It is often forgotten that the bikini was named after an atoll, an islet that forms part of the Marshall Islands in the Pacific Ocean. The bikini burst onto the fashion scene 80 years ago, coinciding with the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945. While the bikini continues to dazzle, the islet after which the summer accessory is named was destroyed due to excessive nuclear testing.
Six decades after the obliteration of Bikini Atoll, some have suggested that U.S. President Donald Trump should resume nuclear testing.
Robert Peters, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, wrote in January 2025 that “nuclear explosive testing may be necessary to convince America’s adversaries that it has the necessary resolve and a credible nuclear arsenal.”
This would be dangerous and counterproductive.
Resuming nuclear testing will have a devastating impact on the environment, exacerbate strategic instability, and offer nothing by way of enhancing credibility or resolve. Instead of resuming testing, the Trump administration should initiate firm efforts to revive the arms control regime.
A new nuclear age has begun. The return of great power competition has destabilized the global rules-based order. U.S. adversaries are cooperating more closely than at any time since the end of the Cold War. These adversaries include two great nuclear powers in China and Russia, a rogue nuclear power in North Korea, and an aspiring nuclear power with disconcerting strategic intentions in Iran.
Conflict under the nuclear shadow is intensifying. China and Russia are expanding, modernizing, and diversifying their nuclear forces. Iran is on the cusp of a weaponized nuclear capability. The Trump administration’s behavior has cast doubt on the credibility of its extended nuclear deterrent, and countries that have historically ruled out nuclear acquisition are now militarily rearming.
Proliferation Possibilities and the Risks of Nuclear Escalation
Horizontal nuclear proliferation is among the most pressing problems in the new nuclear age. A precarious security landscape characterized by increasing tensions between the great nuclear weapons states and a deepening sense of global geopolitical uncertainty has made acquiring nuclear weapons attractive again to regional powers.
The strategic environment in Asia is becoming increasingly unstable. In East Asia, China’s unprecedented nuclear expansion program has precipitated a security dilemma. Its close military and economic cooperation with Pyongyang has increased threat perceptions in Tokyo and Seoul.
In 2023, Tokyo announced increased defense spending. Meanwhile, support for an indigenous nuclear weapons program in Seoul has gained some traction in recent years. Both Japan and South Korea are latent nuclear powers, meaning that they have the technical and architectural capabilities to weaponize existing civilian nuclear programs. If the international security landscape deteriorates further, all it would take for these powers to acquire a nuclear weapons capability is the political will to institute weaponization.
In South Asia, the risk of nuclear escalation between India and Pakistan has been recurrent, ever since the Kargil Crisis of 1999. The threat of direct military conflict between the hostile neighbors recently re-emerged in Kashmir. Without the establishment of a confidence-building framework between Indian and Pakistani nuclear command and control, de-escalation may prove short-term, at best. Cooperation through a durable arms control framework presents a viable opportunity to establish long-term crisis stability between India and Pakistan over contested Kashmir.
The situation in Europe is equally worrying, as the war in Ukraine rages on. The European Union has long been a champion of arms control, but there are indications that this is changing. Donald Tusk, the prime minister of Poland, signaled a desire for Poland to host or acquire nuclear weapons. In March he stated, “We must be aware that Poland must reach for the most modern capabilities also related to nuclear weapons and modern unconventional weapons… this is a race for security, not for war.”
An arms race is precisely what the international community must avoid.
The prospect of emerging nuclear weapon states poses a severe threat to global peace and stability. The Trump administration has exacerbated the fragmentation of the U.S.-led security architecture. While it would be a tall ask for the Trump administration to course correct from its assault on the transatlantic alliance, reviving the arms control regime is the kind of endeavor that could improve Trump’s popularity globally. It would also enhance Trump’s much coveted image as a peacemaker and improve the United States’ strategic environment.
Arms Control Among Friends and Foes
From 1959 to 2015, 23 nuclear-related arms control treaties were opened for signature. Many entered into force, but several critical treaties were never ratified. Among them were the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II), which sought to compel the United States and Russia to further reduce their strategic nuclear weapons, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which sought to completely ban all nuclear weapons testing.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, sought to disincentivize Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The United States left the treaty during the first Trump administration, in 2018.
That same year, the first Trump administration also left the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.
The arms control regime has been in free fall ever since.
Under the current circumstances, the New START Treaty, which expires in 2026, looks unlikely to be renewed. As the great nuclear powers diplomatically disengage, the durability of the arms control regime deteriorates.
The state of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is symptomatic of this decline. Opened for signature in 1968, the NPT is considered a landmark arms control treaty. It has been signed by 191 states. It came into force in 1970, and was extended indefinitely in 1995. By extending it indefinitely, direct and active engagement between signatories became infrequent.
As the perceived importance of direct engagement diminished, complacency began to set in among the NPT’s signatories. The NPT is the only “binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear weapons states.’”
Without regular consultations and constructive, dynamic conventions between the parties, the NPT’s mission has long been taken for granted. It will undergo a review in 2026 but has been languishing in partial obscurity for several decades. In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the NPT. India, Pakistan, and Israel have yet to sign the treaty.
Hence, all nuclear weapons states that are not permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are not party to the NPT. For all intents and purposes, the treaty is unfit for purpose. The treaty’s ineffectiveness is emblematic of the arms control regime’s gradual erosion.
A No First Use Silver Lining?
However, glimmers of a silver lining have emerged.
China has expressed a desire to engage in talks to pursue a No First Use treaty. Trump has intimated a vision for a world free of nuclear weapons. Iran, despite its checkered past, has also indicated an appetite for a nuclear deal. European countries prefer to adhere to treaties such as the NPT.
