For Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s first visit, what Pakistan keenly sought was a show of mutual adoration, along with pledges to rejuvenate the undying friendship both nations love to proclaim. Certainly, Pakistan’s intentions were in abundant evidence for Li’s welcome, which started with his plane being ushered in by Pakistani fighter aircraft and an airport reception that brought out the country’s entire civilian and military leadership.

The visit offers an excellent insight into the kind of relations Pakistan has with its northeastern neighbor. And the Chinese premier wasted no time in proclaiming the adoration as mutual. At a luncheon hosted in his honor the premier defined his visit as a clear message to the international community that whatever direction world affairs may take, China’s ties with Pakistan will only flourish and strengthen.

That statement would have resonated a tad stronger had Li not visited India just prior. The only true regional power competitor with China, India has had a long and tense rivalry with Pakistan, creating a delicate situation for the three countries.

Li’s visit comes at a critical point for both the region and for the U.S., which remains a strategically vital player.

The U.S. may be eager to end large-scale operations in Afghanistan, but the only practical way to withdraw its assets in that country demands Pakistan’s cooperation. But Pakistan’s incoming prime minister Nawaz Sharif has already issued statements calling for dialogue as a solution to the problem of extremists. He also appears closer to the Middle East and China than to the U.S. Indeed, Westerners probably remember Sharif as the prime minister who defied tremendous U.S. pressure to conduct a nuclear test in May 28, 1998, in response to India’s own test.

Still, times have changed and the new Pakistani government takes power at a time when the country is grappling with an extreme energy crisis, ongoing violence and a struggling economy. Pakistan is in dire need of developmental and financial support.

Of course, in China it sees the second option it had longed for during the War on Terror. But it should be careful. Experts believe that the governments of China and Pakistan exaggerate the strength of their ties. For instance, although the Chinese premier reiterated that bilateral trade would rise from the current $12 billion to $15 billion, out of the $29 billion in foreign investment Pakistan has received during the last decade, only $0.8 billion came from China. In contrast, the U.S. provided $7.7 billion. And this is the same China that has become the largest investor in the region, investing nearly $202 billion in Asia for the period 2004-2010.

At a time when the world’s largest economies are investing heavily in their emerging neighbors – the U.S. in Latin America, for instance, or the EU in Eastern Europe – Pakistan’s BFF is offering only platitudes and rhetoric.

The situation has been complicated by a recent video, apparently released by the East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM), which shows children being trained at what appears to be a terrorist camp in the Waziristan area of Pakistan. The Chinese government blames the ETIM for several acts of terror in China and has expressed rising concerns about ETIM sanctuaries in Pakistan.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is likely none too pleased at the idea of Pakistan handing over the Gwadar port operation to China or at the inauguration of a gas pipeline between Pakistan and Iran. These events suggest a shift in the policies Islamabad developed during its alliance with Washington.

So Pakistan faces the dilemma of picking the right side at a crucial juncture. Yet history shows it has the ability to do just that. Pakistan’s role in helping bring the U.S. and China together during Nixon’s 1972 visit is a great example of how this mortal has survived the clashes of Titans for almost seven decades now. It will need to draw on all that experience for the years to come.

Malik Ayub Sumbal is an award-winning journalist based in Islamabad.

As the political dust settles in Pakistan, and the country experiences its first civilian transfer of power from one government to another, many of the leading political parties who lost badly in the elections are turning inwards, in an attempt to analyze their faults, weaknesses and shortcomings.

Just a few weeks ago, in the run up to one of the bloodiest elections in the country’s history, elements of local press, the Western media and political punditry were betting on a victory for cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan.

Others predicted a hung parliament, saying chief of Pakistan Muslim League N (PMLN) Nawaz Sharif may have to make compromises in forming the government.

All were proved wrong when Sharif won, and prepared to be prime minister of Pakistan for the third time.

Not only did the results burst Imran Khan’s bubble, but his party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) could not even beat the incumbent Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which after five years in power had appeared to be the least popular of the contenders vying for seats in the parliament. Right now, Imran is looking as if he won’t even be the opposition leader in the parliament, with the PPP’s nominated candidate taking that role.

According to official results (with some constituencies still to report final tallies), Imran Khan’s party won fewer than 30 seats, despite securing more than 7 million votes nationwide. In contrast, Sharif’s party earned about 14 million votes and won more than 120 seats.

These numbers are important, because they reflect the problem with Khan’s voters: they are concentrated in very few areas of Pakistan – mostly urban middle class.

Many of these city-based (especially youth) supporters of Khan had never voted before, seeing politics as a dirty business that served only to preserve the status quo.

Khan deserves credit for motivating this segment of the electorate to go to the polls, but this was not enough to give him victory. Apparently ignoring the fact that two-thirds of Pakistanis don’t live in cities, Khan utterly failed to reach out to rural voters. In rural Pakistan, Imran is not known as a politician but as the celebrity cricketer who won the country the World Cup in 1992. He can give autographs but can’t get votes.

There’s a simple reason for that: rural voters rely on families with local networks who can get things done. Families such as this are politically entrenched in most parts of the country, and are usually affiliated with traditional parties like the PMLN and PPP. In campaigning for “change” Khan made the mistake of choosing for his party neophyte candidates unknown to rural Pakistanis.

