Chinese President Xi Jinping is on a four-day visit to Russia that started on May 7, which will include his attendance at a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II, and the potential signing of numerous agreements. Media interpreted the trip as a “symbolic show of support for Putin against [the] West.”
Since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, there has been a growing interest in this support, as well as China-Russia security ties more generally. Based on the premise that China wields significant influence over Russia, the United States, European Union, and Ukraine have tried various methods to push Beijing into helping broker a lasting peace settlement.
A scrutiny of Sino-Russian security interactions over the past three years suggests that there has been a duality in China’s approach to Russia during that time. China has not overtly supported Russia’s war in Ukraine but has significantly increased strategic and security cooperation with Moscow in domains that are not directly related to the conflict.
China-Russia Security Ties Before 2022
China and Russia relations fall short of a formal military alliance, but they amount to close strategic collaboration. The framework of this cooperation is laid down in strategic agreements. In 2019, the year that the two sides upgraded their relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination,” Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was aiding China in building a missile attack alert system, a capability possessed by only Washington and Moscow. In 2021, the year when the two sides extended their “Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation,” Russia’s Ministry of Defense announced that Beijing and Moscow had also agreed on a “2021-2025 military cooperation roadmap,” which reflected deep strategic trust between the two nations and their readiness to counter the United States in the Asia-Pacific.
Within this framework, China and Russia nurtured close security ties that have manifested in frequent meetings between their defense and security officials as well as joint military exercises.
In the 2019-2021 period, Chinese and Russian defense and security officials met at least twice a year, on average. These meetings took place in both multilateral and bilateral settings. For instance, 2019 was the first year when Russia’s defense minister participated in the Xiangshan Forum, a multilateral security meeting in Beijing. Chinese and Russian defense officials also participated in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s meeting of defense ministers in 2019, 2020, and 2021.
At the bilateral level, Yang Jiechi, a former member of the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo who headed the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, and Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, met in 2019 and 2021 for the China-Russia Strategic Security Consultation, where they discussed strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, and security cooperation in general.
In the same timeframe, Sino-Russian military and security forces conducted joint exercises at least three times a year on average. These drills included multilateral exercises, such as Mosi with South Africa in 2019, and the Maritime Security Belt drill with Iran in the same year. In parallel, China has regular bilateral maritime exercises with Russia, named Joint Sea, which took place in 2019 and 2021. The Chinese and Russian air forces also conducted a joint air bomber patrol in 2019 that involved two Chinese Xian H-6K and two Russian Tupolev Tu-95MS long-range, nuclear-capable bombers.
In other words, China and Russia had increasingly close security ties before the Ukraine conflict. Although their relationship did not develop into a formal military alliance, it exhibited similar characteristics and an intent to counter security engagements promoted by the United States, such as AUKUS, a trilateral security arrangement between the Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The Ukraine Conflict and Its Implications for China
On February 24, 2022, Russia launched its “special military operation” in Ukraine. The United States, NATO, the European Union, and other U.S. allies (notably Japan and Australia) were appalled by the move. The U.S.-led bloc spoke of an unjustified war, and responded with measures aimed at supporting Ukraine, isolating Russia, and undermining Moscow’s warfighting capacity. For instance, Russian banks were banned from SWIFT, a cross-border payment system used by financial institutions across the globe.
The hostilities in Ukraine occurred against the backdrop of deepening China-Russia ties. Twenty days before the conflict, Beijing and Moscow promulgated their “no limits” partnership. It is no wonder that European and U.S. leaders swiftly approached China to try to convince Beijing to facilitate a settlement in Ukraine.
In March 2022, Ukraine’s then-foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, requested that China mediate a ceasefire with Russia. In the same month, then High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission Josep Borrell said that China had to be the one to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv. At the China-EU summit in April 2022, then-European Council President Charles Michel said that the EU counted on China to facilitate the achievement of lasting peace in Ukraine.
Some of this outreach went beyond mere appeals and sought to deter Beijing from providing material support to Russia in Ukraine. In 2022, then U.S. President Joseph Biden and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin warned their Chinese counterparts about the potential negative consequences of materially supporting Russia in the conflict. In 2023, Borrell’s draft speech for an event at the Center for China and Globalization stated that the EU could not trust China if it did not facilitate peace in Ukraine and that neutrality “in the face of the violation of international law is not credible.”
