Starting on May 13, U.S. President Donald Trump embarked on a four-day state visit to three Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – to secure investments. He obtained a Saudi pledge to invest $600 billion in the United States, Qatari investments worth $243.5 billion, and a $200 billion Emirati investment plan.
Yet within the shadow of broader China-U.S. geopolitical competition, these deals could represent a strategy for the United States to pull the Gulf closer to Washington and away from China, whose influence has been gaining momentum in the region. In recent years, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have pursued multialigned foreign policies, courting Russia and China, while preserving U.S. ties. The question now is: will Trump’s deals bind the Gulf to the U.S. and restrict the Gulf’s ability to hedge between the United States and China?
China’s Growing but Constrained Footprint
Since 2005, China’s investment and construction projects in the Middle East have totaled $314 billion, and China is on track to be the largest trade partner of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE. Companies such as Huawei helped Saudi Arabia and the UAE establish 5G infrastructure, data centers, and develop artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities. U.S. Central Command’s General Michael Kurilla warned that Chinese weapons sales to the Middle East surged 80 percent between 2013 and 2023.
China’s expanded regional clout is demonstrated by its brokering of the 2023 Iran-Saudi Arabia truce, which paved the path for Iran-Saudi rapprochement. China in recent years has also welcomed Gulf states in its multilateral projects; Saudi Arabia and the UAE are both dialogue partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
However, Chinese influence in the Middle East has two limitations. First, Beijing is restricted by its reluctance to commit to formalized comprehensive security and defense alliances with Middle Eastern states. China’s foreign policy doctrine calls for strategic flexibility, preventing Chinese autonomy from being entangled by binding alliances. Thus, while the People’s Liberation Army has conducted joint military exercises with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, China has avoided mutual defense agreements with these states.
The second factor is the Gulf’s preference for American technology. While Chinese technological capabilities are rapidly advancing, the United States remains for now the leader in AI development, semiconductors, and chipmaking – all critical technologies pivotal in strengthening military capabilities and sustaining economic growth. This makes U.S. investments and expertise more attractive for Middle Eastern states that seek comparative advantages over each other. A case in point was in 2024 when the UAE’s artificial intelligence fund G42 divested its Chinese AI investments in favor of Microsoft.
These limitations grant the U.S. openings to curb the expansion of Chinese influence in the region.
U.S. Leverage
Trump’s deals in particular satisfy the Gulf’s strategic interests in ways China cannot. This allows Washington opportunities to restrict Chinese influence in the Middle East by binding the Gulf to the United States. Trump’s deals revolve principally around consolidating Gulf-U.S. security ties through increased transfers of advanced U.S. weapons and military training, which will augment existing bilateral defense pacts and deepen regional reliance on the U.S. military. The United States also offered collaborative efforts in AI development and defense technologies – all in return for Gulf investment in the U.S. economy.
In Saudi Arabia, along with the $142 billion sale of U.S. missile, aircraft and border defense systems – stated to be the largest arms deal in history – the United States will provide “extensive training and support to build the capacity of the Saudi armed forces, including enhancement of Saudi service academies.” AI developer NVIDIA will partner and sell 18,000 AI chips to state-backed Saudi AI start-up Humain. The U.S. and Qatar signed a statement of intent to “further strengthen our security partnership,” including Qatari purchases of advanced U.S. military arms such as the MQ-9B Reaper drone. U.S. quantum computing company Quantinuum finalized a joint venture agreement with Qatari Al Rabban Capital, which will assist Qatar’s quantum computing development. In the UAE, Trump announced the construction of the largest AI campus outside the United States.
Gulf-U.S. ties have always centered around Gulf petroleum or investment in exchange for U.S. security. What is different now is the acute need for technical expertise and enhanced military security as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE are simultaneously implementing ambitious economic reforms, diversifying away from oil production, and pursuing industrialization through advanced manufacturing. Economic reforms make the need for technological expertise more pressing, as these Gulf states seek to develop industries that can compete with industrially advanced states such as Japan and South Korea, which also benefit from U.S. investment. Economic reforms also require stable and secure conditions, which make military security a core objective, especially considering the Middle East’s volatility. Collectively, this explains the Gulf’s preferential stance to the United States, as no other state can currently match the volume of expertise, resources, and commitment necessary to fulfil Gulf ambitions.
Importantly, the flow of Gulf capital into the United States serves as an additional instrument to bind the Gulf to American interests. The reportedly immense value of Saudi, Qatari, and Emirati investments into the U.S. economy combined with the increased U.S. role in these Gulf states’ economic reforms, ties them to the continued stability of a U.S.-led international economic order. This also explains why all three states continue to keep an arms-length in Chinese-led multilateral projects, preferring observer status and dialogue partnerships in organizations like the SCO that represent alternatives to U.S.-led institutions.
Restricting Chinese Influence?
However, while there is a strong potential for Trump’s deals to pull the Gulf closer to the United States, the binding ability of Trump’s deals remains to be seen. These commitments may not materialize fully.
In 2017, during Trump’s first state visit to Saudi Arabia, his administration proclaimed a total of $110 billion in arms sales and $270 billion in commercial agreements made with Saudi Arabia. In actuality, Saudi-U.S. economic exchanges during Trump’s first administration from 2017 to 2020 totaled $92 billion – less than half the promised amount. While it can be argued that the Saudi, Qatari, and Emirati economic diversification plans could lead to greater economic exchanges between the United States and Gulf and thus support the immense proposed investment plans, this ultimately remains a hypothetical scenario, especially given the slowing effect of U.S. tariffs on global economic growth.
The U.S. ability to pull the Gulf closer, and restrict Chinese economic influence may be endangered if these deals fail to materialize deeply anticipated partnerships in AI and advanced manufacturing. These dashed hopes could even push Gulf states to seek more Chinese investments to fulfil ambitious economic reforms.
There is also the possibility that the Gulf’s enthusiastic agreement toward Trump and his deals represents a diplomatic strategy to avoid punitive measures, namely tariffs and sanctions the Trump administration has globally imposed. The highly publicized and near-hyperbolic nature of Trump’s deals appears to play directly into the U.S. president’s policymaking style, which is characterized by transactional and highly symbolic approaches. If so, this could undermine the effectiveness of Trump’s deals in strengthening U.S. influence in the region.
It is clear that the success of Trump’s deals in restricting Chinese influence in the Gulf hinges on the United States’ ability to deliver. While Washington should capitalize on the Gulf’s needs to preserve regional influence, to increase its chances of success the U.S. should avoid over-commitments.