Apparently Khan realized the mistake. In a video statement released from the hospital bed after his dramatic fall at an election rally, he implored the Pakistani public to vote for him, rather than for his local candidates.

Still, after winning only a single seat in the 2002 elections under General Musharraf, Khan’s supporters could be justified in seeing 30 seats as a solid result.

Now should we ignore PTI’s win in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, where the party will be forming government. Khan will now face the very real challenges of governing.

Situated near the border with Afghanistan, KP is plagued by militancy. The last government was at the mercy of terrorists, losing 700+ workers in attacks orchestrated by the Pakistani Taliban and their affiliates.

The Pakistani Taliban, who call democracy un-Islamic and do not believe in the current parliamentary system of governance in Pakistan, need to be eliminated. While Khan’s party has argued that this could be done by pulling out of the War on Terror, during which Pakistan has been an ally of the West, the reality is much more complex.

What Imran Khan does not see – or rather does not want to talk about – is the fact that the Pakistani Taliban are a product of the Pakistani military’s policy of supporting the Afghan Taliban and providing it with safe havens in the tribal belt bordering Afghanistan.

And with the imminent withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan, the military and its political proxies like Imran Khan envision Pakistan being able to bring peace in the region by helping install a Taliban-dominated government in Kabul. What they forget is that the Taliban are not so much a group of people as an ideology that has taken firm roots in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan, which can be defeated only through a head-on approach of acting against any elements that use terror as a tactic.

For Imran Khan, KP will serve as a test case. If he can deliver there, he may find the next elections give him a better outcome. But with policies that seem to favor befriending the Taliban rather than fighting them – an approach that has proven disastrous in the past – his ability to deliver is very much an open question.

Taha Siddiqui is an investigative journalist working with various local and international media outlets focusing on terrorism, politics and minority issues in the country. He tweets @TahaSSiddiqui

Sometimes body language and gestures tell us a lot about the social dynamics between two individuals. During the just concluded visit by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to India, the mannerisms on display between Li and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh demonstrated a newfound bonhomie.

The camaraderie comes on the heels of recent tensions on the border where Chinese troops allegedly penetrated 19 kilometers into Indian territory and set up camp. The incident enraged the nation and prompted the media to indulge in unbridled jingoism, almost creating a diplomatic face-off.

But Li’s visit changed the whole discourse. The Chinese leader set the tone before landing in India through his byline in The Hindu. In his article, “A handshake across the Himalayas”, Li addressed the need to solve difficult historical questions and take a long-term view in India-China relations. He also emphasized the need to build trust rather than suspicion.

While the Chinese leader dwelt on idealism, Singh spoke plainly on a range of issues, from trans-border river issues to bilateral trade.

India’s Ambassador to China, Dr. S. Jaishankar told the media after the meeting that the need to build greater trust was paramount among the points raised. He added that peace on the border is the foundation of the India-China relationship. Further, both sides agreed for Special Representatives to meet and discuss further measures aimed at strengthening peace on the border.

After two days of intense discussions the two sides signed eight agreements, on issues ranging from trade to culture and water resources. Of these, economics were the main focus, and with good reason.

According to news reports in 2012, bilateral trade between the two countries was US$66 billion, a decline from the previous year’s US$74 billion. As such, the two countries have set a target of increasing bilateral trade to US$100 billion by 2015. An article in the Indian Express voiced support for the agreements to pursue a regional trade agreement, set up three working groups under the Joint Economic Group, and provide mutual help in developing industrial zones.

Yet, it is not economics but an idea floated by the Chinese Premier that has attracted the attention of observers of international politics.

In his byline and in a speech that he gave on the last day of his New Delhi visit, Li emphasized that for Asia to drive the global economy China and India must come together. Further, he emphasized that the Asian century will not come about if China and India fail to develop harmoniously together.

Is Li’s vision rhetoric or pragmatism? Opinions are divided.

“It is sheer rhetoric and an attempt to move India away from the U.S.,” Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, Program Director of the Aspen Institute India, told The Diplomat. “Beijing is worried that India is being promoted by Washington as a counterbalance to China. They know that the only country that has potential to emerge as a regional power is India.”

Chaudhury added, “The Communist country is very uncertain about India. That’s why it talks about regional cooperation with New Delhi.”

According to Choudhury, Afghanistan is the sole country where it serves the interests of both countries to have political stability.

“Otherwise China is not bothered about our concerns,” he said. “It is supporting Pakistan and arming the Islamic Republic, which it knows to be a source of terrorism in South Asia and a threat to India.”

C Raja Mohan echoes the same sentiment, writing in The Indian Express that “ideological romanticism and political timidity overwhelms common sense in dealing with China… What mattered, and is lying in plain sight, is Beijing’s growing assertiveness on territorial disputes with all its neighbors. In the last few years, China has used military force in pushing its extraordinary territorial claims against Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan.”

While Indian media outlets and experts see a dichotomy between Chinese rhetoric and reality and remain largely skeptical about Beijing’s intentions, in China a different picture has emerged. Chinese media has positively reported on Li’s visit to India.

Quoting the official China Daily, The Hindu writes, “Despite China and India’s arguments about territory issues and trade imbalances, Premier Li Keqiang’s stop in India during his first overseas trip since he took the office has undoubtedly sent a positive and friendly signal.”

