily taking down computers inside companies like Shinhan Bank, Nonghyup Bank, Munhwa Broadcasting Corp., Yonhap Television News and Korea Broadcasting System.

According to media reports, computers inside those companies failed to boot up following the attack, instead bringing up an image of three skulls with the message “"hacked by Whois Team."

Reuters reported late Tuesday night (South Korean time) that the attacker likely penetrated the companies’ networks through their internet service providers. One of the ISPs, LG Uplus, has said it believes its networks were hacked just prior to the attacks on the country.

The malware—which is already being called DarkSeoul— reportedly damaged nearly 32,000 servers across the country.

In an initial assessment of the malware, Sophos, computer security firm, identified it as, Mal/EncPk-ACE, and described the malware as “not particularly sophisticated.” In fact, the company said its products have been able to detect the virus for over a year, and that the attackers had not tried to obfuscate “the various commands in the malicious.”

That said, tracing the origin of the attack is likely to prove difficult. Just hours ago South Korean officials announced that the malware was traced to an IP address in China, with South Korean communication regulator, Park Jae-moon, telling reporters that: “Unidentified hackers used a Chinese IP address to contact servers of the six affected organizations and plant the malware which attacked their computers." 

Park quickly added that this fact revealed little about the location and identity of the attacker, who could be routing the attack through IP addresses in other countries. “At this stage, we're still making our best efforts to trace the origin of attacks, keeping all kinds of possibilities open," Park said.

North Korea almost certainly tops the list of those possibilities. Pyongyang is believed to be behind at least two prior large cyber attacks on South Korea in 2009 and 2011.

Scott Snyder of the Council on Foreign Relations told The Diplomat in an email that, although authorities don’t know who was behind the attacks yet, Pyongyang’s successful asymmetric provocations usually have three characteristics:  an element of surprise, ambiguity in attribution, and they are difficult to respond to proportionately in a manner that doesn’t escalate hostilities further. 

Speaking of Tuesday’s cyber-attacks Snyder added, “This sort of attack would fulfill those characteristics; what remains is the question of whether there is proof that North Korea was behind it.”

Zachary Keck is assistant editor of The Diplomat. He is on Twitter: @ZacharyKeck.

Last week, Secretary Kerry made his first speech as Secretary of State at the University of Virginia where he spoke about the importance of our foreign policy, especially for young people.  He said “In countries across North Africa and the Middle East, the majority of people are younger than 30 years old.  About half are under 20.  They seek the same things you do: opportunity.  And we have an interest in helping these young people develop the skills they need to defeat the mass unemployment overwhelming their societies so they can start contributing to their communities and rebuild their broken economies.”

There is perhaps no issue more important than youth unemployment. Both fledgling democracies and developed nations alike face massive challenges to create pathways to employment for their young citizens.

Global leaders from the public and private sector have expressed concern as well.  Coca-Cola CEO Muhtar Kent worried that youth unemployment "has a chance of cracking the social fabric." The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Najib Razak, recently wrote of the "opportunity deficit" many young people face in the current job market.  U.N.Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has called for strengthened policies and investments involving young people.

There is a clear leadership role for the United States on this issue.Secretary of State John Kerry asserted, "foreign policy is economic policy." In other words, the U.S. cannot advance its interests abroad without focusing on how to advance global prosperity.

Through the use of our convening power and diplomatic toolkit, the United States must partner with other nations to solve the crises of youth unemployment.

The sheer number of young people globally means they are disproportionately affected by economic and employment policies,usually negatively in today's economy. The International Labour Organization reports that youth, ages 15 to 24, are three times more likely to be unemployed than adults, with nearly 75 million youth unemployed around the world. Consequently, an increasing number of young people have become discouraged and left the labor market.

Now is the time for meaningful action. If we only pay lip service to the this crisis, we risk an insurmountable economic challenge in the future-along with serious threats to stability and prosperity-in many, if not all, regions of the world.

