The current Philippine government’s perspective concerning China’s actions in the eastern part of the South China Sea, known locally as the West Philippine Sea (WPS), is dominated by dismay and anxiety that the situation will only worsen. In response to the Chinese Coast Guard’s blocking of the Philippine Coast Guard vessel BRP Cobra off Zambales on April 6, Palace Press Officer Claire Castro said that President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. expressed concern over the recent incident but underscored the government will maintain a “level of professionalism together with a fearless spirit of patriotism” to address the situation. The Philippines is also vigorously pursuing the modernization of its armed forces and developing its coast guard to better address the operational challenges of China’s growing assertiveness in the area.
The Philippines has long recognized that the growing presence of the China Coast Guard and China’s maritime militia in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) directly impacts the ability of Filipino fisherfolk to access fishing grounds critical to their livelihood. An estimated 300,000 Filipino fisherfolk depend on the fishing activities in the WPS. The National Capital Region, Region IV-B or MIMAROPA, and Central Luzon are among the Philippine regions that greatly depend on fish production from the WPS. These three regions are also among the most densely populated areas in the Philippines. Therefore, decreasing fish catches from the WPS is a direct concern for Filipinos.
In its 2016 arbitral award, an international tribunal in The Hague concluded that China’s actions to prevent Filipino fisherfolk from accessing these fishing grounds was a direct affront to the Philippines’ sovereign rights. Similarly, China’s failure to prevent its fishing fleets from venturing into the Philippines’ EEZ was also considered a violation of Manila’s sovereign rights.
Despite the legal victory, since the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident, the Philippines has had little success in discouraging China from violating its sovereign rights and preventing Filipino fisherfolk from accessing fishing grounds in the WPS. Even with the definitive conclusion of these violations, as noted in the 2016 arbitral award, Beijing has been persistent in advancing its South China Sea claims by limiting Philippine access and jurisdiction. Every counteraction of the Philippines is met with harsher punishment from Beijing, making it more difficult for Philippine maritime agencies to exercise jurisdiction and protect the interests of Filipino fisherfolk.
Even while China excludes Filipinos from South China Sea fishing grounds, Chinese vessels conduct illegal fishing activities in Philippine waters. The presence of 77 Chinese-flagged vessels in the Philippines EEZ, as revealed by a 2024 Overseas Development Institute study, had significant economic and social consequences. Many of these ships engaged in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which contributed to a 0.02 percent decrease in the Philippines’ GDP between mid-2021 and mid-2022. This period also saw the loss of 17,000 marine sector jobs and pushed an additional 24,000 Filipinos into poverty.
In this sense, we can view the South China Sea contest as, in part, a competition over fisheries resources between Manila and Beijing – and so far, China is winning.
It is ironic, then, that China remains one of the top sources of fishery imports for the Philippines. In 2020, imports from China represented 26 percent of the Philippines’ total fishery import value, followed by Papua New Guinea at 21 percent and Vietnam at 12 percent. In 2022, the Philippines imported 219,500 metric tons of fish and fishery/aquatic products from China, worth $343.8 million. The second country source is far behind, with Vietnam exporting 77,400 metric tons worth $133.7 million to the Philippines in the same year. While a slight decrease in imports from China was observed in 2023, it remained the top country of origin with a value of $310 million. The Philippines sourced 76,000 metric tons of mackerel, 33,000 metric tons of cuttlefish, and 2,000 metric tons of seaweed and carrageenan from China in 2023.
As a result, China is dominating both the fisheries in the WPS and the import market in the Philippines. This should prompt the Philippine government to review its fish import policy to tackle the employment, physical, and food security issues it is dealing with. Manila should approach the issue by emphasizing sustainability: it can impose an import ban on fish and fishery/aquatic products derived from IUU fishing activities. This way, the Philippines will not only disincentivize China from pursuing IUU fishing in the WPS but also uphold sustainability in fisheries management and trade.
Using the ASEAN Guidelines for Preventing the Entry of Fish and Fishery Products from IUU Fishing Activities into the Supply Chain, endorsed by the Senior Officials Meeting of ASEAN Ministers of Agriculture and Forestry in 2015, and the Republic Act 10654 or An Act to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing as policy bases, the Philippine government must consider limiting fish imports from China that it believes are from IUU fishing activities – including in the WPS.
The ASEAN Guidelines provide tools for the ASEAN member states to ensure that fish and fishery products from the region entering the global supply chain do not come from IUU fishing activities. While non-binding, this document emphasizes the Philippines’ responsibility to address the growing concerns about IUU fishing in the region.
Domestically, RA 10654 strengthens the authority of the Philippine government, particularly the Department of Agriculture and its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to manage and regulate all fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters, including the EEZ. It also provides for the authority of the Department of Agriculture to “prescribe trade-related measures to reduce or eliminate trade in fish and fishery products derived from illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing.”
Effective implementation of this policy will require strong enforcement mechanisms, international cooperation, and potentially the development of specific regulations targeting IUU-linked fishery imports. In the short term, the Philippine government will have to actively seek and establish trade relationships with other countries known for sustainable fishing practices to help diversify the Philippines’ fish import portfolio and reduce over-reliance on a single source. This is an opportunity to strengthen relationships with trade partners such as Japan, Vietnam, and Indonesia.
It would also require the government to consider providing support to local fish traders and processors who may be affected by import limitations. Government assistance can help them adapt to new supply chains or focus on domestic products. In the long term, the government would need to significantly invest in strengthening the capacity and sustainability of the Philippine fisheries sector. This includes providing financial and technical support to local fisherfolk, promoting sustainable aquaculture, and improving fisheries management practices to increase the domestic supply chain and reduce reliance on imports.
China’s behavior in the WPS should be met with measures that will send a serious message of the Philippines’ dismay and discontent. Manila should not reward China by continuously importing fishery products from Chinese companies. Instead, Manila should penalize China for its IUU fishing activities that hurt the Philippine economy, fisheries sector, and environment.
With thousands of Filipino fisherfolk experiencing the immediate impact, it is not enough to invest in bigger ships and modern equipment for the coast guard and the navy. Now more than ever, it is necessary to stand up sustainability and equity by actively upholding standards and policies that prevent IUU fishing activities and support domestic production. This should be the central focus of the Philippines’ approach to the South China Sea.