On balance, the fact that a Chinese premier chose India as the first destination abroad bodes well for the future relationship of the two neighbors. Viewing a friendly gesture through lenses of paranoia will cloud our vision and hamper growth.

India has become a mature democracy with a robust economy that is an important player on the international stage. The nation’s dealings with its neighbor should confidently reflect this global standing. New Delhi should not allow its evolving relationship with Beijing to be a prisoner of the past.

Jammu and Kashmir have enjoyed relative peace over the last five years. Militancy has declined and normal life has gradually asserted itself. Tourism, a mainstay of the state’s economy, has been on the upswing.

Presiding over this turnaround in India’s most volatile state is Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, the youngest scion of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah’s family, which has been at the forefront of the state’s fight against militancy and the institutionalization of democracy in the region.

Yet, despite successes, Jammu and Kashmir face significant challenges amid regional political developments, from the recent Chinese incursion in the region of Ladakh to the potentially destabilizing withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, scheduled for 2014.

Most recently, Pakistan’s recent elections raise important questions about the stability of Abdullah’s state. Will the new Pakistani government under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif extend its hand in friendship, offering a chance at lasting peace in the Kashmir Valley?

“The fact is that Nawaz Sharif wants to resume the dialogue process,” Abdullah told a group of journalists earlier this week at a conference in New Delhi, attended by The Diplomat. “He wants to invite the Indian Prime Minister to Pakistan. He wants to revive the incomplete peace process that was interrupted after the Kargil war.”

Abdullah was measured with his optimism, however. He continued, “Obviously his position sounds good. Let’s see how the whole thing plays out in the next couple of years. (But) I don't expect much in the next few years.”

As Abdullah explained, many overlook the fact that Pakistan’s elections represent only one side of this dynamic. In 2014, India will also undergo a national leadership transition. At that point, anything could happen.

“India is going to pass through the same grind next year,” Abdullah said. “So clearly expecting any major development or initiative on the Jammu and Kashmir front is expecting too much. However, if we keep talking with each other that itself would be a great feat.”

Further to the west, in Afghanistan, other potential issues loom for Jammu and Kashmir. Many fear that the scheduled withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in 2014 will create a vacuum that terrorist groups could readily fill. This prospect is particularly worrisome for Jammu and Kashmir, which was plagued by terrorism in the 1990s during the Taliban’s rule of the landlocked country. While this fear is understandable, Abdullah has a different view of the matter.

“I might be in a minority here, but I don't believe that there is going to be any significant impact in Jammu and Kashmir after the withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan for a number of reasons,” Abdullah said in response to a question posed by The Diplomat. “I don't believe that security forces are going to leave Afghanistan completely and leave a vacuum there. For a massive influx of militancy into Jammu and Kashmir from Afghanistan after the withdrawal it would require a complete turning of a blind eye to the situation by the international community.”

“The international community knows what happens when the situation flares up in the region,” he continued. “If the withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan means a dramatic reversal of the situation in Kashmir… it would mean that whatever has happened in my state has happened either because of Pakistan or Afghanistan, or because of international troops, which I’m not willing to accept.”

A state besieged from both sides, Jammu and Kashmir has also struggled to secure itself to the east, as seen in the recent incursion by Chinese troops who recently set up tents in the region of Ladakh.

Yet, there is one key differentiating point in the case of China. While the main concern with Afghanistan is security, India’s diplomatic tensions with China carry the possibility of significant economic fallout. One example: tourism.

“Tourism in Ladakh was affected by the recent development, not because the incursion was anywhere near the area, but because of the Indian media reporting about the situation,” Abdullah said. “We need a good relationship between India and China and our Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has conveyed to the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang that peace and tranquility has to be maintained under any circumstances.”

In response to a question about how he would address border disputes with China, he continued, “My message would be to sit down together and work out a mechanism to deal with such situations. No interest is served by this kind of provocation.”

While Abdullah acknowledged the challenges associated with shoring up Jammu and Kashmir’s eastern and western borders, he clearly demarcated the underlying challenges India faces with its two largest neighbors.

“China does not encourage terrorism,” he said. “Comparing our relations with Pakistan and China is like comparing chalk and cheese.”

The U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of 9/11 have increased the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean, transforming the region into a center of geopolitical rivalry. The two wars accelerated what was already a trend: South Asia, a relative backwater during the Cold War era, had begun to gain in prominence, a reflection of persistent regional instabilities.

The war in Afghanistan forced the West to rethink its geopolitical priorities, with an increased presence in the Indian Ocean. Western powers re-formulated their policies, understanding the need to reset relations and form new strategic partnerships with littoral states.

Most important has been the relationship between India and the U.S., which has experienced dramatic fluctuations since the outset of the Afghanistan conflict.

Before that, though, the post-Cold War approach to links between Delhi and Washington was crystallized when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government delineated India’s relationship with America on the eve of President Clinton’s visit to India in 2000. The Indian government’s response was received favorably and India was accommodated in U.S. policies, as illustrated in the 2002 US National Security Strategy.

According to that document, “The Administration sees India’s potential to become one of the great democratic powers of the twenty-first century and has worked hard to transform our relationship accordingly.”

It goes on to say, “The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that U.S. interests require a strong relationship with India.”

Another element in bilateral relations was formed with the The Defence Policy Group in 1996, charged with reviewing and developing bilateral approaches within the defense policy parcel. After 9/11, the Group was revived and modified once America removed the sanctions it had earlier imposed against India.

