In the wake of the horrific attack on unarmed civilians in Pahalgam in April, New Delhi made the momentous decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). It was an unprecedented move in the treaty’s 65-year history. The suspension acted upon hard-felt sentiment of a large section of India’s political discourse – that the country had been too generous with its neighbor on the shared waters of the Indus River system.
To understand the long-term implications, it is important to register certain facts about the nature of the treaty itself. First, the World Bank-brokered treaty has no expiry date. There is no clause under which either country can withdraw from the IWT; there is only room for modification. Second, per its Article XII, any modification or termination can only occur by mutual agreement of both nations. Thus, unless formally renegotiated or abandoned by mutual consent, the treaty continues to remain legally intact.
The decision to suspend the IWT therefore forces India to now navigate a legal grey zone, as the broader region treads unchartered waters. With the suspension, India put an immediate halt to all facets of the treaty, including data sharing, joint oversight and any form of dialogue or cooperation, leaving Pakistan without any advance information on river flows, flood forecasts, or drought risks. Recent reports suggest “short-term punitive action” has been taken on the Chenab River to restrict water flow to Pakistan’s Punjab. New Delhi is unlikely, however, to use the suspension of the treaty to cause a humanitarian crisis in parts of Pakistan, as it would lead to a number of cascading risks to India.
What India does next will have deep implications domestically as well as define the image that India is trying to create for itself as a growing global voice. The stage is now set for a complex legal and diplomatic reckoning over the Indus waters – a development that seems inevitable, given how the Indus Waters Treaty lags behind present realities.
The Past and the Present
The IWT, while widely regarded as one of the world’s most successful and enduring transboundary agreements, has long been teetering on the edge of becoming a relic. The treaty includes structural anachronisms and lacks provisions to address the complex geopolitical, environmental, and climatic realities of today.
Yes, the IWT has withstood numerous instances of conflict, war, and terrorist activities in the past. It has endured through some of the worst events and extreme rhetoric on both sides, such as India’s declaration that “blood and water can’t flow together” or accusations against India of “water terrorism.” The IWT is also a case study for conflict prone regions where water has been used as a weapon or means of coercive tactics.
However, when seen through the lens of present realities, the treaty is akin to a divorce settlement with little safeguards for the river basin itself and limited ability to address the myriad stressors that are emerging. Home to 268 million habitants, the Indus River basin is situated at a hydrologically fragile location. The basin is ranked first among the world’s 78 water towers in terms of vulnerability, based on the significant contribution of meltwater to river flows and the high basin-wide demand for water. It also contains the world’s second most stressed underground water reserves. Glaciers that feed the basin are shrinking with a 23.3 percent decrease in snow cover over the last two years. A change in water quality over time and a potential saltwater intrusion could damage the croplands at the mouth of the river basin in Pakistan.
The IWT was designed when Himalayan glaciers were more stable, the threats of climate change were not on display, and populations were far smaller. Its rigid framework not only fails to account for changing weather patterns, from erratic rainfalls to prolonged droughts, but also ignores the exploding water demand stemming from quadrupled populations and urbanization in both India and Pakistan.
In this atmosphere, India has continually signaled its desire to modify the treaty, including at least four formal and informal requests to Pakistan in the recent years. The last formal request was made in August 2024 – and one of the reasons cited was terrorist activities in Kashmir.
With the recent attacks, in many ways India’s position has been reinforced. New Delhi has not shied away from expressing its dissatisfaction over the IWT’s struggles to keep pace with modern challenges – climate change, population growth, hydropower technology advances, and adaptive data governance. This is a reality that is well understood on both sides of the border but unfortunately there is almost no appetite to address these issues.
An Uncertain Future
India’s decision to hold the IWT in abeyance has now brought the treaty into a legal grey zone, with an uncertain future. Within India there are heated calls for the country to stem the flow of water to cause a drought-like situation in Punjab and to release more water to flood other regions within Pakistan. From Pakistan there have been strong statements against the suspension of the treaty with declarations that any action with respect to the waters will be met with a powerful reaction.
While the common understanding is that India at present does not have the ability to hold back the amount of water needed to cause any significant damage to its neighbor, it can employ means that will cause a number of issues in the short term. In the immediate term the decision to stop sharing data could leads to severe disruptions in the irrigation planning and disaster preparedness within Pakistan, especially given that the 2025 monsoons have been predicted to be severe.
With the suspension, the reliability and predictability of Indus flows into Pakistan are now in question. An end to the IWT-mandated practice of maintaining minimum flows in lean season could damage irrigation systems in a country that is already overusing its groundwater and could also impact Pakistan’s hydropower projects.
All of these tactics, employed in the heat of the moment, will have a devastating impact on populations dependent on the river, potentially leading to a food and water security crisis. A humanitarian crisis in Pakistan, either brought on or bolstered by India, will have international ramifications. This is kind of international scrutiny that India does not want and should not invite.
Rising Above Hypocrisy
New Delhi has consistently maintained that the principles of the United Nations Charter and human rights are to be adhered to especially in times of conflict. India’s statements at the U.N. Security Council on Ukraine, for example, have pushed for diplomacy and dialogue while maintaining that lives of people should be safeguarded.
As a growing global power, India should not fall into the trap of moral hypocrisy as many others have done. A humanitarian crisis in Pakistan will also most likely lead to more violence in the country, a possible refugee crisis that no one in the neighborhood will want, and bolstered support to non-state actors. The erosion of the state in Pakistan and a much less credible neighbor will only further harm India in the long term. A new protracted war will set India off its course of achieving the dream of being a developed, economic powerhouse by 2047. All of this will also have a spillover effect on other regional water treaties that are either due or in conversation for review.
The suspension has put the Indus Water treaty in uncharted territories. From here India could choose to ignore international law; many have done so and continue to do so globally from the United States to China. Or New Delhi could use the suspension as smart leverage to renegotiate the treaty in a way that is reflective of present realities while protecting the river basin and ensuring equitable access for future use. This not only will safeguard present and future needs and development goals, from hydropower to irrigation, but also firmly establish India as a credible global power.