In East Asia, Japan and South Korea seek assurances from the United States to enhance extended deterrence to mitigate Chinese and North Korean predations. While a viable forum for dialogue is found wanting, some steps can be taken to remedy the erosion of arms control.
The United States should exert diplomatic pressure on the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (P5), to participate in a global nuclear summit. The Trump administration should engage with the U.N. and the International Atomic Energy Agency, collectively harnessing their diplomatic influence to compel the great nuclear powers, the non-P5 nuclear weapons states, and nuclear aspirants to engage in renewed arms control talks.
Trump’s penchant for being the center of attention would be satiated by spearheading a global nuclear summit.
His rapport with authoritarian leaders – such as Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping – puts Trump in a strong position to persuade them to participate in a summit initiative of this magnitude. French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer are keen to pander to the U.S. president, which Trump could leverage to compel their participation.
The P5 countries are responsible for most of the world’s nuclear tests. Since 1945, there have been over 2,000 nuclear tests; the most recent nuclear test was conducted by North Korea in 2017. However, the majority of nuclear weapons tests were conducted by the United States (1,030 tests) and the Soviet Union/Russia (715 tests).
In international politics, principles, values, and ethics matter. Especially when it comes to nuclear weapons. The P5 now have an opportunity to right the wrongs of their past behaviors. They should embrace that opportunity and collectively undertake the responsibility to revive international arms control initiatives, perhaps by establishing a common nuclear charter, based on shared nuclear principles.
Notably, this initiative should aim to establish a universal commitment to never use nuclear weapons first, and to agree never to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. The leaders of the P5 countries should also reaffirm the principle that nuclear wars cannot be won, and therefore should never be fought.
New and reformed nuclear treaties to reflect the current security landscape would provide nuclear powers with the opportunity to engage in matters that concern them all. Establishing a modern framework based on a principled and ethical perception of the utility of nuclear weapons would go a long way in reforming the arms control regime.
Limiting the risk of nuclear conflict and protecting the environment should be at the forefront of global considerations. Treaties restricting the role of autonomous weapons and banning the use of AI in nuclear command and control operations would ensure that human judgment remains the sole decision-making apparatus in regard to nuclear weapons.
Space is a domain the world relies on for basic access to banking, communication, navigation systems, and the internet. By updating the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the international community would be protecting critical assets in space. Banning the nuclearization of space and prohibiting the targeting of vital celestial assets like satellites for telecommunications and critical national infrastructure would protect lives and livelihoods, while engendering a sense of goodwill between the competing superpowers.
A nuclear detonation in space would devastatingly impact the globe. According to a 2024 Georgetown Security Studies Review article, a nuclear attack in space would inflict costs of up to $3 trillion on the global economy. Therefore, protecting space from weaponization is a critical common good.
Hypersonic missiles pose a threat to strategic stability. They travel considerably faster than the speed of sound and are virtually impossible to detect. These features increase the threat perceptions of countries like China and the United States, which are engaged in dangerous forms of strategic competition in emerging domains and areas, such as the deep sea and the Arctic. A treaty either limiting or banning hypersonic missiles would reduce threat perceptions and improve strategic stability.
Transparency is also critical in enhancing the credibility of confidence-building measures between adversarial nuclear weapons states. The Biden administration took a significant first step toward nuclear transparency. The Trump administration and the rest of the P5 should continue what the Biden administration started, especially as it pertains to dual-use technology that have potential kinetic conventional and nuclear applications. This could decrease tensions between nuclear powers and incentivize U.S. adversaries to follow suit.
These are all initiatives the P5 can undertake now. In leading by example, the United States specifically and the P5 more broadly can engender a new era of global nuclear cooperation. Not doing so would exacerbate an already tense global security landscape.
The Risks of Further Eroding the Arms Control Regime
A resumption of nuclear testing would expedite the complete erosion of the arms control regime, heighten hostilities between the great nuclear powers China, Russia, and the United States, and sharpen the distrust between the United States and its allies. The environmental costs incurred by a resumption of nuclear testing would be nothing short of catastrophic.
We are at an inflection point in history. The actions undertaken by global leaders today will have impacts that last long into the future.
At best, testing a nuclear device signals a viable nuclear capability. Capability, while critical, does not necessarily demonstrate resolve. It is also only a partial indicator of credibility.
Deterrence, to be effective, requires more. As Shawn Rostker wrote in Just Security last month, “restarting nuclear tests would neither strengthen U.S. security nor compel challengers to submit to U.S. demands.”
Indeed, testing a nuclear device does not make a nuclear threat more believable in the mind of the adversary. More so if the test does not go according to plan, such as the United Kingdom’s failed Trident nuclear missile tests that took place in January 2024.
A resumption of testing, therefore, could even undermine credibility, and weaken deterrence. Instead, the international community, under Trump’s initiative, should follow measures outlined in this article to revive the arms control regime.
Bikini’s Legacy
The arms control regime has been far from perfect. However, perfection need not be the enemy of good. The Trump administration should resist calls to resume nuclear testing. Instead, it should focus on reviving the arms control regime.
Between 1946 and 1958, the United States conducted 23 nuclear weapons tests on Bikini Atoll. It was consequently vaporized in Operation Castle, the hydrogen bomb detonation 1,000 times more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.
Remembering the irreparable damage done to Bikini Atoll should inspire a sense of urgency in the minds of the public and policymakers alike. An arms control revival starts with upholding and strengthening the ban on nuclear testing.
Exercising the political will to engage in nuclear diplomacy would mark the first step toward making arms control viable again.
Audrey Millet, a fashion historian, once wrote that “the bikini epitomizes an entire era: that of a new freedom, of the carefree post-war years and the consumer society.” Failing to revive the arms control regime could epitomize an era of lost freedom, pre-war malaise, and cause nuclear powers to sleepwalk toward catastrophe.