Indo-U.S. defense co-operation has a history. During the first Gulf War, India provided refueling facilities to American warplanes. What has occurred, though, is a rapid reconfiguration of power that has radically modified the geo-political equilibrium in the Indian Ocean, in favor of the U.S. And so, in the aftermath of 9/11, India was one of the first countries to offer its support for the Afghan invasion, deploying its warships for escort duties in the Straits of Malacca.

Increasingly, America has shown a keen interest in the internal politics of the countries in this region. Take Sri Lanka, an island nation in the middle of the Indian Ocean, which lies six nautical miles from four major ocean routes that link the Western Pacific to the Western Indian Ocean via the strategically important South China Sea and Straits of Malacca. It’s no surprise that Sri Lanka’s internal politics are of interest to several outside powers.

In March, India voted against Sri Lanka in favor of a U.S.-sponsored resolution at the UN Human Rights Council on the Tamil issue. The wisdom of that decision is up for debate. Traditionally, Sri Lanka’s lengthy conflict had played out in a sub-continental context, within which India has sought to play a significant and positive role, shaping and influencing the regional balance. In the broader sense, the Sri Lanka conflict mirrored the prevailing strategic tensions between regional and international  powers. The struggle of the Tamils was a lever, which could be manipulated to keep Sri Lanka from aligning itself with the West.

Thus, India’s geopolitical ambitions in the 1980s remained limited to securing its national interests. That calculation meant it acted as a buffer between Colombo’s oppressive military and long-standing Tamil national aspirations, indirectly protecting the democratic rights of the Tamil people.

The post-Cold War “unipolar moment” changed the strategic environment. The power shifts in the Indian Ocean has brought a growing convergence of interests between India and America and has neutered the previous power balance. The new alliances and reorientation reflect Delhi’s realization that if it wants the ability to counter Chinese influence in the region and project power beyond traditional strategic boundaries it needs American support.

But India cannot leave itself wholly reliant on the U.S., which after all is going to pursue its own interests, as underscored by a recent piece in The New York Times, which describes a secret deal signed between Pakistan’s ISI and CIA in 2004. Under the deal, Pakistan allowed American drone strikes on its soil on the condition that the unmanned aircraft would stay away from its nuclear facilities and the mountain camps where Kashmiri militants are trained for attacks on India. It’s a classic example of how the U.S. and its agencies at times work in their own interests, even when that might be contrary to the interests of allies.

Another example: after very considerable pressure from Washington, India's former energy minister R.P.N. Singh announced that India would reduce oil imports from Iran by 11%. Yet India remains heavily reliant on Iran for oil.  Thankfully, after many delays and glitches, India and Iran have finally agreed to draw up a transit pact, which would enable goods to reach Central Asia through Iran. The Indian Cabinet has meanwhile announced it will invest over $100 million in the expansion of Iran’s Chabahar port, which could act as a hub for the new transit arrangement and enhance the trade prospects with both countries.

Like the West, India has its own strategic and economic interests. Even as it engages with the U.S. on strategic and geopolitical matters, it should secure those interests.

The U.S. has unsuccessfully tried to undermine the Islamic Republic for decades. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is gradually doing the job himself.

Indeed, yesterday’s disqualification of Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as presidential candidates is just the latest manifestation of three interrelated trends involving Khamenei’s tenure as Supreme Leader, which collectively undermine key tenets of Ruhollah Khomeini’s Islamic Republic. Although it is likely to persist for years and even decades to come, when the history of the Islamic Republic is finally written, these trends will be seen as crucial turning points.

The first trend is the marginalization of elections. Although Westerners tend to emphasize the Islamic component of the Islamic Republic, most Iranians hold the Republican aspect as equally important. This is evident from, among other things, the traditionally high voter turnout, from a relative low at nearly 60 percent in the 2005 presidential election, to a considerably higher figure upwards of 85 percent in 2009. Even some parliamentary elections, such as those in 2000, saw voter turnout around 80 percent. By contrast, turnout in U.S. presidential elections hasn’t topped 60 percent since 1968.

Voting was also integral to Khomeini’s concept of an Islamic Republic. Not only was there much less electroral meddling under his leadership; he also held referendums to approve the Islamic Republic and initial constitution.

Although Iran will continue to hold elections, unlike most of its neighbors, the votes are becoming much less representative of the Iranian people. This is principally a reflection of the politicization of the Guardian Council under Khamenei, a process that began almost immediately after Khamenei assumed the Supreme Leadership, when he and Rafsanjani used the Guardian Council to eliminate their rivals in the leftist Radical faction. Khamenei would later revive the tactic to undercut the Reformists and, if yesterday is any indication, has only grown more reliant on it over time. As Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted wryly, “[It is] increasingly looking like Iran's presidential election will be one man, one vote. That one man's name is Ayatollah Khamenei.”

The second related trend is the marginalization of the Iranian elite. Although Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers in the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) purged other anti-Shah groups, this still left a relatively diverse group of elites representing different segments of the body politic. This was deliberate. At any one time Khomeini would lend his authority to the weakest faction to protect it.

Lacking the personal authority of his predecessor, Khamenei has always been much less tolerant of different factions and, as noted above, at times has played an active role in purging them. This tendency has only accelerated since the 2009 election as Khamenei has sought to marginalize large swaths of the Reformists, Rafsanjani, and Ahmadinejad.

