There is a serious disconnect between Western pundits and the reality on the ground when it comes to understanding the Kremlin’s thinking. The current popular narrative surrounding Russia and its neighbors boils down to the following: Moscow poses a threat to the purported liberal world order; Russia is “destined” to remain on the “sidelines” of global politics; Central Asia is a “battleground” for Russia, China, and the West; the Russian economy is being “crippled”; and finally, Russia is supposedly growing “dependent” on China.
There are two common ideas guiding these beliefs. First, Russia is simultaneously a powerful and influential giant and a weak actor. Second, the actions of Russia’s neighboring countries are subordinate to Moscow’s interests rather than intrinsically derived. But these narratives miss a big point: There are more layers of affect that shape the Kremlin’s thinking and its assessment of the so-called near abroad. The way to understand how Russia works is to try and get inside this longer-term mindset.
Putin’s Growing Interactions Along Its Southern and Eastern Borders Have Deep Roots
Despite the talk of an eventual peace in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin will continue to step up in countries neighboring Russia, and the West needs to be better prepared. Areas to Russia’s south and east are considered particularly important to Putin. Putin’s Look East policy was first introduced in 2012, and predates the two Ukrainian wars. In the same year Russia adopted a critical new law, the 2012 Federal Law, which for the first time set a clear definition of the Northern Sea Route and its geographical scope.
Putin’s emphasis on the south can been seen in the Kremlin’s ongoing ambitions vis-a-vis the North-South corridor project, otherwise known as the Iranian route, a 7,200-kilometer corridor that connects India with Russia via Iran. Like the Northern Sea Route, part of the northeastern passage connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans through the Arctic seas, the North-South corridor seeks to provide Russia an alternative to the Suez Canal and a way to sanction proof its supply chains.
Likewise, Russia’s interest in the region to its east can be seen through the continued expansion of trade with China, underpinned by new infrastructure. That includes developments of the sea ports of the Russian Far East and projects across the Russia-China land border: new rail links and pipelines through Siberia, crossing to Mongolia, and along the Yangtze River Economic Belt.
These transport infrastructure initiatives have a clear national security dimension in Putin’s eyes. The guiding idea is the creation of new modes and patterns of access. As Nicola P. Contessi has highlighted, “Access determines the ways and the conditions under which Country A can enter Country B’s (and vice versa) markets; how A is able to shape the attribution of contracts for the extraction of the resources contained in B’s territory and how they are exported to world markets; and how A is able to use B’s territory for other economic or military purposes.”
The various transit corridors in development under the broader North-South framework. Graphic by Sophia Nina Burna-Asefi.
Putin’s Southern Strategy
Putin’s south-looking strategy hinges on Russia’s three southern seas – the Caspian, Azov and Black Seas – part of what Moscow calls the Unified Deep-Water System of European Russia (UDWS). The Volga Don Canal constitutes the primary component of the UDWS, which connects these three seas together.
The importance of Russia’s southern strategy in the Kremlin’s thinking can be seen in a meeting held in the Russian city of Tolyatti on April 10, led by Nikolai Patrushev, assistant to the president of Russia, chairman of the Russian Maritime Collegium, and a close personal ally of Putin. The meeting discussed ways to integrate Russian railway infrastructure located along the UDWS with river ports to speed up transit for the North-South corridor. Patrushev reiterated the priority of creating a UDWS during the discussion.
While it is Patrushev’s role as chairman of the National Maritime Collegium to get involved in waterways, he also plays a prominent role in post-Ukraine invasion policymaking. His attendance at this meeting signaled that the North-South transport corridor has been given greater importance in Putin’s thinking.
Putin’s Eastern Strategy
Looking eastward, for the foreseeable future, Russia will be taking a two-pronged approach: it will continue expanding trade with China as Western trade ties reduce, while also building a bigger sphere of activity outside China, in South and East Asia and beyond.
What this looks like in practice is Moscow developing both domestic and international rail, road, sea, and pipelines. For example, in April, in response to a TASS question about how long the construction of the Rasht-Astara railway, part of the North-South corridor, might take, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk revealed that Russian specialists “are already present in Iran and working” on the project.
In a Federation Council meeting on April 17, Overchuk spoke about the development of Russia’s North-South corridor with reference to extensions to Afghanistan and Pakistan. He emphasized the corridor as an opportunity for Russian companies to expand their market to “Greater Eurasia and the Global South.”
