Via a secret telegram dated October 26, 1962, addressed to U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev likened testy strategic relations between the two nations to a knot on a rope. Khrushchev noted that if both the U.S. and USSR both pull the rope relentlessly, both parties will struggle to untie the knot. This knot, which Khrushchev termed the “knot of war,” will then have to be cut. The Soviet premier ended with a cryptic message: “What that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.”
Historians and political observers have often regarded Khrushchev’s message as a caution against nuclear brinkmanship and a quiet appeal for de-escalation. Yet, embedded in his metaphor lies a subtler, often overlooked caution: the uncertainty surrounding how tightly the rope is pulled.
Indeed, in the absence of reliable information to ascertain to what extent the rope is pulled, or rather, the level of escalation, nuclear armed states are left to guess the other’s intentions, capabilities, and red lines. Such opacity, particularly in an environment of mutual suspicion as during the Cold War, often resulted in pessimistic and worst-case assumptions. In this sense, not knowing how taut the rope is can be as dangerous as pulling it too hard. Strategic competition without adequate information risks misinterpretation, miscalculation, and unintended escalation.
Recognizing this, one mechanism to offer reliable information emerged during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) which was later further codified under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START): the exchange of missile telemetry data.
Sharing telemetry – real-time technical information about a missile’s performance – would demystify the missile’s range, accuracy, and performance. Given that nuclear deterrence fundamentally operates on the basis of communicating credible deterrent threats, shedding light on capability and capacity to hurt offers a more somber assessment of mutual vulnerability. Consequently, such transparency encourages more rationality and strategic restraint.
What the SALT agreement demonstrated was that despite deep mistrust and pessimism, technical agreements could still be brokered to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. Examining this episode of arms control agreement offers a remedy for similar day dynamics today – China is embarking on a large-scale nuclear modernization, with the Pentagon estimating that China will build 1,000 nuclear weapons by 2030.
With no arms control agreements in place between Washington and Beijing, the exchange of telemetry data between the United States and China could serve as a foundational confidence building measure.
To be sure, China has often shied away from arms control agreements, citing its smaller nuclear arsenal vis-à-vis the U.S. and Russia. At the same time, China maintains that it has been consistently transparent about its nuclear policy of “no-first use.” Political observers in China suggest that limitations imposed by arms control are attempts by the U.S. to reduce Chinese strategic capabilities.
This is where the exchange of telemetry data becomes significant and valuable. The nature of such an exchange should not be regarded as a traditional form of arms control agreement, as it neither imposes limits on arsenal nor bans specific weapon systems. On the contrary, not only does it avoid imposing any restrictions on China, but it offers their U.S. counterparts a view on the level of technical sophistication – thereby reinforcing mutual vulnerability, the bedrock of mutually assured destruction. Indeed, by selectively exchanging telemetry data, on reciprocal or phased basis, both the U.S. and China could retain their strategic flexibility while at the same time reduce the chances of inadvertent escalation.
Beyond deterrence, exchanging data would make sense for both countries. Exchanging data would appeal to Beijing because it aligns with China’s stated commitment to a “no first use” policy. Given that Chinese nuclear policy operates on an assured retaliation basis, telemetry exchange could demonstrate its confidence and reaffirm its retaliatory capability.
Similarly, the benefits of telemetry exchange are clear for the United States. As it has previously exchanged telemetry data with Russia, the U.S. is no stranger to telemetry transparency. Hence, this institutional knowledge can be leveraged to establish a technical, non-intrusive form of arms control with China – especially pertinent given that the two countries currently have no formal arms control agreement.
Finally, the exchange of telemetry data could unlock broader avenues for crisis management. A natural extension to the exchange of data would be instituting a system of notification of ballistic missile launches. Moreover, the focus on technical agreements could also eventually lead to attempts at institutionalizing deeper technical cooperation. In any case, the exchange of data reinforces deterrence by heightening the sense of mutual vulnerability, which would affirm the core logic of mutually assured destruction. Indeed, such mutual understanding might even open the door to broader long-overdue arms control dialogues.
While skeptics may argue that the current acrimonious state of relations between the United States and China precludes such agreements, it is precisely because relations are tense that non-intrusive, technical measures to maintain strategic stability and reduce the consequence of distrust are more vital than ever. Admittedly, telemetry exchange is no panacea. But as a non-intrusive, confidence building mechanism grounded in strategic logic, it offers a prudent starting point – one solely missing in China-U.S. strategic relations.