Secretary Kerry has said that developed countries have an obligation-and a strategic interest-in helping solve this unemployment crisis by promoting economic freedom, decent work, and opportunity for youth. That is why the Department of State has joined the Youth Livelihoods Alliance, a public-private partnership that convenes foreign governments, multilateral institutions, the private sector, civic organizations, and other entities to find solutions to the underlying causes of youth unemployment.  The Alliance promotes practical and innovative solutions through the exchange of best practices in workforce development, skills training, and job creation through entrepreneurship. Over the next few months, the State Department will be convening Alliance members on several topics related to youth unemployment, so that they can identify innovative solutions and scale them up.

To be sure, America faces serious global challenges everyday which often require immediate attention. However, when considering the long-term economic outlook of the United States, it is important to recall how deeply tied America is to both the global economy and other nations. If today's 75 million unemployed youth are ignored, the damage to the global economy -- including America's -- could be decades-long and devastating.

As Secretary Kerry recently said, "Burgeoning populations of young people, hungry for jobs, opportunity, individual rights and freedom are rebelling against years of disenfranchisement and humiliation...The developed world can do more to meet the challenge and responsibility of these aspirations." Engagement is a smart move forboth the U.S. and other first-world economies.

We are at a tipping point for youth unemployment. By investing inyoung people and their skills, governments around the world can build 21st-century economies that are innovative, sustainable and prosperous.

Zeenat Rahman is U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's Special Adviser for Global Youth Issues at the U.S. Department of State. She is a Fellow with The Truman National Security Project.

In public, U.S .military officials have chosen to focus on their success in training and advising an Afghan national security force that is taking a far greater lead in patrolling its own territory.  But behind closed doors, it would be surprising if those same Americans were not staying up late at night, wondering whether the Afghans can truly protect themselves after foreign forces leave in December 2014. 

Indeed, it is not only the United States, but ordinary Afghans who are debating these very same questions.  Do Afghan leaders have what the ability or the willingness to weed out a pervasive system of corruption?  Can the army hold its gains against an insurgency that refuses to give up?  And will Afghanistan continue to enjoy democracy, however weak its form, as the international community decreases its investment in the country?

Some Afghans are not waiting to find out.  Worried that their country will once again succumb to the warlordism of the early 1990’s, 50,000 or more Afghans decided to flee their country for new pastures last year.  A vast majority did so illegally, thanks to the long wait in getting a visa or permit from a foreign country.  Most of those who choose to flee are leaving their homes and livelihoods behind—knowing that the dangerous trek across borders is likely to be a one-way trip. 

If this is a sign of things to come, then it would at least appear on the surface that a significant number of Afghans do not believe that their government will be able to hold onto the gains that have been made in security (with U.S. and NATO help) over the past four years.  Looking at the country today, it is not an entirely unfounded notion.  While the Taliban have been degraded on the battlefield from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan military, the insurgency is still operating at an impressive level. 

Fortunately for the United States and its allies in the NATO coalition, troop deaths from international forces have declined, with 2012 showing fewer casualties than the previous year.  It is also true that even the Quetta Shura Taliban can no longer be considered a unified movement; reports of Taliban emissaries mulling over peace talks with the Afghan Government is an illustration that some segments of the organization realize that they cannot win the war through military means alone.

Yet despite the decline in NATO troop deaths, a disturbing set of facts have been revealed this year, which may partly explain why tens of thousands of Afghans are trying to get out of the country. 

The Afghan army, after having neared its 352,000 threshold, is suffering incredible losses as they try to take over the fight on their own.  According to data released by the U.S. Department of Defense, there was a 124 percent rise in the number of Afghan troops being hit by IED’s—which the Taliban continue to use effectively against government and foreign troops.  To take just one example of the bloody plight that Afghans are now witnessing, last month at least 18 Afghan police officers were killed in a single day from suicide and roadside bombings against their conveys.