Russia is also eyeing infrastructure cooperation farther afield. On April 9, Russian Deputy Minister for Transport Dmitry Zverev and Sudanese Ambassador to Russia Mohammed Siraj discussed expanding transport cooperation. According to the press service of the Russian Ministry of Transport, Sudan invited Russia to participate in the construction of railway and road projects in the country.
Outreach efforts can also be seen on the cultural side. On March 28, Yevgeny Primakov, the head of Rossotrudnichestvo, a Russian government PR tool, spoke about increasing and expanding Russian educational and cultural projects in Uzbekistan and the other countries of Central Asia at a briefing in the press center of the Russian sponsored media outlet, Sputnik Uzbekistan. Primakov stated that “the agency is refocusing its work on projects that promote international development within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).”
When it comes to Russia’s relationship with China, economic and strategic cooperation has visibly intensified but falls short of a “partnership” or “overreliance,” despite frequent claims in Western media. Indeed, there is an asymmetry in the economic relationships that is forecast to increase. In 2023, China-Russia trade jumped to $250 billion, compared to a meager $147 billion in 2021. But there is a lot of noise coming in the other direction too, which signals Putin’s long term game plan to derisk from China. Russian businesses have been quick to voice their concerns over Moscow’s increasing economic ties with China, and remain distrustful of China’s intentions.
Southern and Eastern Neighbors Welcome a Strong Russia
India, the United Arab Emirates, Turkiye, and China declined to align with the West against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In 2023, Russia exported half of its oil and petroleum products to China. India has also been a big consumer of Russian oil, which in 2024 comprised around 35 percent of its total crude oil imports.
In the case of Central Asia, despite some linguistic and cultural backlash to the Russian language and Soviet past, economically, politically, and in terms of security, Russia will continue to play an influential role, notwithstanding China’s inroads. When it comes to two of Central Asia’s largest economies, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Russian involvement in trade and transport policy actually seems to be increasing.
Most notably, Tashkent has invited Russia on a number of occasions (2018, 2022) to participate in the building of the Trans-Afghan Railway project. In early April 2025, the Russian and Uzbek transport ministries, together with their respective national railway operators, agreed to begin preparations for a feasibility study. They are looking to develop two routes: the Trans-Afghan Railway running from Termez to Naibabad, Logar, and Kharlachi, and a second line linking Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Dilaram, Kandahar, and Chaman.
Similarly, Kazakhstan is in talks with Russia over developing a transit corridor linking Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, including deepening energy relations.
Conclusion
As U.S. President Donald Trump carries out negotiations with Putin, and the United Kingdom and European Union step up their defense efforts against Russia, Western diplomats and policymakers should zoom out and head back to the drawing board. An honest review of the current sanctions regime needs to be undertaken.
Putin has been laying the groundwork against Western sanctions for over a decade and this has proved fruitful in blunting their impact. While there is high inflation, high interest rates, and serious labor shortages in Russia, the economy has fared better than expected. In 2023, Russia’s economy grew by 3.6 percent and it continued to grow in 2024. Many Russian businesses, including those in strategically important sectors, can access state-subsidized loans at very low interest rates.
With that in mind, Western decision-makers must find new and creative ways to understand Russia. It is important for the West to be clear about Moscow’s security interests not only in Europe but also in the regions to Russia’s south and east – and where Western states need to shore up their positions accordingly.
There are several ways that they can go about this. The efforts of the U.S., U.K., the EU, and other powers should focus on a strategy that builds and strengthens their defense especially in the “gray zone.” They can deliver serious sanctions on Russia’s shadow fleet and offshore holding companies with potential Kremlin links. It’s also important to monitor and counter any signs of Russian-government proxies and covert activities that destabilize businesses and seek monopolies in economic sectors in its neighboring countries. Western governments should ensure that a specialized task force of regional experts are proactively keeping an eye on developments and putting matters in context for diplomats and policymakers.
This won’t be easy; as United States takes a more unilateral posture on the world stage, its interests will differ with those U.K. and the EU. Meanwhile, the West should anticipate that Russia will respond in kind and should mitigate the impact and ripple effects its presence will have as it builds its own sphere of activity.
The West needs to be able to keep the doors open and cultivate access in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, while also anticipating that Putin will be keeping a close watch. Crucially, Western policymakers need to remember that without encouraging key countries such as China, India, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to support their strategy, their plans to contain this “transformed” Russia will be difficult to achieve.