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Why Did Pyongyang and Moscow Finally Admit North Koreans Are Fighting in the Russia-Ukraine War?

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The Koreas | Diplomacy | East Asia

Why Did Pyongyang and Moscow Finally Admit North Koreans Are Fighting in the Russia-Ukraine War?

History suggests we should pay close attention to such official pronouncements – not just actions – in North Korea-Russia relations. 

Why Did Pyongyang and Moscow Finally Admit North Koreans Are Fighting in the Russia-Ukraine War?

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (left) shakes hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a meeting at the Vostochny Cosmodrome, Sep. 13, 2023.

Credit: Russian Presidential Press and Information Office

In late April, North Korea and Russia officially acknowledged North Korean troops’ involvement in battles in the Kursk region bordering Ukraine. It was the first official admission of the North Korean forces’ presence since their deployment to Russia half a year ago.

Russia’s top military official, Valery Gerasimov, reported to President Vladimir Putin about the complete liberation of Kursk, while praising the professionalism and heroism of North Korean soldiers who participated in the military actions. This was followed by a report from North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) confirming the successful completion of the operation and expressing hope that “friendship proven by blood” will foster cooperation between the allies. On the same day, Putin expressed his gratitude to the people of North Korea, the country’s leadership, and to Kim Jong Un personally. 

In the United Nations, Russia’s permanent representative, Vasily Nebenzya, stressed that the involvement of North Korean units was in full compliance with Article 4 of the North Korea-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, which obliges the allies to provide military assistance if one is attacked. 

When the fact of the North Korean troops’ deployment became public knowledge in autumn, Russia first denied it but then changed its strategy, neither denying nor admitting it. The months of official silence made many observers question what made the countries confirm this now. 

The timing of the public acknowledgment might have been related to Victory Day, celebrated in Russia each year on May 9, in hopes of preparing the ground for Kim Jong Un’s possible visit. North Korean troops, despite an invitation from Moscow, won’t participate in the military parade, and it appears Kim will not attend – but Russian officials have hinted about “another interesting meeting” involving North Korea.

Cautious and diplomatic wording has always been one of the features of North Korea-Russia relations. Before 2022, when the level of cooperation between the two countries was moderate, public statements and verbal support were among the core tools that helped Moscow and Pyongyang express their goodwill toward each other, especially in critical situations. 

Remember, for example, Russia’s reaction to the Cheonan incident in 2010, when South Korea claimed that North Korea sank a warship by launching a torpedo. While Moscow expressed its condolences to Seoul, it did not explicitly accept South Korea’s explanation of what caused the sinking and decided to send its own group of experts to examine the evidence and circumstances that led to the incident.

North Korea’s support of Russia in 2014 is another good illustration. Pyongyang considered the Crimea referendum to be legitimate, calling it a “reunification,” and voted against the U.N. resolution that called on members to refrain from recognizing changes in Crimea’s status. In 2017, North Korea published a world political map that showed the Crimean Peninsula as a part of Russia. When asked about the map by the Russian Embassy in Pyongyang, North Korea’s government responded that the 2014 referendum met international standards; therefore, Crimea was Russian territory.

Russia’s sympathetic narrative on North Korea and its critical view of the effectiveness and ethical implications of sanctions imposed on Pyongyang in 2016-17 serve as yet another example of this diplomatic signaling. By expressing concerns about the humanitarian consequences of newly imposed restrictions and criticizing the United States for attempting to tighten them even further, Russia may have sought to repair the damage done to relations by Moscow’s voting for the sanctions in the U.N. Security Council (UNSC). Amid the North Korea-U.S. negotiations of 2017-18, Russia urged the United Nations to ease sanctions, citing North Korea’s willingness to cooperate, and condemned unilateral secondary sanctions that hindered businesses from cooperating with North Korea, even in areas not prohibited by the UNSC. Given the failure of sanctions to stop Pyongyang’s nuclear program, Russia viewed them as ineffective and, to a certain extent, harmful diplomatic tools.

Kim Jong Un’s visit to Russia in 2019, after an unsuccessful summit with the U.S. president in Hanoi, once again showed the importance of language and diplomatic gestures in relations with Russia. Though the meeting did not bear any practical results, it had an important symbolic meaning, showing that North Korea still viewed Russia as one of its allies. During the meeting, Kim highlighted the friendship between the two nations, reinforced by common goals and interests, and personally praised Putin.

Since 2022, as North Korea-Russia relations soared to the highest level since the dissolution of Soviet Union, the narrative of friendship has been woven throughout almost all official statements where countries mention each other. In an article titled “Russia and the DPRK: Traditions of Friendship and Cooperation Through the Years,” which was published before an official visit to Pyongyang in 2024, Putin recalled examples of solidarity and mutual respect between the USSR and North Korea, expressing hope that the two nations will expand cooperation even further. 

The 2024 North Korea-Russia treaty, which introduced an obligation to provide assistance to each other in case of a military attack, was characterized by a tone of friendship and mutual goodwill. At the press conference following the signing of the treaty, Putin noticed that Russia might consider military technical cooperation with North Korea, given military escalation by the United States and other NATO countries. That was one of the signals that Russia is currently prioritizing its alliance with North Korea and security interests over compliance with international sanctions.

Against that backdrop, the recent acknowledgment of North Korean troops’ involvement, which had already been reported by the foreign intelligence in the fall of 2024, and mutual congratulations on the successful ending of the Kursk operation can be viewed as a diplomatic move aimed at demonstrating the robustness of North Korea-Russia relations to the international community.