On April 21, Beijing hosted a quietly monumental event: China’s inaugural 2+2 dialogue at the ministerial level, bringing together its foreign and defense ministers with their Indonesian counterparts. This is more than a diplomatic debut. It represents a symbolic reorientation of Chinese foreign policy, marking a cautious but calculated entry into a strategic format long considered a Western construct.
The 2+2 mechanism – pairing foreign and defense ministers in joint dialogue – originated in NATO’s Cold War practices and has since become a signature tool of U.S. strategic coordination. Today, the United States maintains around a dozen such dialogues with key allies and partners like Japan, India, and Australia. These meetings are not mere protocol; they institutionalize high-level defense and diplomatic coordination, sending strong signals of alignment and intent.
China, by contrast, has traditionally avoided this format. Guided by its doctrine of non-alignment and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, Beijing has preferred bilateral summits, economic forums, and political dialogues devoid of overt defense components. This makes the 2+2 with Indonesia not only China’s first – but a significant departure from its diplomatic orthodoxy.
Credit for initiating the shift goes to Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, who proposed the mechanism during his July 2023 visit to China. As a seasoned defense figure with experienced engagement with Western institutions, Prabowo recognized the 2+2 format’s value: a framework for integrated engagement that simultaneously elevates security dialogue and maintains regional balance. For Indonesia, this dialogue welcomes greater Chinese involvement while reinforcing its “free and active” foreign policy posture.
But this 2+2 bears important distinctions from Western models. In the Chinese political hierarchy, Foreign Minister Wang Yi is far more senior than Defense Minister Dong Jun, especially in the current context of the two ministerial roles. Wang is a member of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo and director of the party’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission – a position akin to a national security adviser with vice premier status. Dong, by contrast, holds a standard ministerial role without broader party or Central Military Commission appointments. This internal asymmetry reinforces the notion that the 2+2, for China, is primarily a diplomatic and strategic gesture rather than a military integration tool.
Its symbolic weight, however, should not be underestimated. As China and Indonesia celebrate 75 years of diplomatic relations, this mechanism offers a new channel to deepen strategic trust, coordinate on maritime issues, and expand defense cooperation without the binding commitments of alliances. Chinese officials described the mechanism as a “premier platform” for bilateral security engagement – a narrative that reflects both ambition and pragmatism.
From Beijing’s perspective, choosing Indonesia as its first 2+2 partner is both strategic and opportunistic. As Southeast Asia’s largest economy and the only G-20 member in the region, Indonesia holds considerable regional influence. It maintains balanced relations with both Washington and Beijing, and its absence of binding strategic alignment offers China room to engage without the friction that the Philippines and Vietnam might pose.
Economically, the two countries are already deeply intertwined. China has been Indonesia’s largest trading partner for over a decade, and landmark projects like the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway reflect their growing infrastructure cooperation. Strategically, Indonesia sits at the maritime crossroads of the Indo-Pacific, serving as a vital buffer and bridge in the intensifying China-U.S. competition.
While the current 2+2 dialogue is limited in scope, it offers a template that could be replicated. It is likely that the format may expand to other ASEAN members or even ASEAN as a whole. Such moves could give China a structured voice in South China Sea deliberations, which have long been dominated by fragmented diplomacy and competing claims. By introducing a regionally accepted mechanism, China would position itself as a constructive, rules-based actor in regional security.
This first 2+2 also signals a subtle adaptation of Chinese diplomacy in an era of multipolar competition. The choice to adopt a traditionally Western format is not a sign of ideological shift but of strategic accommodation. Rather than confront existing norms, China is now entering established frameworks on its own terms, using tools familiar to regional countries – even those championed by Western countries – to pursue its distinct regional vision.
For Indonesia, the benefits are clear. The dialogue offers a platform to manage sensitive maritime issues, coordinate humanitarian missions, and explore defense technology cooperation, and reaffirms Indonesia’s leading status within ASEAN. More importantly, it enables Jakarta to balance its deepening economic and security engagement with China against its simultaneous outreach to the United States and other partners. This balance, if maintained, reinforces Indonesia’s regional leadership and strategic relevance.
Still, skepticism persists. Some observers noted that the asymmetry in ministerial rank, the absence of joint military declarations, and the broad language of the communiqué suggest limited immediate substance. These critiques are not unfounded, but they miss the strategic foresight embedded in the gesture. Mechanisms like 2+2 are rarely transformative overnight; their value lies in the structure they create for future dialogue.
Moreover, the broader geopolitical context gives this dialogue added significance. As the United States pressures ASEAN members over their economic and strategic alignments, China’s soft-touch approach – emphasizing trade, infrastructure, and now structured dialogue – offers a compelling alternative. The 2+2 format, stripped of its alliance connotations, becomes a vessel for influence without provocation.
Whether this initiative remains symbolic or evolves into substantive coordination will depend on political will and mutual trust. If successful, it could serve as a model for similar mechanisms in the Middle East, South Asia, or Africa – regions where China is increasingly seen as a security stakeholder. Used wisely, the 2+2 could allow Beijing to project stability without triggering the alarms of encroachment.
In the final analysis, the China-Indonesia 2+2 is a modest beginning with potentially far-reaching consequences. It is an exercise in strategic symbolism, diplomatic agility, and regional experimentation. By entering the arena of strategic dialogues long dominated by the West, China is not just following precedent – it is writing a new script, one that prioritizes gradualism, flexibility, and regional consensus over confrontation.