A Cambodian soldier was killed during a border clash between Cambodian and Thai troops in Preah Vihear province yesterday. The clash comes after months of mounting tensions between the two countries. Naturally, both sides have blamed the other. According to Cambodia’s Ministry of Defense, the “unprovoked” incident happened after Thai troops launched an initial offensive attack on a position that Cambodian forces had been occupying for some time.
The Royal Thai Army said in a statement that the Cambodian soldiers initiated the exchange of fire and that the Thais shot back in response. “I have been informed that the return fire was necessary to defend ourselves and protect Thailand’s sovereignty. I have instructed caution. Although the ceasefire holds, both sides continue to face each other,” Phumtham Wechayachai, Thailand’s minister of defense, said yesterday. Cambodia’s Defense Ministry said that it would, “continue discussions with the Thai Ministry of Defense to find a mutual solution that will quickly return the situation to normal and prevent such incidents from occurring again.”
How might this play out? The first eventuality is that both sides can downplay the events and try to return to the negotiating table. Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and her Cambodian counterpart Hun Manet reportedly spoke yesterday and agreed to resolve the border row “as quickly as possible.” Paetongtarn said that their relationship is “still good.”
Both sides have issued conciliatory but robust statements. For instance, Cambodia’s Defense Ministry has stated that the clash “was not Cambodia’s choice. We will continue discussions with Thailand’s Ministry of Defense to seek a joint solution that can quickly restore the situation to normal and prevent future incidents.” However, it warned that Cambodia “is resolutely committed to defending its territorial integrity, whatever the cost.” Such statements are to be expected; neither side is willing to look weak.
The second, and perhaps preferable, option is for Thailand and Cambodia to finally refer their disputes to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Phnom Penh wanted to do this back when the tensions over Preah Vihear Temple were mounting in 2008, a three-year dispute that left 35 troops dead on both sides and ended with the International Court of Justice awarding the area to Cambodia.
Some in Thailand might hesitate because Kao Kim Hourn, the ASEAN general secretary, is a Cambodian. However, mediating a meaningful resolution to Cambodia and Thailand’s many disputes is something ASEAN could achieve. In a recent column, I argued that we must have far more realistic expectations of the Southeast Asian bloc. Solving the Myanmar civil war or the tensions in the South China Sea is, quite obviously, too much for ASEAN, but the Thai-Cambodia disputes probably aren’t. Moreover, if there is something that ASEAN should and can do, it is to dampen the revanchist impulses of its own members. ASEAN should be engaging far more in, say, the territorial disputes between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah.
The third, and obviously least desirable, outcome would be if both sides were to escalate the tensions. One cannot rule this out, not least because there will be pressure on both governments to look tough, especially since their defense ministries have already rushed to blame the other side for the attack. Especially for Cambodia, given that a Cambodian soldier was killed, there will be pressure to respond. The Cambodian army spokesman, Mao Phalla, was quoted as saying, “Our soldiers died in the trenches. The Thais came to attack us.”
Opposition groups from both countries have fanned nationalist flames for at least the past 12 months, sometimes solely for political reasons. Indeed, the border tensions, as well as ongoing disputes over Koh Kood, an island in the Gulf of Thailand, have given opposition groups a means of attack. Thailand and Cambodia are both now run by the children of former leaders, and neither Cambodia’s princeling nor Thailand’s “princessling” is experienced or has solid nationalist credentials.
There are also claims that the close friendship between Hun Sen and Thaksin Shinawatra (their parents and former premiers) is hindering a resolution, with certain voices claiming that their country’s dynastic ruler is about to sell out their own side for the sake of the friendship with the other dynastic ruler. In Thailand, this is especially the case with the government’s insistence that “MOU-44” – a deal that Hun Sen and Thaksin started to discuss in 2001 – can be the basis for talks with Phnom Penh over maritime rights. Some opposition parties and legal experts claim that this agreement gives away what is legally Thailand’s, and, thus, they claim that the Shinawatras are selling Thai sovereignty.
As one scholar wrote in February, “Thaksin’s influence over his 36-year-old daughter is exposing him to additional accusations of political interference, and putting Paetongtarn at risk of dereliction of duty, which could lead to her dismissal.” Nationalism has always been something of a sore spot for the ruling Cambodian People’s Party, though mainly because of the strain of virulent anti-Vietnamese hatred that infects Cambodian nationalism. Last August, the government went into a panic about a possible “color revolution to overthrow the government” after public agitation over an aging development agreement with Vietnam and Laos that some claimed was selling off Cambodian sovereignty.