In his first foreign policy blitz of his second term, President Donald Trump is aiming to reshape the United States’ global footprint with bold strokes: imposing sweeping tariffs on China in a bid to revive domestic manufacturing, while exploring options to acquire Greenland for its strategic access to the Arctic and to annex Canada as the 51st state to dominate the Americas. The Trump administration is also extricating the United States from its responsibilities in Ukraine through direct negotiations with Russia to end the war – even if it means justifying Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s eastern flanks on the basis that they are “Russian-speaking.”
This new Trump Doctrine of dominating the Western Hemisphere while scaling back commitments elsewhere in the world could have tangible effects on U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Will the United States continue to serve as a trustworthy partner and security backer for Taiwan, as it has for decades? A second Trump presidency may bring about a transactional U.S. retrenchment, leaving Taiwan dangerously exposed – unless Taipei adopts a more self-sufficient and politically flexible posture.
The current atmosphere between Washington and Taipei stands in stark contrast to the amiable relations during Trump’s first term, when he accepted an unprecedented congratulatory call from Taiwan’s then-President Tsai Ing-wen and initiated the visit of Health Secretary Alex Azar, the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit Taiwan since 1979. Unlike former President Joe Biden, who on many occasions pledged to have American men and women defend Taiwan, Trump has refrained from offering assurances for Taiwan’s security. Instead, he has demanded that Taiwan “pay us” for protection and declined to comment on his commitments to intervene in case of a Chinese invasion. Notably, Trump characterized Taiwan as being “9,500 miles away” from the U.S. and “68 miles from China,” questioning the feasibility of keeping Taiwan out of China’s orbit.
Taiwan has historically enjoyed strong bipartisan support in Congress, dating back to the early Cold War, when U.S. General Douglas MacArthur famously described Taiwan as an “unsinkable carrier” for anchoring U.S. power in the Pacific. However, with Trump’s firm control over the Republican Party, stances on Taiwan are rapidly shifting. The Senate confirmation of Elbridge Colby, Trump’s pick for under secretary of defense for policy, signals the arrival of Trump’s America First strategy and the growing dominance of MAGA loyalists over traditional defense hawks.
Colby has consistently asserted in recent years that “Taiwan isn’t itself of existential importance to America,” nor is it “essential” to U.S. interests in preventing Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific. Despite being a well-known China hawk, he backtracked on his previous calls for strategic clarity – or explicit defense commitments to Taiwan – stating during a Senate committee hearing that the “military balance vis-à-vis China” had “deteriorated dramatically.” This shift in views on Taiwan’s value to the U.S. national interest within the Republican Party portends the possibility of a Trump administration acquiescing to a Chinese takeover of Taiwan.
Trump appears largely indifferent to security threats facing Taiwan; instead, he has expressed greater concern that Taiwan “stole” the semiconductor industry from the United States. His calls for tariffs on Taiwan’s chip exports reportedly contributed to TSMC’s announcement of a $100 billion investment plan for new semiconductor manufacturing facilities in Arizona. In response to a question about whether TSMC’s Arizona investments would blunt the impact of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Trump said that “it will at least give us a position where we have – in this very, very important business, we would have a very big part of it in the United States,” suggesting that his resolve to defend Taiwan could be contingent on the onshoring of advanced chip manufacturing.
Trump has long expressed his belief that allies are “ripping off” the United States and free-riding on U.S. security assistance. He views the Japan-U.S. defense treaty as unfair because Japan is not obligated to defend the United States. Underlying Trump’s complaints about meager defense spending by allies is the belief that the United States should not bear primary responsibility for defending them unless it is clearly in the U.S. national interest.
In light of this worldview, it is unlikely that the Trump administration would continue to meaningfully invest in military bases in Japan. Since World War II, the U.S. has maintained a global network of military bases in the Western Pacific, such as Okinawa, that has successfully deterred China from moving on Taiwan during previous Taiwan Strait crises. Deterrence against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could be severely degraded without stronger U.S. forward military postures in the First Island Chain.
Trump has aimed to shrink the trade deficit with China and revive domestic manufacturing by slapping 145 percent tariffs on Chinese imports. But if the retaliatory tariffs from China threaten Trump’s approval rating – say, by sparking a recession or inflation that hits consumer wallets – he might trade concessions elsewhere in China-U.S. relations for better terms. If these concessions involve Taiwan, the likelihood of China testing Washington’s resolve to defend the island would increase. To illustrate, Trump could publicly refuse to involve U.S. soldiers in an invasion of Taiwan or endorse Beijing’s stance on Taiwan’s sovereignty.