Afghan troops are also dying at an unprecedented rate. Gen. Mohammad Zahir Azimi, an Afghan Defense Ministry Spokesman, told Stars and Stripes that an average of nearly 300 security forces have been killed monthly over the past few months. Meanwhile, the Afghan army's high attrition rate forces it to replace a third of its entire force every year. 

As much as U.S., NATO, and Afghan officials are publicly claiming that the war is coming to an end, the fact is that the Afghan conflict is only entering another stage—one in which there will not be tens of thousands of foreign soldiers for reinforcement. Indeed, there is a strong possibility that the pace of the insurgency could increase as international troops pull back or terminate key enablers such as air power, medivac support, troop transport, and intelligence.

None of this is preordained; the United States seems content with supporting the Afghans economically and militarily for years to come with spending that is estimated to be $4 billion a year.  But a less hopeful outcome is anything but unrealistic. When viewed through this prism, it is easier to understand why tens of thousands of Afghans are fleeing, and why those who choose to stay are preparing for the worst.

Daniel R. DePetris is a Washington, D.C. analyst and a past contributor to The Diplomat.

Nearly half of the twenty countries with the least amount of press freedom in the world are located in the Asia-Pacific, according to Reporters Without Borders’ 2013 World Press Freedom Index.

Of the twenty countries making the bottom of the list, nine are located in the Asia-Pacific. In ascending order these countries are: North Korea, Iran, China, Vietnam, Laos, Uzbekistan, Laos, Sri Lanka and Kazakhstan.

Of these nine “worst of the worst,” only Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan saw significant changes from their positions during the last year, with the former dropping six spots and the latter declining by seven spots from the 2012 World Press Freedom Index.

Other parts of Asia saw more dramatic swings over the course of 2012. Most of these were in the wrong direction.

Singapore, for instance, dropped 14 spots from 135 to 149. Other countries in Southeast Asia fared worse, with Malaysia dropping 23 spots to 145th and Cambodia plummeting 26 spots to 143th of 179 countries surveyed.

In between the two with the 144th most free press freedoms in the world was Bangladesh, which had dropped 15 spots on the year. It was not alone among South Asian nations that saw a decline in press freedom last year. In fact, Pakistan dropped 7 spots, India declined by 9 places, and Nepal by 12. Maldives, which suffered from political stability all year, declined 30 spots but still ranked at 103, much higher than Pakistan’s 159, India’s 140, and Nepal’s 118 rankings.

Reporters Without Borders noted that India’s ranking this year was its “lowest since 2002 because of increasing impunity for violence against journalists and because Internet censorship continues to grow.”

Even the democratic states in Northeast Asia saw at least marginal setbacks, with South Korea falling six spots to finish 50th, and Taiwan dropping two spots to finish 47th.

Most shocking however was Japan, which fell a whopping 31 places from 22nd place to 53th in terms of press freedoms over the course of 2012. Reporters Without Borders justified this steep drop by pointing to growing “censorship of nuclear industry coverage and its failure to reform the ‘kisha club’ system.”

There were some bright spots in Asia, however. Notably, Myanmar climbed another 18 spots last year, finishing at 151. This is only four spots behind the Philippines who finished the year at 147 out of 179 countries after dropping six places. Reporters Without Borders noted in its analysis that Myanmar had previously “been in the bottom 15 every year since 2002 but now, thanks to the Burmese spring’s unprecedented reforms, it has reached its best-ever position.”

Afghanistan saw even more dramatic improvements, rising 22 places to finish 128th. Reporters Without Borders cited “the fact that no journalists are in prison” as the reason for Kabul’s rise in its rankings. At the same time, it said that Afghanistan continued to face many challenges and suggested it was not optimistic about Afghanistan’s media freedom after foreign troops leave the country at the end of next year.

With the 9th ranking New Zealand was the only country outside of Europe to be ranked among the top ten countries with the most press freedoms. The next highest ranked Asia-Pacific country was Australia at 26.

