In the second week of March, while the media was busy covering the deadly train hijacking in Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan, the provincial assembly quietly and in great haste passed an important and now controversial piece of legislation: the Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act, 2025.
With little to no discussion or opposition to the bill, it silently slipped through the Balochistan provincial assembly and became an act on March 14, receiving barely any media coverage. Only after a similar bill in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province sparked controversy did the Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act come into the limelight.
What does the Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act provide for? What makes it problematic? And importantly, why was it enacted now and in such a rush?
The act says that its purpose is to develop an internationally competitive, stable, and enabling environment for domestic and foreign investment in the provincial mining and minerals sector.
Section 22(2) of the act provides for a Mineral Investment Facilitation Authority (MIFA), consisting of different provincial ministries as well as federal entities. Indeed, MIFA operates under the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), which is a federal entity. Section 22(3) states that MIFA can direct any concerned department or committee. Since MIFA operates under the federal government, its decisions would prevail over those of provincial departments.
The Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act is therefore problematic as it seeks to centralize control of provincial mineral resources.
In Pakistan, the development of mineral resources has long been the prerogative of provincial governments; The Regulation of Mines and Oil Fields and Mineral Development Act, 1948, gave Pakistan’s provinces jurisdiction over their mineral reserves. The 18th Amendment of 2010 went further. Not only did it guarantee provinces exclusive jurisdiction over minerals — excluding nuclear energy and oil and gas fields — but also, it reinforced provincial autonomy, with its Article 172(3) setting constitutional limits on federal control over natural resources.
The Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act not only rolls back the 18th Amendment, but its Sections 121 and 122 establish supremacy of this act over other laws on provincial mines and minerals. It shrinks the role of Balochistan province to that of a mere spectator with limited authority to shape or propose policies over its mineral reserves, while vesting the federal government (i.e. the Federal Mineral Wing) with powers over the entire development and financial processes, including issuing mining licenses, bidding, rents, and deciding royalties.
Hence, the major concern the Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act has raised is about federal overreach.
Among the first to blow the whistle on this issue was Rafiaullah Kakar, who pointed out in a podcast how federal overreach on provincial resources can have a long-term impact. The consequences include, but are not limited to, mismanagement of mineral wealth. This is already one of the many grievances and crucial drivers of the ongoing unrest in Balochistan.
Balochistan’s past experiences are cautionary tales. The history of the Reko Diq case underscores why provincial control over natural resources is important.
Reko Diq is believed to be one of the world’s largest undeveloped copper and gold deposits. In the 1990s, an Australian mining company, BHP Minerals, signed a deal with the Balochistan government for a feasibility study in the area. The study confirmed Reko Diq’s significance as one of the world’s largest untapped mineral reserves. BHP then claimed 75 percent of the discoveries for the next 56 years. A deal was signed, but it was never implemented.
In 2000, BHP handed the project to Tethyan Copper Company (TCC), a joint venture of Chilean company Antofagasta and Canada’s Barrick Gold, which took charge of the project in 2006. However, mining remained a challenge, as public outcry over exploitative deals triggered unrest in Balochistan.
Under pressure from the public, civil society, and nationalist movements, the Balochistan government refused to issue TCC a mining license, as provincial governments had the authority and legal standing to challenge the deal. The case was taken to the Supreme Court in 2011, and the apex court ruled in the provincial government’s favor.
However, in 2016, TCC won its case at the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and Pakistan was held liable because of the breach of the agreement. To avoid paying the penalty, the federal government of Pakistan and the provincial government of Balochistan signed a new deal with Barrick Gold.
Under the new deal, Barrick holds a 50 percent stake, while the remaining 50 percent is divided between the federal government of Pakistan and the Balochistan government. The feasibility study was completed recently, and mining has yet to begin.
The Reko Diq dispute provides useful lessons. Although withdrawal from the deal came after public resistance, the province had the power to refuse a mining license. But as Balochistan gets into a deal with Barrick Gold once again, it will be far more difficult for the province to push back this time, thanks to the new mining law.
Not only does the Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act limit provincial autonomy over resources and related decision-making, but also it makes no mention of community participation. Instead, it allows MIFA to dominate strategic decisions. Local stakeholders could be sidelined to favor federal and foreign mining companies’ interests. Although mining can potentially affect land rights and livelihoods, there is hardly anything in the act about community consent mechanisms. While encouraging foreign investment, the act lacks safeguards for adequate local development.
Much of the current political unrest in the province stems from long-standing grievances over the federal government’s control of provincial resources and failure to translate mineral wealth into local development. In this context, the Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act seems to reinforce the existing pattern of resource extraction without equitable local development. Instead of correcting past mistakes, the act deepens problems and risks perpetuating the instability in Balochistan.
So why was the controversial law enacted now?
Pakistan is currently actively seeking foreign investment in its mineral sector. Earlier this month, Islamabad held a two-day Minerals Investment Forum 2025, bringing around 300 foreign delegates to promote its mining sector and mineral investment opportunities.
With the Donald Trump administration unleashing tariff wars with U.S. trade partners, especially with China, which produces 90 percent of the world’s rare earths, Washington is looking to source minerals elsewhere, and Pakistan has emerged an important partner in this regard.
In early April, a U.S. delegation led by Eric Meyer, a senior official in the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Central and South Asian Affairs, was in Islamabad to discuss American interest in Pakistan’s mineral sector. This explains why the Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act was rushed through the Balochistan assembly in March.
The U.S. interest in minerals can open up new opportunities for Pakistan, and Islamabad is keen to benefit from this interest. The centralizing control that the new mining law put in place signals Islamabad’s willingness to hand over provincial mineral wealth to foreign companies to extract and export in exchange for some minimal returns, sidelining the provincial stake.
However, the new legislation may cost Islamabad far more than what it hopes to earn from making a deal with the United States.
There are concerns that a deal between Islamabad and Washington may not benefit Balochistan, a province where grievances over resource control have already fueled tensions. The new mining law is likely to contribute further to the ongoing volatility in this restive province.