In 2017, China began fielding an array of high-powered microwave (HPM) weapons that emit electromagnetic pulses (EMP) capable of disabling electronic systems. According to a RAND report, about 90 percent of HPM-related patents globally are owned by China-affiliated organizations, indicating continued advances in the precision and power of their HPM capabilities. These HPMs can be fitted onto land vehicles, aircraft, naval vessels, and cruise missiles.
Additionally, China’s high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) – a nuclear warhead delivered with a missile that emits waves of EMPs when detonated above a target – arsenal is set to expand as China pursues an ambitious nuclear modernization program aimed at doubling its nuclear arsenal by 2035.
Both HPMs and HEMPs are capable of disabling or destroying electronic equipment integrated into practically every sort of critical infrastructure, placing essential services such as water purification, hospitals, telecommunications, and transportation at risk of paralysis.
These advanced weapon systems have become a critical component of China’s “informatized” warfare strategy that guides its overall warfighting doctrine, according to the Science of Military Strategy, one of the Central Military Commission’s core strategic documents. Under this strategy, China seeks to dominate the cyber and electromagnetic domain by quickly disabling essential military and civilian electronic systems.
When paired with major advances in China’s hypersonic cruise missiles capable of delivering EMP warheads, China will soon be able to disable large parts of Taiwan’s critical infrastructure, paving the way for further conventional attacks. Facing this threat, it is important to evaluate Taiwan’s existing resilience to EMP attacks and how current preparedness measures align with China’s capabilities.
Missile Defense
Taiwan fields a range of surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems capable of intercepting HEMP and missile-borne HPMs. Taiwan currently deploys three types of indigenous SAMs: the Tien Kung 2, 3, and 4 (the older Tien Kung 1 is being decommissioned). Hundreds of Tien Kung 2 and 3 missiles are stationed mainly along the west coast and outlying islands.
The exact capabilities of these SAMs are classified, and estimates are conflicting. According to Open Nuclear Network and the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, the maximum range of both the Tien Kung 2 and 3 missiles is between 70 and 160 kilometers. Regarding the maximum interception altitude for the Tien Kung 3, this is placed at 30 kilometers by the Open Nuclear Network and at 45 kilometers by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology. The Tien Kung 4, which passed initial combat tests in 2023, is being integrated into Taiwan’s SAM network at an undisclosed pace and can reportedly intercept threats up to 70 km altitude.
Additionally, Taiwan currently fields an estimated 380 PAC-3 and 200 PAC-2 air defense missiles purchased from the United States in various configurations. It is estimated that the most advanced version of the PAC-3 has a range of 70 kilometers and a maximum interception altitude of 24 kilometers. Earlier this year, Taiwan signed a $761 million deal with the U.S. for a National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) defense package set for delivery in 2030. According to a U.S. Congressional report, NASAMS is reported to have a 40 kilometer range. Its maximum interception altitude is estimated to be 15 kilometers, according to the Global Security think tank.
Few of these SAMs can intercept HEMPs across the spectrum of effective altitudes that HEMPs would likely detonate at – between 20 and 50 kilometers, according to a U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency report. Additionally, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has a large arsenal of maneuverable missile systems attached to multiple reentry vehicles and has been developing hypersonic cruise missiles, likely capable of carrying HPMs and HEMPs, that could overwhelm and evade Taiwan’s SAMs. Therefore, SAM systems are not a definitive defensive measure against HEMPs and missile-borne HPMs, and alternative resilience-building measures should be pursued.
Hardening
Taiwan’s military standard for electromagnetic hardening requires critical systems to withstand an EMP of at least 1 gigahertz in frequency and 80 decibels in intensity. This standard is borrowed from the U.S. Department of Defense regulation MIL-STD-188-125-1. This level of EMP protection primarily defends against the ultrawideband HEMP attacks, which are of a lower frequency than HPMs. Therefore, facilities designated as “hardened” under this regulation are still likely vulnerable to these higher-frequency attacks.
The exact extent of hardening across military facilities is classified. According to open-source intelligence, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) has recently undertaken initiatives to harden certain critical military facilities. In 2023, the MND installed defensive measures at New Taipei City’s Sanzhi Naval Base to guard it against EMP attacks, including shielded rooms made of six-sided double-layer zinc-plated steel walls built to withstand the 1 gigahertz level EMP attacks. The Sanzhi Naval Base is affiliated with the Haifeng Brigade, an anti-ship missile unit set to incorporate Harpoon anti-ship missiles from the U.S. into their force, making it a critical unit for repelling a PLA amphibious assault. The Heng Shan Military Command Center, the Air Force Combatant Command, Chiashan Air Force Base, and the Shizishan facility at Chihhang Air Base are also reported to have installed EMP protection measures.
In the civilian sector, Taiwan’s Bureau of Standards, Metrology, and Inspection inspects over 1,065 electronic goods across all industries to ensure that they abide by the International Electro-technical Commission’s (IEC) EMP protection standards. The IEC advises that electronic devices should withstand electric fast transient and lightning-induced transient pulses, which are approximately 30 decibels strong. This level of protection is half that of the military standard of 80 decibels, so it would not defend well against high-intensity EMPs from either HEMPs or HPMs.
