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The Political Messaging of China and Serbia’s Belgrade Bombing Commemoration

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The Political Messaging of China and Serbia’s Belgrade Bombing Commemoration

Memories of NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in 1999 reinforce China and Serbia’s partnership, with an eye to establishing a “shared future.”

The Political Messaging of China and Serbia’s Belgrade Bombing Commemoration

A Serbian Cabinet member and the Chinese ambassador present wreaths at the monument for the three Chinese martyrs, Belgrade, May 7, 2025

Credit: Vincent K. L. Chang

While Chinese President Xi Jinping was traveling to Moscow to participate in the memorial events marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, a less noticeable but nonetheless significant joint commemoration took place elsewhere in Europe.

At 9 a.m. on May 7, around a hundred Chinese and a dozen Serbs gathered in front of the Chinese Cultural Center in New Belgrade. The center stands at the site of the former Chinese embassy to Yugoslavia, which was attacked by satellite-guided bombs dropped from a U.S. B-2 stealth bomber on May 7, 1999, during NATO’s war against Yugoslavia. The bombing injured 20 embassy workers and killed three Chinese journalists.

Beijing reacted furiously at the time, accusing the United States of a barbaric act in what China’s government had considered an illegal war of aggression from the outset. In an exceptional move, the Chinese leadership condoned a wave of anti-U.S. protests across the country, which included tens of thousands of enraged demonstrators laying siege to the U.S. embassy in Beijing.

Rejecting accusations of ill-intent, Washington apologized for what it called a tragic accident. A salient fact, however, is that weeks before the bombing a U.S. stealth fighter had been shot down by the Yugoslav army. Rumors emerged that critical stealth technology recovered from the wreckage had been handed to the Chinese, or that the Chinese embassy had assisted then-Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milošević, and that this could have prompted a CIA-led attack on the embassy. Such reports have never been confirmed, but neither have they been conclusively refuted.

Memorializing Martyrs

The three Chinese casualties – Xinhua News Agency correspondent Shao Yunhuan and Guangming Daily reporters Xu Xinghu and Zhu Ying, who were also spouses – were instantly declared martyrs by the Chinese government. Local authorities built a martyrs’ memorial hall for Xu and Zhu in the former’s hometown, which was renamed after him in 2010. In 2022, the memorial hall was renovated in response to public demands.

In Belgrade, two commemorative plaques at the former embassy site recall the tragic events of May 7, 1999: one placed by the Belgrade municipal government in 2009 marking the 10th anniversary of the bombing; the other erected by the Chinese government in 2016, when Xi made his first state visit to Serbia and visited the site immediately upon his arrival. The space in front of the site was named Serbian-Chinese Friendship Square.

The Serbian monument at the former site of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Photo by Vincent K. L. Chang.

It was here that last week’s official commemoration took place. Serbia’s Minister of Labor, Veterans and Social Affairs Milica Đurđević Stamenkovski and Chinese Ambassador Li Ming presented wreaths. The attendees, which included Belgrade Deputy Mayor Vesna Vidović and Chinese diplomatic and military representatives, observed a minute’s silence and laid white roses on the slab, which urges observers to “Remember the martyrs and cherish peace.” 

The Chinese monument at the former site of the Chinese embassy, decorated with wreaths after the May 7, 2025 ceremony. Photo by Vincent K. L. Chang.

Wreaths were also presented by the Belgrade offices of Xinhua and Guangming Daily as well as China’s state television broadcaster and the Independent Journalists Association of Serbia. Chinese and Serbian media reported on the event on the day.

Wreaths presented by the Belgrade offices of Chinese state-controlled media. Photo by Vincent K. L. Chang.

Mobilizing the Past

In his speech after the memorial service, the Chinese ambassador recalled how “NATO’s crimes violated the sovereignty of China and Serbia, violated international law and the basic norms of international relations, and brought disasters to countries in the region that are difficult to eliminate even today.”

Đurđević Stamenkovski spoke in similar terms of the bombing as a “crime of global proportions and unforeseen consequences,” adding that Serbia and China “will not give up on building a world in which tragedies will not be repeated.” The memorial is a reminder of shared suffering but also of the strength of today’s alliance, the Serbian minister stated.

