A survey from last November found that 34.7 percent of Taiwanese believed that being pro-United States would provoke China to invade Taiwan. Although the number decreased by 6.5 points from 2023, these figures are alarming. They show that many Taiwanese people are misreading the conditions under which China would launch a major invasion, misperceiving the enemy as an irrational actor that defies realist logic.
There is no reason to believe that China would invade when the costs, namely the likelihood of a U.S. intervention, are high. This misperception poses significant risks to Taiwan’s deterrence against a Chinese invasion.
To understand China more accurately, it is important to gain a deeper understanding of this misperception’s origin, which stems from Beijing’s propaganda 30 years ago during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, as well as China’s actual crisis behaviors back then. It is also essential to investigate how Taiwan’s domestic politics has played a role in aggravating this misperception then and now.
The Origin: China’s 1995-96 Crisis Propaganda
The misperception that stronger Taiwan-U.S. ties would bring Taiwan to a war originates from China’s propaganda during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis. It was the first time China framed Taiwan’s efforts to forge closer Taiwan-U.S. relations as pursuing Taiwan independence, after which a major political-military coercion campaign was launched against Taiwan.
In response to Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s speech at Cornell University, which was the first-ever U.S. visit by a sitting Taiwan president, Beijing launched an intensive propaganda campaign as they fired six missiles into the open sea north of Taiwan in July 1995. In a rare move, Xinhua and the People’s Daily published four joint commentaries criticizing Lee’s U.S. visit as pursuing Taiwan independence.
Framing closer Taiwan-U.S. ties as pursuing Taiwan independence is closely linked to China’s appeal to Chinese nationalism on Taiwan. As the U.S. support for Taiwan grew later during the 1995-96 crisis, Beijing began to criticize the Clinton administration’s actions for being anti-Chinese (反華, fan hua). At the same time, the Chinese government told the Taiwanese that Taiwan would not be invaded, provided that the United States did not intervene in “Chinese” matters.
China’s appeal to Chinese nationalism worked to a certain extent. Two of the four candidates running during the March 1996 presidential election denounced U.S. carrier battle groups’ show of force near Taiwan, urging the United States to let the “Chinese” on both sides of the Strait settle the internal matters. Nonetheless, their support for distancing Taiwan from the United States failed to win public support. Two United Daily News surveys conducted during the crisis found that less than 17 percent of people opposed a U.S. intervention in the event of a Chinese invasion. This explains why the two candidates collectively won only 25 percent of the popular vote.
China’s Actual Actions Tell a Different Story
Despite China’s propaganda that peace would be ensured if cross-strait disputes were settled internally, Beijing’s actual behaviors suggest otherwise. China escalated its coercion campaign when it anticipated few costs would be imposed by the United States – and de-escalated when Washington showed a stronger commitment to Taiwan’s security.
The Clinton administration’s early crisis goal of preventing a downward spiral in China-U.S. ties, which included downplaying China’s threats against Taiwan, gave Chinese decision-makers the confidence to continue the escalation. In October 1995, a senior Chinese military officer asserted to recently retired Assistant Secretary of Defense Chas W. Freeman Jr. that U.S. leaders “care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan.” This remark strongly suggested that Beijing expected Washington to continue making conciliatory gestures if their coercion campaign persisted. Other U.S. officials who engaged with the Chinese government early in the crisis also perceived similar attitudes from their Chinese counterparts.
However, the Clinton administration’s decision to show strength later in 1996, including the deployment of two carrier battle groups near the Taiwan Strait, forced China to de-escalate. U.S. support for Taiwan and its superior military capabilities convinced China that its post-1996 military planning and modernization efforts needed to consider the likelihood of a U.S. intervention.
Explaining China’s Actions
China’s actions during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis were undoubtedly rational and followed a realist logic. Beijing escalated the coercion campaign when anticipating little cost imposed by the United States and de-escalated when otherwise. In fact, China’s measured behavior was consistent with Geoffrey Blainey’s findings in his seminal work “The Causes of War,” which noted that most countries’ decisions regarding the use of force follow a rational calculation: countries would not launch a major invasion without a positive assessment of their relative strength, which encompasses military capabilities and the likelihood of third-party intervention.
Nonetheless, China attempted to convince Taiwan that its logic was different, stressing that peace would only be possible if Taiwan ceased pursuing independence – which, according to Beijing’s definition, included pursuing closer political ties with the United States. Portraying its invasion of Taiwan as an irrational behavior driven by Chinese nationalism was part of China’s cognitive warfare, only seeking to gain the upper hand in shaping Taiwan’s political choices.
Taiwan’s Misperception: Then and Now
Thirty years apart, it is extremely alarming to observe nearly 20 percentage point growth in the number of Taiwanese buying into China’s propaganda. Besides Beijing’s frequent warnings not to “rely on the United States to seek independence” nowadays, Taiwan’s domestic politics have played a crucial role in amplifying China’s propaganda.
Whereas the two candidates that cautioned against stronger Taiwan-U.S. relations during the 1996 presidential election did not represent any major political party, Taiwan’s largest opposition today, the Kuomintang (KMT), is the leading proponent against building stronger ties with the United States. This explains why the 2024 survey mentioned above found that 55.3 percent of KMT supporters agreed that being pro-U.S. would bring Taiwan to war, the highest among all major parties’ supporters. Meanwhile, only 12.5 percent of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) supporters believed so.
For instance, in response to the ruling DPP’s pledge to raise defense spending to over 3 percent of Taiwan’s GDP, the KMT’s vice presidential candidate in the 2024 election contended that being subservient to Washington without a cross-strait rapprochement would make Taiwan the next Ukraine. Likewise, a KMT lawmaker asserted that the Lai Ching-te administration is making mistakes in its security policy, arguing that Taiwan should prioritize cross-strait rapprochement instead of relying on the United States. Finally, another KMT official called U.S. Senator Dan Sullivan’s criticisms about the KMT-controlled legislature’s defense budget cut an intervention in Taiwan’s domestic affairs.
Clearly, many in Taiwan’s largest opposition are not concerned that a potential downturn in Taiwan-U.S. ties, stemming from the question of Taiwan’s commitment to its self defense, would weaken Taiwan’s deterrence against China.
These examples showed that Taiwan’s evolving political landscape played a crucial role in making China’s propaganda more prevalent 30 years after its origin, leading to a growing number of Taiwanese misperceiving China’s logic tree to use force.
Conclusion
The most important lesson from the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis is that there is no such thing as Chinese exceptionalism when it comes to launching a major invasion. Understanding China requires nothing more than common sense – it will be deterred from launching an invasion when its adversaries, including third-party actors, especially the United States, demonstrate strength. Simply put, China wants Taiwan to believe otherwise because it grants Beijing the leverage to coerce Taiwan.