The primary danger in this, as any student of revolution knows, is that disillusioned elites – those who feel the system isn’t open for their participation – are a key component of successful political and social movements. The more disillusioned elites there are within a society, the more potential revolutionary leaders there are waiting in the wings. This was inherently understood by Khomeini as well as by the Communist Party of China who, under President Jiang Zemin, began opening up the party to the economic elites that Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” policies had created. Iranian leaders should be troubled by the fact that their system has become open to a diminishing number of elites over time.

Besides alienating the elites themselves, their marginalization also leaves large segments of the population with the sense that they are not being represented in the political system. This is almost certainly occurring in Iran already, as the marginalization of the Reformists is likely to alienate the upper-class “Westernized” Iranians concentrated in northern Tehran, whereas fully undermining Ahmadinejad risks alienating rural and working class Iranians.

Meanwhile, Rafsanjani gave voice to parts of the business community—including some of the Bazaris—as well as certain clerics in Qom (other clerics also support the Reformists). Notably, both of these groups are already having their interests challenged by the growing economic and political clout of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.

Additionally, it’s not at all clear to what extent Khamenei and his inner circle benefit from these purges. Time and again the purge of one faction or group from the Islamic Republic has simply prompted the remaining groups to turn on each other. Thus, after Khamenei and Rafsanjani collaborated in ousting the Radical faction, they quickly turned to undermining each other. Similarly, no sooner had Khamenei successfully undermined the Green Party leaders and Rafsanjani in late 2010 and early 2011 that he quickly found himself locked in a bitter power struggle with Ahmadinejad.

Once the remaining conservatives and principlists are no longer united in their opposition to Ahmadinejad, subtle divisions between them are likely to become increasingly consequential. In other words, Khamenei’s dream of a pliant elite is almost certain to remain elusive, particularly if Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf emerges victorious at next month’s poll. 

The third and final trend undermining the Islamic Republic is the politicization of the Supreme Leadership as an institution. Although Khomeini’s pre-revolutionary speeches and writings suggested an all-powerful Marja ruler, as Supreme Leader he tried to stay “above the fray” of day-to-day politics, or at least gave that public impression.

He was smart to do so. Politics are by nature divisive and entering the fray creates far more enemies and critics than supporters. American politics is instructive, as presidents rarely leave office as popular as they were when first elected. Similarly, the political scientists Robert Putnam and David Campbell find that as Christianity has taken on a greater prominence in U.S. politics since the 1970s, Americans – particularly those growing up after the 1970s –  have come to hold it in less regard. The religion didn’t fundamentally change during that time, of course, but Americans began associating it with partisan politics instead of with morality or theology.

Just as America’s Founding Fathers sought to separate religion and politics to protect the sanctity of the former, Khomeini protected the Supreme Leader (and through it, the Islamic Republic) by separating himself from the elected leaders who handled day-to-day governance. Thus, when people opposed government policies and became disgusted by politics, they would direct their anger towards elected politicians instead of the Supreme Leader. This is what mostly occurred in the initial unrest following the 2009 presidential election, when the overwhelming majority of protesters demanded a new vote and Ahmadinejad’s ouster, not an overthrow of the system or Khamenei’s dismissal.

The more Khamenei reduces the autonomy of the elected leaders and intervenes directly in politics, the more he’ll have to answer to the people directly next time around. 

Zachary Keck (@ZacharyKeck) is Assistant Editor of The Diplomat.

The children in the video look to be as young as 6. They are shown firing handguns, AK-47 assault rifles and machine guns at what appears to be a training camp. For Pakistan, the video may well prove a major headache, as the camp is apparently located in the volatile North Waziristan tribal area of the country, but is operated by a Chinese rebel force known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), or the Turkestan Islamic Party.

The ETIM is an extremist movement mostly active in the Xinjiang province at the Pakistan-China border. The video bears striking similarities to the training videos released by Jehadi groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Fidayeen-e-Islam (FI), with a visible black Taliban Flag and the light blue Turkestan Islamic Party's banner in the background. With a newly elected government, Islamabad has still not announced any strategy to tackle the alarming turn of events that could conceivably lead to a breach in its relations with China.

Formally founded in 1997, the ETIM is a separatist movement with a goal of liberating Xinjiang from what it calls China's colonial occupation, establishing the East Turkestan autonomous state and installing an Islamic caliphate. Bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan, Xinjiang is a strategically important province with about 45% percent of its people belonging to the Turkic-speaking Uyghur Muslim ethnic community. Although several separatist and extremist factions operate in the province, ETIM has been the most effective and the most widely condemned over its terrorist activities. Its members range across Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan, and operate from sanctuaries mostly dotted across the war-torn Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The movement operates at two levels, with one solely dedicated to Xinjiang's liberation from China and the other providing assistance to Al-Qaeda and similar Jehadi groups in the region.

The video is the first evidence of long-time Chinese claims that such training camps are active in the tribal areas of Pakistan. What complicates the situation are Pakistan’s strong relations with China. Pakistan's reaction to the video has not been made official by the authorities but it is expected to be supportive of China’s position. China has long been criticized by the international community, especially human rights organizations in the U.S., over alleged human rights violations and abuses of Muslims in the Xinjiang province. Pakistan has been silent on the claims, despite being not only a majority Muslim state but also a long-time U.S. ally in the so-called War on Terror. With the Pakistan military already operating in the Waziristan areas at the behest of the U.S., a China-backed initiative cannot be ruled out as a possible solution for Pakistan.