Reporters Without Borders is a French-based non-governmental organization that advocates for freedom of information and freedom of expression as the “the foundation of any democracy.”

Zachary Keck is assistant editor of The Diplomat. He is on Twitter: @ZacharyKeck.

Discussions on Korea today often revolve around North Korea and its nuclear weapons program. Yet, it is highly unlikely that the Korean Peninsula will remain divided forever, and emergence of a successfully unified and stable Korea is certainly one of many possibilities that merits close attention. Such a scenario would have far-reaching and potentially destabilizing consequences on the balance of power in Northeast Asia, especially with regard to a rising China and a normalizing Japan, both of which have critical security interests on the Korean Peninsula.

For the time being, there is in fact a great power status quo on the Korean Peninsula, as North Korea in many ways is an issue that unites the major regional powers who are often at odds with each other, including Japan, South Korea, China, the United States, and Russia. In the most basic sense, all five countries support North Korea denuclearizing and not collapsing, and oppose actions that could lead to war on the Peninsula. Thus, the lack of policy coordination among the different powers has been due to differences in priorities more so than interests.

Korean reunification would dramatically alter the consensus that now exists. Notably, China and a reunified Korea (under Seoul) will have direct security issues due to their shared borders and outstanding border disputes. Beijing will be particularly worried about Korean and U.S. troops moving up to the very open China-Korea Yalu River border. Even if the U.S. military were to remain below the DMZ line or leave the Korean Peninsula entirely, China will still have to worry about the South Korean military, which is well equipped and has nearly seven-hundred thousand troops (one of the largest in the world). Without North Korea and its 1.1 million troops serving as geographic and human buffers, Beijing will consider Korean and U.S. troops as serious regional threats.

Furthermore, a reunified Korea would be able to direct more energy to issues that received less attention before, especially highly charged historical disputes with Japan. There are several unresolved issues between the two countries, including the territorial disputes (Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, names of the Sea of Japan/East Sea) and numerous issues originating from Japan’s colonization of Korea and World War II (for example, the comfort women issue). Focusing more on these issues would fuel nationalism in an increasingly confident, assertive, and powerful Korea. This might be useful inbuilding cohesiveness among the formerly split Korean people, but Tokyo would likely feel threatened by Seoul’s intention to address its past grievances. While the two countries might not become openly hostile, their relations would almost certainly deteriorate, intensifying the tension in the region.

The second factor, which will further complicate the situation, is the on-going rise of China, assuming that it continues to grow without experiencing serious domestic instability. In the future, an increasingly powerful Chinese military power will render U.S. security guarantees in the region less credible. Despite the so-called “pivot,” the fact of the matter is that Chinese military power will grow relative to U.S. military power in the region. Given the Korean Peninsula’s importance to China’s security, Beijing may push Seoul to distance itself from Washington or even to align with it.

In its own response to a rising China, Japan could become a fully normal nation without any constitutional limit placed on its military power. Japan remains the third largest economy in the world, while the Maritime Self-Defense Force at this time remains the most powerful naval force in the region after the U.S. navy. Tokyo would consider the possibility of Seoul aligned with Beijing a serious national security threat, “a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan,” as Korea could be used as a springboard for attacks against the Japanese Isles (Pusan, a major Korean port, is less than two-hundred nautical miles from Yamaguchi Porton the Japanese mainland).

With the reunification of Korea and a rising China, the Northeast Asia of the future will be fraught with security dilemmas. Given Korea’s strategic location and the fact that it has become a significant middle power in its own right, Seoul’s choice of alignment among the great powers competing could potentially tilt the balance of power in the region in favor of one side or another. Such a shift would no doubt cause dangerous destabilization in the region, if there is no dominant force to keep stability.