The United States and its allies, the EU, and Ukraine also took action against Chinese entities for their purported support of Russia’s war machine. The United States imposed sanctions on dozens of Mainland China- and Hong Kong-based entities in multiple rounds for supporting the Russian war effort and aiding Moscow in sanction circumvention. For instance, Washington sanctioned Changsha Tianyi Space Science and Technology Research Institute, also known as Spacety, in January 2023 for supplying the Wagner Group with radar satellite imagery to facilitate its operations in Ukraine. In October 2024, the U.S. sanctioned two Chinese drone companies, Xiamen Limbach Aircraft Engine Co. and Redlepus Vector Industry Shenzhen Co., for purportedly aiding the Russian war effort.
The EU and Ukraine took similar steps. The 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th sanction packages against Russia blacklisted multiple China- and Hong Kong-based companies for aiding Moscow in sanctions circumvention. The latest sanction package in February 2025 included 25 such entities. In April 2025, Ukraine banned three Chinese firms from doing business in Ukraine and froze their assets for purportedly aiding Russia in missile building. Last month, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed that at least 150 Chinese citizens were fighting in Ukraine and the Chinese government had willingly ignored it.
In sum, the leaders of the United States, the EU, and Ukraine are well aware of the deepening security ties between China and Russia. Throughout the Ukraine conflict, they have employed a mix of appeals, threats, and sanctions to persuade Beijing to leverage its influence over Moscow to help facilitate a peace settlement.
China-Russia Security Ties Since 2022
Officially, China sought to distance itself from the conflict in Ukraine. On the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion, Beijing issued a 12-point position paper on the Ukraine crisis and repeatedly said that “dialogue and negotiation” are the only way to solve the conflict. Chinese officials also opposed sanctions against Chinese firms and called out certain unnamed parties for making “irresponsible remarks” regarding Chinese nationals fighting in Ukraine.
At the same time, China and Russia forged ahead with their security engagements in domains unrelated to the Ukraine conflict. They augmented the framework of their security relations by signing a memorandum of understanding on deepening maritime law enforcement cooperation.
The interactions between Chinese and Russian military and security forces roughly doubled in numbers in the 2022-2024 period. The two sides had virtual or in-person meetings four times a year, on average. In 2023 alone, Chinese defense officials visited Russia at least three times, and Moscow also claimed that the two sides engaged in missile defense consultations.
There was an increase in joint drills as well, with the two militaries and security forces conducting cooperative exercises six times a year, on average. Bilateral engagements increased in frequency, with the continued regular implementation of the Joint Sea and Northern/Interaction exercises. Furthermore, the two sides continued their multilateral exercises with Iran in 2022, 2023, and 2024, as well as with South Africa in 2023.
2024 was a record-setting year in China’s joint drills with foreign forces, and its engagements with Russia were no exception from this pattern. Their security forces trained together at least 10 times, and their joint exercises included anti-mine and search and rescue training, air patrols, and anti-terror drills. On some occasions, the joint exercises and patrols taunted the U.S. and its allies. Chinese and Russian bombers conducted a joint drill near Alaska and later that year, Chinese and Russian air patrols entered South Korea’s Air Defense Identification Zone.
The Dichotomy in China-Russia Security Ties
The numbers suggest a duality in China’s approach to its security relations with Russia following the Ukraine conflict. On the one hand, the Chinese government refrained from officially supporting the Russian war effort. It distanced itself from accusations about dual-use exports, Chinese mercenaries, and aiding Russian weapons development while emphasizing the importance of consultations and dialogue in achieving a settlement. At the same time, Beijing formally enhanced its security relations with Russia in areas that cannot be connected to the Ukraine conflict, such as maritime exercises, joint patrols, and engagement with third actors, such as Iran, North Korea, and South Africa.
This has at least two implications. First, Western powers have used requests, threats, and sanctions to convince Beijing to help bring Moscow to the negotiating table. The efficacy of those methods has been questionable, to say the least, given that China-Russia security relations have only grown stronger since the outbreak of the conflict and Beijing has so far refused to leverage its influence over Moscow.
Second, while the China-Russia relationship is officially not targeted against third parties, the pattern of their interactions shows the characteristics of balancing against the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. Moscow is a key partner of Beijing in its efforts to resist U.S. pressure, and Russia’s controversial behavior and the West’s isolation of Moscow are unlikely to change that.
China’s calibrated approach reflects a broader strategic calculation: advancing its geopolitical interests through a closer partnership with Russia while avoiding confrontation with the West. This allows Beijing to harness geopolitical benefits from Moscow’s alignment without fully bearing its diplomatic or economic costs. If current trends persist, China is likely to continue deepening selective security ties with Russia while managing tensions with the West.