Energy Grid Reform
As a highly modernized society, Taiwan relies deeply on electricity to sustain its critical infrastructures, including water supply, communications, healthcare, and transportation. Therefore, EMP strikes targeting the island’s energy generation and transmission systems could trigger widespread blackouts and system paralysis, severely undermining national stability. In response, Taiwan’s efforts to enhance grid resilience through energy grid reforms are crucial in mitigating the strategic risks of EMP attacks.
Following a major blackout in 2022, Taipower initiated a ten-year, $18 billion Grid Resilience Strengthening Construction Plan. The primary aim of the plan is to decentralize the electric grid by developing clusters of microgrids powered by locally generated energy sources. The plan also intends to direct the installation of more switching yards at critical substations and construct more power distribution nodes to isolate threats quickly.
Taipower’s decentralizing efforts are building off Taiwan’s 2016 Electricity Act, aimed at diversifying Taiwan’s energy supply. The Electricity Act incentivized greater investments in renewable energy, stating that “priority shall be given to connecting and dispatching renewable energy.” Accordingly, Taipower seeks to shift energy production toward renewable sources such as solar, hydro, and wind. This energy diversification will lessen the nation’s reliance on a small number of fossil fuel power plants, reducing the risk of systemic and prolonged blackouts caused by natural disasters or attacks.
These energy reforms will greatly enhance Taiwan’s energy grid resilience to EMP attacks by making it more difficult for the PLA to target centralized nodes throughout the grid to set off cascading blackouts. Instead, regions would be more self-sufficient in energy production, creating a more resilient grid nationwide.
Communication Infrastructure Resilience
Another target for China’s EMP attacks would be communication infrastructure, as the disabling of telecommunications and networked devices would reduce military operational effectiveness and degrade governmental services.
Facing these threats, Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA) has been leading initiatives to ensure communication infrastructures remain functional in the event of a disaster or conflict. In addition to building redundancies into their networks, specifically for undersea cables, and improving repair times, a significant aspect of their efforts has been developing alternative communication channels that can be relied upon once traditional channels falter. For instance, MODA seeks to establish non-geostationary orbit satellites as an emergency communication network. In 2024, Taiwan’s largest telecommunication company, Chunghwa, and a U.K.-European company, Eutelsat OneWeb, signed an agreement to deploy low-earth-orbit satellites, similar to Starlink, over Taiwan in 2026.
MODA has also established a Public Protection and Disaster Relief communication system that prioritizes access to telecom services for critical government personnel. Under this program, special SIM cards are distributed to emergency responders and other essential personnel, who will be given special access to services from surviving base stations during a large-scale emergency when standard telecommunications are disrupted.
These emergency measures significantly strengthen Taiwan’s resilience by improving preparedness for disruptions to communication infrastructure in the event of EMP attacks.
Moving Forward
The layered missile defense network, hardening initiatives, energy grid reforms, and increased emergency preparedness in the communication sector are enhancing Taiwan’s overall EMP resilience. Yet there remain significant gaps in this defensive posture. The last three defense measures are reactive rather than preventive, as they only help mitigate the large-scale consequences of an EMP strike instead of offering a direct defense against the attacks. Moreover, Taiwan’s current SAM systems are ineffective at intercepting HEMPs, while the hardening of civilian infrastructure is well below military standards.
Addressing these vulnerabilities will be costly and out of reach for Taiwan in the near future. There currently aren’t any effective missile defense measures that can intercept HEMPs at the high altitudes where they detonate, and China’s rapid development of maneuverable missile systems capable of carrying HPMs only adds to these difficulties.
Hardening critical infrastructures nationally to withstand military grade EMPs would also be expensive. To cite an example from the United States, the proposed 2025 South Carolina House Bill H. 4954, aimed at hardening the energy grid to EMPs, estimates this would cost the state of South Carolina $910 million over a ten-year period to carry through. If Taiwan pursued a similar hardening initiative, the costs would likely be a few billion dollars due to the larger size of its energy grid. Taiwan has four times the number of substations and close to four times the length of transmission lines as South Carolina.
Although this may appear costly, compared to the large sums spent on conventional capabilities – such as the 66 F-16 fighter jets Taiwan purchased from the U.S. at a cost of $ 7.7 billion – the price appears more reasonable. Taiwan could potentially harden its entire energy grid for less than what it is spending on the F-16s.
Moreover, an advantage for policymakers supporting EMP defenses is that most of the measures listed in this article are dual-purpose, addressing many conventional and non-conflict threats. SAMs defend against all missiles, not just ones bearing EMP weapons. Decentralizing the energy grid would also help mitigate major blackouts caused by earthquakes, and alternative communication channels are critical during telecommunication disruptions caused by typhoons. Therefore, EMP resilience can be integrated into a broader preparedness framework, making it more likely to garner support and funding.
Taiwan is moving in the right direction regarding EMP preparedness. President Lai Ching-te has made clear that his administration is focused on developing asymmetric capabilities, elevating a growing group of national security leaders advocating a shift away from the costly conventional platforms and strategies of the past. Although the EMP threat remains overlooked, with this fundamental shift toward asymmetric defense policy, it seems more likely than ever that Taiwan will finally attempt to address this threat in the near future.