In such a circumstance, one possible strategy that Seoul could pursue is balancing without alignment. Korea’s potential role as East Asia’s political and economic intersection point— and perhaps even as an independent balancing player in its own right— is being increasingly discussed in the country. Many Koreans today are hoping that Seoul in the future could be the country where regional political issues and economic exchanges are mediated, despite the fact that balancing has historically been an extraordinarily difficult feat for Korea.

In fact, Korea experimented unsuccessfully with a similarly independent balancing strategy before during the late 19th and early 20th century, when multiple great powers were competing for regional dominance in East Asia. China’s Qing Dynasty at that time had weakened significantly, and it was too risky for Korea to rely on the Middle Kingdom as the guarantor of security. Instead, Seoul tried to forge relations with as many great powers as possible and play them off one another so that none of them would be able to actually control Korea. The gambit, however, failed, and Korea came under Japanese rule between 1910 and 1945.

In the end, the best strategy (or rather, the least bad option) for Seoul may be retaining its alliance with Washington (even if its influence declines in the region), while attempting to remain as neutral as possible between Beijing and Tokyo, as difficult (and perhaps even unsustainable) as it may be. Korea should strive to act as an absolutely neutral buffer between China and Japan– a status that should preferably be guaranteed by the United States, which might still be able to play the role of a distant, neutral arbiter. This strategy would be one of neutrality guaranteed by an outside actor as opposed to active balancing without aligning with one actor. It is certainly not a risk-free strategy, as maintenance of neutrality is almost as difficult as balancing, but it may be the only viable strategy.

The primary threat to this policy remains nationalism, which will constantly push Korea to adopt a more assertive foreign policy. Maintenance of neutrality will require all the tact, restraint, and subtlety that Seoul can muster. Resolving the East Asian countries’ historical grievances with each other might be one way to moderate Korean nationalism. Washington could also further defense and technological cooperation with Seoul to strengthen the latter’s military so that it may fend for its own security to some degree.A strong Korea that is able to resist pressure from both China and Japan might lead to a more stable Northeast Asia.

Other major actors in the region too, including the United States, should recognize the pivotal importance of the Korean Peninsula in maintaining stability in the region, and work together to keep the peninsula an independent buffer state. No state should attempt to disturb the status quo and bring Korea under its dominance, and in this endeavor, the United States should continue to play its part as Northeast Asia’s peacekeeper in the future.

Sungtae“Jacky” Park is a research assistant at Center for the National Interest. He has previously written for CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), France 24, and the International Affairs Review.

The Diplomat’s assistant editor Zachary Keck recently spoke with Richard Fontaine, President of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and Dr. Daniel Kliman, a Transatlantic Fellow with the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) about their new report: Global Swing States: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey and the Future of International Order.

In the report, you note that China’s bilateral aid and financing mechanisms, as well as the Chiang Mai Initiative, are presenting potential alternatives to U.S.-led international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Currently, BRICS is considering establishing its own development bank and bailout fund. How worried are you about this proposal?

Whether these five disparate countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – can successfully establish joint financial institutions remains an open question. The five will need to agree on a set of governing rules and on how to denominate commonly held funds, which may prove a difficult task. Not only do the five lack a unity of interests, but several of them remain concerned about Chinese domination of the grouping. Ideally, any BRICS development bank or bailout fund would operate on rules akin to those that govern other international institutions; whether they will remains to be seen.

As the report documents nicely, there is substantial diversity within the global swing states on most issues. One issue they seem to agree on, however, is that the UN Security Council (UNSC) should be reorganized in order to reflect the changed power dynamics since the end of WWII, with many of the swing states themselves seeking permanent seats on the UNSC. In light of this, do you believe the U.S. is currently giving UNSC reform enough attention and what steps can be done to make more (any?) progress on this front?

The global swing states seek greater voice within the UN, but reforming the Security Council remains a Sisyphean task on which U.S. action can make only limited headway. In addition, no solution is likely to satisfy all four powers, attract support from a divided foreign policy establishment in Washington, and win the backing of European leaders for whom rebalancing the Security Council is a zero-sum exercise. While American leaders should continue to affirm the need for UN reform, they should devote far greater attention to capitalizing on areas where Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey have already taken on new global responsibilities.

