Last week we kicked off the winter term in the Naval War College’s Intermediate Level Course, dubbed Strategy & War. We spend the first week of seminars with the giants of strategic theory, namely Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao Zedong. That provides a platform from which we vault into historical case studies for the balance of the course. We encounter the rest of the greats—Thucydides, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett, David Galula—along the way. At the outset of any seminar I like to canvass the students about their predispositions toward strategy. Solomon-like, I decree that each person justify his choice by listing a favorite passage from that theorist’s writings.
Does Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Mao speak to a particular group of people more, and why? Which concepts find more favor? Mao tends to finish third, probably because he carries heavy historical baggage. In six years of overseeing seminars, I have never had a Maoist class. Whatever the Chinese Communist Party chairman’s strategic ingenuity, it’s hard to overlook the mounds of dead Chinese bodies stacked up during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, when Mao made the transition from tearing down a state to building his own. By my unscientific count, around a quarter of students ‘fess up to being admirers of Maoist works such as On Protracted War. On the whole, setting aside Mao’s third-party candidacy, seminars generally incline slightly to Clausewitz’s On War or to Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.
This result implies that the late Michael Handel, who taught in my department when I was a mere whippersnapper of a student—hard to believe, I know—was correct to conclude that there is no clear-cut Asian or Western way of war. If there were, European soldier Clausewitz would be the clear winner every time with overwhelmingly American audiences. Why do students lean one way or the other? Some reasons are pragmatic. Sun Tzu furnishes a short, quick, easy read that appears straightforward, whereas Clausewitz heaps page upon page of 19th-century German on the unwary student. Why not take the path of least resistance? And the domain where we operate makes a difference, as a lesser-known commentator, Admiral J. C. Wylie, observes. Airmen tend to see things one way, as do seamen, soldiers, diplomats, or anyone else. For instance, Sun Tzu premises his writings on the artful use of information, surprise, and deception. Ergo, he’s a darling of intelligence professionals. And so forth.
The Naval Diplomat owns up to waffling on this important question. As a former resident of greater Boston who spent many a happy day cycling or hiking at Lexington and Concord, I could mimic Emerson and mumble some lofty sentiment about a foolish consistency’s being the hobgoblin of little minds. Or maybe it’s just strategic aimlessness. If forced to take a stand, however, I take rank with Clausewitz. Sun Tzu extols the use of orthodox and unorthodox methods to keep adversaries off-balance. Mao urges Red Army commanders to let stronger foemen overextend themselves before turning the tables on the enemy and winning.
These are worthy insights, but they’re about methods. Clausewitz resonates with me more than the others simply because his insights are more fundamental. He respects his enemies, as befits someone who fought Napoleon and often lost. Sun Tzu insists that those who read his book win every time. Mao conveys a sense of Marxist-Leninist inevitability. Clausewitz refuses to sound such a cheery note. For him, strategy isn’t about our acting on some inert mass, an adversary with little capacity to adapt or innovate. Strategy is about interacting with living, breathing adversaries who have as many brain cells as we do and as much resolve to prevail. If we haven’t overthrown the enemy, we are bound to fear he will overthrow us.
Giving opponents their due means taking them seriously. That’s the proper attitude to take into international competition—and a usefulstarting point for strategic wisdom. Sign me up with the great Carl.

Chuck Hill
I suppose many would consider Boyd a tactician. But write large could not the OODA loop writ large be strategy as well. It certainly reflects the same regard for time that the quote from Napoleon did.
Christopher Bassford
I found Professor Holmes' military-theoretical op-ed as useful an exercise as one can expect in that format, and, of course, I heartily endorse his conclusions. However, I'm always a little dismayed by discussions like the one that follows Holmes' own text. A few basic points: "Strategists" are people who make strategy (i.e., political leaders and very high military commanders), not people who write and/or teach about it. The latter are theorists, historians, or perhaps "Strategiologists." As working professionals, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini may have participated (as subordinates) in the making of strategy–Sun Tzu probably, Clausewitz certainly, Jomini probably not–but we almost never talk about them in that role. Thus of the three listed–Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Mao–only Mao qualifies as a strategist. Whether he was a good guy or not, whether he was creative in a theoretical sense, how many Chinese he sent to their deaths, and how poorly his methods fit into our own value system, are all quite irrelevant issues. The only truly relevant question is whether he was successful–and especially whether he was successful in accomplishing what HE sought to accomplish, not what we think he ought to have sought. In those terms, Mao was massively successful, and the magnitude of the odds against him throughout can only magnify his success. The fact that he died as the undisputed virtual emperor of a powerful, independent, ideologically Maoist China, of (presumably) natural causes at the age of 82, is a pretty good marker. Strategiologists are of course free to judge him in as many dimensions as they like, but their primary tasks are to explain his success and the relevance of his ideas and methods to the problems future strategists may face. Because Mao–unlike most strategists–was also a writing political/military theorist, they also face the additional task of disentangling his fundamental ideas from the messages he needed to send to various audiences at particular times, which may have little to do with anything Mao thought of as "truth." That's also a problem with writers like Sun Tzu, Jomini, and Liddell Hart, who were essentially military-theoretical entrepreneurs, and particularly with Napoleon, whose military writings are almost pure political spin. It isn't a problem with Clausewitz, who had no desire or reason to dissemble, but his legacy is similarly complicated by the tangled stratigraphy of his magnum opus On War, which incorporates in no particular order various stages of his very dynamic theoretical evolution.
