You recently penned a piece in The Diplomat discussing the likely rise of Xi Jinping as the new leader of China. Many articles have speculated on what he may or may not do. While you were very clear that much is unknown about his motives and policy goals, what things would you say Xi should not do? Is there anything in your view that would be a clear mistake for China’s future?
Instead of saying what I think Xi Jinping should and should not do, I will highlight a few areas that would be very problematic for Xi to ignore. First, although “reform” is sometimes considered a dirty word in China, it would really behoove Xi and the fifth generation leadership to pay more attention to the desires of the Chinese people. For example, a recently released Global Times survey suggests that “81.4 percent of respondents said they support political reform in China and 69.7 percent of the respondents said they felt that gradual reform is good for the country.” How this political reform may manifest itself is up to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); however, it cannot afford to ignore this sort of popular sentiment – losing the support of the people would eat away at the core of its authority.
In this same vein, Xi Jinping should also broaden and deepen China’s commitment to welfare policies including increased coverage of social assistance, social pension insurance, social health insurance, and job injury insurance. The unequal development that China has experienced and the widening gap between the rich and the poor will lead to greater social unrest and instability if not addressed soon.
Finally, I believe that Xi should rethink some of China’s foreign policy decisions. For decades China has expressed a desire to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region so that it can continue to focus on its own economic development. However, provocations over the past several years with its neighbors in Southeast and Northeast Asia have led many to fear that China’s “rise” might not be entirely “peaceful.” Obviously it takes two (and in this case sometimes three and four) to tango, but I believe that China should think very carefully about how its actions reflect on the country as a whole and how they affect its security environment.
President Obama has won re-election. In his second term, what policy objectives and goals do you see him pushing forward in the Asia-Pacific? Do you see the pivot continuing in its present form? Secretary Hillary Clinton, one of the pivot’s top advocates, has also made it clear she is leaving the administration. Will this have any effect in your view on Asia-Pacific policy?
I believe that President Obama has, by and large, done an excellent job when it comes to his Asia-Pacific policy and will continue to build on these first-term success stories in his second-term. Putting the “pivot” or “rebalance” aside for a moment, Obama in conjunction with people like Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, and a host of other dedicated and talented Asia-hands, have done a yeoman’s job of strengthening our ties with what is arguably the most dynamic region in the world. For example, under this administration KORUS was signed, the decision was made to participate in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, the United States finally signed on to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with the ASEAN members, Secretary Clinton’s first trip as Secretary of State was to Asia, instead of the usual Europe, reflecting the region’s growing importance, and she was also the first Secretary of State to visit Burma since John Foster Dulles in 1955. The list of accomplishments could, literally, go on and on.
Of course one of the main stories of this year has been the administration’s “rebalance to Asia.” This has been much discussed (and sometimes criticized) both at home and abroad with different camps claiming that it is either “too little too late,” or that it has been “flat-footed,” or that it is “more slogan than substance.” There may be some truth to some of these criticisms, but at the end of the day, I believe that a second-term Obama administration will continue to push the “rebalance” ahead. It is a whole-of-government strategy which means that the United States will not just enhance its military presence in the region, but also its economic and diplomatic activities as well. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter put it, the rebalance is “about a peaceful Asia-Pacific region, where sovereign states can enjoy the benefit of security and continue to prosper.” No matter who spearheads Asia-Pacific policy during these next four years, I would be hard-pressed to imagine that they would not share a similar commitment to this goal.
In your view, what is the greatest challenge China’s leaders face going forward? Economic? Political Social? International tensions?
Unfortunately, China’s leaders truly face a myriad of complex and interconnected problems which tend to feed off one another. However, if I had to pick just one challenge, it would probably have to be economic because this will also greatly impact China’s social and international tensions. Xi will be taking the reins at a time when the Chinese economy is starting to sputter, and he will have to help his country transition from an export-oriented economy to one that is driven more by domestic consumption. Couple this, as I mentioned earlier, with a widening gulf between the “haves” and the “have nots” and demographic trends which are far from favorable, and we the possibility of a China that will grow old before it gets rich. This means that the government will also need to find a way to pay for a social safety net or risk massive social instability.
The future and destiny of the Party and the regime depends on the popular support of the masses – if China’s future leaders are unable to address people’s economic concerns, it may not be able to count on the people’s support in the future.
What are the implications of Jiang Zemin’s reappearance in recent weeks?
Everyone is familiar with the phrase “gone but not forgotten.” When it comes to China’s former leaders the phrase should perhaps read more like “not ever really gone and impossible to ignore.” Jiang Zemin, like Deng Xiaoping before him, has been instrumental in this current leadership transition and will undoubtedly have a hand in selecting the 6th generation leaders. It is widely known that he has expressed dissatisfaction and frustration with the Hu-Wen regime, and though just last year he was said to be either near death, or in some cases was reported as having died, he has been working behind the scenes to help shape policy, and to ensure that his protégés, like Xi Jinping, will be well represented on the Standing Committee. This might also be a harbinger of things to come. For example, Jiang Zemin has always been a champion of market-oriented economic policies, which have slowed under Hu Jintao. Perhaps with more Jiang loyalists in seats of power, these policies might again pick up steam.
On the other hand, the fact that Jiang was so easily able to reinsert himself into Party affairs shows the important role factions and factional allegiances play within the CCP. In my opinion, that an 86-year old former patriarch of the Party is able to wield so much power ten years after leaving office means that personality politics are far from over and that China’s political system suffers from some very fundamental weaknesses.
Bo Xilai was recently formerly expelled from the Communist Party. What lessons do you think the party learned from the ordeal? Will it affect China’s leadership transition, which is currently underway?
The fact that corruption has been a blight on the CCP should come as a surprise to no one, and each successive leader of China has railed against its insidiousness. In fact, during the opening of the 18th Party Congress President Hu Jintao warned that the failure to deal with corruption could be the CCP’s undoing. However, Bo Xilai’s political “purge” is nothing necessarily new. Beginning in the Maoist era, purges have been a popular way to quickly dispatch of an “enemy of the state” or political rival. Former high-ranking officials such as Chen Xitong and Chen Liangyu also fell from grace on charges of corruption, though both Chens (like Bo) also had the reputation of being “tall poppies.” Not only were all of these leaders seen as potential rivals who had the potential to generate political instability, but through their purges, the Party showed the Chinese people that its leaders were serious about cracking down on corruption. The major difference between the Bo case and these earlier manifestations was, of course, how widely covered the scandal was both at home and abroad; and the fact that it seemed to have a number of moving parts – lest we forget that Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai, was convicted of murdering the British businessman, Neil Heywood.
With all this being said, I don’t feel as if it will have a significant affect on the current leadership transition. Obviously, prior to this year’s scandal, Bo Xilai was one of the CCP’s rising stars and was widely thought to be on track to receive one of the top spots on the Politburo’s Standing Committee. However, the fact that they purged him so quickly shows that the CCP very much wanted to put this case behind it so that the focus could remain on the 18th Party Congress and the leadership transition without having the Bo Xilai scandal hanging over everyone’s heads.