In the wake of the deadly terror attack in Pahalgam — initially claimed by The Resistance Force (TRF), an affiliate of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba — India-Pakistan relations have deteriorated dangerously. Based on evidence of “cross-border linkages,” the Indian government has blamed the terror attack on Islamabad and acted against it by suspending the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, among other measures.
Islamabad has denied involvement in the attack and has announced a series of “tit-for-tat” responses, which include holding all bilateral agreements with India, including the 1972 Simla Agreement, in abeyance. The Pakistan Senate even passed a resolution describing the attack as an “orchestrated campaign to malign Pakistan,” suggesting that New Delhi was “exploiting terrorism narratives for political gain.”
In the aftermath of the attack, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi received calls from at least 16 foreign leaders, who condemned the attack. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu came out strongly in support of India, describing the act as an “Islamic terrorist attack.” In light of concerns of military escalation between two nuclear-armed nations, countries such as the United States and United Kingdom have taken a more balanced approach, calling upon both New Delhi and Islamabad to behave responsibly. Referring to the historical conflict in the disputed border region, U.S. President Donald Trump remarked that India and Pakistan will “sort it out one way or another,” indicating no appetite in Washington to engage in mediatory efforts.
The United Nations Security Council also released a statement condemning the “terrorist attack” while urging the governments of India and Pakistan to “exercise maximum restraint to ensure the situation does not deteriorate further.” Indian experts noted that the statement was significantly watered down compared to the one issued in February 2019 after the Pulwama suicide bombing — making no mention of the TRF, cross-border links, or support for the Indian government — likely due to Pakistan’s current role on the U.N. Security Council.
Meanwhile, New Delhi has launched a diplomatic blitz to globally isolate Islamabad. The Ministry of External Affairs has already briefed envoys of 45 nations on the attack and its link to cross-border terrorism, including diplomats from West Asia.
Historically, the Gulf countries have provided strong support to Islamabad, both diplomatically and strategically, especially on the Kashmir issue — to the extent that in 1994, Saudi Arabia co-sponsored a Pakistani resolution on Kashmir at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. However, owing to growing economic and political ties between New Delhi and West Asian, particularly the GCC countries, this equation has changed significantly.
Modi was in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, when the attack took place, forcing him to cut short the visit. The visit was significant not only because it strengthened the bilateral partnership, but also because it indicated Saudi Arabia’s growing support for India’s position on terrorism. According to a joint statement, both sides “condemned cross-border terrorism, and called on all States to reject the use of terrorism against other countries, dismantle terrorism infrastructure where it exists, and bring perpetrators of terrorism to justice swiftly.” As noted by an Indian analyst, this stands out as one of the strongest condemnations of terrorism from a major Muslim country.
However, Gulf nations continue to maintain a policy of equidistance in their relations with both India and Pakistan. This explains why Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan held separate phone conversations with his Indian and Pakistani counterparts after the attack. Saudi readouts of its foreign minister’s talks with the Indian and Pakistani ministers are vague and only mention discussions on “the evolving situation in the region and efforts being made to reduce tensions.” However, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar said that he discussed the “cross-border linkages,” while Pakistan’s foreign ministry claims Faisal “rejected India’s baseless allegations and cautioned against further escalatory moves.”
As part of their balancing act, several West Asian countries, including Iran, have offered to mediate between India and Pakistan. This is not the first time that Tehran has made such an offer. In the past, India dismissed such offers of mediation on the Kashmir issue from Iran. It is unlikely to welcome it this time around either.
This stems from India’s longstanding opposition to third party mediation on Kashmir, or any attempt to internationalize the dispute. New Delhi sees itself as a regional leader, and relying on mediation to resolve disputes with neighbors undermines that image. Especially after the 1972 Simla Agreement, New Delhi has strongly resisted any attempt at overt mediation in the persistent hostilities between India and Pakistan.
Yet, third parties have played a role in brokering deals. In February 2021, for example, the UAE brokered a ceasefire understanding between India and Pakistan. It is worth noting that while Islamabad has publicly acknowledged the UAE’s mediatory role, New Delhi has refrained from confirming it officially.
Pakistan has always been more receptive to such offers, especially when it was trying to scale up ties with Muslim-majority states outside of the Arab Gulf — which includes Iran. Its relations with Iran have come under strain in the last couple of years, especially after the cross-border missile and drone strikes in January 2024. This explains why, although Islamabad has officially “appreciated” Tehran’s offer to mediate between India and Pakistan, it is pushing for Beijing and Moscow’s involvement to conduct an “international investigation.”
This time around, New Delhi is unlikely to cede ground for any third-party involvement. The Pahalgam attack has sparked significant domestic outrage in India and prompted calls to “avenge” it through decisive military action. So far, India’s response has been within the realm of non-military measures. However, escalation — potentially including military options — cannot be ruled out.
As the space for bilateral diplomacy shrinks, many in New Delhi will interpret the neutrality of third-party countries as a pro-Pakistan position. At the same time, any foreign pressure on how India chooses to respond in what it considers to be an internal matter will be strongly rejected.
New Delhi is closely tracking the world’s response. India’s Ministry of External Affairs has reportedly written to the regional office of the British Broadcasting Corporation expressing concern about its use of the term “militants” — instead of terrorists — while referring to the perpetrators of the Pahalgam attack.
Meanwhile, unverified reports on social media of Turkiye sending arms to Islamabad, which Ankara has officially denied, have prompted calls from the Indian public on social media to boycott Turkiye as a tourist destination. Apart from Turkiye, China and Azerbaijan, two countries with whom Pakistan has close ties, have already been deemed as “enemies” by Indian hawks.
So far, most West Asian countries have been able to maintain healthy relations with India and Pakistan by de-hyphenating them. However, the unfolding situation in Kashmir puts their balancing act in South Asia to the test.
The stakes are high for Arab countries. On one hand, the Kashmir issue is embroiled in the larger geopolitics surrounding the hotly contested race for the leadership of the Muslim world between Iran and Saudi Arabia. On the other, these countries see a natural partnership with New Delhi, driven largely by economic motivations, notably India’s energy demands and the massive Indian diaspora in the region.
Post the Pahalgam attack, both Pakistan and India have launched an intense diplomatic campaign to engage with the Gulf states, pulling them in opposite directions. It remains to be seen which way they will lean, or if they choose to test the limits of hedging.