The ongoing war in Ukraine and crises in the Middle East have caused significant instability in the international energy supply. For energy importers like Japan, a reliable and affordable energy supply is vital to national security and economic development. Following the 2011 Fukushima triple disaster, the Japanese government shut down all nuclear power plants. However, this increased Japan’s reliance on imported fossil fuels, particularly LNG. To reduce its dependence on overseas energy imports, the Japanese government has decided to restart its nuclear power plants.
Efforts Toward Restarting the Nuclear Program
The restart of nuclear power plants is based on the Sixth Basic Energy Plan, approved by the Cabinet in October 2021. Given that the trauma of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster remains vivid in the public consciousness, the government has adopted a cautious, step-by-step approach. The reactivation of reactors must first be approved by the Nuclear Regulation Authority under the new regulatory standards. Subsequently, the restart can proceed only with the consent of local governments and residents. The government hopes that its safety-first approach will reassure local communities and alleviate their concerns about nuclear energy.
In addition, efforts are underway to develop and construct next-generation innovative reactors. These include plans to replace decommissioned nuclear plants with advanced models, contingent on securing local support. While maintaining the effective 60-year operational limit, the government is also promoting a policy that excludes certain shutdown periods from being counted toward that limit.
Kansai Electric Power’s Takahama Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 were restarted in August and September 2023, respectively. In November and December 2024, two more reactors came online: Onagawa Unit 2 (operated by Tohoku Electric Power) and Shimane Unit 2 (Chugoku Electric Power). As of January 2025, a total of 14 reactors nationwide had resumed operation.
To ensure the stable use of nuclear power in the future, it is essential to address the approximately 20,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel currently stored in Japan. With an eye toward efficient resource utilization and the reduction of both volume and toxicity of high-level radioactive waste, the Japanese government promotes the nuclear fuel cycle as a core policy. Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited’s Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant received approval for a revised business plan in July 2020 and for its first design and construction plan change in December 2022. The facility is scheduled for completion as early as the first half of fiscal year 2024. Similarly, the company’s MOX fuel fabrication plant received approval for a revised business plan in December 2020 and for its first construction plan change in September 2022, with completion targeted within the same timeframe.
In addition, efforts are underway to expand storage capacity for spent nuclear fuel. Dry storage facilities are currently under construction at Shikoku Electric Power’s Ikata Nuclear Power Plant and Kyushu Electric Power’s Genkai Nuclear Power Plant. In August 2023, the Mutsu interim storage facility for recycled fuel received approval from the Nuclear Regulation Authority for changes to its safety regulations, marking concrete progress toward increasing storage capacity.
Furthermore, the Japanese government has conducted a national survey as part of its research on the final disposal of high-level radioactive waste generated through the nuclear fuel cycle. This includes engaging with local residents and leaders. Currently, the government has identified two locations as potential final disposal sites: Suttsu Town and Kamoenai Village in Hokkaido, and Genkai Town in Saga Prefecture.
The Challenge of Japan’s “Nuclear Village”
To understand Japan’s plan to restart nuclear power plants, it is essential to first examine the question: What caused the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima plant, operated by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)? While the earthquake and tsunami were widely regarded as the immediate triggers, the National Diet Investigation Report identified the Fukushima nuclear meltdown as a “man-made disaster.”
This argument centers on Japan’s so-called “nuclear village,” a tightly knit community composed of actors from the nuclear industry, national and local regulatory bodies, and academia. At the core of this nuclear village is a group of approximately 200 to 300 university scholars, many of whom know each other personally. Through these personal connections, they help their students secure positions in electric power companies, manufacturing firms, or as technical officials in government agencies and local authorities.
As a result of this inbreeding between the public and private sectors, members of the nuclear power industry have been cultivated within the same “village,” sharing common interests. For example, Japan’s nuclear safety oversight was originally designed as a double-check system involving the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) and the Nuclear Safety Commission. However, because both regulators and those being regulated had close personal relationships, a prevailing commitment to protecting and advancing the industry’s collective interests often outweighed safety concerns. Not only did the national regulator neglect unsafe practices at TEPCO, but it also actively colluded with the company to revise nuclear safety regulations in ways that reduced TEPCO’s potential legal liability.
The nuclear village also promoted the myth of “absolute safety,” a narrative that began in the 1950s to build public support for nuclear energy in Japan, at a time when nuclear issues remained highly sensitive due to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Daigo Fukuryū Maru incident. Over the years, this evolved into a nationwide propaganda effort aimed at educating the Japanese public – starting with schoolchildren – on the supposed safety of nuclear power.