In recent years, the annual commemoration of the three martyrs has come to symbolize not only the history of victimhood shared by the Chinese and Serbian people but also the shared values that are at the heart of Beijing’s professed “ironclad” friendship with Belgrade. Similar to the remembrance of World War II, Serbian and Chinese actors use these commemorations to denounce (U.S.) “hegemonism and power politics” and to promote “a more just and equitable” global governance system. 

Praising the “unbreakable bond” between the Chinese and Serbian peoples, Vidović, the deputy mayor of Belgrade, likewise emphasized in her speech that “today’s commemoration is not only a reminder of the tragedy but also a confirmation of our common path towards a future based on cooperation and mutual respect.”

A message posted on the Chinese ambassador’s Instagram account on Wednesday contrasted NATO’s crimes with China’s constructive track record in Serbia. The post suggested that whereas NATO destroyed numerous bridges, roads, and railway tracks, the Chinese have since contributed to Serbian society by rebuilding many of these.

Screenshot of a post on the Instagram account of the Chinese ambassador to Serbia, retrieved May 8, 2025

The post offers a striking contrast with Xi’s decision a year earlier not to visit the monument, even though he was in Serbia on the 25th anniversary of the bombing. Xi’s last-minute move – advanced preparations had been made at the site – was interpreted as aiming to avoid fueling tensions with the United States. Yet Chinese state actors seem to have now returned to the earlier path of invoking this dark past for present-day politics.

Heroes of the People

These commemorations speak strongly to the sentiments of countless Chinese who visit the monument to pay tribute and offer flowers to the three martyrs. 

On the day before the 2025 memorial service, the Chinese monument was already covered in flowers, Chinese flags, and other items. Amid the flowers was a framed picture of China’s new sixth-generation fighters; next to it was a laminated photo depicting the first ever dual-carrier formation exercise of the Chinese aircraft carriers Shandong and Liaoning, which was held in October 2024. The message is clear: now that China has become a strong military power, the Chinese people will not allow the United States and its allies to commit such transgressions again.

Pictures of Chinese aircraft carriers at the memorial plaque, May 2025. Photo by Vincent K. L. Chang.

Although the photos and frame were removed on the eve of the commemoration, they are sold at a small flower shop on the premises of the Chinese Cultural Center, developed and maintained by the Chinese government and marked on the street with signs in Chinese and English.

The Chinese “flower shop” on the premises of the Chinese Cultural Center. Photo by Vincent K. L. Chang.

On the morning after the commemoration, miniature models of China’s J-36 stealth fighter and J-20 stealth fighter, a prototype of which was first presented in 2011, had been placed on the plaque, with six tiny missiles neatly placed adjacent to them. These models can also be purchased at the flower shop.

Models of Chinese stealth aircraft at the memorial plaque, May 2025. Photo by Vincent K. L. Chang.

Aside from Chinese expatriates based in New Belgrade and other ethnic Chinese residents, significant numbers of Chinese tourists visiting the Balkans stop by at the monument to pay tribute and take pictures.   

On the day of the memorial service, tour buses carrying Chinese tourists from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Montenegro successively stopped at the square. An elderly couple took pictures at the monument as the man presented a bouquet of flowers with a photo of a J-20 fighter wrapped in foil, purchased from the adjacent shop. Some bowed at the monument or sang patriotic songs.

A tour bus stopping at the Chinese Cultural Center. Photo by Vincent K. L. Chang.

A Shared Past

Other foreign tourists rarely stop by the memorial site. Aside from those who make a deliberate effort, only the few hundred tourists who sign up annually for the English-language private guided tour Tracing the Enduring Scars of NATO’s Bombing, offered by a local travel company, are likely to come across this unique memorial site.

Neither do ordinary Serbs seem to take great interest in the Chinese martyrs. While the Belgrade government’s monument conveys gratitude to China for its “support and friendship in the most difficult time” for the Serbian people, few Serbs pay tribute there beyond the participants in the May 7 memorial. Besides brief reports published by government-friendly media, the Serbian public has scant opportunity to learn about the events.

Nevertheless, it is likely that to the extent that they are aware of them, most Serbs are sympathetic to these remembrances. Many hold positive views of China and China-Serbia relations, particularly since the COVID-19 pandemic, while negative views of NATO and disillusionment about the EU are commonplace.