The actual question Holmes raises, however, is which writer (from the choices Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Mao, Thucydides, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett, David Galula) sparks the most enthusiasm from students at the US Naval War College. That's an excellent question, but their answers tells us a great deal more about students at the US Naval War College than about the writers in question. Asking students who among these writers is "the greatest" may not, in fact, be a good idea, as it reinforces their natural tendency to choose sides rather than to keep thinking. As Michael Handel well understood, we want students to understand these writers as flexible, evolving human minds rather than as a set of frozen lists of competing caricatures (to which some PME programs are badly addicted). One of our goals should be to enable our students to read Sun Tzu, et al, through Clausewitz's eyes, and vice versa. Unfortunately, that requires a great deal more historical context than most PME programs are willing or able to provide.
Bankotsu
I agree with your views. Mao was different from the rest in the fact that he wrote military treatises during war and practicised them on the enemy. Such is the profound difference between Mao and the other military theorists.
Devindra Sethi
Agree with you Christopher.STRATEGISTS ARE PEOPLE WHO MAKE STRATEGY , POLITICAL LEADERS AND HIGH MILITARY COMMANDERS. The finest example of the last century, is President Franklin DelanoRoosvelt ! He kept USA out of WW2 till he was ready and yet supported Allied Powers by his famous Lend – Lease Agreement Act. In effect he controlled Mr Stalin and Churchill strategically right through and prosecuted the entire war successfully to finally defeat the AXIS Powers. All other leaders of the 20th century and before, pale in comparision to him.
One input from his library, he was an avid reader of PM CHANAYKYA's treatise, the Arthasastra!! The citizens of USA correctly rewarded him with an unprecdented third term as the President of the country. Professor Holmes should expose his students in the Naval War College accordingly.
Reason
Arh, am not sure Mao won anything with his tactics.
Chiang Kai Shek definitely lost China, rather than Maoism winning it.
Stefan Stackhouse
A distinction needs to be made here between "strategy" and "grand strategy". The former tends to be focused just upon a current (or anticipated near-future) war, or even just a theater of operations within that war, while the latter tends to be global and long-term in scope. This article seems to me to actually be about grand strategy.
A grand strategy should rarely or only gradually change – one is reminded of Palmerston's saying that "nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests". Nations may not have permanent enemies either, but the defeat or elimination of one enemy will likely only mean that a new one takes their place, sooner or later. Any notion of an "end to history" is laughably naive, to the point that it was amazing that anyone would have ever even suggested such a notion, let alone take it seriously. An effective grand strategy is flexible and forsightful enough to allow for a changing global landscape of friends and enemies, and to adjust accordingly. The dustbin of history is filled with the memories of former nations and empires that did not manage to develop grand strategies that were good enough to cope with a changing world. This thus suggests the acid test and gold standard of grand strategies: the longevity of the nation or empire under that strategy. Many grand strategies work pretty well for decades, a few for several centuries, but grand strategies that hold up for a millennium or more are extremely rare. The grand strategy of China – hold their own territory, the "middle kingdom", very tightly but avoid overextending themselves beyond – has served them exceptionally well, and has enabled China to stand nearly invinceable (with the unfortunate exception of the "century of shame") for thousands of years. The grand strategy of the Arabic Islamic civilization – conquer by sword plus incentivized conversion a swath of territory and then defend it by jihad, integrating mosque and state – has also held up pretty well for 1400 years. The grand strategy of the Swiss – arm themselves to the teeth and hunker down in their mountain fortress, staying neutral and not pissing off anyone – has worked pretty well for over half a millennium as well. Most of the other big empires that managed to exist over the course of several centuries or more had grand strategies that worked well for a time, but then they either didn't adjust them to changing events or stopped following them, usually through a combination of lust for power and wealth with hubris and pride and folly.
The fundamental and unchanging geographic feature of the US is that North America is for all practical purposes an island, separated by large oceans from the rest of the world, and from any serious potential threats. We are bordered only by two countries that have been effectively pacified and implicitly forced to be friendly, or could explicitly be without much trouble if they were ever to be governed by hostile regimes. We are the natural hegemon over North America, and we have a land mass, natural resources, and population that can enable us to have a prosperous, largely self-sufficient economy, and to be one of the largest and most powerful nations in the world REGARDLESS of what happens overseas. These facts suggest a natural grand strategy for the US: maintain strategic depth by projecting naval and air power well beyond our shores, keeping any potential adversaries at bay far away from North America. As a secondary objective, to the extent that we can do so without risking our overextension or entanglement overseas, it is advantageous to take a page out of the old British Empire playbook and to try and discourage the major Eurasian powers from combining or consolidating into a single empire.
Mahan is the theoretical strategist that probably came closest to getting this right, and his friend and disciple Teddy Roosevelt probably came closest to actually implementing this natural grand strategy. For the most part, though, the US hasn't gotten its grand strategy very right at all.
JohnX
I partially agree with you that the USA has an isolationalist streak as it can. Though, in a way it also doesn't truly have the strenght to be isolationist. 1941, 2001 are both examples of actions forced upon the USA even though they wished to sleep.
I also disagree that the USA has forced its neighbors to be friendly as much as its been a stroke of good luck that both of its neighbors have similar interests in peaceful relations with its neighbor.
I do believe that the USA is ignorant of many other nations real attitudes as it focuses too much on technology, but the benefit for my nation is that they are more aware of other nations and thier concerns than the next major challenger. Thus they will be quicker to build relationships that are win/win than them.
The USAs problem is that it is a Grizzly Bear looking for another similar sized Grizzly to wrestle, it tends to underestimate the scorpians, centipedes, snakes etc that can threaten it until they bite. It then goes into a frenzy stamping on the underbrush and roaring loudly until it loses sight of the wound as the pain subsides.
All is calm until it happens again.
Tony
Obviously the author never read the Art of War in full. Sun Tzu never suggested that the opponent was some inert, unintelligent mass. Sun Tzu himself strongly cautioned against waging underinformed, prolonged wars.
David
I'm surprised there was no mention of Jomini in these discussions.