Trans-Pacific View author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Michael A. Hunzeker, an associate professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, is the 459th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”
Identify the strategic priorities for Washington and Taipei in advancing Taiwan-U.S. relations.
This is a tricky question given that Washington’s priorities – and therefore its policies – are in a state of flux. My sense is that Taipei’s overarching objective remains unchanged. President Lai wants to deepen Taiwan’s ties with the United States across a range of domains (security of course, but also economic and diplomatic), not least because he knows that cross-strait relations will continue to deteriorate as long as the DPP remains in power, as evidenced by the fact that Beijing uses virtually anything Lai says or does as a pretext to “turn up the heat.” But because Washington’s priorities have suddenly become harder to discern, Lai’s ability to achieve those objectives just got a lot harder.
Certainly, some of the Trump administration’s goals as they pertain to Taiwan are clear: redress the U.S.-Taiwan trade imbalance; reshore critical production chains; restore America’s military, economic, and technological advantages vis-à-vis China. But others are not. Add to that the fact that President Trump uses uncertainty to gain and maintain a bargaining advantage; that making concessions now is no guarantee against additional demands later – for example, TSMC’s promise to invest an additional $100 billion in the U.S. did not protect Taipei from that initial round of reciprocal tariffs – and that there seem to be internal debates within the administration about how Taiwan fits into U.S. strategy; and it becomes hard to predict how it will all unfold.
Analyze President Lai Ching-te’s effectiveness in articulating Taiwan’s strategic relevance to the Trump administration.
Given the fundamental uncertainty surrounding what we know about how the Trump administration views Taiwan, I would start by pointing out that it would be hard for anyone in President Lai’s position to effectively articulate Taiwan’s strategic relevance to the United States. That said, I do think the Lai administration has made a few avoidable mistakes.
Given the degree to which President Trump prioritizes personal relationships, meeting with former officials from the first Trump administration long after it was clear they had fallen out of favor with Trump – for example, meeting with former U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley in August of 2024 and former Vice President Mike Pence just a few days before Trump’s second inauguration – was puzzling. Lai’s team also continued to tout values and priorities that resonated with the Biden administration more than its successor.
But one of the biggest missed opportunities, at least in my view, was not taking defense reform more seriously, and responding to calls for a dramatic increase in defense spending with a less than credible “counteroffer” to make incremental increases. We know from various memoirs and media reports that President Trump was skeptical of Taiwan’s defensibility during his first term. It therefore would have made more sense to make every possible effort to assuage those concerns from the outset. Now, in the wake of the currently suspended reciprocal tariffs, I imagine it will be even harder for Lai to convince opposition legislators and voters to go along with such reforms.
Evaluate Taipei’s commitment to bolstering self-defense capabilities and investments vis-à-vis China’s increasingly aggressive posture.
I remain skeptical. I do not say this to downplay President Lai’s myriad improvements on this front. Under his watch, defense spending is incrementally up; he put a true civilian in charge of the Ministry of National Defense; he created a Whole-of-Society-Resilience Committee; and he seems to take more interest in defense issues than his predecessor. That said, the trajectory and rate of change remain insufficient, and a lot of hard work remains to be done.
Nor is it clear Lai has – or is willing to expend – the political capital necessary to implement more meaningful reforms to the Ministry of National Defense, including an overdue reduction in the number of generals and admirals. Taiwan has 308 generals and admirals. That’s 1 for every 500 troops, or 2.5 times as many generals and admirals per soldier than the United States – and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth already thinks the U.S. military is top heavy. The services are still trying to pursue expensive, and frankly outdated, high-profile weapons like the Indigenous Diesel Submarine, the F-35, and retired U.S. frigates. The military’s senior leadership has yet to articulate a coherent asymmetric doctrine to replace Admiral Lee’s Overall Defense Concept. And the Taiwanese officer corps remains hierarchical, rigid, and averse to civilian oversight and advice from partners like the United States.
Time is running out to make these sorts of foundational changes. And I think the Trump administration knows it.
How should Taipei respond to President Trump’s unpredictable dealmaking approach?
Taiwan is in a tough spot. I certainly think President Lai was wise not to threaten retaliation against Washington’s across the board and suspended reciprocal tariffs given that Taiwan does not have a lot of leverage, and that the DPP has positioned itself as the party that can improve U.S.-Taiwan relations. Since this administration is eager to make deals, offering concessions on a range of issues, such as non-tariff barriers, that have long been a source of frustration for the United States will likely be necessary. I also think that taking defense reform and defense spending seriously will help, not least because Taipei needs to do it anyway. A big defense purchase from the United States – one that explicitly prioritizes paying for training, munitions, parts, and genuinely asymmetric weapons, not F-35s and frigates – would also be a good idea.
Assess the impact of the Trump administration’s treatment of Ukraine on Taiwan’s security reliance on the United States.
I can see why Taiwanese voters and policymakers might take the Trump administration’s reoriented Ukraine policy to mean that the United States won’t have Taiwan’s back in a crisis. But I’m not sure that’s the right interpretation. Without a doubt, the ultimate decision to defend Taiwan (or not) rests with the president. And President Trump has made clear that he “won’t show his cards.” Nevertheless, one of the key reasons Trump officials disliked the Biden administration’s Ukraine policy was that it consumed and diverted resources that could and should otherwise be used in the Indo-Pacific. The first Trump administration both explicitly prioritized China as the pacing threat and was very good to Taiwan. Many key officials in this second administration likewise consider Taiwan a security and economic linchpin and are also serious about keeping Taiwan safe and secure, provided that Taiwan is just as serious about the same.