Different sources have claimed that ETIM has had links with Al-Qaeda, Osama bin laden and the Taliban, including training and financial assistance for ETIM members in Xinjiang. In fact, the U.S. State Department has said the movement has not only received training and financial assistance from Al-Qaeda, but its operatives have fought in the ranks of Al-Qaeda against the United States in Operation Enduring Freedom. According to reports, 22 Uyghur militants were captured by the US marines in Afghanistan in 2006, and were held at Guantanamo for possible ties with Al-Qaeda. In 2002, a Chinese government study also found that ETIM was receiving weapons, money and support from Al-Qaeda.

The name ETIM became a little too familiar to intelligence agencies in Pakistan and China after the 2011 Kashgar attacks. The series of knife and bomb attacks by Uyghur men in the city of Kashgar on July 30 and 31, 2011 left at least 20 dead and several injured. The 5 attackers detained by the police confessed ties to ETIM. In a major blow to Sino-Pakistan relations, the city government announced that a probe revealed the attackers were trained in Pakistan. Earlier, in 2007, ETIM had claimed responsibility for the shooting of Chinese nationals in the Balochistan province of Pakistan. ETIM has also claimed responsibility for several bus bombings in Kunming and an attempted plane hijacking in Urumqi. And bomb plots have been foiled in Dubai and Norway, suggesting an increasingly international reach.

Surprisingly, the U.S. has been careful about choosing sides over the ETIM issue. The State Department did not hesitate to put ETIM on its terrorist list, and yet managed to retain a studied neutrality on the Uyghurs autonomous Eastern Turkestan cause. The 22 Uyghur militants captured in Afghanistan were subsequently reclassified as No Longer Enemy Combatants and were ordered by a panel of judges to be released. Some of these detainees have been transferred to Palau and Bermuda. despite criticism by the U.K.

Another interesting aspect is the World Uyghur Congress, an international organization working for the rights of Uyghurs within and outside Xinjiang. Criticized by China as a legal cover to illegal ETIM activities, the congress is financially supported by the National Endowment of Democracy (NED) in the U.S., which is a nonprofit organization supported by the U.S. government's United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The ETIM issue is a challenge for both China and Pakistan. If tackled correctly it could take bilateral relations to a new level. But even a slight miscalculation could prove devastating for both countries and the regional resolve against terrorism.

Malik Ayub Sumbal is an award-winning journalist based in Islamabad. 

Three young Pakistanis – Qasim Aslam, Ayyaz Ahmad and Zoya Siddiqui – are providing schoolchildren in India and Pakistan with an opportunity to critically analyze, evaluate and question significant events in their nations’ shared history and heritage.

The History Project, comprising excerpts from three Indian textbooks and nine Pakistani textbooks, provides students an illuminating comparison of the ways that key historical events – leading up to partition – are taught in schools in both countries. 

Last month, Aslam, Ahmad and Siddiqui visited four schools in Mumbai – officially launching The History Project in India. Next month, the trio plans to introduce the project to schools across Pakistan, in the hope that it will spark healthy debate, underpinned by curiosity, impartiality, and an open-minded look at the tumultuous epoch that is India and Pakistan’s shared history.  

According to Aslam, the inspiration for The History Project came in 2005 from Feruzan Mehta, the then Country Director (India) for Seeds of Peace, an international NGO that seeks to inspire and train new leaders from conflict zones to build a more peaceful future. The inspiration grew in the ensuing years, and Aslam and Ahmad finally decided to make their shared dream a reality two years ago.

In an exclusive interview with The Diplomat, the founders of The History Project speak about the laborious process that went into the compilation of the book, the importance of a solid artistic element to complement the book and their experience of formally introducing their project to children in India last month.

What inspired you to undertake The History Project?

Qasim Aslam: It informally started off around 12 years ago when we met Indians across the border for the first time in our lives. We were at this conflict resolution camp [Seeds of Peace, hosted in Maine, USA], where a dozen Indians and Pakistanis were brought to live together for three weeks.

Over the course of that time, in addition to playing sports and indulging in other activities together, we found history to be a recurring discussion in our interaction. In some cases, the conversations resulted in flared emotions. Over those three weeks, we didn't quite reconcile our versions of history, but we did find it in ourselves to respect the alternative reality, its existence, and the fact that it was as authentic as ours. 

In an effort to scale this process, as it is super expensive to fly a couple dozen kids from the region to the U.S., we came up with the concept of The History Project; which, in essence, is taking the process to the kids themselves. 

Was compiling the book a difficult process?

Qasim Aslam: In retrospect, it was. It definitely was. We probably underestimated the task at hand when we set out to accomplish it. The first few months, we went around from expert to expert, trying to finalize the direction of the project. Everyone seemed to have an opinion – a legit, daunting contribution that sent us back to the drawing board more than once. 

We finally reached a conclusion after four months of extensive deliberations. Mid-way through the project, we realized that we couldn’t put out a book in pure text. We'd lose the interest of our target readership, kids between the ages of 12 and 15. The prospect of finding a decent illustrator turned out to be a journey in its own. 

