The 2015 Constitution of Nepal incorporates a curious definition of secularism. The charter defines Nepal as a “secular” state, one guaranteeing “religious, cultural freedoms, including protection of religion, culture handed down from the time immemorial.” The last bit was added to appease the religious conservatives who saw an existential threat to the Sanatana Hindu dharma under the new secular order.
Multiple factors helped shape Nepal’s new religious identity. Inside the country, the warring Maoists, who had formally entered the political mainstream following a 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, were secularism’s most vocal champions. The hardcore communists shunned all religions.
During the insurgency days (1996-2006), most Maoist fighters came from traditionally marginalized hill communities. These Dalit and Janajati groups feel that the erstwhile Hindu monarchs and the political systems they put in place had for centuries suppressed their own indigenous religions and cultures. So when the Nepali monarchy was abolished in 2008, members of these communities also were in favor of Nepal shifting away from its status as the world’s only Hindu state.
But during the eight years of the constitution writing process (2008-2015), its Nepali drafters embraced many inputs from Westerners, including the suggestion that a modern nation-state should have no official religion. Some at the time saw this as a devious Western plot to make conversion to Christianity easier—something which had been hard to do under the old Hindu, monarchical order.
The counsel of Western countries was in direct opposition to India’s repeated messages to the Nepali political class that even without the monarchy, the country’s Hindu status should be retained in the new charter.
When the Nepali political class ignored this message, India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government under Narendra Modi imposed a crippling six-month-long economic blockade on its land-locked neighbor in 2015.
The rapid spread of Christianity in Nepal in the decade since it embraced secularism has only added to the old religious conservatives’ conviction that they were right all along: secularism was something imposed from the outside rather than what Nepalis wanted.
Developments in India over the past decade have also contributed to the growth of pro-Hindu sentiment in Nepal.
The political success the Hindu nationalist BJP has enjoyed on the back of its Hindutva agenda and the way the party has been able to assert the collective Hindu identity is a source of inspiration for Nepal’s religious conservatives. Sensing the religion’s appeal among the electorate in these turbulent times, even Nepal’s mainstream political actors are reconsidering their previous support for secularism.
Take the Nepali Congress (NC), the single largest party in the federal legislature. At the time of the constitution’s promulgation, there were murmurs of discontent over the country’s new secular character. Now, even the NC leaders, who once welcomed Nepal’s embrace of secularism, are rethinking their earlier position There is a feeling in the NC that the loss of its electoral support — between the last two general elections, it lost 5 percent of its vote-share — partly owes to its alienation of the conservative elements of the society. It fears that if it continues to back the “unpopular” secular agenda, a sizable section of the population will gravitate towards the resurgent monarchists, or other new forces who can appeal to them.
Compared to politicians from other parties, NC leaders have traditionally been closer to India, and see the benefit of having New Delhi’s BJP leadership on their side.
So, the pro-Hindu state agenda is gaining traction in the more liberal NC.
However, even the country’s biggest communist force, the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxists Leninists (CPN-UML), wants to be seen as pro-Hindu. This is why its leader and current prime minister, K.P. Sharma Oli, makes a show of visiting temples and taking part in Hindu rituals. Oli has also come to realize that it is impossible to be at the helm in Kathmandu for any length of time without New Delhi’s support.
The Maoists, Nepal’s third largest force, as well as the traditionally marginalized communities, don’t much like the idea of scrapping secularism — especially when the state is already partial towards Hinduism.
They believe that if secularism, one of the three pillars of the new Constitution (along with federalism and republicanism) goes, the two other pillars could also collapse — and with it the dream of restructuring the state to create a level playing field for all ethnic communities. Yet, the march towards a Hindu state will be hard to halt.
In the wake of the latest India-Pakistan clashes, New Delhi could become even more forceful in its old demand that Nepal check the rise of “extremist” Islamic forces in border areas. Concomitantly, this will entail the BJP and its ideological mentor, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), using their clout to strengthen Nepal’s pro-Hindu and Hindutva forces.
With Hinduism having become more assertive and overtly expressive in Nepal, Hindu-Muslim clashes are already growing in the Terai-Madhesh belt, abutting India.
The progressive changes Nepal has welcomed since the success of the 2006 people’s movement are under threat. This owes less to the failure of the new system and more to the reluctance of the old Nepali ruling elite to delegate power and responsibilities to the new provinces and local bodies, thus undercutting the very rationale of the new Constitution.
The next big test for Hinduism’s mass appeal will be the 2027 general elections. It is not inconceivable to imagine the NC going to the polls with restoration of the Hindu state as one of its major agendas. And if it does so, the UML could be forced to follow suit. And so would other smaller parties.
This will make electoral sense. Members of the Khas-Arya communities, the traditional ruling elites, who together constitute over 31 percent of the national population, are already partial to the idea of a Hindu state. And as the appeal of Hindutva increases in Nepal’s lowlands, so it will among the native Madheshis, who make up another 25-30 percent of the population.
But with traditionally marginalized Dalits (13 percent of the population) and Janajatis (around 35 percent) likely to resist the idea of a Hindu state, the new polarization along religious lines will not be a salubrious development for a country that is still struggling to come to terms with its ethnic and cultural diversity.