The Trump administration’s hardball approach to negotiating an end to the Ukraine conflict may offer a preview of how it would handle negotiations over Taiwan. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has ruled out the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO and called the reclamation of territories occupied by Russia unrealistic. The Trump administration also chose to unilaterally negotiate with Russia and withheld U.S. military aid and intelligence sharing to pressure Ukraine into accepting a deal. It is hard to believe that Trump would take a different approach to negotiating a hypothetical Taiwan deal. Taiwan may very well face a similar predicament if it refuses to sign on to Trump-led negotiations with China. Taiwan must prepare for a more transactional United States, one that prioritizes trade wins and monetary gains over long-standing alliances.
With Trump reluctant to offer security guarantees for Ukraine and shifting that burden to the EU, the United States may choose to delegate responsibility for Taiwan’s security to Japan. Under former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, Japan reinterpreted its constitution to provide a legal basis for intervening in a Taiwan contingency. Yet Japan’s constitution, which limits the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to self-defense, complicates this role. The SDF can act abroad only if an attack on an ally threatens Japan’s “survival” – a high bar to meet absent direct Chinese strikes or blockades against Japan. Even then, the SDF would likely be limited to defensive and supportive roles, backing U.S. offensive operations rather than directly fighting China near Taiwan. Moreover, public opinion further complicates matters: a majority of Japanese oppose the SDF engaging in combat with China over Taiwan, reflecting deep-rooted pacifism.
Despite the constraints on a Japanese intervention, it is still in Japan’s national security interest to prevent Taiwan from falling under Beijing’s control. If China forcibly annexes Taiwan, it could breach the First Island Chain, enabling Beijing to project power into the western Pacific and threaten Japan’s national security and access to critical sea lanes. Taiwan should thus strengthen defense cooperation with Japan. Tokyo could take the practical step of initiating technology transfers and arms exports to the Taiwanese military. For example, equipping Taiwan’s submarine program with Japan’s world-class underwater capabilities could prove decisive in thwarting a Chinese invasion fleet.
Besides working with allies, Taiwan must shield its own economy. It should also anchor its position within critical supply chains and ensure that the most cutting-edge semiconductor manufacturing and research take place in Taiwan. Taiwan should recognize that U.S. domestic chip production could embolden Trump to impose higher tariffs on Taiwan-made chips, as it would shield the U.S. economy from price hikes and shortages. TSMC’s announcement to invest more in the United States, allegedly in response to Trump’s tariff threats, was also a grave mistake, as it rewarded Trump’s propensity to use tariffs as a tool in trade negotiations. Without such investment from chipmakers like TSMC, tariffs alone wouldn’t contribute to the revival of domestic chip manufacturing. Taipei should signal that any tariffs on Taiwan’s chips could be met with restrictions on future semiconductor investments in the United States, reinforcing that Taiwan’s chipmaking capacity is not easily replaceable. By remaining indispensable to the U.S. economy, Taiwan can boost its bargaining position with Trump – a professed dealmaker who often undervalues goodwill from even the closest U.S. allies.
Taipei would also be wise to initiate dialogue with Beijing to seek a political solution to the cross-strait conflict. This olive branch would demonstrate to the international community that Taiwan is a willing seeker of peace with China. While Taiwan should continue cooperating with the United States and Japan in preparing to win a war against China, the Taiwanese leadership should realize that some political concessions could prevent a bloody and potentially lengthy war without any practical changes to Taiwan’s autonomy, democratic governance, or way of life. Negotiating a political deal sooner rather than later may become increasingly attractive for Taiwan, especially if the Trump administration moves deeper into isolationism.
Indeed, the greatest danger to Taiwan may not only come from across the Strait, but from a strategic vacuum left by an inward-turning United States. If the U.S. proceeds to concede on Taiwan, it could create a once-in-a-century window of opportunity for China. To prepare for this, Taiwan should build stronger ties with Japan, engage in peace talks with China, and use its economic leverage. As the U.S. shadow of protection wanes, Taiwan’s survival may depend not on guarantees from the White House, but on its own strength and statecraft.