And then came the grand finale of selling such an idea to the Indian High Commission for the purpose of visas, coordinating with schools across the border and a dozen other hoops that somehow got sorted out and we found ourselves in Mumbai one fine Monday morning in April this year.

Zoya, as the illustrator, tell us a little about the artistic element of the book. What did you visualize initially for the book and what did you think would work for your audience?

Zoya Siddiqui: I knew from the very beginning that the task would not be easy. An illustrator’s job is to very clearly show and reaffirm an opinion, whereas our idea for the whole project was to refrain from propagating our personal opinions and simply reproducing what information already exists in textbooks/history. The idea of a faceless man immediately struck as the solution to the problem.

The faceless man essentially depicts what we, the team, are doing: displaying established opinions as clothes or symbols that can be easily adopted, worn and shed. The faceless man has no symbols or opinions of his own, but he theatrically demonstrates both histories. History is thus shown not as absolute truth or “fact”, but rather as variable opinions and stereotypes. The truth is unknowable, like the faceless man.

Do you think children in Pakistan and India will be able to formulate their own opinions about their shared history after reading the book?

Zoya Siddiqui: Actually, we have not aimed for the children to formulate an opinion on Indo-Pakistani history when they read the book. Our goal is to trigger a thought process, to unsettle the students and confuse them, which is somewhat like what we went through after our Seeds of Peace camp experience. Even after all these years, we ourselves are struggling for answers.

However, the struggle is good, important and healthy. Having answers and well-formulated opinions, I personally believe, is dangerous. We wish for the students to get started on that journey to critical thinking, beyond textbooks.

Ayyaz, you and your team visited four schools in Mumbai last month. What was the response?

Ayyaz Ahmad: The response was phenomenal. The children and the teachers both were extremely interested to know and understand the Pakistani perspective. They also had a number of questions about Pakistan beyond the scope of history. They were quite curious about how Indian history was viewed in Pakistan and also about the cultural similarities between the two countries.

How did you go about contacting schools in India to introduce the book? Were they initially hesitant? 

Ayyaz Ahmad: In India, Seeds of Peace put us in touch with the local schools. In Pakistan, we are reaching out to different schools through friends involved with educational institutions.

When will you introduce the book to schools in Pakistan? 

Ayyaz Ahmad: We have already started a round of presentations in Pakistan. In the next month, we hope to visit a number of schools to introduce the initiative.

Through your research, what were some of the major discrepancies that you found in the textbooks? 

Ayyaz Ahmad: The primary difference is in the way different aspects of the same event are highlighted. This also became our focus as we worked on the book. The idea was that instead of imposing another narrative or our opinion, we would simply lay out what has already been written, to show that history is extremely dynamic and is a combination of numerous perspectives.

What do you hope your initiative achieves?

Ayyaz Ahmad: The History Project initiative has a two-fold objective; first, to enable the youth in conflict-stricken countries to have access to the other side of conflict history in their formative years. And second, to get youth to question the generally accepted stereotypes (not just pertaining to history) which form the foundation of their ideologies. We hope that the books will instill in the youth, the importance of recognizing alternative perspectives; that there is always another side to every story.

Sonya Rehman is a journalist based in Lahore, Pakistan. She can be reached at: sonjarehman@gmail.com.

Last month, well-known Pakistani pop star, Shehzad Roy made an appearance at Harvard to talk about music, activism and his new documentary series, Chal Parha (Urdu for: Come, Teach), which highlights the extensive issues plaguing Pakistan’s education system.

Having visited over 200 schools across the country, in an interview with DAWN, Roy stated: “In each episode we highlight an issue from public schools, for example, corporal punishment, medium of instruction, population, textbooks, curriculum, teachers.”

He added, “I want to share the lessons that we have learnt; both good and ugly. We want people to know the obstacles standing in the way of improving the structure of education in government schools while also highlighting the remarkable individuals committed to the teaching profession. These people prove the power of individual efforts.”

Broadcast on a local television channel, GEO TV, the show  has gained immense popularity, fast making an impact in a country where, according to the non-profit Alif Ailaan, the government spends just 2.4 percent of its national GDP on education and where just over half of children enroll in primary school.

Mariam Chughtai, the founder of Harvard’s Pakistan Student Group told The Diplomat that the singer was invited primarily because the student group “is committed to changing the discourse on Pakistan at Harvard from one of terrorism and challenges, to that of resilience, art and social change.”

“[Roy] embodied for us an activist who is using music to make an impact on the ground, which is why his discussants, Professor Ali Asani and I were able to have a conversation with him in light of how artists have historically played a key role in keeping governments and rulers accountable,” Chughtai said.

“Roy himself spoke of the main learnings he has had in his journey of Chal Parha, including clippings from his show which illustrated these learnings. They represented both strengths and weaknesses of society in being ready for change on education.”

Alongside his music career, which, over the past couple of years, has veered sharply into the direction of socio-political commentary, Roy has managed to rather successfully integrate both his music and humanitarian work.

Having launched Zindagi Trust, an NGO that focuses primarily on education for the underprivileged in Pakistan, in 2003, Roy made headlines in local and foreign media when the musician brought Bryan Adams to Pakistan in 2006 as part of Roy’s Rock for a Cause charity concert in the wake of the tragic earthquake that killed thousands and left many homeless in Pakistan.

