As Emmanuel Macron wraps up his visits to Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore – where he delivered the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue – the French president reaffirmed the Indo-Pacific’s strategic importance for both France and Europe. In a context of growing geopolitical uncertainty and renewed unilateralism, Macron emphasized France’s commitment to a stable, multipolar order grounded in international law, freedom of navigation, and inclusive multilateralism – an international posture shared with key partners such as India, Japan, and ASEAN.
Building on this common strategic vision, and as the only remaining European Union (EU) member state with sovereign territories in the Indo-Pacific, France seeks to position its diplomacy not only as a national actor but also as a standard-bearer for European engagement in the region.
The exercise of sovereignty is precisely what underpins France’s specificity and credibility as a resident power. The French Indo-Pacific overseas collectivities (FIPOCs) – La Réunion, Mayotte, les TAAF (or South Antarctic Lands), New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, and Clipperton – which together have a population of 1.65 million inhabitants, play a central role in the construction and elaboration of a credible strategy.
Notably, 93 percent of France’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) lies in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, making it the second largest EEZ in the world after that of the United States. There are also around 200,000 French expats residing in countries of the region, more than 7,000 French subsidiary companies operating in the region, and 8,000 military personnel stationed permanently.
The assimilation of the FIPOCs into a single geostrategic Indo-Pacific framework is a logical step for a state seeking to assert itself as a legitimate actor in the region. However, despite some common geographical, economic, and political characteristics, grouping the FIPOCs into a single macro-region does not fully reflect the diversity of contexts and geopolitical challenges specific to each territory.
A comprehensive and nuanced understanding of local contexts is thus essential to fully comprehend the complexity of France’s Indo-Pacific engagement. This series will explore each of the FIPOCs separately to understand their characteristics, role in France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, and potential friction points between national and local drivers. You can view the full series here; today, we focus on La Réunion.

A map highlighting the French Indo-Pacific overseas collectivities (FIPOCs). Map by Paco Milhiet.
Located in the western Indian Ocean – 170 kilometers west of Mauritius and 680 kilometers east of Madagascar – La Réunion occupies a unique position within France’s Indo-Pacific strategy. With a population of approximately 860,000, it is the most densely populated FIPOC. Its deep cultural and religious diversity, shaped by successive waves of migration from Europe, Africa, Madagascar, India, and Asia, reflects a complex colonial history and a continuing plural identity.
La Réunion embodies France’s enduring presence in the Indian Ocean and its ambition to project influence across the wider Indo-Pacific region. However, the territory is marked by persistent social inequalities and structural economic dependence. The island’s trajectory will serve as a critical test of the coherence and long-term viability of France’s regional ambitions.
A Geopolitical Anchor
La Réunion occupies a central position in France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, allowing Paris to project influence across the Indian Ocean by participating actively in regional multilateral organizations such as the Indian Ocean Commission, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. La Réunion also hosts the administrative headquarters of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF), reinforcing its institutional regional centrality.
The island is home to around 1,600 permanently deployed military personnel, further anchoring France’s presence in the region. In parallel, the 2018 defense logistics agreement with India – granting India access to French military infrastructure – illustrates the island’s growing role in a regional context increasingly shaped by China-India rivalry. While India has become a key partner in strategic cooperation, China has also made notable inroads in La Réunion by opening a consulate, establishing a Confucius Institute, and engaging in economic cooperation.
Other actors have also sought to assert their presence. Azerbaijan for example, which has criticized Paris for its perceived alignment with Armenia, has attempted – through the so-called “Baku Initiative Group” – to influence local discourse by promoting narratives supportive of the island’s independence, albeit with limited resonance
Persistent Socioeconomic Vulnerabilities
Unlike other FIPOCs, France’s sovereignty over La Réunion is (mostly) uncontested. Annexed in 1640, the island was uninhabited when it became a French possession, establishing a clear and continuous administrative and cultural link with the metropolitan power.
Despite its institutional stability, La Réunion continues to grapple with deep-rooted social and economic vulnerabilities. Indicators of social precarity – particularly unemployment and poverty – remain significantly higher than those observed in mainland France. These structural vulnerabilities have been further exacerbated by recurrent public health emergencies, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and chikungunya outbreaks, as well as by repeated natural disasters.. The most recent, Cyclone Garance, inflicted an estimated 250 million euros in damages, with especially severe repercussions for the agricultural sector.
Enduring socioeconomic fragilities has contributed to growing political disaffection. Recent national elections have revealed a marked rejection of centrist parties – most notably the presidential majority party, Renaissance (La République en Marche/ Ensemble) – with voting patterns increasingly polarized between far-left and far-right forces.
Economically, the island is heavily dependent on transfers from mainland France, which account for nearly 30 percent of its GDP. It remains only marginally integrated into its African regional environment. According to 2024 data, Africa represents just 2 percent of La Réunion’s trade, while 60 percent of its imports come from mainland France. This disconnection from its immediate regional surroundings raises questions about long-term sustainability and regional integration.
Rethinking Regional Integration
Considering these evolving dynamics, it is necessary for local leaders and policymakers to undertake a strategic reorientation that seeks to more effectively align La Réunion’s economic and diplomatic posture with the African continent, while simultaneously preserving the benefits associated with its French and European integration.
This shift will require more than symbolic initiatives. It demands coordination between Paris and Saint-Denis, the development of territorial intelligence, and sustained efforts to bridge the gap between local realities and national strategy.
Ultimately, La Réunion illustrates the geopolitical paradox of being both a strategic asset and a territory marked by social fragilities. As France seeks to strengthen its international role in the Indo-Pacific, its ability to respond effectively to the complex challenges faced in this key territory will be crucial for maintaining the coherence and legitimacy of its regional strategy.