Despite the general congruence among the swing states’ interests and Washington’s own, the report notes that they’re substantial differences between them on a whole host of issues. For example, even though they are all democracies, in contrast to Washington the swing states often give state sovereignty priority over human rights and nuclear proliferation. What can the U.S. do to ensure that these inevitable differences do not hinder the overall tone and trajectory of its relationships with these countries?

Where the four have adopted policies that run contrary to elements of the current system, Washington should seek continued dialogue as a way to minimize differences. An example to follow is the Washington-New Delhi dialogue on Iran, which has prevented different visions of how to manage Tehran’s nuclear program from poisoning the larger U.S.-India bilateral relationship. At the same time, Washington should concentrate on expanding cooperation in areas where global swing states have already started to contribute to the international order. As points of collaboration grow, America’s relationships with Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey will become more resilient.

In the report’s introduction, you express concern that if the U.S. does not strengthen the global order, the world will fragment in such a way that there will be different rules of the road in different regions of the world. In this sense, are you at all concerned that if the U.S. does strengthen its engagement with the four global swing states on a bilateral basis, as the report recommends, Washington could inadvertently give rise to a global order defined by spheres of influence? What measures do you believe could be taken to hedge against this possibility?

These countries are already leaders in their respective region – the question is what kind of role they will play. Will they try to carve out spheres of influence in which they dictate the rules? Or will they seek to enshrine the international order’s underlying principles within their region? The task for Washington is to work with these countries to make the latter outcome more likely. Because Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey are not a bloc and are unlikely to act in concert, it would be a mistake for Washington to treat the four as a collective. American engagement will, by necessity, be overwhelmingly bilateral.

In the past, both of you have done extensive work on some of the United States more traditional allies, particularly Japan, and the report itself does discuss these countries briefly. What role do you two see Washington’s traditional allies in Asia, such as Japan, Australia and South Korea, playing in supporting the rise of the swing states?

The need to hedge against China’s rise and the pursuit of new economic opportunities has led Japan, South Korea, and Australia to increase their engagement of India and Indonesia. In the case of India, trilateral cooperation involving Washington and its Asian allies is also notable. Many of the recommendations outlined in our report could be adopted – and adapted as needed – by America’s allies in Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra and elsewhere. For example, all three could cooperate with India and Indonesia to seize the opportunity afforded by the political opening in Burma and encourage Jakarta’s aspirations to become a regional and global leader on nonproliferation issues.

The full report and supplementary working papers are available for download in PDF, e-reader, or Kindle format on CNAS’ website.  

Since before President Obama officially nominated him as his next Secretary of Defense on Monday, former Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) faced a wide-ranging set of criticisms including that he is "soft" on Iran and doesn't support Israel.

More troubling,  a growing number of Hagel's critics are now going further in claiming that Hagel doesn't just not support Israel but is in fact an anti-Semite, which the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines as  "hostility towards or discrimination against Jews as a religious, ethnic, or racial group." These charges first emerged last month with an article by the The Wall Street Journal's Bret Stephens entitled "Chuck Hagel's Jewish Problem." 

They have only become more frequent over the last few days however. Speaking of Hagel's coming nomination on Sunday, the Washington Post's Jennifer Rubin said  "This is not merely about Israel or Iran policy or defense spending. It is about the acceptability of the worst expression of anti-Semitism." The following day when Hagel was officially nominated, AEI's Danielle Pletka wrote in USA Today that Hagel displayed "troubling hints of anti-Semitism," while the Council on Foreign Relations' Elliot Abrams told NBR that Hagel appears to be "an anti-Semite. It's not just being anti-Israel. He's got a problem with what he calls the Jews."