Apart from raising awareness about the appalling condition of public schools in the country, Roy also hopes to bring about considerable, tangible, and long-lasting change within the national education system itself.

Roy told Dawn, “We have installed thumb-printing attendance machines in the five provinces to bring transparency to the issue of teacher absenteeism. We are now collecting this data and are happy to report that teacher attendance has increased considerably in these schools. Similarly, in the episode on corporal punishment, we are proposing a law banning physical abuse in schools and we plan to diligently pursue this issue in the media.”

The particular episode on corporal punishment that Roy mentioned features a young girl, Malaika, whose eye was damaged after her teacher threw a pen at her for not paying attention in class.

The episode prompted the approval of a bill on corporal punishment by the National Assembly in March that prohibits the physical abuse of children in educational institutions in Pakistan. Once the bill becomes law, an individual found guilty of administering corporal punishment in an educational institution in the country will be liable to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000, serve a one-year prison sentence, or both. 

Given the state of public school education in Pakistan today, there is hope that Roy’s high-impact initiative will act as a much-needed impetus for change and reform of the country’s education emergency.

Sonya Rehman is a journalist based in Lahore, Pakistan. She can be reached at: sonjarehman@gmail.com.

Now that we know Nawaz Sharif will succeed Raja Pervez Ashraf as the next prime minster of Pakistan, it’s worth noting that Pakistan has never seen a democratic transition as smooth as the one set to take place between the outgoing Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the newly elected Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, or PML(N).

In its 66-year history as an independent nation, Pakistan has witnessed three military coups and extended rule by army generals. Even today, the nation is plagued by political turmoil. But this year seems to be a new chapter in its turbulent history.

The verdict from the 2013 elections gives the PML(N) 123 seats out of 254 declared results as of Tuesday evening, giving Sharif’s party an unassailable lead over its main rivals, PPP and Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, which had secured 31 and 26 seats, respectively. The electoral results for the final 18 of Pakistan’s 272 National Assembly seats remain unannounced.

The voter turnout this year was impressive, with 60 percent of all registered voters turning up to the polls, up from a 45 percent turnout in the last national elections in 2008. This impressive turnout came despite the threat of violence. More than 150 people lost their lives and scores were injured in attacks by insurgents across the country during the election campaigning period and on election day. This brave statement by the people of Pakistan sends a new message to the outside world and gives hope for peace on the Subcontinent.

In particular, India has a stake in the democratic success of its neighbor, with whom relations have been turbulent. There is widespread hope in India that Sharif, who formed a new Indo-Pakistani relationship in the 1990s, will revive the peace process and improve Islamabad’s ties with New Delhi.

Indian Prime minister Manmohan Singh was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Sharif after his emphatic victory. In a letter, Singh talked about charting a new course for the relationship between the two countries and invited his Pakistan counterpart to visit India.

Sharif reciprocated and emphasized the need for improved relations with India. He further stressed the importance of resolving issues, including Kashmir, through peaceful means. He even informally invited the Indian premier to his inauguration ceremony in Islamabad.

According to veteran Pakistani author and political analyst Ahmed Rashid, circumstances may be more favorable this time for Sharif to improve ties with New Delhi. He writes, “During his two premierships in the 1990s, Sharif made genuine efforts at peace with India but was thwarted by an aggressive and uncompromising army.” But, he continues, “The army—faced with a severe weakening of the state—now seems more amenable to improving relations with New Delhi.”

The Hindu opines that where Sharif “gives most hope is in his strong and unambiguous articulation of better India-Pakistan relations, though this will depend on his stated determination to correct the civil-military imbalance, and reclaim the national agenda from the security establishment. Whether he can succeed is another question, but India will be hoping he will.”

As Pakistan passes through a rough economic patch, deeper engagement with its immediate neighbor will not only give the volatile country increased political stability but will also boost growth. India can play a major role in reviving Pakistan's bankrupt economy as a potential investor.

According to an article published by the New Delhi-based think tank Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), trade between the two South Asian countries could receive renewed impetus under the new regime, barring complications from opposition by the religious right. However, the IDSA article also notes that “one should not expect a lot of change in policies related to terrorism targeted at India or its aversion to India’s presence in Afghanistan.”

Despite skepticism, there is a general mood of optimism in India about the regime change in Pakistan. Just a couple of weeks ago Indian media was full of anti-Pakistan stories in the wake of the attack on Indian prisoner Sarabjit Singh in a Pakistani jail. While most Indian reports were full of jingoism in their coverage of the death of Singh, the election has changed the tone of the discourse.

The optimism stems from Sharif’s earlier initiatives in the 1990s to deepen ties with India. In 1999, he started a bus service that runs between Lahore and New Delhi. Then Indian PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Pakistan in the inaugural bus ride. This bonhomie, however, was short-lived. Later that year hostilities erupted between the two nations at the Kargil sector, when the Pakistani army crossed the Line of Control under the leadership of former military ruler Pervez Musharraf.

The new leadership in Pakistan has a very tough job at hand: alleviate the deep-seated historical fear and mistrust between the two countries.

Likewise, India will have to show maturity in understanding the changing mood and aspirations of the people of Pakistan.

New Delhi needs to recognize that never before has there been such an overwhelming consensus for Pakistan to normalize relations with India. If the leaderships of both countries work hard to tap this desire, they may be able to usher in a new era of peace and progress on the Subcontinent.