Chinese leader Xi Jinping was the guest of honor at Russian President Vladimir Putin’s May 9 Victory Day parade, celebrating the 80th anniversary of the Nazi defeat in World War II. He was placed next to Putin on the reviewing stand and sported the ribbon of Saint George on his lapel – a symbol of the Russian military, banned in Ukraine and several other countries for its association with Russian aggression. Prior to the parade the two leaders met for over seven hours of talks while enjoying copious cups of tea.
This was Xi’s 11th visit to Putin’s Russia; the two leaders have met more than 45 times. This was their first in-person meeting since the Trump administration came back to power, however, and Putin and Xi were determined to display the resilience of their strategic partnership despite the U.S. imposition of tariffs on China and efforts to induce Putin to negotiate an end to his war on Ukraine.
This may explain why, in a departure from previous joint statements, their May 8, 2025 agreement failed to specify that the Sino-Russian partnership was not an alliance, stating instead that it had “unique strategic value.” Nearly identical language can be found in China’s White Paper on National Security, published a few days later on May 12: “China-Russia relations have strong endogenous driving force and unique strategic value. They are non-confrontational and not directed against any third party, and are not affected by any third party, nor are they interfered with or coerced by external parties.”
Since 2023, Sino-Russian joint statements have all included the “Three Noes” — no alliance, no confrontation, no targeting third parties — a PRC formulation attributed to the Deng Xiaoping era. As recently as April 1, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi repeated this formulation in an interview with RT during a visit to Moscow. The omission of “no alliance” in the latest joint statement may indicate a further deepening of the partnership in the face of increased international pressure, but is more likely an effort to create some strategic ambiguity for deterrence purposes, as the two leaders seek to cope with a highly changeable international environment.
As in previous agreements, Xi and Putin went into great detail in their shared security narratives, glossing over areas of disagreement. They issued a separate statement on strategic stability providing very detailed criticism of Western military alliances, forward deployment, missile defense, and extended nuclear deterrence. Although they claimed to be committed to avoiding escalation by nuclear states, their joint statement did not mention China’s oft-repeated admonition (in the context of Ukraine) against the use of nuclear threats. Neither did Russia’s transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus appear to count as “provocative actions taken by some nuclear states” in their estimation.
The joint statement on “further deepening the comprehensive partnership and strategic partnership in the new era” was notable for both its length and its lack of detail on key issues. The primary purpose of the statement was to highlight that: 1) China and Russia would not be influenced by third parties (i.e. U.S. policy); and 2) China and Russia were united in their opposition to what they termed “hegemonism and neocolonial thinking” (i.e. by the U.S. and its allies). There was no new language on any of the key concerns Xi and Putin brought to the meeting, and the statements they made were so vague that they could accommodate areas of disagreement. The most specific language was an agreement on protecting wildlife (giant pandas, Amur tigers, snow leopards, and snub-nosed monkeys).
On the South China Sea, for example, the statement simply says that “Russia supports the efforts of China and ASEAN member countries to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea” and the resolution of outstanding issues via negotiations. As in previous joint statements, Putin did not say that Russia supports China’s position. This contrasts with the language on Taiwan in the joint statement restating Russia’s commitment to Beijing’s “One China principle.” In an article published in Rossiiskaia Gazeta (Russia Gazette) prior to his visit, Xi notably commended Russia for holding this “consistent position.”
The section on the Korean Peninsula is even more vague than in last year’s joint statement, which called out the United States for ratcheting up tension and urged “the international community to support joint Russian-Chinese initiatives.” No such proposals were mentioned in the 2025 joint statement, which did not reflect in any way the signing of a mutual defense agreement between Russia and North Korea in June 2024 or the role that Pyongyang has played in the Russian war on Ukraine by providing as many as 14,000 troops as well as ammunition, guns, and ballistic missiles.
Interestingly, a Chinese honor guard marched in the Victory Day parade, but the only North Koreans military present were on the reviewing stand, where Colonel General Kim Yong-Bok, vice chief of the Korean People’s Army General Staff and reportedly the commander of the unit dispatching North Korean forces to Kursk, received a personal thank you (and a hug) from Putin. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un did not attend, although he gave a speech to the Russian embassy in Pyongyang where he explained North Korea’s participation in Russia’s war as an effort to deter South Korea from attacking his country.
Once again there was no resolution to Putin’s effort to seal the deal on the Power of Siberia 2, a second overland gas pipeline from Russia to China via Mongolia. In his statement to the press after their meeting, Putin noted that Gazprom “invariably meets the wishes of Chinese colleagues” and had fulfilled its contractual responsibilities for the first Power of Siberia pipeline from Russia to China.
The role of Mongolia as a transit country remains a sticking point for China, as the Sino-Russian joint statement noted that the two sides would encourage Mongolia’s regional integration, including within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Mongolia has sought to engage with a wider range of partners well beyond its immediate region, particularly through the “third neighbor policy” prioritizing relations with democracies. More importantly, China just does not need the additional Russian gas immediately and has the time to wait for a lower price and consider alternative routes, such as a fourth pipeline from Turkmenistan.
Despite the ambiguity in the joint statement about a drift toward a Sino-Russian alliance, some Chinese and Russian analysts are more clearheaded about the challenges ahead for the partnership. There is much truth to retired Senior Colonel Zhou Bo’s statement that China and Russia are “like two lines in parallel, that is, however close they are, they won’t meet to become an alliance.” In a joint article, Fudan University Professor Zhao Huasheng and Russian International Affairs Council Director Andrey Kortunov noted several potential friction points, including the challenges for their economic ties posed by global economic change, especially a much greater role for advanced technology and the continued energy transition. Other challenges include harmonizing differences in China and Russia’s approaches to North Korea and rapid changes in the global order.
Both Xi and Putin emphasized the durability of their partnership, but in doing so only served to highlight some potential fracture points. Putin emphasized that he and Xi “are keeping and will continue to keep all aspects of the Russian-Chinese partnership under constant personal control,” but this means that its future is dependent on the durability of their regimes, as well as their own longevity. For his part, Xi chose to highlight the role of China’s historical friendship with Russia, also a fraught choice considering their record of conflict over the centuries. Stay tuned for another Xi-Putin meeting in Beijing in September, when we will see if this non-non-alliance continues over more cups of tea.