This is particularly true for older generations who witnessed the bombings or remember the news reports of the fiery protests in China following the Belgrade embassy bombing. Conversations with Serbian analysts and local citizens suggest that the Chinese response was seen at the time as a rare international expression of solidarity.

A Serbian Cabinet member and the Chinese ambassador present wreaths at the monument for the three Chinese martyrs in Belgrade, May 7, 2025. Photo by Vincent K. L. Chang.

Building Roads and Making Inroads

Younger Serbs may be more familiar with China’s commercial presence in their country. Chinese firms are heavily involved in development projects across Serbia. In Belgrade these include the construction of an underground garage at the Serbian Parliament building in Belgrade and a vast Eurasia shopping mall in the city’s western outskirts, replacing the city’s older Chinatown in Blok 70, which burned down last year.

Several Chinese firms have established their local headquarters on the upper floors of the building that houses the Chinese Cultural Center. The most visible is the Shandong Hi-Speed Group (SDHS), which recently completed the Lajkovac-Valjevo motorway and has been selected to build New Belgrade’s new railway station.

The old road to the recently revamped Nikola Tesla Airport is today lined with Chinese shops, restaurants, KTV halls, and massage parlors. Belgradians have long gotten used to their presence and no longer view the Chinese as newcomers or aliens. 

Except for concerns over environmental pollution and labor conditions in Chinese-run mining projects, the Serbs generally welcome Chinese contributions to their economy and infrastructure and seem unconcerned about Chinese competition or the possibility of intrusion by the Chinese state. As a local guide explained: “There may be some price we will have to pay one day for these investments, but at least the Chinese aren’t bombing us.”

A Shared Future?

Xi’s 2024 state visit saw the conclusion of some 30 deals in areas ranging across infrastructure, trade, agriculture, education and media. The two sides also signed a bilateral extradition agreement. 

Above the Chinese Cultural Center, next to a restaurant belonging to an upmarket Chinese-run hotel on the second floor, sits a showcase of a dozen of “deep intelligent” surveillance video cameras manufactured by the Chinese company Uniview, a strategic partner of SDHS.

Chinese-made smart surveillance cameras on display in the building of the Chinese Cultural Center in Belgrade. Photo by Vincent K. L. Chang.

This display would not alarm many Serbs. Few have raised concerns about the spread of smart surveillance cameras supplied by Chinese manufacturers across cities, towns, and villages, particularly since the COVID-19 pandemic.

Few Serbs would know that the landmark Chinese building at the former site of the Chinese embassy also houses several Chinese and Chinese-Serbian associations, including one aimed at promoting China’s peaceful “reunification” with Taiwan

Even fewer Serbs would be concerned over this. After all, Beijing firmly backs Belgrade’s claim to Kosovo, and reciprocally supporting the Chinese position on Taiwan may seem only natural to many, including in the government.

Perhaps these developments offer glimpses into what a “shared future” between Beijing and Belgrade would entail. Ideals of “shared destiny” thrive in discourses about a shared past, such as those provided by the experiences of World War II and, above all for China and Serbia, the bombing of Belgrade.

From Xi’s signed letter in Politika preceding his 2024 state visit to the meeting between Xi and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić on the sidelines of the commemoration in Moscow last week, the messaging has been consistent and clear: Beijing and Belgrade will continue to foster their “ironclad” friendship in the face of challenges posed by the West to multilateralism, world peace, and the lessons of history.

The author thanks all those in Belgrade who shared their experiences, knowledge, and insights for this article.

A previous version of this article mistakenly said photos and models of a U.S. stealth bomber were laid on the plaque. The aircraft displayed were China’s sixth-generation fighters. 

Authors
Guest Author

Vincent K. L. Chang

Dr. Vincent K. L. Chang (Ph.D., LLM) is a university lecturer of the history and global interactions of modern China at Leiden University and a senior fellow of the Leiden Asia Centre. He researches China’s regional and global interactions and the associated contestations over narratives and norms. He is the principal investigator of the project “Advancing Authoritarian Memory: Global China’s New Heroes” (2024–27).

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