Since August 2024, when a student-led uprising toppled Sheikh Hasina’s government, Bangladesh has been undergoing a political transition. The country is now governed by an interim administration led by Nobel Laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus.
Major political parties, excluding Hasina’s Awami League (AL), are in consultation with the government to pave the way for long-overdue electoral reforms. Meanwhile, several new political parties have emerged.
In just nine months, 24 new political parties have been formed, and a total of 65 new parties have applied for registration with the Election Commission of Bangladesh. The country already has 55 registered parties. Between August and December 2024, 11 parties were launched, with September witnessing the highest number. The first to appear post-uprising was the Nucleus Party of Bangladesh (NPB), announced on August 23, with a lack of a clear ideological framework, in front of Dhaka University’s central library.
Several other parties soon followed: the Nationalist Democratic Party, World Muslim Community, Bangladesh Popular Party, and the Sovereignty Movement launched in September. October and November saw the emergence of the Bangladesh Reformist Party, Bangladesh Muktir Dak 71, Bangladesh Jagrata Party, and Bangladesh Democratic Party. On December 16, the National Revolutionary Council was announced.
The trend accelerated in 2025, with 12 new parties formed in the first four months alone. Among these, the National Citizens Party (NCP), launched on February 28 by student leaders from the July uprising, stands out. Its centrist ideology and youth-led foundation have gained significant traction, embodying the public’s desire to break free from the decades-old AL-Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) duopoly in the country.
In contrast to the NCP, many other parties are ideologically vague. Some lack even basic infrastructure — no offices, official websites, or clear agendas — operating instead through Facebook pages and groups. A few, however, appear to be leaning toward right-wing populism or are driven by personal gain.
One such example is that of the Bangladesh A-Am Janata Party (BAJP), launched by Mohammad Rafiqul Amin, former managing director of the controversial Destiny Group, after his release from prison following a 12-year sentence for embezzlement. In an interview with BBC Bangla, Amin revealed that being denied release during a wave of political prisoner pardons after August 5, 2024, pushed him into politics. He cited a prison official who allegedly said to him, “If you had been in Harkat-ul-Jihad or Ansarullah (two Islamist militant groups), I could’ve helped.” This anecdote highlights a grim reality of Bangladesh’s volatile political climate, where party affiliation can mean protection.
Amin’s move reflects a broader pattern of individuals entering politics not to serve the people, but to maintain influence. His 297-member party committee showcases the scale of ambition but raises doubts about integrity.
Other parties have tapped into public frustrations. Tarek Rahman, formerly with Gana Adhikar Parishad, launched Aam Janatar Dal (AJD), which has built its platform on strong anti-India sentiment. The Sovereignty Movement, while less vocal, also emphasizes national independence — a veiled critique of Indian influence in Bangladeshi affairs. These narratives resonate with widespread anger over India’s support for Hasina and her regime.
Despite their promise, the new parties struggle with visibility and grassroots mobilization. The NCP, though popular among urban youth, faces challenges in reaching rural voters. Moreover, many of its leaders are also facing questions about financial transparency.
Bangladesh’s political history offers cautionary lessons. After the 1990 mass uprising that removed General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, dozens of parties emerged. Most failed. The Islamic Oikya Jote secured a few seats, but fragmented. The Gano Forum, led by Dr. Kamal Hossain, remained limited to elite circles. Although 76 parties contested the 1991 election, power returned to the BNP and the AL became the main opposition.
Similarly, during the 2007–2008 military-backed caretaker government period, commonly referred to as 1/11, several new political parties emerged, including the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), Nagorik Shakti, the National People’s Party, and the Bangladesh Kalyan Party. However, these parties did not survive. Civil society lacked the organizational strength to resist political pressure, and the dominance of the AL and BNP left little room for alternative political forces to grow. The Grand Alliance, led by the AL, won 263 seats out of 300 in the 2008 election.
The 2024 uprising has offered Bangladesh a broader opening than previous transitions. However, of all the newly formed parties, only the NCP, rooted in student-led activism, is showing promise. Still, it faces challenges, including limited funding, lack of grassroots networks outside urban areas, inexperience in policy-making, and growing pressure from both internal power struggles and external geopolitical influence.
The burst of new political parties in post-uprising Bangladesh signals a long-awaited yearning for change. Yet, history reminds us that enthusiasm alone cannot dismantle entrenched systems. For any of these parties to succeed, they must build strong grassroots connections, maintain ideological clarity, and resist becoming tools for personal ambition or recycled elites. As Bangladesh prepares for free and fair elections and builds a genuine democracy, the people will judge politicians and parties on more than slogans and symbols.
Meanwhile, although the interim government is playing a pivotal role in shaping this political moment, criticism about the government’s stability is also under scrutiny. Yunus, a globally respected figure, brings credibility, but his administration lacks political experience, and public patience for unelected governance is waning.
The proliferation of new parties complicates this landscape, as many lack the organizational capacity to engage meaningfully in reform discussions, which may channel their anger later into disruptive actions if they feel ignored, risking further instability.
Moreover, there are concerns that corrupt and discredited leaders from the former AL may re-enter politics through these new parties and mobilize to destabilize the country.