Interestingly, Hagel himself as a history of condemning others for anti-Semitism. While Stephens, Rubins, Pletka, and Abrams have made their allegations against a two-term Senator who, by some estimates, supported over $40 billion of U.S. aid to Israel while in the senate and visited the country regularly, Hagel has reserved his accusations for none other than the President and Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who Hagel is now charged with appeasing.

In a letter dated December 21, 2005 -- a few months after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became Iran's President -- Senators Hagel and Evan Bayh (D-IN) wrote to then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan urging him to get the UN General Assembly to pass a resolution condemning "the anti-Semitic and hateful statements" Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and its Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had recently made."

The letter begins: "We write you to express our outrage at the anti-Semitic and hateful statements being made both by the President and by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran threatening the United States, denying the Holocaust, and rejecting the existence of the State of Israel."

The senators next express their appreciation to Kofi for personally criticizing the Iranian leaders' statements, and to the UN Security Council also condemning them. Deeming these actions insufficient, however, Hagel and Bayh insist that Kofi demonstrate "leadership" in ensuring the UN General Assembly follows suit by passing a "strong resolution" condemning the Iranian leaders.

After months of debate in the U.S. defense community and anxious waiting from Afghan watchers, General John R. Allen—the senior American commander in the Afghan war—has finally given President Barack Obama his professional opinion on how many troops should stay in Afghanistan after the NATO mission concludes at the end of 2014. When that milestone is reached, the United States and its NATO allies will be formally handing over responsibility for Afghan security to the country’s national army and police.  But just as the Obama administration tried to do in Iraq, the White House would prefer to keep a residual U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan even after the formal mission is complete.

According to a story in the New York Times this week, which cites unnamed U.S. officials, Gen. Allen has come away from his security review with three broad options for Obama’s national security team to consider.  The first would leave approximately 6,000 American soldiers in Afghanistan after 2014, whose mission would be primarily geared towards a narrow, yet intense, counterterrorism operation that would concentrate on high-value Al-Qaeda and Taliban targets.   The second option increases the troop level to 10,000, providing the U.S. military with greater leverage on the ground and an ability to continue partnering and training Afghan security forces. The third and by far most extensive recommendation would see 20,000 Americans staying in country, leaving open the possibility that conventional U.S. troop units would be able to patrol certain neighborhoods when needed.

President Obama is expected to consider all three options next week when he meets with Afghan President Hamid Karzai at the White House.  Both the Americans and Afghans are still in the middle of complicated negotiations over granting the post-2014 U.S. troops immunity from prosecution by Afghan authorities. Karzai has been tough throughout the entire process on this issue.  If the past is any guide to the future, the Afghan President will likely advocate leaving the smallest post-2014 U.S. troop presence in the country in order to burnish Afghanistan’s newfound sovereignty as an independent nation-state, and perhaps elevate his legacy as a statesman before stepping down permanently in 2014. 

In the end, however, Karzai may not need to worry about what Obama is thinking.  The war in Afghanistan has become a sore point for the Obama administration, punctuated by the enormous rise in insider attacks on coalition forces and the persistent tenacity and lethality of the Taliban insurgency. Whenever the Obama White House publicly speaks about the war these days, the discussion is centered on bringing the post-9/11 wars to a close rather than emphasizing the successes that have been made after years of fighting  Nothing better illustrated this than the Vice Presidential debate in October, when Vice President Joe Biden passionately hammered home to Paul Ryan and the American people that the U.S. would be out by 2014 regardless of conditions on the ground.

Tactically speaking, the 6,000-troop option may not be enough for U.S. commanders, most of whom would prefer to have as many resources and the greatest latitude as possible to execute their mission.  Yet for Presidents Obama and Karzai—two leaders who are eager to normalize a U.S.-Afghan relationship that has largely been dictated by Washington for the past eleven years—a few thousand American soldiers to track down and kill wanted terrorists may very well be the best package that they can sell to their war-weary citizens.

Daniel R. DePetris is a Washington, D.C. analyst and a past contributor to The Diplomat.