The campaign rested on three pillars: manipulating media coverage to suppress safety concerns, implementing outreach programs in the education system, and enlisting prominent scholars to lead the safety campaign. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology even distributed picture books to children that illustrated the five-layer safety measures of nuclear power plants.
Industry insiders within the “nuclear village” often dismiss dissenting views as amateurish. Power generators frequently send protest letters to media outlets, accusing them of negative reporting on nuclear safety issues and threatening to withdraw their advertisements. They even demand that reporters “come and learn” so they can “properly reflect on the erroneous report.”
Members of the “nuclear village” also treat opinions from civil society groups and even Diet members as ignorant. For instance, in 2005, a civil society group warned the then-president of TEPCO that the tsunami height assumption used in the company’s preparedness plan was too low. The warning was ignored, and TEPCO failed to prepare for a tsunami larger than expected. As a result, the Fukushima tsunami caused a total failure of seawater cooling pumps and a system-wide breakdown of the five-layer safety measures, which ultimately led to the nuclear meltdown.
The “Nuclear Village” Today
Fourteen years have passed since the Fukushima disaster, yet the “nuclear village” remains. Following the disaster, the government attempted to dismantle the close connections between academia, regulators, and the nuclear industry, only to find it nearly impossible. One challenge is that, by eliminating the “nuclear village” entirely, Japan would lose its nuclear expertise, as almost every expert is linked to the system. As a result, the village persists.
For example, although the Nuclear Regulation Authority has a disqualification rule stating that executives and employees of businesses involved in nuclear refining, processing, reprocessing, or waste disposal cannot serve as commissioners or chairpersons, this rule has become largely meaningless in practice. Many commissioners and chairpersons have past employment ties to nuclear industries. As all members of the commission support nuclear promotion, dissenting voices – including experts in seismology – have disappeared. Hence, it is difficult to argue that the Nuclear Regulation Authority maintains true independence.
The Noto Peninsula earthquake on New Year’s Day in 2024 exposed issues at the Shika Nuclear Power Plant, operated by Hokuriku Electric Power. Initially, Hokuriku Electric reported to the Nuclear Regulation Authority that firefighting systems had been activated when a transformer was damaged, and that there were “sounds resembling explosions and a burning smell.” However, the company later revised its report, claiming that no fire had occurred. It also initially reported that approximately 3,500 liters of oil had leaked from the damaged transformer at Unit 2, but later corrected this to approximately 19,800 liters – more than five times the original estimate.
Regarding tsunami monitoring, Hokuriku Electric stated at a January 2 press conference that “no significant change was detected in water levels.” However, later that night, the company corrected this statement, admitting that a 3-meter rise in water levels had been recorded by on-site gauges.
The company neither promptly reported the incidents to the regulator nor disclosed the information publicly, demonstrating that the “village” mentality persists even after the 2011 nuclear accident.
The Lesson From Japan
Restarting nuclear power is certainly important in addressing energy security challenges, but ensuring safety must remain the highest priority. Fourteen years after the Fukushima disaster, the problematic structure of the “nuclear village” still exists. Unless this structure is dismantled, the risk of another “man-made” nuclear disaster will persist.
The story of Japan’s nuclear village should serve as a cautionary tale for other places engaged in debates on nuclear energy. For example, Taiwan faces many of the same trade-offs as Japan. On one hand, Taiwan is an energy importer with a vulnerable supply. On the other hand, it is prone to earthquakes. As a result, nuclear energy has become a central political debate. While the Kuomintang (KMT) supports nuclear energy from an economic and energy security perspective, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has made opposition to nuclear power a central mandate, appealing to safety concerns through slogans such as “Fukushima Today, Taiwan Tomorrow.” Following the DPP’s rise to power in 2016, Taiwan decided to phase out nuclear power, with the final nuclear reactor set to cease operation on May 17, 2025.
In March 2025, even the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto U.S. embassy in Taipei, joined the national debate, highlighting Taiwan’s energy security concerns and offering Taiwan-U.S. cooperation on nuclear energy. This has been interpreted as U.S. support for nuclear energy in Taiwan.
In Taiwan’s debate, the issue of regulatory capacity is notably absent. As Japan’s example illustrates, however, a truly independent and capable regulatory agency is the most crucial factor when it comes to ensuring nuclear safety.