On June 15, 2006, during the 60th anniversary celebrations for the accession of King Bhumibol Adulyadej to the throne, some 40 government buildings were bombed, resulting in two deaths. The bombs were many and the death toll surprisingly low. The bombs reportedly contained just a small amount of explosives, prompting analysts to suggest that they were designed more to send a message to authorities than to cause widespread carnage.
Then in November 2006 – two months after Thaksin was ousted – Wan Kadir Che Wan leader of Bersatu, an umbrella organization for a myriad of southern separatist groups, announced that JI was helping local insurgents stage attacks in Thailand.
That declaration took the fight in the south to another level, which went largely ignored in Bangkok by successive governments as political convulsions bought on by clashes between the largely rural-based Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts of the mainly urban middle classes monopolized national attention.Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.
Gavin Greenwood, a risk assessment analyst with Hong Kong-based Allan & Associates, says Thai authorities have ignored the south at their peril, and the end of March bombings targeting Thai and ethnic Chinese business interests signaled another new phase in the southern insurgency.
“The attacks demonstrated capacity and ruthlessness,” he says, adding that Thai security forces and government agencies are divided by a multitude of differing loyalties, animosities and agendas and have been “exceptionally inept in their efforts” to manage or contain the insurgency – let alone bring the insurgency under control.
“This failure to either exert leverage on the insurgents through the use of force or the Thai government’s seeming inability to negotiate a settlement may well have led the separatists to conclude that they must step up pressure if they are to even begin the process of gaining a degree of autonomy.”
His sentiments are supported by Loveard, who adds that only Bangkok has the power to find a solution that will require some form of regional autonomy for the southern provinces, considered an anathema by many forces in the capital, in particular the military.
Like the bombs detonated during the monarch’s anniversary in 2006, the March attacks could signal a change in strategy and a shift from Thai school teachers, Chinese business interest and poorly equipped rangers who have borne the brunt of the strikes since 2004 alongside local Muslims, whose deaths are seen more as collateral damage by the shadowy insurgents.
The southern way of life has changed remarkably since January 2004 as is evident on the streets of Hat Yai, a provincial town of about 160,000 people where security is tight, queues form and delays are inevitable as security guards check suspicious cars. Parts of town are fenced off by intimidating soldiers; the streets are quiet at night.
The scene is reminiscent of Belfast in the early 1980s.
“What may come next is a direct attack on key economic targets close to the southern Muslim majority provinces,” Greenwood says. “It would take very little effort to extend the present campaign into such tourist-dependent regions as the area around Phuket.”
“Foreign, Western or East Asian casualties, would instantly internationalize the insurgency, cause an immediate fall in tourist revenue and profoundly embarrass the government,” he adds.
“This has presumably long remained the ‘nuclear option’ for the insurgents and the Yala attacks – which by early-June hadn’t been repeated – may well have served a reminder of what such a attack could look like at a busy beach resort at the height of the tourist season.”
If such a tragic scenario unfolds then the era of terrorism in Southeast Asia as defined by the first decade of the 21st century may not be over as many, including this author, would like to think. Instead, it would simply have shifted – and in places like Hat Yai – that’s not what anybody wants to hear.