Six weeks after gunmen massacred 26 civilians – almost all tourists – in Pahalgam, the initial shock has solidified into a discernible pattern of crisis dynamics between India and Pakistan. Diplomatic expulsions, trade prohibitions, and sensational discourse regarding recriminations have occurred in rapid succession; nevertheless, the two nuclear-armed adversaries have, at this point, refrained from taking any military action.
Looking at Herman Kahn’s famous escalation ladder, the present conflict is positioned on the fifth level, known as a “show of force,” where military displays act as replacements for outright violence. The relevant question remains whether New Delhi or Islamabad will escalate further, or if external pressures coupled with more rational perspectives can mitigate the situation before the conventional crisis intensifies.
The opening days fit Kahn’s first stage, “ostensible crisis,” almost to the letter. Within hours of the Pahalgam attack, Indian leaders publicly blamed Pakistan’s deep state; Islamabad denied involvement and accused New Delhi of concocting a pretext for aggression. No troops moved, but the narrative of imminent danger took hold, giving both governments a domestic justification for stricter measures.
In stage two, symbolic “political, economic, and diplomatic gestures” came into play. India suspended the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, expelled Pakistani diplomats, and prohibited imports and shipping under the Pakistani flag. While the direct economic impact of these measures is limited, their signaling significance is huge. In response, Pakistan reciprocated by closing its airspace to Indian flights and designating Indian diplomats as personae non gratae, also warning that any interference with the Indus water flows would be seen as an act of war.
The third rung, “solemn and formal declarations,” came when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed to “pursue the terrorists and those who shelter them to the very end,” and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif promised a “crushing reply to any Indian misadventure.” Red lines were drawn in public, painting both leaders into rhetorical corners from which retreat now looks like weakness. In the fourth stage of the escalation ladder, “hardening of positions,” each party has refused dialogue unless the other first yields on the core dispute: India demands verifiable action against Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) proxies; Pakistan demands proof of culpability and restoration of the water accord. Private back-channels exist, but no high-level meeting has been scheduled.
Events of the past week confirm entry into Kahn’s fifth level, “show of force – limited troop or fleet displays.” Indian warships have surged into the Arabian Sea, conducting live-fire exercises and broadcasting a pointed “Trident of Power” message on social media. The Indian Air Force, meanwhile, has forward-deployed Rafale squadrons to bases in Punjab and Rajasthan after New Delhi cleared a $7.4 billion deal for 26 additional Rafale aircraft. Islamabad has answered with a highly publicized training launch of its Abdali surface-to-surface ballistic missile, a 450-kilometre system capable of striking Indian forward bases yet small enough to be packaged as a tactical rather than strategic asset. These moves are classic demonstrations of capability, meant less to start a war than to show readiness for it.
Neither side has yet crossed into level six, “significant mobilization.” Army reservists remain at home; civilian rail schedules continue; there is no mass movement of heavy armor toward the Line of Control. Intelligence imagery cited in open-source forums shows heightened alert at several air bases but no nationwide dispersal of aircraft or strategic assets. Kahn warned that mobilization is a visible, escalatory, commitment signal: once tanks roll north on the Grand Trunk Road, it becomes far harder to stand them down without political penalty. That neither state has taken this step suggests residual caution despite the warlike rhetoric.
Domestic pressure could propel escalation, however. With state elections looming, India’s Bharatiya Janata Party may feel compelled to stage a limited reprisal – special-forces raids, or a Balakot-style airstrike – aimed at appeasing voters while remaining below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. Yet even a “surgical” blow would push the crisis up Kahn’s ladder to level seven or eight, where retaliation spirals.
Pakistan, whose army equates national honor with swift response, would almost certainly answer with artillery duels or armor probes across the Line of Control – level nine, “dramatic military confrontations.” The Kargil War of 1999 showed how such skirmishes can draw in U.S. and Chinese crisis managers and force both sides toward intense crisis, severing diplomatic ties (level 10) and leading to the readying of nuclear forces.
Nuclear specters loom long before any warhead is armed. Both states’ field short-range systems, explicitly designed for battlefield use, India’s Prahaar and Pakistan’s Nasr- tactical ballistic missiles, and doctrinal writings since 2019 suggest a willingness to brandish these weapons early to signal resolve. On Kahn’s ladder, the first overtly nuclear stage is 15, “barely nuclear war,” involving preparations rather than detonations. Analysts of South Asian deterrence often assume a hair-trigger atomic threshold. Still, empirical studies of past crises (Brasstacks 1986–87, Kargil 1999, Pulwama-Balakot 2019) show that even intense conventional exchanges did not immediately translate into nuclear alerts. With its many levels between conventional battle and atomic cataclysm, Kahn’s model retains explanatory power: decision-makers pause, calculate, and signal at multiple points.
Yet the ladder analogy also exposes dangers unique to today’s information environment. Social media hysteria, drone footage of skirmishes, and rapid-fire television debates compress decision times. The space between rung five’s shows of force and rung nine’s dramatic confrontations can shrink to hours – imagine, for example, if a stray artillery round kills civilians or a drone strike is misidentified as a manned incursion. Kahn himself cautioned that escalation need not be linear; a panicked leader might “skip rungs.” The same social media feed that amplifies deterrent messaging can also magnify rumors, turning a local firefight into proof of national betrayal.
Where, then, are the off-ramps? Washington, Beijing, Dubai, and Riyadh have repeatedly brokered pauses – after Balakot, the U.S. national security adviser’s call secured an Indian pilot’s release. China has again urged “maximum restraint,” even as its ties with New Delhi sour and U.S. attention drifts. Multilateral channels, notably the now-suspended Indus Waters Treaty, could re-engage: pressure from the World Bank and downstream states might let India brand the suspension “temporary,” handing Islamabad a face-saving win while it quietly pursues militants. Economic constituencies, too, lobby for calm: Indian exporters dread Wagah’s closure, Pakistani farmers need Indian-sourced fertilizer, and both recall the post-Pulwama slump and the pandemic shock.
Real de-escalation, however, demands visible, near-simultaneous steps down Kahn’s ladder. New Delhi would need to reopen consular offices and limited air corridors. At the same time, Islamabad has to deepen its crackdown on terrorist financing, lauded by the Financial Action Task Force, and invite U.N. inspectors to suspected LeT camps in the Neelum Valley, moves that would shift the crisis back into the realm of political and diplomatic gestures without forcing either side into unilateral retreat.
The coming week could be critical, as India’s National Security Council is set to meet and decide on possible military responses, from artillery strikes to cyberattacks against LeT targets. At the same time, Pakistan’s top military commanders are also in a special session. Suppose either government feels pressured to act for domestic reasons. In that case, they may issue mobilization orders by the end of the week, pushing the crisis to a dangerous level where military movements and radar tracking create pressure to strike first, what Herman Kahn called the “reciprocal fear of surprise attack.”
This fear has fueled past nuclear crises and could quickly escalate the current one. However, both sides still have tools like intelligence hotlines, the 2005 nuclear risk reduction agreement, and back-channel communication between national security advisers to manage tensions. Using these channels is not a form of weakness but a smart way to avoid crossing a point of no return.
Kahn wrote his ladder to remind statesmen that catastrophe is not inevitable: choices exist, and they matter. The India-Pakistan confrontation of 2025 has already scaled five levels, but many remain above and, importantly, below the current perch. The trajectory of this crisis toward confrontation or compromise will be determined by the choices made in New Delhi and Islamabad in the days ahead. With tensions running high and the stakes immense, the coming period will be critical in deciding whether the leaders on both sides escalate further or step back in favor of stability and peace.