In the newly released white paper titled “National Security in the New Era,” Beijing signaled a notable shift in how it frames its maritime affairs within the national security system. For the first time, “maritime rights” is not only named as a core component of China’s national security concern – it is framed through the lens of China’s “unfulfilled reunification” with Taiwan front and center.
In the 2019 white paper, “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” maritime rights and interests were mentioned largely in relation to land border issues, and received only a passing nod through brief references to Taiwan and South China Sea disputes. By contrast, the 2025 document devoted much of the section “Safeguard Territorial Integrity and Maritime Rights and Interests” to the Taiwan question. Such a rhetorical evolution reveals a recalibration of China’s strategic priorities – and an increasingly direct linkage between Taiwan, the South China Sea, maritime rights and interests, and national security.
Maritime Rights, Not Just Security
Moving beyond traditional references to maritime security or defense, China has placed a particular emphasis on “maritime rights and interests” (海洋权益) in its official discourse for the past few years.
From the late 20th century till today, the advancement of China’s military capability has greatly reshaped the neighboring security environment for Beijing, prompting a shift from the original security-oriented strategy of “stability maintenance” to the current resource- and narrative-oriented “protection of maritime rights and interests” approach.
Today, China continues to face complex challenges in its maritime periphery, but in general territorial disputes between China and other countries are increasingly being contested in global media coverage, discussions of international order, and courts of international law rather than playing out on battlefields. The 2016 Philippine arbitration case served as a wake-up call for China regarding the fast-evolving form of external threats, which no longer come as gunboats and warships as in the 19th century, but as conceptual attacks on the legitimacy of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and the South China Sea islands.
Rhetorically, an emphasis on “security” implies violence and confrontation, whereas “rights” implies justice and legitimacy. The salience of “maritime rights and interests” within China’s national security narrative thus reflects Beijing’s evolving perception of external threats to national security, and its intention to counter narratives that portray China as a disruptive force in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait. Instead, Beijing seeks to frame its behavior as the lawful exercise of long-standing maritime claims bestowed upon it by historical international law and agreements.
Strategic Motivations of “Maritime Rights” Protection
At the forefront of China’s maritime strategy is its long-standing objective of achieving national reunification with Taiwan. On May 14, two days after the release of the new white paper on national security, Chen Binhua, spokesperson of the Taiwan Affairs Office at the State Council, referred to the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation, and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender as the legal foundations of China’s sovereignty over Taiwan. On May 12, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian also made a similar statement, citing the above three documents as basis of China’s lawful sovereignty over Taiwan. From Beijing’s perspective, reunification with Taiwan is a sovereign matter grounded in historical claims and international agreements, rather than an act of aggression – despite frequent international criticisms framing it otherwise.
Another factor that prompted the renewed emphasis on “maritime rights and interests” is the possibility of a second arbitration case from the Philippines concerning marine environment damage. Since September 2023, the Philippines government has been exploring the possibility of bringing a second legal case against China before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague. Senior officials from the Philippines National Security Council, the Solicitor General’s Office, and Department of Justice have repeatedly and publicly threatened to file such a case against China. As of January 2025, the Philippines was reported to be in the process of picking a legal venue.
In the wake of the narrative disadvantage it faced following the 2016 arbitral ruling, China has been made sharply aware of its vulnerabilities in the arena of international law. Beijing has since recalibrated its approach to international legal engagement – moving away from outright non-participation toward a more proactive and vocal stance in shaping discourse on international law.
Regional and Global Implications
Beijing’s renewed focus on international order and law underscores its intention of being regarded as a responsible actor, instead of a disruptive force of regional and global order, reflecting its growing recognition of the value of reputational power.
As an example, take the protracted negotiations over the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. While Beijing is unlikely to adjust any of its fundamental claims, its increasing investment in legal discourse and reputational image suggests a heightened sensitivity to the perception and interpretation of China’s behavior among its neighboring countries. This means that China will likely place more emphasis on establishing a rules-based framework that not only reinforces its maritime rights and interests, but also demonstrates its commitment to stability and security in the increasingly contested regional waters. However, if China’s neighboring countries in Southeast Asia, especially the other claimant states of the South China Sea, chose to interpret Beijing’s demonstrated determination to safeguard its maritime rights and claims as a more assertive gesture, the ongoing negotiations on the COC would face yet more complication.
Furthermore, Beijing’s increasing focus on the discourse of international order and law is a reflection of its concern over legitimacy and potential legal challenges from the Philippines. This may also encourage other claimant states, such as Vietnam, to strengthen their own domestic maritime laws and to seek more international legal remedies.
From a global perspective, Beijing’s renewed focus on safeguarding its maritime rights and interests has long-term yet subtle influence over the fluctuating strategic competition between the United States and China. The U.S. has long framed its military presence in the Indo-Pacific as an instrument to uphold a rules-based international order. But as China increasingly aligns its foreign policy narrative with the international order and law, future China-U.S. maritime encounters will necessarily face more complexity, as each side insists it is the one truly safeguarding regional stability and upholding international order. Both China and the U.S. view their actions as justified by international law, but both sides’ actions are, in fact, inherently destabilizing to the other.